期权合同在供应链采购中的应用

为分析具有期权性质的合同对于采购方降低成本的价值，文章讨论了期权合同在由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的两极供应链中的应用，并通过建立数学模型找出制造商的最优订购策略，证明了期权合同对于采购方降低采购成本、规避价格风险具有显著的作用。     

应急巡逻艇两次采购引起的“异议”及启示

案由 2012年4月上旬，南京市政府采购中心（以下简称“采购中心”）为一家采购单位（以下简称“采购人”）第二次公开招标采购两艘应急巡逻艇开标仪式即将举行，参加投标的乙供应商向采购中心工作人员递交了盖有投标人公章的“异议函”，提出与乙供应商来自同一地区的甲供应商在该项目第一次招标中标后放弃中标，     

高校仪器设备招标采购工作初探

本文从招标采购的工作实践出发,提出了在实际的招标采购中,建立和完善招标采购的规章制度、制定好招标采购文件、做好供应商的资格审查、选定合适的采购方式和评标原则、严格执行合同是提高采购效率、降低成本、使高校的仪器设备招标采购工作迈上一个新台阶的几个重要环节,必须重视。     

供应链电子商务采购平台(SRM系统)电子化采购探索与实施

本文主要通过对电子化采购业务的分析与探讨,通过SAPSRM系统平台的实施,打破传统的采购方式,优化采购业务流程,实现了网上询价,网上招标,供应商网上报价,网上在线签订采购合同,实现了数据信息时时传递与共享,增强了协同供应商的伙伴关系,采购业务发生了实质性的变革。     

高校仪器设备招标采购工作初探

本文从招标采购的工作实践出发，提出了在实际的招标采购中，建立和完善招标采购的规章制度、制定好招标采购文件、做好供应商的资格审查、选定合适的采购方式和评标原则、严格执行合同是提高采购效率、降低成本、使高校的仪器设备招标采购工作迈上一个新台阶的几个重要环节，必须重视。     

对中标供应商的合法权益保护

案例回放案例一：2012年年初,盐城市政府采购中心受采购人委托,就该单位设备进行了公开招标采购,其中某项分包的内容为小型机设备。招标文件中没有对该设备要求提供厂家授权,评标委员会按招标文件的相关要求确定了排名顺序,第一中标意向人中标价为18万（无厂方授权,符合招标文件要求）,第二中标意向人中标价为26万（有厂方授权）,而该设备的预算价是28万元。然而,第一中标意向人在拿着政府采购中心发出的中标通知书和合同去采购单位签订合同时,却被告知要求提供原厂商针对本项目的授权,否则合同不予签订。     

共应链懒务采购平台（SRM系统）电子化采购探索与实施

本文主要通过对电子化采购业务的分析与探讨，通过SAP—SRM系统平台的实施，打破传统的采购方式，优化采购业务流程，实现了网上询价，网上招标，供应商网上报价，网上在线签订采购合同，实现了数据信息时时传递与共享，增强了协同供应商的伙伴关系，采购业务发生了实质性的变革。     

浅析县级政府采购工作现状及措施

一、县级政府采购存在的问题 （一）投标供应商数不足,采购成本增加。 《中华人民共和国政府采购法》规定采用公开招标、邀请招标、竞争性谈判和询价方式采购的,参与政府采购活动的供应商不得少于三家,即必须在三家以上才符合要求。但县级政府采购部门在招标时,     

实行招标采购 推进阳光工程

材料支出在工业企业成本中一直占有很大比重，一般要达到总成本的60％以上，因此材料成本的控制是工业企业成本控制的关键，而材料采购成本的控制又是控制材料成本的关键。传统的材料采购方式是寻价采购，又称选购，即由材料采购人员直接寻找材料供应商并询问所需材料的质量、价格及供货情况，然后对不同供应商所提供的产品进行比较，从中选出价廉物美者并与之签定采购合同的一种采购方法。政府采购的推行为企业材料采购提供了成功经验，笔者认为，看企业材料采购中实行招标采购完全可行。     

加强物资招标采购 有效降低材料成本

近几年来，为规范采购管理，不少施工企业都实行了物资招标采购，通过招标采购，企业更广泛地了解物质供需，价格变动的市场行情及供应商信用资质状况，扩大选择范围，增加采购透明度，减少违规操作，控制和降低采购成本，提高企业经济效益。     

Electronic reverse auction configuration and its impact on buyer price and supplier perceptions of opportunism: A laboratory experiment

Buying organizations are increasingly using electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) to source from suppliers. However, recent quasi-experimental and field research has suggested that the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among participating suppliers. Yet from the buyer's perspective, online reverse auctions can yield lower purchase prices. Given the many ways in which to configure on-line auctions, we extend existing research by using a laboratory experiment to investigate how different reverse auction configurations jointly influence bid price and suppliers’ perceptions of buyer opportunism.Our findings suggest that supplier bid prices decrease over time as they participate in more eRAs, regardless of the configuration of auction parameters. However, the combination of rank (versus price) visibility, high (versus low) supplier need to win a contract, and six (versus three) competitors was significantly more effective than other combinations of variables in immediately reducing bid prices. The data also indicated that when suppliers’ bids dropped substantially across auctions, their perceptions of opportunism increased. Notably, auction parameter combinations such as price visibility, three competitors, and low need for the contract yielded comparably low bids by the third auction, without any increases in perceived buyer opportunism.     

Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality

In this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade-off between price and quality for the buyer. The quality proposals of the competing firms are assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. After defining the optimal auction, we characterize the discriminatory first score auction and the modified second score auction implementing it when the buyer is assumed to have the same information as the firms. Then we consider an auction which requires no specific information from the buyer and show that a second score auction followed by a negotiation stage can implement the optimal auction outcome under this more realistic assumption. Received: 30 March 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001 I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Supplier incentives and resource constraints under uncertainty

Procurement in environments of cost uncertainty and asymmetric information require special arrangements such as the linear incentive contract. Usually the buyer is motivated to make investments that can relieve temporary supplier resource constraints during the procurement. Special problems arise, however, due to interactions between investments in suppliers and the risk-incentive trade-off achieved by the incentive contract. A cost signaling model is proposed to overcome these problems, where a supplier offers an equity share in the profit from the incentive contract to the buyer in return for a priori investment. The equity share signals the supplier's private cost information, and forms the basis for the buyer's investment decision. Under equilibrium the buyer can expect to recover the entire amount provided to the supplier through his or her share of the profit.     

Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.     

装备供应链信息共享价格契约模型

提出通过价格契约激励军方和供应商共享信息。建立了一个由军方和多供应商组成的两级供应链模型,根据Cournot模型,在供应商利润最大化条件下设计价格折扣,降低军方的采购成本。结果表明,本契约能够合理分配信息共享带来的额外利润,有效激励双方采取信息共享策略。     

‘Sweet deals’: State-owned enterprises,corruption and repeated contracts in public procurement

We show how a price analysis of stable relations between customer and supplier in the public procurement of homogeneous goods can help differentiate opportunistic from honest behaviour among economic agents. We consider two types of stable relations: repeated procurements and connections based on the state ownership of suppliers. On the basis of a large dataset on the procurement of granulated sugar in Russia from 2011 to 2013, we find that for private suppliers, prices of repeated contracts were lower compared to one-time deals when procured through more transparent procedures and higher when procured through non-transparent procedures. For non-transparent procedures, we observe significant overpricing of contracts with state-owned suppliers compared to private suppliers, especially in the case of repeated contracts, whereas for competitive e-auctions, there is only a small difference between the contract prices of state-owned suppliers and private suppliers.     

Managing challenges in social care service triads – Exploring public procurement practices of Dutch municipalities

Buying services in a triad constellation is associated with challenges related to quality control, performance monitoring, and a deteriorating information position for the buyer. There is growing attention for service triads in Supply Chain Management (SCM) literature. However, these studies are mainly theoretical. The studies suggest to manage the identified challenges by monitoring supplier performance, maintaining a strong position in the service triad, developing collaborative trusting relationships, using outcome-based contracts, and aligning incentives between buyer and suppliers. Empirical studies on service triads and management mechanisms are rare, especially in a public procurement context. We study the application of management mechanisms in a public procurement context where 393 Dutch municipalities each had to contract social care service providers at the same time. This context allows us to study which of the management mechanisms proposed in literature are actually employed in a public procurement context, and whether other mechanisms are applied that are not addressed in the literature. We find municipalities deviate from traditional bureaucratic procurement procedures and apply a relational approach to the procurement procedure, including establishing social contracts, to cope with buyer challenges in service triads. Furthermore we identify municipalities apply ex post competition to drive up service quality through tendering framework agreements and allowing clients to choose their care provider of choice. This mechanism of ex post competition through the use of framework agreements has not been suggested in service triad literature before, and may be an effective mechanism in other service triads to address service quality and customer needs fulfilment issues.     

The effect of unethical behavior on trust in a buyer–supplier relationship: The mediating role of psychological contract violation

Research on trust in buyer–supplier relationships has tended to focus on the performance outcomes of a trusting relationship, as well as the processes that serve to build trust. Largely absent from the buyer–supplier literature is an in-depth examination of activities that break down trust, and the resulting effect on supplier trust in the buyer. The authors propose and test a model that evaluates psychological contract violations between a buyer and a supplier as a mediating variable of the effect of unethical activities on trust within a partnership. Survey data was collected from 110 tier one suppliers of major corporations in the state of Ohio. Our results show how a supplier's perception of a violation of the psychological contract either partially mediates or fully mediates the relationship between the buyers unethical activity and the suppliers trust in that buyer. We discuss how suppliers may demonstrate bounded ethicality when they overlook perceived unethical behaviors by the buyer.     

Using announcement options in the bid construction phase for disaster relief procurement

This paper presents an analysis of the bid construction phase of procurement auctions in disaster relief and humanitarian logistics. Substitution and partial fulfillment options are presented in formulations to allow bidders with fewer inventories to offer substitute item types and partial bids in auctions. During the auction announcement phase, a coordinating platform for disaster locations (i.e., auctioneer) allows substitution and partial fulfillment options to the relief suppliers (i.e., bidders) when acceptable. Thus, suppliers with fewer inventories can offer substitute item types and participate in more auctions by partially bidding. A genetic algorithm, a simulated annealing algorithm and an integer program are used for the analysis of the bid construction phase with different announcement options. Heuristic solution techniques and an IP formulation help understand the dynamics of the bid construction problem. It is shown that the addition of substitution and partial fulfillment options is essential to diversify and increase the usable capacity of the supplier base. Additionally, the partial fulfillment option enables better usage of supplier inventories in an environment with scarce supplies.