Economic Effects of Making the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts Permanent

All of the provisions of the landmark tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 are scheduled to expire by the end of 2010. This paper analyzes the economic effects of making the tax cuts permanent. We describe the recent tax cuts and the proposals to make them permanent, and explore the consequences of making the tax cuts permanent with regard to the fiscal status of the government, the distribution of after-tax income, and prospects for long-term economic growth.JEL Code: H24     

Unemployment,Government Spending and the Laffer Effect*

The paper studies the effects of income tax rate changes in a general equilibrium model with frictional unemployment. Laffer curve effects, by which a tax rate reduction may increase the level of government spending or its share in output, are shown to be possible under certain conditions. These are the presence of unemployment benefit payments, government budget balance through fiscal spending adjustment and limited quantitative importance of labour reallocation costs. Endogenous government spending acts as a fiscal accelerator if the fiscal burden of unemployment benefit payments is large, but reduces the employment effects of tax rate cuts if it is low.     

Political economy of prudent budgetary policy

The principles of tax smoothing and public debt management with stochastic shocks to future national income are extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate is high. As a precaution the tax rate is thus set higher and public spending lower to build precautionary buffers. This leads to gradual reductions in debt and debt service over time and thus, depending on political preferences, cuts in taxes or increases in public spending. Prudence offsets the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from common-pool distortions. Appointing a strong finance minister with as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined ensures that the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated. A strong and prudent minister of finance can thus offset the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, finance ministers are tempted to build excessive precautionary buffers early on to dish out tax cuts and boost spending on election eve. Too much prudence may thus be abused for short-run electoral gains.     

The Heterogeneous Responses of Consumption between Poor and Rich to Government Spending Shocks

Government spending shocks have substantially different effects on consumers across the income distribution: consumption increases for the poor whereas it decreases for the rich in response to a rise in government expenditure. I shed light on this issue by incorporating a progressive tax scheme and productive public expenditure into a heterogeneous agent model economy with indivisible labor. The model economy is able to successfully match aggregate and disaggregate effects of government spending shocks on consumption. When the government increases its spending and accompanies it by a rise in tax progressivity, the poor are employed and increase their consumption since after‐tax wage rates increase while the rich decrease their consumption because of a fall in after‐tax wage rates.     

Effects of Progressive Taxes under Decentralized Bargaining and Heterogeneous Labor

We consider changes in income tax progressivity in an economy where workers' productivities differ and workers and firms bargain individually over wages. With given employment a pure increase in tax progressivity reduces wages by reducing workers' relative bargaining power. When average taxes also increase, after-tax wages are unambiguously reduced, while the effects on gross wages and firm profitability are ambiguous. We next endogenize employment and firm entry under a uniform worker productivity distribution and the government's only policy instrument is a linear income tax. While a first-best solution then is ruled out, a second-best solution can be implemented using a family of linear tax functions, where a more progressive tax implies a higher tax revenue to the government. We show that the government can increase its tax revenue, and reduce after-tax income differences, without any additional disturbance to allocation.     

Tax reforms and the underground economy: a simulation-based analysis

This paper studies the effects of several tax reforms in an economy where taxes are partially evaded by means of undeclared work. To this purpose, we consider a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to Italy which explicitly accounts for underground production. We construct various tax reform scenarios, such as ex ante budget-neutral tax shifts from direct to indirect taxes, and tax cuts on labor and business financed by decreases of government spending. Our results indicate that neglecting the existence of the underground sector may lead to severely miscalculating the macroeconomic effects of tax reforms. Further, the dimension of the underground sector is permanently and considerably reduced by changes in the tax mix that diminish the labor tax wedge. Reductions of the business tax prove to be highly expansionary in the presence of a sizable informal sector.     

Income repatriation decision for multinational corporations: Tax issues

This paper analyzes the existing asymmetry in the US corporate tax law governing the determination of foreign tax credits earned by US firms with foreign subsidiaries. The existing asymmetry results in the US government de facto holding foreign currency put options against US firms with foreign subsidiaries. Combined with the exchange rate volatility, this tax law asymmetry reduces the effective foreign after-tax rate of return and, thus, makes it profitable for US firms to repatriate their foreign source income earlier even when the foreign after-tax rate of return is higher than the domestic rate. Although this paper identifies this asymmetry in the tax law and analyzes its potential effect on the timing of foreign source income repatriation, it is an open question as to the economic significance of this tax code feature provided the firms’ ability to curry the unused tax credit forward for up to 10 years.     

Fiscal policy with banks and financial frictions

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.     

Dividend and capital gains taxation under incomplete markets

Motivated by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003, the effects of capital income tax cuts are investigated in an economy with heterogeneous households and a representative, mature firm. Dividend tax cuts, contrary to capital gains tax cuts, lead to a decrease in investment and capital. This is because they increase the market value of existing capital and households require a higher return to hold this additional wealth. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts substantial increases in dividends and stock prices. Overall, the tax cuts lead to a welfare reduction equivalent to a consumption drop of 0.5%.     

Canada's Budget Triumph

In the mid‐1990s Canada's federal government, concerned about a debt‐to‐GDP ratio that was approaching 70%, began a decade‐long policy of cutting government spending. It also increased taxes, but by only one dollar for about every six dollars of spending cuts. The Canadian government cut subsidies to individuals, corporations, and provincial governments while tightening eligibility for unemployment insurance. The government also sold off its holdings of various state‐owned enterprises. One major success was its shifting of air traffic control to NAV Canada, a private, non‐profit user cooperative. This step netted the government $1.4 billion at the outset, saved about $200 million a year in subsidies, and resulted in a technological revolution in air traffic control that has put Canada years ahead of the United States. From 1997 to 2008, Canada's government had an unbroken string of annual budget surpluses; and by 2009, Canada's debt‐to‐GDP ratio had fallen below 30%. Starting in 2000, the government used some of what otherwise would have been surplus to cut taxes on individuals and corporations. The corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 28% in 2000 to 21% by 2004.     

Population Ageing,Fiscal Pressure and Tax Smoothing: A CGE Application to Australia*

This paper analyses the fiscal pressure from population ageing using an intertemporal CGE model, applied to Australia, and compares the results with those of a recent government‐commissioned study. The latter study uses an alternative modelling approach based on extrapolation rather than optimising behaviour of consumers and firms. The deadweight losses from the fiscal pressure caused by population ageing are equivalent to an annual loss of consumption of $260 per person per year in 2003 dollars in the balanced‐budget scenario. A feasible degree of tax smoothing would reduce this welfare loss by an equivalent of $70 per person per year. Unlike the extrapolation‐based model, the CGE approach takes account of feedback effects of ageing‐induced tax increases on consumption and labour supply, which in turn impact on the ultimate magnitude of fiscal pressure and therefore tax increases. However, a counterfactual simulation suggests that the difference in terms of deadweight losses between the two modelling approaches is modest, at about $30 per person per year.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

The Keynesian Multiplier Effect Reconsidered

In the standard Keynesian framework, government spending on useless public works has a larger multiplier effect than spending on government transfer payments does. In other words, spending on useless public works increases national income by more than an equivalent increase in government transfer payments would. Nevertheless, their effects on national benefit are identical. For both, the national benefit equals the direct benefit created by the spending. If there are two income classes, some transfers reduce both the national income and the national benefit. Some government purchases completely crowd out private consumption and reduce the national benefit.     

The Government Spending Multiplier in Turkey

This study aims to measure the size of the government spending multiplier in Turkey for post-2001 financial crisis period within a structural VAR framework. The analysis demonstrates that a positive shock to government spending tends to increase output, tax, and real interest rate on impact and the size of the fiscal multiplier is relatively large at first few quarters. The fiscal multiplier reaches a peak value of 1.5 at second quarter and then starts to diminish. Furthermore, investigating the effects of the components of government spending reveals the fact that government investment expenditures, rather than consumption expenditures, have a profound impact on output at first few quarters.     

How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes?

We examine how different accounting metrics used to evaluate CEO performance for annual bonuses affect the level of corporate tax planning as well as financial reporting for income taxes. We predict and find that firms using cash flow metrics report lower GAAP and cash effective tax rates (ETR) than firms using earnings metrics. We also find that firms using after-tax earnings metrics report lower GAAP ETRs but similar cash ETRs as firms using pre-tax earnings metrics. Further analyses show that firms using after-tax earnings metrics are more likely to designate foreign earnings as permanently reinvested and have lower discretionary reserves for tax uncertainty. Hence, it appears that both types of firms engage in similar levels of tax planning, but firms evaluating CEOs with after tax-earnings metrics incentivize different financial reporting choices.     

关于新一轮个人所得税调整的思考——工资薪金改革角度的探讨

近些年以来,个人所得税的改革一直都是大众所关心的话题。本文首先对此次新一轮个人所得税的改革做一个简单的回顾,通过较为详细的数据对比,分析了年终奖在缴纳个人所得税时,存在奖金增加反而税后收入减少的现象,然后以新、旧个人所得税法间的比较为出发点,对新个人所得税法可能产生的诸多影响进行简单的探讨。     

INCORPORATION OF TAX CONSIDERATIONS INTO THE COMPUTATION OF DURATION

In this paper, the immunization process is extended to protect after-tax income, and the duration indices for after-tax immunization are derived. Selection of the appropriate index depends on individual investor differences in tax regulations. Attention is focused on the mutually exclusive decisions to amortize or not to amortize premia or discounts.     

间接税亲贫性与代内归宿——穷人从减税中获益了吗?

税收工具作为财政扶贫机制中的重要一环,在推进精准扶贫、精准脱贫上发挥着重要作用。本文基于CFPS2012入户调查数据和中国2012年投入产出表,运用微观模拟方法测算出家庭的间接税负,在此基础上,借鉴衡量经济“涓滴效应”的亲贫增长指数,构建了识别和测度税制“亲贫性”的数量方法,评估间接税的减税政策能否自发惠及穷人,进一步测算家庭不同年龄层的间接税负代内归宿。结果显示:间接税整体上不具有“亲贫性”,其中增值税的“亲富性”最强,减税能让穷人比富人获益更多;儿童、成人以及老人均是间接税的负税人,贫困家庭抚养小孩而承担的间接税负比重高于非贫困家庭,赡养老人而负担的间接税负比重低于非贫困家庭。据此本文认为,继续推动大规模的间接税减税政策、采取差别化的增值税和消费税减免策略、逐步形成以直接税为主的税制结构,是改变间接税"亲富性"和强化税收扶贫职能的有效措施。     

Expected future earnings,taxation, and university enrollment

Taxation changes the expectations of prospective university students about their future level and uncertainty of after-tax income. To estimate the impact of taxes on university enrollment, we estimate a structural microeconometric model, in which a high-school graduate decides to enter university studies if expected lifetime utility from this choice is greater than that anticipated from starting to work right away. We estimate the ex-ante future paths of the expectation and variance of after-tax income for German high-school graduates, accounting for nonrandom selection. The enrollment model takes into account university dropout and unemployment risks. Consistently with expectations, the estimation results indicate that higher expected returns to a tertiary education increase the probability of university enrollment, whereas higher uncertainty among graduates decreases enrollment rates. A simulation based on the estimated model indicates that a revenue-neutral, flat-rate tax reform with an unchanged basic tax allowance would increase enrollment rates for men in Germany.     

A general equilibrium model of housing consumption and investment

This article develops an applied general equilibrium model for analyzing the effects of tax policy on housing consumption and investment. The model incorporates housing tenure choice and consumption decisions in an explicit model of household portfolio choice that recognizes that the demand for owner-occupied housing depends on the after-tax returns from housing capital and other investments. Asset returns are stochastic so that asset holdings are determined by the desired risk-return relationships of households. Owner-occupied housing has a unique position because it has both a consumption role in providing housing services and an investment role. The model is then used to evaluate the effects of tax policy on the size and composition of the housing stock. Potential tax changes include a flat rate income tax and taxation of the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing.