Reprint to: Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

中国地方政府支出与居民消费关系的区域差异研究

本文利用分类回归树(CART)方法,根据中国地方政府支出与居民消费关系的差异将中国31个省(市、区)分为两组,分别对两组区域进行面板数据分析。结果表明:政府支出增长对居民消费的影响在第一组区域具有显著的引致效应,而在第二组区域则表现为挤出效应。在第一组,农业支出、政策性补贴和政府消费的增长对居民消费具有较大的正向影响,但只能在当期发挥作用;在第二组,则是基本建设支出和科学技术支出的增长显著促进了居民消费,且显示出较好的持续性。应根据不同的区域特征采取针对性措施,以有效拉动居民消费增长。     

Government Subsidies

This paper addresses the problems of defining and measuring government subsidies, examines why and how government subsidies are used as a fiscal policy tool, discusses their general economic effects in terms of real welfare costs and distributional implications, appraises international empirical evidence on government subsidies, and offers options for their reform. Recent international trends in government subsidy expenditure are analyzed for the 16‐year period from 1975 to 1990, using general government subsidy data for 60 countries from the United Nations' System of National Accounts (SNA). The paper reviews major policy options for subsidy reform, focusing on ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of subsidy programs.     

The impact of adjustment and stabilization policies on infrastructure spending in Central America

During the 1980s and 1990s the countries of Central America experienced protracted fiscal crises and debt repayment problems which resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment agreements. Apart from attempting to reestablish fiscal balance and to control inflation, the proponents of adjustment policies sought to enhance growth by de-emphasizing the wasteful aspects of state spending while maintaining public expenditures on physical and human capital, which were believed to promote private sector productivity. By comparing a pre-debt crisis period with the period given by debt crisis and adjustment, the study reveals that the shares of government spending on human and, particularly, physical infrastructure dropped precipitously during the adjustment period. At the same time, the shares devoted to defense and subsidy categories—as well as interest payments on external debt—generally registered notable gains. The experience of adjustment policies in Central America indicated that substantial discrepancies existed between the idea and the reality.     

Long-run growth and welfare effects of public policies with distortionary taxation

In a one-sector growth model with infrastructure investment, we study the impact of fiscal policies on growth. The government collects taxes on labor income and profits. The government uses these revenues to purchase infrastructure investment, provide utility enhancing government services, and to provide transfer payments to the households. We show that the balanced growth rate is an increasing function of the percent of government revenues that goes to infrastructure. We find that the growth maximizing mix of taxes depends on the elasticity of substitution between inputs. In particular, with distortionary taxes, the growth maximizing tax rate on capital is higher the lower the elasticity of substitution between private physical capital and public capital. In addition, the growth maximizing size of the government is higher when the elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is low. We also investigate welfare effects of other public expenditures as well. Depending on the elasticity of substitution in production, the welfare implications of different public policies can be substantial.     

基于成本差异的最佳贸易与产业政策选择

本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题，讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现，在Cournot竞争下，政府首先行动时，当政府基金影子价格低于4／3时，政府对出口进行补贴，并且本国越有成本优势，补贴越高，补贴的利润转移效应越大；当政府基金影子价格高于4／3时，政府对出口征收出口税，且本国越有成本优势，征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下，当政府先行动时，对出口征收出口税；当政府后行动时，对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时，事后补贴是最佳政蓑。     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

Optimal fiscal policy under learning

This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy when agents learn about future taxation. A benevolent and fully rational government chooses taxes on labor income and state-contingent bonds to finance public spending, considering that private agents form their expectations through a learning algorithm. Facing a trade-off between distortionary taxes and distorted expectations, the Ramsey planner chooses the policy that minimizes the total cost of distortions. The analysis produces two main results. First, the government will use fiscal variables to manipulate expectations, reducing taxes and issuing debt at times of pessimism and doing the opposite at times of optimism. This speeds up learning. Second, the expectation-dependent fiscal plan is also history-dependent, and it prescribes taxes that are not as smooth and more persistent than under rational expectations. These findings are robust to alternative learning algorithms.     

Prudence and Pragmatism in the Fiscal Stance

In this article, Simon Price argues that the government is pursuing a remarkably conservative fiscal policy. Not only has demand management been left almost entirely to the MPC, but since 1997 spending has been held down while the overall tax burden has been raised. Consequently, the relative size of the national debt is declining at a rapid rate. There are rules that are intended to govern debt policy, but they are based on less sound principles than the government argues, and may be inconsistent. Oddly, despite the emphasis on these rules, the government has announced a path for spending that makes it clear that it is in fact planning not to follow them. The government may be planning to reduce the national debt at an excessive rate. This may make sense in the short run, but is more problematic in the medium to long term. This is not to say fiscal policy should be immediately relaxed; the current low levels of private sector saving may well justify a temporarily tight fiscal stance.     

财政金融政策对中国民营经济发展的影响效应研究

当前中国民营经济正处于转型发展期,分析影响中国民营经济发展的因素显得尤为重要。本文运用向量误差修正模型实证研究了财政金融政策与中国民营经济发展的关系。结果显示,财政政策、金融政策都会正向长期地促进中国民营经济发展,金融政策对中国民营经济发展的影响效应明显比财政政策大,且财政金融政策均为中国民营经济发展的单向因果原因。在此基础上,提出了促进中国民营经济转型发展的相关财政金融政策建议。     

INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY: The Case of Nigerian Manufacturing A Framework for Policy Study*

This paper reviews the Nigerian situation regarding the private provision of infrastructure services by manufacturers with a focus on electrical power generation. While private provision occurs also in water supply, intraurban freight and worker transport, telecommunications, and waste disposal, the degree of its occurence in electrical power generation, a relatively expensive manufacturing input, has the largest economic implications for the firms and the country. The policy framework developed in this paper, however, is applicable to these other subsectors. Manufacturing firms' private provision responses are identified, analyzed, and grouped into seven regimes, four of which are currently observed to occur, and three are precluded from occuring due to existing regulations. A model of public infrastructure supply that is pertinent for developing countries is proposed and discussed. Policy options which could improve the current situation are also examined and discussed. It is argued that the most promising options are likely to be those which encourage new modes of cooperative private provision among manufacturers, accompanied by deregulation, privatization, contestability, modern pricing, and selective maintenance in the public agencies.     

Environmental regulations in private and mixed duopolies: Taxes on emissions versus green R&D subsidies

In this article, we compare two kinds of environmental regulations—emissions taxes and green R&D subsidies—in private and mixed-duopoly markets in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that a green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than an emissions tax when the green R&D is efficient (inefficient), irrespective of R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a publicly owned firm encourages the government to adopt a subsidy policy. We also show that the optimal policy choice depends on R&D efficiency and spillovers. In particular, when green R&D is inefficient and the spillover rate is low (high), the government should choose an emissions tax and (not) privatize the state-owned firm. When green R&D is efficient, however, an R&D subsidy is better, but a privatization policy is not desirable for society, irrespective of spillovers.     

Government subsidy provision in biomass energy supply chains

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the government’s optimal subsidy provision strategy for a biomass energy supply chain that consists of the power plant, the villagers’ committee and farmer. We examine three possible subsidy provision strategies depending on which party (the power plant, the villagers’ committee or the farmer) the government chooses to subsidise, and compare how it can influence the government’s target by assuming that the subsidy price is exogenously given. We also extend our findings when the government can endogenously determine the subsidy price. Moreover, our analyses reveal the optimal stakeholder selection strategy for each party to maximise its payoff.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Electoral accountability and local government efficiency: quasi-experimental evidence from the Italian health care sector reforms

This paper evaluates the effect of two policy changes on the efficiency of Italian regional governments in the provision of health care services: first a change in the electoral system, second a process of fiscal decentralisation. The paper provides two main contributions: (1) a comprehensive analysis of the two main reforms that involved Italian regional governments and the health care sector during the 1990s, (2) the evaluation of the impact of the electoral reform in a quasi-experimental setting. Final results are in line with recent theoretical predictions that show a positive relationship between government efficiency and the electoral accountability enhanced by institutions such as electoral rules and fiscal decentralisation.     

In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area

This paper applies the DSGE‐VAR methodology to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in the data and the relative contributions of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks, namely hand‐to‐mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Econometric experiments show that a DSGE model with Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy as it yields dynamic responses close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE‐VAR model (i.e. an impact output multiplier larger than one and a crowding‐in of private consumption). The estimated share of hand‐to‐mouth consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints

The government may delegate two sequential tasks (e.g., building and operating an infrastructure) to the same or different agents (i.e., partnership vs. sequential contracts). Agents are risk-neutral but face financial constraints, whereas the government's contractual capacity may be limited by the renegotiation-proofness and fiscal constraints. By relying on history-dependent incentives, the partnership contract corrects moral hazard more effectively than sequential contracts. Thus, it is socially preferred unless bundling different tasks deteriorates the agent's financial conditions. Our results shed new light on the role of firms' financial and government's fiscal conditions in driving the cost–benefit analysis of public–private partnerships.