Agricultural Extension: Good Intentions and Hard Realities

What considerations lead policymakers to invest in agriculturalextension as a key public responsibility, and what factors andagency incentives explain differences in extension system performance?To help answer these questions, this article provides a frameworkoutlining farmers' demand for information, the public goodscharacter of extension services, and the organizational andpolitical attributes affecting the performance of extensionsystems. This conceptual framework is used to analyze severalextension modalities and their likely and actual effectiveness.The analysis highlights the efficiency gains that can come fromlocally decentralized delivery systems with incentive structuresbased on largely private provision, although in most poorercountries extension services will remain publicly funded.      

Public Sector Reform in New Zealand and Its Relevance to Developing Countries

Does New Zealand's success story have lessons for developingcountries contemplating public sector reform? That questionusually elicits one of two reactions, both inadvisable in theauthors' view. The first reaction is to be impressed with theefficacy of the reforms and conclude that they should be adopteduncritically in other countries. The second reaction is thatthe special conditions existing in New Zealand are such thatnone of its reform experience is relevant to others. The authorstake a middle position, maintaining that poorer countries canindeed extrapolate from the experience of their higher incomeneighbor despite the different conditions under which they haveto operate. New Zealand's comprehensive overhaul of its publicsector affords both general principles and specific elementsrelevant to countries looking to improve the quality, efficiency,and cost effectiveness of their public service sectors, anda careful analysis of those reforms can ascertain what mightbe transferable and what principles might apply.      

The Potential and Limitations of Self-Targeted Food Subsidies

Can self-selection ofsubsidized commodities be used as a mechanismto transfer income to the poor? Evidence from two self-targetingprograms, one in South Africa and one in Tunisia, shows thatalthough self-targeting can clearly improve the distributionof food subsidies to the poorest members of society, its powerto alleviate poverty and reduce income disparities is limitedby preference patterns, income inequality, and the size of theindividual subsidies. Self-targeting through quality and productdifferentiation can be a useful means to reform existing universalsubsidy schemes, but it should be considered a transitionaltool while the capacity for implementing more precise mechanisms is developed.      

THE DEMAND FOR WATER IN RURAL AREAS: DETERMINANTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Improving the adequacy and quality of water supplies is a priorityfor rural development in developing countries. So far, the strategiesof governments and international donors for tackling the problemhave been supply-driven; the fundamental importance of demandin the selection of appropriate policies has been virtuallyignored. The realization that effective policy and planningmust take into account what the rural clients want and are preparedto pay for was the impetus for the World Bank's multicountrystudy of households' demand for improved water services. This article summarizes the findings of the 1987–90 investigationof determinants of rural demand in selected regions of LatinAmerica, Africa, and South Asia. The research team used bothdirect (contingent valuation) surveys and indirect (revealedpreference) methods to estimate households' willingness to payfor different levels and types of improvement. The methodologyproduced some illuminating insights into how to decide whatlevel of service is appropriate for a particular community andhow the improved services should be paid for. The team identifiedfour broad categories of village situations, with appropriatepolicies ranging from the provision of house connections atfull cost at one extreme, to no improvement in traditional suppliesat the other extreme.      

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.      

THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION: THE TRAINING AND VISIT SYSTEM IN INDIA

This article reviews the rationale for public sector involvementin the dissemination of technological information to farmers,concluding that free markets do not fully satisfy farmers' informationneeds, and that government support is justified. Agriculturalextension is a principal way that governments can disseminateinformation, and the World Bank is financing many extensionprojects throughout the developing world. One specific approachto extension adopted in many Bank extension projects is theTraining and Visit (T&V) system. Data from a Bank-sponsoredsurvey in northwest India and from monitoring and evaluationreports issued by several Indian states are used in this articleto evaluate T&V extension operations and their impact. Extensionagents' interaction with farmers is found to be more intensiveand more significant as a source of information in areas coveredby T&V extension than in areas with a different extensionsystem. The yield levels of farmers whose main source of informationwas the T&V extension agent are also shown to be higher.In one case study, the incremental investment in T&V extensionis shown to be likely to generate at least a 15 to 20 percentrate of return.      

THE DANGERS OF DECENTRALIZATION

Demand for decentralization is strong throughout the world.But the benefits of decentralization are not as obvious as thestandard theory of fiscal federalism suggests, and there areserious drawbacks that should be considered in designing anydecentralization program. An analysis of these dangers makesit easier to understand some of the real choices. These choicesare not so much whether to decentralize in general, but ratherwhat functions to decentralize, in which sectors, and in whichregions. In many cases the problem is not so much whether acertain service should be provided by a central, regional, orlocal government, but rather how to organize the joint productionof the service by the various levels. In many—if not most—cases, such measures have anenormous potential and could, if properly designed and implemented,significantly improve the efficiency of the public sector. Decentralizationmeasures are like some potent drugs, however: when prescribedfor the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment and in thecorrect dose, they can have the desired salutary effect; butin the wrong circumstances, they can harm rather than heal.This article looks at some of the negative effects of decentralizationin the hope that a better understanding of its dangers willcontribute to a wiser application of potentially desirable decentralizationprograms.      

PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM MARKET ECONOMIES

In the past decade governments all over the world have begunprivatizing state enterprises—indeed, it is becoming quitehard to find a country without a program of privatization underway or at least on the policy agenda. This striking reversalof the push to expand state ownership in the 1960s and 1970sresults from generally poor performance of state enterprisesand a disappointing record of past reform efforts that fellshort of ownership change. This article examines the objectives of privatization and thestrategies for achieving them, documenting recent trends andreviewing the experience with privatizing state-owned commercial,manufacturing, and service enterprises in both competitive andnoncompetitive markets. The authors analyze the various tacticsthat can be or have been employed, in relation to scope, pace,sequencing, and methods of implementation. The evidence showsthat privatization produces benefits of efficiency and innovation—ifdone right. The lessons of experience discussed in the articleoffer guidance on how to realize the promise of privatizationwhile minimizing the risks and costs.      

Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure Risks

The privatization of infrastructure should lead to the developmentof new infrastructure, improvements in the operation of existinginfrastructure, and a reduction in budgetary subsidies. Whethercountries reap the full benefits of privatization, however,depends on how risks are allocated. If, as is often the casein developing countries, governments assume risks that shouldbe borne by investors, they may reduce incentives for efficiencyand incur significant liabilities. To solve these problems,governments need to improve their policies and restrict theirrisk bearing to certain political and regulatory risks overwhich they have direct control. When a government provides guarantees,it should attempt to measure their cost and improve the waythey are handled in the accounts and budgets. Measurement andbudgeting are critical to improving decisions about the provisionof guarantees, to improving project selection and contract design,and to protecting governments from unknowingly entering intocommitments that might jeopardize future budgets.      

The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries

The literature on the benefits and costs of regulation demonstratesthat this issue can be explored systematically using standardeconomic analysis. It also shows that regulation can have asignificant adverse impact on economic growth. Specifically,regulation aimed at controlling prices and entry into marketsthat would otherwise be workably competitive is likely to reducegrowth and adversely affect the average standard of living.In addition, process regulation can impose a significant coston the economy. Nonetheless, social regulations may have significantnet benefits for the average consumer if designed judiciously. There are several policies developing countries might consideradopting to improve their general approach to regulation. Theappropriate regulatory tools and framework will depend on manyfactors, including bureaucratic expertise, resource availability,political constraints, and economic impacts. There is a generalneed to enhance the capability for evaluating regulation atthe local and national levels.      

Lessons in Structuring Derivatives Exchanges

The global deregulation of financial markets has created newinvestment opportunities, which in turn require the developmentof new instruments to deal with the increased risks. Institutionalinvestors who are actively engaged in industrial and emergingmarkets need to hedge their risks from these cross border transactions.Agents in liberalized market economies who are exposed to volatilecommodity price and interest rate changes require appropriatehedging products to deal with them. And the economic expansionin emerging economies demands that corporations find betterways to manage financial and commodity risks. The instrumentsthat allow market participants to manage risk are known as derivativesbecause they represent contracts whose payoff at expirationis determined by the price of the underlying asset a currency,an interest rate, a commodity, or a stock. Derivatives are tradedin organized exchanges or over the counter by derivatives dealers.Since the mid-1980s the number of derivatives exchanges operatingin both industrial and emerging-market economies has increasedsubstantially. What benefits do these exchanges provide to investorsand to the home country? Are they a good idea? Emerging marketscan capture important benefits, including the ability to transferrisks, enhance public information, and lower transaction costs,but the success of a derivatives exchange depends on the soundnessof the foundations on which it is built, the structure thatis adopted, and the products that are traded.      

Timing and Duration of Exposure in Evaluations of Social Programs

Impact evaluations aim to measure the outcomes that can be attributedto a specific policy or intervention. While there have beenexcellent reviews of the different methods for estimating impact,insufficient attention has been paid to questions related totiming: How long after a program has begun should it be evaluated?For how long should treatment groups be exposed to a programbefore they benefit from it? Are there time patterns in a program'simpact? This paper examines the evaluation issues related totiming, and discusses the sources of variation in the durationof exposure within programs and their implications for impactestimates. It reviews the evidence from careful evaluationsof programs (with a focus on developing countries) on the waysthat duration affects impacts.      

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR HEALTH PROJECTS

This paper applies to the health sector a method of projectanalysis advocated recently by Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput.A health project evaluation should establish a firm justificationfor public involvement; establish the counterfactual—whatwould happen with and without the project; and determine thefiscal effect of the project and the appropriate levels of feesin conjunction with project evaluation. The evaluation shouldalso acknowledge the fungibility of project resources and examinethe incentives both for high-level public servants to shiftgovernment resources away from project-funded activities tothose that have not been evaluated and for lower-level contractorsand civil servants to provide good or bad service. Market failuresin health services and insurance markets should serve as a startingpoint for economic analysis, not as a reason to ignore economicsin health projects. Project outputs should be predicted aftertaking into account the reaction of consumers and providersin the private sector as well as market structures of supply,demand, and equilibrium for health services.      

A SURVEY OF THE COSTS OF WORLD SUGAR POLICIES

The world sugar market has long been characterized by volatileprices and widespread intervention. Controls on domestic prices,demand, and supply have created an inefficient pattern of worldproduction, consumption, and trade. Without government controls,production would shift from the countries with higher cost,subsidized production (especially the European Community, Japan,and the United States) to the countries with lower costs (suchas Australia, Brazil, and Thailand). The resources saved couldthen be directed to other activities. Sugar policies in countries with high costs reduce world sugarprices quite substantially in the long run and increase pricevariability significantly; production controls in countrieswith low costs increase world prices somewhat and also increasetheir variability. What would happen if all interventions ceased? Average worldsugar prices would probably— but not definitely—rise. World prices would definitely vary less, and economicconditions would definitely improve, especially in developingcountries that depend heavily on sugar exports. But the prospectsfor substantial reform of the sugar market are not promising,even though the GATT Uruguay Round continues. This article putsforward some modest proposals for changing the existing interventionsto lessen economic distortions and reduce costs.      

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES: The Economics of Enclave Manufacturing

Export processing zones (EPZS) are economics enclaves withinwhich manufacturing for export occurs under virtual free tradeconditions. Many developing countries have established EPZSin hopes of reaping economic gains through employment, foreignexchange earnings, and technology transfer. This article studiesthe benefits and costs of EPZS in Indonesia, the Republic ofKorea, Malaysia, and the Philippines and reviews the relationshipbetween the welfare effects of EPZS and the host country's economicpolicies. When the domestic economy is distorted, the EPZ conferslimited welfare gains. Nevertheless, EPZS are far from the "enginesof development" that some countries had initially hoped theywould become.      

Appraising Workfare

Workfare programs aim to reduce poverty by providing low-wagework to those who need it. They are often turned to in a crisis.This article offers some simple analytical tools that can beused to rapidly appraise the cost-effectiveness of an existingworkfare operation as a basis for deciding whether the programshould be expanded. For pedagogic purposes, two stylized versionsof a range of programs found in practice are analyzed: one fora middle-income country, the other for a low-income country.The cost of a given gain to the poor is about the same for bothprograms, although the components of that cost are very different,with implications for the timing of benefits. The author pointsto program design changes that could enhance the impact on poverty.      

SOME LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

The rapid economic growth of eight East Asian economies, oftencalled the "East Asian miracle, " raises two questions: Whatpolicies and other factors contributed to that growth? And canother developing countries replicate those policies to stimulateequally rapid growth? This article, based on case studies, econometric data, and economictheory, offers a list of the ingredients that contributed tothat success. But it is the combination of these ingredients,many of which involve government interventions acting together,that accounts for East Asia's success.      

Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand's Industrial Firms

New data on Thailand's industrial firms shed light on the originsof the East Asian financial crisis and on the response of themanufacturing sector to the structural adjust-ment program supportedby the international financial institutions. Before the crisis,Thai firms had declining profitability, but they neverthelessmaintained high levels of investment, often in domesticallyoriented areas (notably the auto sector). Thai firms financedthese investments with short-term borrowing from financial institutions,which in turn borrowed short term on foreign markets. That only40 percent of firms provided audited financial statements totheir banks meant that the financial sector had poor informationfor assessing the true riskiness of these investments. The financialstructure was thus vulnerable even to small shocks. How well did the adjustment program deal with the crisis? Thaifirms had difficulty increasing their exports quickly becauseof investment in the wrong sectors, a decline in regional demand,and bottlenecks that included red tape and poor customs administration.Because of the poor export response, the brunt of adjustmenthad to come through compression of demand and of imports. Inretrospect, the macroeconomic program— which assumed quickexport recovery— was too tight.      

The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges

This article examines the evolution of policy recommendationsconcerning rural land issues since the formulation of the WorldBank's "Land Reform Policy Paper" in 1975. That paper set outthree guiding principles: the desirability of owner-operatedfamily farms; the need for markets to permit land to be transferredto more productive users; and the importance of an egalitarianasset distribution. In the 25 years since that paper was published,these guiding principles have remained the same, but it is nowrecognized that communal tenure systems can be more cost-effectivethan formal title, that titling programs should be judged ontheir equity as well as their efficiency, that the potentialof land rental markets has often been severely underestimated,that land-sale markets enhance efficiency only if they are integratedinto a broader effort at developing rural factor markets, andthat land reform is more likely to result in a reduction ofpoverty if it harnesses (rather than undermines) the operationof land markets and is implemented in a decentralized fashion.Achieving land policies that incorporate these elements requiresa coherent legal and institutional framework together with greaterreliance on pilot programs to examine the applicability of interventionsunder local conditions.