Competitive bidding with a bid floor

We study competitive bidding with an explicit bid floor, motivated by minimum wage legislation and minimum labor standards. We derive the equilibrium strategies in, and compare the expected procurement costs among, the first‐price, second‐price, English, and Dutch auctions in a private‐cost model. For the English auction, we also consider a variant in which each seller can terminate the auction by jumping down to sell at the price floor. We find that the first‐price auction and the aforementioned jump‐down English auction lead to a lower expected procurement cost than under the second‐price auction and the standard English auction.     

Exclusive Dealing through Resellers in Auctions with Stochastic Bidder Participation

This paper demonstrates that a seller prefers to exclude final consumers from an auction and sell only to resellers when these resellers can gain access, at a cost, to a sufficiently bigger market than the seller himself. The intuition is that resellers recoup their expenses for marketing the item by reselling it to final consumers. If some consumers participate in the first auction and are outbid by the resellers, then their values for the item are relatively low. Outbidding part of their customer base is “bad news” for the resellers, and this depresses their bids when consumers compete with them. The socially optimal and revenue-maximizing choices of auction format may not coincide: Restricting participation of consumers may be socially optimal but privately suboptimal and vice-versa. The results suggest that (i) the exclusion of final consumers in some auctions may not be driven by transaction cost considerations, and (ii) sellers should not necessarily sell directly to consumers, even though new technologies allow them to do so at essentially zero cost, unless they can access a sufficiently large portion of the market.     

Rational Reserve Pricing in Sequential Auctions

A durable asset is sold in a sealed-bid first price auction. The seller sets an undisclosed reservation price. The seller has no prior information respecting the private valuations of the bidders. If no bid exceeds the reservation price, the asset is sequentially auctioned until it is sold. A rational seller will design an intertemporal series of reservation prices that maximize the discounted value of the transaction price. To accomplish this, the seller uses the history of unsuccessful bids to estimate the probability density functions governing the maximum bids at each hypothetical future auction date.     

The Determinants of Price in Internet Auctions of Used Cars

This study analyzes how auction, seller, and product factors influence the price premium in an eBay used car auction market. In auctions with at least one bid, the reputation of the seller, title status, and the time the auction ended influenced the price premium on the highest bid. For auctions that resulted in a sale, cars with clear title and dealers were able to secure significantly greater price premiums, but seller reputation had no significant effect. Using a binary logit model, cars had a greater probability of selling if the seller had a better reputation. The quality of the presentation and number of pictures did not enhance the price premium in any of the models.

浅析“招拍挂”与地价的关系

2009年是"地王"频发的一年,土地价格惊心动魄地上扬,甚至一些地方出现了"面粉比面包贵"的非正常现象。"招拍挂"引入市场竞争机制对土地资源进行配置,是实现土地价值的良好途径,但其供给垄断和需求竞争的模式及"价高者得"的特点,同时也会推高地价,对价格机制产生破坏,造成市场失灵的情况发生。本文从介绍城市土地配置方式的转变入手,基于土地价格机制理论分析了"招拍挂"与地价的影响,最后提出了改良"招拍挂"的建议。     

业绩承诺的价值与定增并购价格偏离——基于B-S期权定价模型

近年来,业绩承诺被广泛运用于定增并购中,其作用主要在于保护投资者和激励标的公司。现有研究中,基于业绩承诺的存在与否、及其部分参数的设定所产生的经济影响在理论层面及实证层面得到初步验证,但是这部分研究的出发点不够全面,衡量业绩承诺产生经济影响的真实路径,依然需要进一步探索。文章选取2011年至2019年7月A股上市公司签订了业绩承诺的定增并购事件为样本,基于B-S期权定价模型,测算以期权形式存在的业绩承诺价值,并探讨该价值高低对定增并购价格偏离的影响及其路径。研究结果表明：业绩承诺价值越大,并购溢价越高,该影响在股份支付的情况下更明显;业绩承诺价值越大,定增折价越低,该影响在非股份支付情况下更明显。文章从新颖而全面的视角衡量了业绩承诺的价值,独特地解释了定增并购价格偏离形成的机理,为定增并购多方设置更合理的交易价格提供了新的思路,也为监管机构完善定增并购交易制度提供了理论支持。     

Revisiting Cash Endowment and House Money Effects in an Experimental Auction of a Novel Agri‐food Product in the Philippines

This study explores the effect of varying cash endowments on bidding behavior in auction experiments conducted in a developing country. Our results suggest that cash endowment levels can have different effects on bidding behavior under second price auction and random nth price auction. In contrast to past studies conducted in developed countries, we generally do not see the presence of positive house money effect in our results. If behavior varies significantly as the cash endowment is varied, then care must be taken when designing auction experiments or when comparing results to other experimental results and theoretical predictions.     

Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi‐Unit Dutch Auctions

We design a multi‐unit descending‐price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed. The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining. These laboratory results conform to some directional predictions from our theory, although overbidding is common.     

拍卖机制中最优保留价比较分析

在基准模型中,讨论了拍卖商期望收益最大化的最优保留价设置问题。在拍卖机制中,公开与不公开最 优保留价的两种情况下,比较了投标商的投标策略和拍卖商获得的最大期望收益与投标商估价区间的关系。     

我国出租车牌照拍卖机制研究

论文以有效分配、促进竞争、实现经济价值为目标，建立了公开升价拍卖+密封拍卖的两阶段牌照拍卖模型，证明了其有效性和最优性。并以北京市为例讨论了牌照数量的确定、进入密封拍卖阶段的时机和牌照的流通等实际问题。这些讨论将有利于拍卖机制在现实中的操作实施。     

Aspects of agricultural marketing in Lebowa

Marketing development is crucial for agricultural development in less developed areas, and should keep pace with general agricultural development. In Lebowa, markets for surplus food crops tend to be too far away from producers. Thirty‐five per cent of farmers sell livestock products, mostly privately. Livestock sales are mostly by auction. Many farmers take cattle to auctions and decide not to sell. Co‐operatives will probably be the most suitable marketing institutions for crop products channeled to South African controlled markets, while farmers should be free to market other products in any manner they wish. Lebowa farmers prefer private credit, particularly from friends and relatives, to bank credit. They also prefer to hoard money rather than bank it. Relatively little credit seems to be needed at an early development stage, but less than necessary is available. Co‐ops can in future be important in this respect. Collateral for loans presents a problem.     

《会计监管风险提示第8号——商誉减值》的政策效果研究——基于业绩补偿承诺的视角

新一轮并购潮以来,由"高溢价、高承诺"的不合理业绩补偿承诺导致的商誉减值"爆雷"事件不断发生,引起了监管部门的关注。证监会于2018年11月发布《会计监管风险提示第8号——商誉减值》(以下简称"8号文"),旨在规范商誉减值会计确认、计提时点及监管细节,并明令禁止故意以业绩承诺期为由不计提或跨期计提商誉减值的行为。文章通过双重差分法研究发现:"8号文"有助于降低签订了业绩补偿承诺上市公司的商誉减值水平,加强媒体对签订业绩补偿承诺公司的关注与监督,但存在2018年突击计提商誉减值的现象。此外,"8号文"能够降低上市公司对不合理业绩补偿承诺的使用倾向,降低并购溢价并提高长期并购绩效。最后,签订了业绩补偿承诺的并购企业在"8号文"之后没有显著提升盈余管理水平和股价崩盘风险。文章总体表明,"8号文"有助于上市公司在并购过程中合理使用业绩补偿承诺,降低商誉减值水平。但从长远来看,仍然需要从完善业绩补偿承诺设计机制、健全法律法规约束等角度遏制商誉减值的潜在风险。     

论民事强制执行拍卖之性质

民事强制执行拍卖是指执行法院将查封、扣押的动产或不动产以公开竞争出价的方式卖与出价最高的应买人,并以卖得价金清偿债权的行为。强制执行拍卖性质的界定,是强制执行制度设计的理论基础,不同的性质界定,将会直接影响拍卖各方当事人的权利义务。私法说认为拍卖是私法行为,属于买卖契约之一种;公法说认为强制执行拍卖是公法上的行为,与私法上的买卖不同;折衷说认为拍卖一方面是公法行为,另一方面又同时具有私法买卖之性质与效果。拍卖性质将对拍卖的程序、拍卖物所有权转移的形式、拍卖的法律效力、拍卖的救济程序、拍卖中法律责任的承担等问题产生较大影响,我国民事强制执行拍卖的性质应界定为公法性。     

为何招标采购偏好“低于均价中标法”

低于均价中标法招标机制被广泛应用于各类招标采购中,但其合理性存在大量争议。文章首先在理论上证明了标准低于均价中标法下投标人不存在随真实成本严格递增的贝叶斯纳什均衡报价策略,然后基于某大型电力公司的招标采购数据,对投标行为进行实证分析,发现低于均价中标法下投标人报价可以反映其真实成本,且该机制在时间趋势上既可以激励投标人压缩利润,降低采购成本,又可以引导投标人形成稳定的低利润预期,指导投标人报"合理低价",防止"赢者诅咒"现象的发生。以上发现均说明低于均价中标法在业界被广泛应用的合理性,但这种招标机制也易于催生投标人间串谋。文章研究为低于均价中标法的合理使用提出了管理建议。     

Auction Markets for Evaluations

When the value of a product or service is uncertain, outcomes can be inefficient. A market for evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided. This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations. The mechanisms considered are derived from the oft studied uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock auction, and Dutch clock auction. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that (i) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (ii) the performances of the four mechanisms are equivalent. This second point is particularly noteworthy given that differing behavior is routinely observed in traditional private value auctions.     

建筑工程中“工程量清单”计价法浅议

工程量清单计价方法相对于传统的定额计价方法是一种新的计价模式,是一种市场的定价模式,是由建设产品的买方和卖方在建设市场上根据供求情况、信息情况进行自由竞价,从而能够确定合同价格的方法。推行工程量清单计价方法是工程造价计价方法改革的一项具体措施,也是我国加入WTO与国际工程管理接轨的必然要求。     

Fiscal Deficits, Taylor Rules, and Price Dynamics

This paper reconsiders the issue of price level determination under interest rate feedback rules using an optimizing general equilibrium framework with overlapping generations and flexible prices. The analysis shows that under fiscal shocks, monetary policy commitment to instrument rules of the Taylor-type might be insufficient for inflation control. It is also demonstrated that the existence of a unique stable equilibrium path for the price level does not require active monetary rules.The author wishes to thank an anonymous referee, Barbara Annicchiarico, Giuseppe De Arcangelis, Giancarlo Marini, and Giorgio Rodano for useful comments and suggestions.The usual disclaimer applies.     

SMP与PAB电力竞价机制的激励性研究

电力市场的两种基本竞价机制为传统的统一边际价竞价机制(SMP机制)和按报价支付的竞价机制(PAB机制)。首先从拍卖角度出发讨论两种竞价机制激励性,并对两种机制下发电商行使市场力的机理进行了深入分析。分析得出,无论是统一边际价竞价机制还是按报价支付的竞价机制都缺乏让发电商按真实成本信息报价的激励相容性,存在发电商虚报高价的现象,影响电力系统的稳定运行和经济调度。因而需要设计一种新的具有激励相容特性的价格机制。     

并购交易中的信息传递机制研究——基于业绩承诺的视角

由于并购具有金额大与标的资产质量难以辨别等特点，如何在并购交易中降低交易风险一直是学术界持续关注的话题。文章以中小板和创业板公司2015年至2016年审核通过的并购事件为样本，从业绩承诺视角探讨市场对于并购重组交易契约中信息传递机制的看法。研究表明，市场会对业绩承诺这一信息传递机制予以积极反应，业绩承诺越乐观，并购方在公告期间的超额收益越大。进一步研究发现，在非关联并购、投资者专业化程度较低或财务信息更稳健的情况下，业绩承诺所带来的财富效应更明显。文章以业绩承诺为切入点，为学术界了解如何降低并购交易中的信息风险提供了重要的视角与经验证据。     

Risk attitude in lotteries offering real products and monetary outcomes

Using two auction mechanisms, the second price auction and the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak mechanism, we examined individuals’ buying and selling bidding patterns in three types of binary lotteries: a lottery offering only real products, a lottery offering only monetary outcomes and mixed lotteries offering both real products and monetary value outcomes. Participants’ willingness to pay and willingness to accept for the product lottery suggest risk neutrality. In contrast, participants’ bidding prices for the monetary and mixed lotteries suggest risk aversion. These findings suggest that an individual's risk attitude depends upon the type of lottery, perhaps indicating a “product illusion.”