零售企业商品采购价格的影响因素及确定方法

零售企业管理中的一个重要环节是商品的采购。目前,零售企业为了获取更大利润,通常绕过中间商直接向制造商采购商品。在具体采购的过程中,作为采购方的零售商希望采购商品的价格最低,从而获得更多的利润,因此商品的价格往往成为零售企业与上游的制造商谈判中的焦点。     

基于滑动价格保值条款的供应链汇率风险管理

基于一个使用批发价契约的跨国供应链,构建了一个滑动价格保值条款来实现上下游节点企业绩效的改进。研究结果表明:当汇率对零售商不利时,降低批发价格会促使零售商订购更多商品;当汇率对零售商有利时,提高批发价格会提升供应商的绩效;滑动价格保值条款对批发价格的修正幅度与上下游企业的期望利润正相关。最后通过算例分析揭示了滑动价格保值条款的管理意义。     

基于鲁棒优化方法的供应链协同创新——非完全竞争市场下的RSFC问题

供应链协同问题是企业供应链管理领域的一个热门话题。本文通过对传统零售商一供应商柔性~（RSFC）问题进行改进和延伸,将条件置于非完全竞争市场,从零售商视角探讨了非完全竞争市场下“零售商一供应商”两级系统最优订购策略问题,在利润最大化原则下建立起了运筹学模型,采用鲁棒优化方法进行模型求解,比较了不同形式不确定性水平下的优化结果差异。     

信息不对称下数量折扣和返回措施对三层供应链的协调

文章研究了信息不对称下三层供应链的协调订购问题,即随机需求下供应商、制造商、零售商追求利润最大化问题。首先建立供应商、制造商、零售商三者互不合作分散决策的利润模型及三者在供应链下集中决策模型和采用数量折扣与返回措施完全合作下集中决策的利润模型,并给出三种情况下零售商的最优订购量的一般通式,得出采用数量折扣和返回措施契约措施时供应链的利润最大;其次得出制造商和零售商批发价格和利润与各自的目标利润率有关的;最后通过需求服从均匀分布和正态分布的实例验证了供应商-制造商-零售商在采用数量折扣和返回措施三者完全合作时供应链上的利润最大。     

零售商占主导地位的两级供应链企业间的博弈分析

针对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链,其成员之间市场需求信息掌握程度不同的问题,建立了零售商起主导作用下的批发价与订货量的S tacke lberg博弈模型,给出了零售商和供应商分别拥有需求信息下的博弈均衡解。数值实例分析了非对称信息对价格、订货量及利润的影响。     

考虑个性化服务的双渠道供应链决策与协调

针对由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的双渠道供应链,研究了制造商直销渠道个性化服务的最优决策问题,并分析了在零售商渠道面临随机需求的情况下服务水平对零售商决策的影响。研究表明:在均衡状态下,随着线上消费者对个性化服务的偏好程度的提高,线上售价会提高,线下价格先降低后上升;当该偏好程度高于一定阈值后,供应链双方的利润都会大幅增加,双方从服务改进中获益;随着需求不确定性的增强,价格竞争加剧、利润降低;签订两部定价合同可实现双渠道供应链的协调并缓和渠道间的横向竞争。     

连锁经营采购中如何进行商品来源的市场调查

从先后顺序来看，连锁经营采购的商品来源市场调查有三种：一是供应商的初步调查；二是资源市场调查；三是供应商的深入调查。供应商初步调查是为选择最佳供应商做准备；资源市场的调查目的就是要进行资源市场分析，以便制定不同的采购策略；供应商的深入调查则是为了发现可靠的供应商，建立起比较稳定的采购供需关系。     

提高零售商业企业商品采购管理水平

一、我国零售商业企业商品采购的现状及问题零售商业企业的发展在很大程度上取决于商品采购管理科学与否。商品采购成本占零售商业企业总成本的80%以上,直接关系到零售商业企业的经济效益。商品的采购管理对于零售商业企业而言,是核心竞争力,是主要的利润来源。合理有效的商品采购管理是其赢得竞争优势,实现经济效益的重要保障。通过对我国零售商业企业中较为典型的商业业态的采购管理现状的调查,我们可以看出存在的几个问题。1、采购模式不尽合理,采购渠道长零售商业企业现在较为广泛的应用分散采购模式。分散采购不能发挥规模采购的优势和…     

竞争环境下绿色供应链的融资策略研究

在一个含有两个竞争型供应商和单一零售商的供应链中，生产绿色产品的供应商缺乏资金时，可通过零售商提前支付和反向保理融资两种 渠道获得融资。当使用反向保理时，银行提高支付比例可以促进供应商的绿色生产、零售商的订购量，同时也能促进绿色供应商、零售商以及整个供 应链的利润增长。提前支付则是根据市场环境的不同，会对供应链上企业决策产生不同的影响。资金约束的绿色供应链可以根据自身以及市场环境的 不同，选择不同的融资方式，制定运营策略。     

均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。     

Price or quantity setting under uncertain demand and capacity constraints: An examination of the profits

This article considers price formation and quantity setting of a capacity-constrained risk-neutral firm facing uncertain demand. It is shown that the optimal price of a price-setting risk-neutral monopolist decreases with demand uncertainty. With a strictly convex demand function expected profits increase with uncertainty for a quantity-setting monopolist whereas expected profits decrease for a price-setting monopolist. Furthermore, similar results on the effect of uncertainty are derived for a differentiated goods industry.     

Uncertainty and the theory of international trade in long-run equilibrium

We consider a country with two factors and two industries, each of which faces technical and price uncertainty. Entrepreneurs choose outputs in order to maximize the expected utility of profits. They also draw factor payments and purchase consumption goods after the uncertainty isresolved. They enter and exit from an industry according to whether participation there increases their expected utility. Within this model, the validity of the propositions of neoclassical trade theory depends on how the entrepreneurs' entry decisions are affected by parameter changes via their roles as risk bearers, consumers and factor owners.     

A model of fashions and status

This paper presents a model of fashion cycles based on the idea that individuals purchase fashion goods because their displayed status increases with the personal status of other consumers who buy the same good. Fashion cycles occur in the model because demand now is a rising function of future prices: if future prices are high, only rich consumers will buy it in the future and the good will have a higher status value in the future and will be more desirable now, even though demand now is a decreasing function of current price. The time inconsistency problem is solved by repeated cycles which allows for reputation building. The crucial assumption made is that there is perfect information about the price path of all firms and the average status of the purchasers of each product. This limits possible profits in fashion markets in competition as imitation of price paths is then possible.     

Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device

In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning their actual valuation at the offered advance-purchase discount; consumers with a low expected valuation will wait and purchase the good at the regular price only in the event where their realized valuation is high. We characterize the profit-maximizing pricing strategy of the monopolist. Furthermore, adopting a mechanism design perspective, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which advance-purchase discounts implement the monopolist's optimal mechanism.     

Simulation study of the price differentiation effect in a stochastic deteriorating inventory with heterogeneous consumers – freshness sensitivity

A fixed price policy regardless of expiration date may result in unsold inventory and sales loss. Price reduction over time as the expiration date approaches motivates customers to purchase all items, including the ones that are left with only a short interval until their expiration. We conduct a discrete event simulation that captures the main characteristics of this phenomenon. Results show that a moderate differentiation of price increases profits by 6%, a larger differentiation reduces profits. Profits are the highest for freshness-oriented customers. A fixed price policy is preferred in an environment of large variance and expected near term expirations.     

A post‐Keynesian model of output,employment and monetary demand

This paper presents a simple model based on three broad Post‐Keynesian hypotheses: (1) the economic process develops over time; (2) money is endogenous; and (3) producers are price setters. To make the analysis easier we also assume (4) that firms are vertically integrated. Producers assess the expected demand and ask banks for credit in order to start production; banks create credit at the request of producers to finance the wage bill; workers buy goods sold by firms; firms must repay banks the amount borrowed plus interest and earn a target rate of profit. Since firms have created only as much purchasing power as they have advanced to workers in the form of the wage fund, equilibrium requires that there is an amount of autonomous monetary demand equal to profits and interest. Furthermore, in order to make the value of supply equal to the value of effective demand, firms will employ the number of workers necessary to create the purchasing power which, when added to the anticipated autonomous demand, enables all costs to be covered and the planned rate of profits to be attained.     

How do selling mechanisms affect profits,surplus, capacity and prices with unknown demand?

I analyze a model in which a seller wishes to sell multiple homogeneous goods to a large group of buyers with unknown demand. The seller may either sell objects via a posted‐price mechanism, a discriminatory‐price auction, a uniform‐price auction, their open‐bid analogs, or a revelation mechanism in which the seller first asks all potential buyers to report their valuations and then sets a reserve price. I show that the revelation mechanism leads to the greatest profits, the auction mechanisms result in identical expected profits and the posted‐price mechanism results in the smallest profits. However, the more profitable mechanisms impose stronger informational requirements that may make these mechanisms infeasible in practice, and the posted‐price mechanism also results in the greatest total surplus. I also find the seller chooses a lower capacity and reserve price in an auction than in the posted‐price mechanism.     

MANUFACTURER ACCEPTANCE OF RETURNS*

Modelling the retailers' behaviour explicitly, I extend the model of manufacturer returns policy of Flath and Nariu (1989) by introducing general demand conditions under uncertainty. I derive an equivalence theorem between manufacturer acceptance of returns and resale price maintenance (RPM) under conditions of zero marginal cost, risk neutrality and symmetric information. This was first shown by Marvel and Reagan (1986) in a somewhat different context. I also discuss some differences between RPM and return policy under asymmetric information and risk attitudes.     

产需双重不确定情形下绿色农产品供应链的协调研究

为解决产需不确定性给绿色农产品供应链运营带来的复杂影响,寻求绿色农产品生产商和销售商面对产需双重不确定情形下各自的最优决策,研究从农产品产出和市场需求双重不确定性视角出发,结合目前消费者对绿色农产品的需求偏好,构建由生产商和销售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,探究收益共享契约能否有效协调产需都不确定的绿色农产品供应链。研究结果表明:分散决策时的批发价契约无法协调此供应链。引入收益共享契约后,在合适的共享系数范围内,生产商的农资投入量会增加,农产品的绿色度会比分散决策时高,同时销售商的销售价格降低;当农产品订购量变大后,引入契约后的生产商和销售商各自的利润相较于分散决策时更高。     

Price Dynamics in Repeat-Purchase Markets*

A retail market in which customers repeat purchase is modelled. When customer movement between firms is sluggish, price overshooting characterizes firms' optimal response to demand or cost shocks. Thus retail prices would be predicted to be more variable than wholesale prices, a prediction at variance with empirical evidence. Uncertainty in demand and customer imperfect information are introduced into the model to attempt to reconcile this inconsistency between theory and evidence. The introduction of demand uncertainty actually increases the magnitude of price overshooting. By contrast, the introduction of imperfect customer information reduces the variability in retail prices.