Income splitting, specialization, and intra-family distribution

Abstract Income splitting for tax purposes results in more specialization of wives, but does this in turn generate more gender inequality? In my dynamic bargaining model with a divorce threatpoint, I find that who controls the couple's labour supply plays a crucial role in establishing this link. If spouses choose their labour supply non‐cooperatively, only the husband's increase – but not her own decrease – in labour supply introduces a negative term in the wife's change in welfare. If the wife does not control her own labour supply, a decrease in her own labour supply introduces an additional negative term.     

The Economic Emergence of Women: Bergmann's Six Commitments

I suggest in this essay that Barbara Bergmann's approach to the economics of women is characterized by six striking dimensions, or what I call 'commitments', namely: (1) a willingness to incorporate values into her analysis openly; (2) a commitment to applied economics - economic analysis that supports policy change that will improve women's and children's lives; (3) a commitment to empirical economics, i.e. to data collection and data-based analysis; (4) a commitment to communication with the public; (5) a commitment to the truth even if it challenges convenient orthodoxy; (6) a commitment to focus on how change can occur - to be positive not defeatist. A review of these six commitments, I demonstrate, reveals that they are held together by the first one, her willingness to incorporate values into her scholarly work openly.     

Minutes of Business Meeting,December 30, 1953

Corporations institutionalize managerial and professional positions in a hierarchical pyramid in which many young professionals begin work at a lower and wider level of the pyramid where positions are numerous. However, as the professionals start climbing up the pyramid in their careers, the number of positions rapidly declines at higher levels. The pyramid gets narrower as the professionals climb up into fewer and fewer positions. Since they usually either move up or out in their career climb, as the young professionals begin aging, more and more of them are forced out to look for jobs elsewhere or eventually, to retire. This article develops a simple model that shows how this particular way of organizing work results in premature retirement and aging for many workers. Alternative ways of organizing work are discussed in which premature aging and retirement do not take place. Furthermore, a number of implications are explored and various projections made all of which show that the so-called future crisis in the Social Security and Medicare Systems in the United States is exaggerated. If reform is really needed, what is called for is adjustment in the way work is organized, not abandonment of security for the elderly.     

Team production,endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.     

The Women's Movement Against Sexual Harassment,by Carrie N. Baker

This paper examines some of the effects of East and West German family policy on women's economic position by analyzing intrahousehold bargaining power, defined here as based on co-resident partners' relative fall-back positions, which in turn depend on the individuals' access to income in the event that the partnership ends. East German policy sought to integrate women into the labor force through programs such as free public child care and liberal maternity leave. West Germany based its family policy on the assumption of a stark gender division of labor, with one lifetime breadwinner per family and a second parent who temporarily leaves the labor force to raise children. On the basis of her findings and analysis, the author argues that while East German institutions increased women's bargaining power, gender-specific policies interfered with women's ability to use this power to bring about changes in the household division of labor. West German family policy did not assign gender roles, but it offered women less bargaining power with which to negotiate. The author maintains that society's refusal to address women's greater child-rearing costs is not based on an assessment of such costs and the costs of redistributive government programs, but on the assumption that women should absorb the risks and burdens of reproduction.     

Competitive politics, simplified heuristics, and preferences for public goods

This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in the formation of preferences for public goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use simplified heuristics based on the positions of familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and to cast a vote in line with their interests and values. Here, we use a two-stage field-survey experiment to investigate how knowledge of party positions affects policy choices. We followed standard procedures in developing an attribute-based choice experiment on alternative land-use policies in Switzerland. In contrast to the usual formulation, however, the hypothetical costs of the proposed policies were formulated as a percentage change in taxes. The benefit of this formulation relative to the usual absolute money amounts is that the credibility of the (hypothetical) costs for respondents does not depend on respondent income. Furthermore, the formulation allowed us to solicit party positions on the proposed policies. Six out of eight contacted parties provided their positions. We then conducted a split-sample mail survey where we included a table of the party positions with a subsample of the questionnaires. We report six main experimental results. (1) The response rate of the survey was unaffected by the party positions. (2) The proportion of no-choice answers was decreased by forty percent relative to the control. (3) The party information significantly affected the choices directly and in interaction with respondents' general attitudes towards public spending for nature and landscape conservation and thus affected the way how individuals mapped from general attitudes to preferences for specific policies. (4) The information interacted with educational level in only eight out of forty choice sets, suggesting that even the more educated relied on simplified heuristics. (5) Respondents who knew the party positions were more sensitive to the tax attribute. (6) For respondents with medium and higher tax bills, the resulting willingness-to-pay estimates were decreased by a factor of two to ten relative to the control. These findings suggest that the party information helped the respondents to articulate more consistent preferences than in the treatment without the party information.     

Vox Populi,Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics

We study competition between political parties in repeated elections with probabilistic voting. This model entails multiple equilibria, and we focus on cases where political collusion occurs. When parties hold different opinions on some policy, they may take different policy positions that do not coincide with the median voter's preferred policy platform. In contrast, when parties have a mutual understanding on a particular policy, their policy positions may converge (on some dimension) but not to the median voter's preferred policy. That is to say, parties can tacitly collude with one another, despite political competition. Collusion may collapse, for instance, after the entry of a new political party. This model rationalizes patterns in survey data from Sweden, where politicians on different sides of the political spectrum take different positions on economic policy but similar positions on refugee intake—diverging from the average voter's position, but only until the entry of a populist party.     

NOTES AND MEMORANDA INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND SAVING IN URBAN AND RURAL INDIA: A NOTE

In a recent issue of the Review of Income and Wealth [1], Uma Datta Roy Choudhury presented some results on consumption and saving functions in India. While the study is interesting, some of the results are quite peculiar. Thus she reports a marginal propensity to save of 0.88 for the urban sector, an abnormally high figure. Other available evidence points to a much lower figure. Again she reports a negative marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income for urban households. This makes no economic sense. Furthermore her attempts at explaining urban consumption behaviour are not very successful. In this paper, we shall show that these suspicious results are the consequences of the measurement and definitions of the variables, and the specification of the functions. Once these shortcomings are removed, we obtain more satisfactory and more plausible results.
In the first section we present a critique of Mrs. Roy Choudhury's article. In the second section we present our results. The last section summarizes the conclusions.     

专题二：共和国六十年（之二）——“中国经验”与“比较优势”

近现代主流人文社会科学的指导思想是一元论哲学,其对西方中心主义内在地发挥决定作用。中国由于地处“远东”,殖民化的成本太高,原住民人口过于庞大,不仅没有被殖民者及其后裔所替代,而且在近现代的国家政治建设中维护了自身传统,并形成了能够整合社会资源的有效机制,这样的机制使中国比那些西方殖民社会具备了更快、更易于进入工业化的条件,这也正是中国完成工业化并且维持经济持续增长的真正的“比较优势”之所在。     

Joan Robinson and Maurice Dobb on Marx

This paper examines the formation of Joan Robinson's early viewson Marx through a dialogue with Maurice Dobb and then the receptionof these views at the time by Kalecki, Keynes and some prominentreviewers. It considers how her views were formed and developedin this dialogue and assesses how her position differed fromthose of others interested in Marx and working in Cambridgeat the time, including Piero Sraffa. It concludes that, despitecertain misreadings and limitations, Robinson's reading of Marxwas not of inconsequence and that she was not unaware of thedifferent approach she took to Marx.     

Concentric circles of limits to the rate of accumulation: an interpretation of Joan Robinson's theory of economic dynamics

In addition to her well-known contributions to the theory of capital, Joan Robinson provided, in her Accumulation of Capital and Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, a theory about the determinants of the rate of growth. The growth rate was limited by entrepreneurs' animal spirits. Within that constraint, growth might be further limited by the inflation barrier, which could occur either because of a floor to real wages or because of full employment. This paper provides a series of simple dynamic models that illustrate these situations, drawing attention to this neglected aspect of her work and making it easier to compare her work with the monetary growth models produced by her neoclassical contemporaries.     

Mobile Capital, Local Externalities, and Industrialization

This paper seeks to understand how industrialization is distributed geographically when capital is mobile and labor is not. A stylized model of a spatial economy is constructed where individuals not employed in industry work in traditional activities. Results show that convergence across locations is characterized by a succession of catching-up episodes. As one location at a time industrializes, the others stagnate. This occurs whether or not local externalities are present. These results cast doubt on whether free movements of capital can foster the rapid industrialization of all countries and regions of the world simultaneously.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 345–365. Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-6072.     

Get Out The Vote: How Encouraging Voting Changes Political Outcomes

How do measures to increase turnout affect election outcomes? I use a novel approach to analyze how these measures influence both voter turnout and the candidates' political positions. In general, lowering the net expense of voting reduces political polarization. If the net expense of voting is made very low, then candidates no longer have an incentive to take partisan positions to motivate turnout and will converge at the median voter's ideal point. For small changes in the net expense of voting, however, decreasing the cost of voting and penalties for not voting (two common measures) can result in drastically different political outcomes. Counter intuitively, measures that make voting cheaper might not increase turnout: since these measures decrease the difference between the candidates' political positions, they also decrease the benefit of voting.     

Joan Robinson's disillusion with economics

In her last public comments on the state of economics, Joan Robinson made some extraordinary remarks that conveyed profound pessimism and theoretical nihilism. To account for the bleakness of Robinson's later views on economics and economic policy this article examines her last decade. These years were marked by an array of reverses to the causes she espoused. While ill health and a propensity to be provocative coloured her disposition, her comment about economic theory disintegrating in her hands was not made casually; it was, rather, an acknowledgement that her project to integrate Keynes with the classical surplus theory had failed. This acknowledgement crystallised into her rejection of the long-period equilibrium interpretation of Keynes's theory of unemployment. At the end of her life Robinson was willing only to embrace the more traditional short-period Keynesian model grounded in uncertainty and expectations.     

Characterizing the emergence of a technological field: Expectations, agendas and networks in Lab-on-a-chip technologies

In this paper we develop and use mapping tools to investigate emerging technological fields by studying the dynamics of expectations, agenda building and early networks. In our approach, expectations describe shared beliefs with regard to prospective entities and positions. Agendas are sets of priorities present to guide the actors in their work. The structure that arises as a result of the actions and interactions of actors is the emerging network. For emerging technologies these processes are susceptible to change and the technological paths that may arise are still easy to influence. We propose that not only looking at expectation dynamics, but also including agenda setting and networks dynamics is essential in order to successfully capture the complexities of the emergence of technological paths. A major challenge for this work lies in unveiling the socio-technical dynamics leading to path emergence. For this purpose we investigate the phenomena of irreversibilities that emerge during the ongoing interactions of researchers, institutes, policy makers and firms. With these aspects in mind, we will use a broadened view of expectation dynamics in order to arrive at an improved understanding of the building blocks of path emergence. We illustrate our approach with a case study of Lab-on-a-chip technology for medical and pharmaceutical applications.     

Introduction: methodologies of bounded rationality

The modelling of bounded rationality is currently pursued by approaches that exhibit a wide diversity of methodologies. This special issue collects five contributions that discuss different methodological aspects of these approaches. In our introduction, we map the variety of methodological positions with respect to three questions. First, what kinds of evidence do the respective approaches consider relevant for modelling bounded rationality? Second, what kind of modelling desiderata do the respective approaches focus on? And third, how do the respective approaches justify the normative validity of bounded rationality? To broaden the picture, we not only discusss the five contributions of this issue, but also include relevant positions from the extant literature.     

Extraterritoriality of swaps regulation and regulatory arbitrage

Journal of Regulatory Economics - In this paper, we investigate how the extraterritorial applicability of the US over-the-counter derivatives regulation impacts the off-balance sheet positions of...     

Market power, survival and accuracy of predictions in financial markets

In a standard General Equilibrium framework, we consider an agent strategically using her large volume of trade to influence asset prices to increase her consumption. We show that, as in Sandroni (Econometrica 68:1303–1341, 2000) for the competitive case, if markets are dynamically complete and some general conditions on market preferences are met then this agent’ long-run consumption will vanish if she makes less accurate predictions than the market, and will maintain her market power otherwise. We thus argue that the Market Selection Hypothesis extends to this situation of market power, in contrast to Alchian (J Pol Econ 58:211–221, 1950) and Friedman (Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953) who claimed that this selection was solely driven by the competitiveness of markets. I would like to thank T. Hens, A. Kirman and A. Sandroni for many stimulating conversations and encouragements. Two anonymous referees also provided very valuable comments.     

The Mind of the Social Individual: A Comment on Sherman and Hodgson

In the Spring 1998 (56(1): 47-57) and Fall 1998 (56(3): 295-306, 307-310) issues of this review, Howard Sherman and Geoffrey Hodgson debated, inter alia , the extent to which Veblen-Ayres institutionalism is compatible with Marx and recent Marxist work. This paper argues that the differences between Hodgson and Sherman"s positions do not rely on assumptions of "illogical" behavior, individualist arguments or structural conceptions of the individual. Instead, the debate turns on the authors' respective conceptions of the formation and role of the human mind in what it is to be a social individual.     

Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game

Studies of collective action in commons dilemmas in social–ecological systems typically focus on scenarios in which actors all share symmetric (or similar) positions in relation to the common-pool resource. Many common social–ecological systems do not meet these criteria, most notably, irrigation systems. Participants in irrigation systems must solve two related collective action problems: 1) the provisioning of physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the resource (water), and 2) the asymmetric common-pool resource dilemma where the relative positions of “head-enders” and “tail-enders” generate asymmetric access to the resource itself (water). In times of scarcity, head-enders have an incentive to not share water with tail-enders. Likewise, tail-enders have an incentive to not provide labor to maintain the system if they do not receive water. These interdependent incentives may induce a cooperative outcome under favorable conditions. However, how robust is this system of interdependent incentives in the presence of environmental variability that generates uncertainty about water availability either through variation in the water supply itself or through shocks to infrastructure? This paper reports on results from laboratory experiments designed to address this question.