Social Security reform: the effect of investing in equities

Several proposals have been developed to reform the Social Security System to ensure that it is fully funded. The investment of a portion of Social Security funds in equities has often been proposed as a means to avoid increasing payroll taxes. This paper develops a general equilibrium model to demonstrate that investing Social Security funds in equities will decrease the return on equities and increase interest rates on bonds, which also leads to an increase in general income taxes. Thus, investing Social Security funds in equities simply shifts a potential increase in payroll taxes to an increase in income taxes.     

THE EFFECT OF TAX PREFERENCES ON HEALTH SPENDING

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the tax preference for health insurance on health care spending using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys from 1996-2005. We use the fact that Social Security taxes are only levied on earnings below a statutory threshold to identify the impact of the tax preference. Because employer-sponsored health insurance premiums are excluded from Social Security payroll taxes, workers who earn just below the Social Security tax threshold receive a larger tax preference for health insurance than workers who earn just above it. We find a significant effect of the tax preference, consistent with previous research.     

Funding a PAYG pension system: the case of Italy

Italy is characterised by a mature pay‐as‐you‐go social security system and by particularly adverse population projections. Given these trends, the social security contribution rate is expected to increase above its current high level. This hinders the development of employer‐provided pension funds and introduces a significant wedge between labour cost and earnings that discourages both labour demand and labour supply. Any proposal to reduce payroll taxes and to reform the system in the direction of partial funding has to cope with the state of Italian public finances. Italy has to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact that imposes constraints on budget deficit and debt trends. Using micro data from the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth and official population projections, we estimate future employment trends under different demographic and macroeconomic scenarios and compute the cost of the transition. We show that it would be substantially reduced if positive effects on employment were induced by the payroll tax reduction.     

Single payer: the California referendum

The California Health Security Act is likely to appear on the November 1994 ballot. The bill would provide universal coverage to California residents and assign the state as the single payer for all medical care provided, financed with funding for programs already in place, employer payroll taxes, individual income taxes and taxes on tobacco products.     

Capital tax competition and social security

The classic capital tax policy externality is studied in the presence of a social security program where both the benefits and taxes depend on wages in an overlapping generations economy with many countries and mobile capital. We study the response and welfare implications of a coordinated capital tax rate increase across countries competing for the mobile tax base on the initial generations, the transition, and the steady state. The tax increase is initially completely capitalized, but some of the burden is shifted to labor on the transition path and in the steady state. Several new welfare effects are uncovered including an effect involving the parameters of the social security program. Sufficient conditions are provided so that all current and future generations are better off from the reform. However, social security may reduce the gain to capital tax reform.     

Wenn nicht jetzt, wann dann? Zur Reform der Pflegeversicherung

The recent reform of the German compulsory long-term care insurance provides for an adjustment of the benefits. According to our calculations, the reform proposal will fail to ensure constant benefits in real terms, due to an increase of the demand for long-term care associated with population ageing. Furthermore, as long-term care insurance is payroll based and pay-as-you-go financed, it will substantially burden future generations. For this reason, further reforms are needed if sustainability is to be achieved. A transition from a pay-as-you-go to a funded system would disburden future generations almost completely, at the cost of transitory generations whose payments would markedly increase. Delaying the reform even a few years would however increase the burden for future generations again.     

Optimal tax-timing and asset allocation when tax rebates on capital losses are limited

This article studies the portfolio problem with realization-based capital gain taxation when limited amounts of losses qualify for tax rebate payments, as is the case under current US tax law. When the tax rate applicable to realized losses exceeds that on realized capital gains, it can be optimal to realize capital gains immediately and pay capital gain taxes to regain the option to use potential future losses against a higher tax rate. This incentive adds an entirely new and as yet unstudied dimension to the portfolio problem. It causes risk averse investors to hold more equity and attain higher welfare levels than is the case when trading under a tax system that seeks to collect the same amount of taxes, but does not allow for tax rebate payments. This is because the benefit to these investors from having their losses subsidized is greater than the suffering from having profits taxed at a higher rate.     

Rent taxation and its intertemporal welfare effects in a small open economy

Previous literature concludes that replacing wage taxation by taxes on a fixed factor or its rents benefits future generations. However, the effects of such steady-state gains on the transition generations have been left open. In this paper, we show that taxation of rents may also increase utility of the current generation provided tax revenues are earmarked to reduce wage taxes. In particular, a shift in the tax mix may yield an intergenerational Pareto-improvement when the initially prevailing tax mix is sufficiently skewed toward wage taxation.     

Risk sharing across generations without publicly owned equities

The U.S. Social Security trust fund currently invests in government bonds. Investing some of it instead in equities while continuing to pay Social Security benefits under existing rules would alter—potentially improve—the sharing of financial risks across non-trading generations. This paper shows that the same risk sharing can be achieved without direct government ownership of equities if instead the government places a linear and symmetric tax on risky private capital returns. This equivalence is very robust and holds even if some agents are endogenously borrowing constrained.     

Taxes and stabilization in contemporary macroeconomic models

The role of proportional and procyclic labor income taxes for automatic stabilization with stochastic productivity is analyzed in a contemporary macroeconomic model based on imperfect competition. The importance of short-run nominal wage rigidity for the effectiveness of progressive taxes on labor income for stabilizing output and raising household welfare is examined in a model that yields complete analytical solutions with stochastic output shocks. Increasing the procyclicity of labor income tax rates raises welfare with and without rigid nominal wages in the model economy. With fully flexible prices and wages, a positive covariance between the distortionary tax rate and productivity reduces the volatility of production and employment. This effect disappears under nominal wage rigidity, although progressive taxation can still raise welfare by reducing the distortion caused by a proportional labor tax. With rigid nominal wages and flexible consumer goods prices, payroll taxes levied at rates that rise with output can serve as automatic stabilizers. JEL Code E62 · H20     

Comparing the top and the bottom income earners: Distribution of income and taxes in the United States

Tax reform is again at the center stage as Congress grapples with ideas to reduce the US budget deficit and the country readies itself for another election year. Given this unusually charged tax reform season, populist and party rhetoric appears to the general population to have largely replaced reasoned debate as politicians, economists and pundits “cherry pick” facts to justify their claims. Our contribution to the current debate on tax equity is that this is one of the very few studies that jointly consider the impact of payroll and income taxes. Most tax equity studies focus only on the federal income tax and as such issue misleading implications. It is important to jointly consider payroll and income taxes because (a) for taxpayers in lower income ranges, the payroll tax burden outweighs the income tax burden, while (b) for higher income taxpayers income from wages above $106,800 ($110,000 in 2012) are payroll-tax free, and (c) other sources of income, namely dividends and capital gains, are not subject to payroll taxes at all. Thus, we provide a more comprehensive picture of the overall progressivity (or lack thereof) exhibited by the current tax laws. In addition, we also consider how some often-raised tax proposals would prospectively affect income inequality and tax progressivity.     

Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search

A key obstacle to reducing payroll taxes in many industrialized and transition countries is the direct revenue loss to the government that it implies. This paper studies a simple and practical labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Such a strategy increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. Moreover, welfare rises if workers’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to exceed a critical value determined by the second-best Hosios condition.      

Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives: Theory and evidence

Many Americans claim Social Security benefits early, though this leaves them with lower monthly payments throughout retirement. We build a lifecycle model that closely tracks claiming patterns under current rules, and we use it to predict claiming delays if, by delaying benefits, people were to receive a lump sum instead of an annuity. We predict that current early claimers would defer claiming by a year given actuarially fair lump sums, and the predictions conform with respondents' answers to a strategic survey about the lump sum. In other words, such a reform could provide an avenue for encouraging delayed retirement without benefit cuts or tax increases. Moreover, many people would still defer claiming even for smaller lump sums.     

Dynamic Effects of Extending the 2001 and 2003 Income Tax Cuts

This paper focuses on the impact of permanently extending most of the provisions in EGTRRA and JGTRRA, coupled with potential legislative changes to the AMT, on the federal deficit, the distribution of after-tax income, and economic growth. The paper shows that including moderate behavioral responses offsets 16 percent of the static revenue loss estimate from 2005 to 2014. In addition, including behavioral responses implies that the percentage change in after-tax income from permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts would be largest for taxpayers with incomes ranging from $20,000 to $40,000. Finally, the simulation results suggest that extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts and reducing the growth rate of government spending (excluding Social Security and Medicare), assuming that government expenditures are cut to avoid dramatic increases in government consumption relative to GDP in comparison to historical norms, would increase investment, employment, and output. However, postponing the implementation of tight spending controls would more than offset the positive benefits of lower tax rates on the size of the economy and leave future generations with fewer resources for private consumption and production.JEL Code: E62, H20, H30, H60The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Baker Institute for Public Policy or any other organization. This paper was partially written while the author was employed by the Joint Committee on Taxation.     

Rentenversicherung, Bev?lkerungsentwicklung und Kapitalmarktrendite – Eine Simulationsrechnung

How can the pension schemes be sustainably financed? This is an important issue particularly with regard to the demographic changes in many industrialized countries but also in other emerging economies such as China and India. In this paper, we use a macroeconomic model of overlapping generations to analyze the impacts of the demographic changes as well as the interactions between pension system, bond and stock markets. Furthermore, we examine how the pension system influences the distribution of wealth, consumption and saving within generations. We found out that an aging population will cause a drastic decline. Moreover, we examined which impacts on individuals?? welfare demographic changes can have for an existing pay-as-you-go pension scheme. An increase of pension age combined with a decrease of the contributions seems to be the best policy. On the other hand, increases in contributions as a result of demographic changes show the highest welfare losses.     

The Status of Social Security and Its Role in Retirement Planning: A Professional Advisor's Perspective

Currently, one of the more salient retirement debates surrounds the future insolvency of the Social Security retirement system. In spite of the important role that financial planning professionals play in the retirement and private-savings decisions that individuals make, no research has focused on assessing the opinions of this group. This study uses a survey approach to assess the opinions of financial planning professionals regarding the problems faced by the Social Security retirement system, the solutions that have been proposed thus far, and the use of Social Security benefits in the financial planning process.     

Intergenerational risksharing and equilibrium asset prices

In the presence of overlapping generations, a social security system, with contingent taxes and benefits, can affect both asset prices and intergenerational risksharing. In a simple model with two risky factors of production—human capital, owned by the young, and physical capital, owned by all older generations—a social security system that optimally shares risks exposes future generations to a share of the risk in physical capital. Such a system reduces precautionary saving and increases the riskbearing capacity of the economy. Under plausible conditions it increases the riskless interest rate, and lowers the price and risk premium of physical capital.     

Payroll Taxes and the Decision to be Self-Employed

This paper investigates and quantifies the role of payroll taxes in the decision to be self-employed. It examines the effects of introducing into the labour market a payroll tax which taxes employers, but which exempts the self-employed. It exploits two changes in the tax legislation to confirm that it is changes in legislation and not other sector specific trends that are driving the results. Our findings suggest that payroll taxes do indeed influence the decision to be self-employed, with the probability of self-employment increasing as taxes on employees increase and vice versa. Furthermore, there appear to be declines in the return to self-employment caused by the tax, possibly due to inefficient allocation of labour towards self-employment.     

Fiscal Policy Reforms in a Global Economy

Two countries are populated by workers and capitalists. Their governments collect taxes to finance productive expenditure and income redistribution. The share of income redistributed defines the size of the welfare state. Although both groups benefit from an abolition of the welfare state in the long run, the optimal fiscal policy in autarky can be characterized by maintaining a large welfare state since transfer cuts would induce transitional losses. Starting in such a position of policy inertia free trade and capital mobility is introduced. Fiscal policy competition leads to a reduction of tax rates and a relative increase of productive expenditure. If both countries coordinate their fiscal policy the reduction of taxes and income transfers is less pronounced. Quantitative effects of increasing globalization are assessed in a calibrated model for an average Europe G-4 country and the United States.     

National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population

We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.