Environmental quality,the macroeconomy,and intergenerational distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard–Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes – taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply – is shown to yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed – prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state – to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. Furthermore, it raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.     

Financial liberalization,urban unemployment and welfare: some implications of the artificial low interest rate and the high wage rate policies in LDCs

This paper investigates how the low interest rate policy in the commercial banking sector affects the urban unemployment in a small open Harris-Todaro model. The rate of urban unemployment unambiguously declines. The volume of it shrinks if the rural-to-urban employment rate and the urban unemployment rate are sufficiently high relative to the wage elasticity of agricultural labor demand. The national income increases if agriculture is dominant in the domestic production. In such an economy, the “financial liberalization” advocated by the Mckinnon-Shaw school may aggravate the welfare even if it eliminates the “financial repression”.     

The Optimal Environmental Tax and Urban Unemployment in an Open Economy

This paper investigates how a rise in the urban pollution tax rate may affect urban unemployment and welfare in a small open Harris–Todaro (HT) model with intersectoral capital mobility. First, by formulating urban pollution as a dirty input in manufacturing, we find that an increase in the urban pollution tax rate can increase the level of urban unemployment even with intersectoral capital mobility. That is, the optimistic finding by Rapanos (2007 ) that environmental protection policy reduces urban unemployment in the long run does not always hold. Second, the (sub)optimal pollution tax rate under urban unemployment is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate (the marginal damage of pollution). This result opposes those of Beladi and Chao (2006 ) for a closed HT economy and that of Tsakiris et al. (2008 ) for an open HT economy with sector‐specific capital.     

The Dynamics of Technological Unemployment*

This article compares the short‐ and long‐run effects of technological progress on employment. It presents a simple model of frictional unemployment capturing the negative creative destruction effects of technological change on employment. In the long run, faster technological change accelerates job obsolescence, which reduces the equilibrium level of employment. But it is also shown to have short‐run positive and potentially important effects on employment. This tends to partially reconcile the ‘‘Schumpeterian'’ view of the effects of technological change on labor markets with facts such as the response of most OECD unemployment rates to the 1970s productivity slowdown.     

Environmental Protection and Trade Liberalization in a Small Open Dual Economy

The author investigates the conditions under which environmental protection and trade liberalization might improve urban unemployment and welfare in a small open Harris–Todaro model with polluting urban manufacturing. While a tariff reduction decreases manufacturing employment, a rise in the pollution tax rate may increase it when a dirty input is complementary to capital. Environmental protection and trade liberalization are consistent in reducing the level of urban unemployment because they lower it under the same condition. They are consistent in increasing GDP if a rise in the pollution tax rate decreases manufacturing employment. Otherwise, trade liberalization will mitigate a decrease in GDP because of environmental protection if the degree of urbanization is low and if rural technology exhibits weak diminishing returns to labor. This GDP effect plays a central role in welfare improvement.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

Rural-urban migration,informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis

"A theoretical model of rural-urban migration has been developed with special reference to the informal sector. The wage rate and employment in the informal sector are determined endogenously. The paper shows the simultaneous existence of open unemployment and informal sector in the urban area in migration equilibrium. The effects of alternative subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare of the workers are studied." The model is intended primarily for use in analyzing trends and policies in developing countries.     

WELFARE MEASUREMENT,INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT,AND HETEROGENEITY

This paper concerns welfare measurement in an economy with union wage setting, where the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. Contrary to results derived in the first best, the current value Hamiltonian is not an exact welfare measure in an economy with unemployment. Instead, the welfare measure also depends on “employment effect,” which are caused by the discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. In addition, since unemployment gives rise to heterogeneity, distributional effects will also characterize the welfare measure.     

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TOURISM, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF HONG KONG

Abstract.  The present paper uses a dynamic open-economy model with wage indexation to examine the impact of tourism on employment and welfare. Both short-run and long-run situations are analysed. It is well known that tourism converts non-traded goods into tradable goods. An increase in the demand for a non-traded good raises its relative price, which results in an expansion of the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded goods sector. This output shift raises labour employment in the short run. However, in the long run, the higher relative price leads to higher wages, resulting in a negative impact on labour employment. If the output effect is dominant, the expansion in tourism raises employment and welfare. However, under realistic conditions tourism may lower both labour employment and welfare due to rising costs. These results are demonstrated by simulating a dynamic model for the case of Hong Kong.     

Equity Control of Multinational Firms: Effects on Resource Allocation and National Welfare

In this paper, we re-examine the effects of equity control of multinational firms on resource allocation and national welfare in a model with rural–urban migration and urban unemployment. A large number of recipient (host) countries are developing countries with dual economies. We indicate, among other things, that a restriction on multinational investment may lower the unemployment rate and increase the total employment in the host country. Furthermore, we find that the restriction on multinational investment raises the national welfare in the host economy if the tariff imposed on imports is sufficiently large and the difference between domestic and foreign capital rental is sufficiently small.     

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ASSET RULES ON AUTO OWNERSHIP,EMPLOYMENT, AND WELFARE PARTICIPATION: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

This paper investigates how asset tests for welfare eligibility affect auto ownership, employment, and welfare participation for single mothers without a college degree. We combine longitudinal data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation with data on state‐level welfare program rules from the Urban Institute and data on state‐level controls to test whether these single mothers were more likely to (1) own a car, (2) be employed, and (3) be off of welfare, depending on the welfare asset rules instituted in their state. We find evidence that, taken as a group, the asset rules have a statistically significant effect on the probability of car ownership. Ordinary least squares results and cross‐sectional two‐stage least squares (2SLS) results using the asset rules to instrument for car ownership show a large, positive, statistically significant effect of car ownership on employment. However, in 2SLS models controlling for prior car ownership and prior employment, the asset instruments are weaker and we do not find an effect of car ownership on employment. Of significance for policy makers, we find that the asset rules do not have a statistically significant joint effect on welfare participation, even after addressing possible endogeneity. (JEL I38, J68, J08)     

Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e. unemployment benefits relative to after–tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when labor taxes are raised.     

A dynamic macroeconomic model with monopolistic behavior in the labor market

Is the monopolistic behavior of a wage setting labor union compatible, in the long and in the short run, with price stability and full employment? What is the effect, if any, of economic policies? The answers are strongly affected by the prevailing technology and by the union's objective function. With limited short run production possibilities, a short run trade-off may exist between full employment and maximum expected real wage revenues. In the long run, however, when expectations are fully adjusted, this trade-off disappears. Therefore, a labor union consistently pursuing maximum short run expected real wage revenues may not maximize long run effective real wage revenues. Price stability is granted in the long run, provided inflation is not induced by public policy. The only instrument a pure consuming government has to fight long unemployment is to reduce its share of aggregate demand.     

Urban job creation and unemployment in LDCs: Todaro vs. Harris and Todaro

Overwhelming urban migration occurred so rapidly in many developing countries that widespread unemployment and squalid living conditions are commonplace. For many of these countries, stopping urban migration has become a major policy. Two models propose 2 different theories of urban unemployment. Todaro's short-term effects model concludes that job creation actually causes unemployment. Todaro and Harris formulated a long-term effects model in which welfare subsidies create more employment and stimulate the economy. A real solution to urban job creation would include optimal allocation of investment between the rural and labor sectors. A once and for all hiring tax would reduce replacement hiring. It is impossible to design an optimal tax subsidy package for urban unemployment unless it includes knowledge of the dynamic response of migration and unemployment to the rate of net and gross hiring of labor. If subsidy taxes are levied on the agricultural sector, the net result may be a higher rate of capital formation in the (low social return) manufacturing sector and a lower one in the agricultural sector.     

Urban unemployment, informal sector and development policies

We analyze the effects of wage subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare in the model that is characterized by the existence of both open unemployment and the informal sector that producesfinal goods. Our main findings are as follows. Wage subsidies to the agricultural and informal sectors increase welfare and decrease urban unemployment. The effects of a wage subsidy to manufacturing sector on welfare and unemployment are conditional. We identify some sufficient conditions for the definite results and interpret them.     

Economic transition and private-sector labor: Evidence from urban China

This paper studies the transition of labor from the state sector to the infant private sector in urban China. We examine the impact of the first wave of housing reforms, which untied access to housing in urban areas from working for the state sector. We find that the reform significantly increased private housing ownership and private-sector employment, and reduced private-sector wages. The housing reform had no effect on unemployment or self-employment.     

Falling Labor Share and Rising Unemployment: Long–Run Consequences of Institutional Shocks?

The literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues while the impact of capital formation is largely neglected. Job creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock. In contrast, this paper explicitly deals with the long–run consequences of institutional shocks on capital formation and employment. It is shown that the usual tradeoff between employment and wages disappears in the long run. In line with an appropriation model, the estimated values for the long–run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are substantially greater than one.     

Conflict,growth, distribution,and employment: a long-run Kaleckian model

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the rate of employment are adjusted in the medium run, and (ii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of capital accumulation are adjusted in the long run. The long-run equilibrium is a continuum of equilibria and is characterized by hysteresis in that the long-run position of the economy depends on where it starts. An increase in the bargaining power of workers lowers the rate of unemployment in both the medium-run and the long-run equilibrium.