Critical levels and the (reverse) repugnant conclusion

It is well-known that there is a trade-off among the properties of population principles that are used to make social evaluations when the number of people in the society under consideration may vary. The commonly used principles either lead to the repugnant conclusion (which is the case for classical utilitarianism), or they violate the Pareto-plus principle and related properties (average utilitarianism is an example of such a principle). This paper examines the nature of this trade-off and shows that the incompatibility between avoiding the repugnant conclusion and the Pareto-plus principle is fundamental and not restricted to the commonly used population principles.     

Population growth: A pure welfarist approach

In this study we propose a framework based on welfarist principles to deal with several issues concerned with population economics models, such as the Repugnant Conclusion, both in absolute and relative sense, the shape of childbearing costs and population dynamics, under both normative and positive perspectives. We show that the relative critical level criterion can avoid both the assumption of high childbearing costs and the absolute repugnant conclusion (ARC) but cannot avoid the relative repugnant conclusion (RRC). Moreover, optimal fertility is increased by technological shocks and displays cycles. Both ARC and RRC can be avoided by extending the model to a decentralized economy with consumption externalities; in the latter model, a technological shock reduces long‐run fertility and can generate cycles along the transitional path.     

A characterization of consistent collective choice rules

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.     

A Strategy‐Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

Assuming at least four individuals and at least four alternatives, a social choice function on the domain of profiles at which there is an alternative ranked first by more individuals than any other alternative is nondictatorial, strategy‐proof, and has full range if and only if it is plurality rule.     

The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules

Aziz and Stursberg propose an “Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation” rule (ESR), a generalization of Serial rule, one of the most discussed mechanisms in the random assignment problem, to the more general random social choice domain. This article provides an alternative definition, or characterization, of ESR as the unique most ordinally egalitarian one. Specifically, given a lottery p over alternatives, for each agent i the author considers the total probability share in p of objects from her first k indifference classes. ESR is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (calculated for all i, k). Serial rule is known to be characterized by the same property. Thus, the author provides an alternative way to show that ESR, indeed, coincides with Serial rule on the assignment domain. Moreover, since both rules are defined as the unique most ordinally egalitarian ones, the result shows that ESR is “the right way” to think about generalizing Serial rule.     

Social evaluations when populations differ in size

Assessments of “social welfare” do not usually take into account population sizes. This can lead to serious social evaluation flaws, particularly in contexts in which policies can affect demographic growth. We develop in this paper a little‐known though ethically attractive approach to correcting the flaws of traditional social evaluations, an approach that is sensitive to population sizes and that is based on critical‐level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU). Traditional CLGU is extended by considering arbitrary orders of welfare dominance and ranges of “poverty lines,” as well as values for the “critical level” of how much a life must be minimally worth to contribute to social welfare. We apply these social evaluation methods to rank Canada across 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006 and to estimate normatively and statistically robust lower and upper bounds of critical levels over which these rankings can be made.     

Apportionment Behind the Veil of Uncertainty

Apportionment of representatives is a basic rule of everyday politics. By definition, this basic rule is a constitutional stage problem and should be decided behind the veil of uncertainty. To bring apportionment closer to quotas, we introduce f‐divergence for utilitarianism and Bregman divergence for consistent optimization. Even in our less restricted condition, we find that we must use α‐divergence for optimization and show that the minimization of α‐divergence induces the same divisor methods that correspond to the maximization of the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function (or the expected utility function), which is bounded by constant relative risk aversion.     

Discreteness and the Welfare Cost of Labor Supply Tax Distortions*

We compare the welfare costs of tax distortions of labor supply in one‐ and two‐member household discrete and continuous choice labor supply (leisure consumption) models calibrated to the same aggregate uncompensated labor supply elasticities. In the discrete models, taxes induce a large response from a subset of the population, whereas the majority of the population exhibits unchanged behavior. In contrast, the majority of the population reacts to tax changes in continuous models. Discrete choice matters as the welfare costs of similar taxes vary significantly when individuals face discrete labor supply choices from when they choose working hours continuously.     

A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Summary. A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let (resp., denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain , and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain . Received: August 29, 2000; revised version: November 13, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"We are grateful to Wulf Gaertner and our two referees for insightful comments on a previous draft. Correspondence to: D. E. Campbell     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

Population age structure and private consumption in Spain

In this paper we study the effect of population age distribution upon private consumption expenditure in Spain from 1964 to 1997 using aggregate data. We obtain four main results. First, changes in the population pyramid have substantial effects upon the behaviour of private consumption. Second, the pattern of the coefficients of the demographic variables is not consistent with the simplest version of the life cycle hypothesis. Third, we estimate the impact of the demographic transition upon consumption and find positive values associated with episodes in which the shares of groups of individuals with expenditure levels higher (lower) than the mean increased (decreased). Fourth, the results are robust to alternative specifications for the population age distribution.     

ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS

We consider strategy‐proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops‐onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single‐peakedness (referred to as semilattice single‐peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single‐peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well‐known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy‐proof rules are admissible are semilattice single‐peaked domains.     

Maximizing human development

The Human Development Index (HDI) is widely used as a measure of well‐being. We examine the allocations implied by the maximization of this index using a standard growth model. Maximization leads to consumption (excluding education and health expenditures) being pushed to minimal levels. It also leads to the overaccumulation of education and/or health capital and possibly physical capital, relative to the standard golden rule. We propose an alternative specification for the HDI, where consumption replaces income as a proxy for decent standard of living. Maximization of this alternative implies a ‘human development golden rule’ which balances consumption, education and health expenditure. We advocate the method of optimization subject to constraints for revealing the policy implications of taking an achievement measure and its underlying philosophy seriously.     

Fully sincere voting

In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight.     

Fully sincere voting

In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight.     

Population growth and economic and social development

This article sets forth 3 positions on population growth: 1) rapid population growth is a central development problem that implies lower living standards for the poor; 2) proposals for reducing population growth raise difficult questions about the proper domain of public policy, yet it is acceptable for governments to attempt to influence private decisions about family size; and 3) the experience in many developing countries shows that quick, effective measures can be taken to reduce fertility. Rapid population growth has slowed development because it exacerbates the difficult choice between higher consumption in the present and the investment needed to bring higher consumption in the future. As populations grow, larger investments are needed just to maintain current capital/person. It further threatens the balance between natural resources and people and creates severe economic and social problems in urban areas. Public policy must provide alternative ways for poor families to secure the benefits provided by large family size. That is, governments need to provide tangible evidence that it really is in the best interests of parents to have fewer children. Also required is greater infomation about and access to fertility control. When family planning services have been widespread and affordable, fertility has decline faster than social and economic progress alone would predict. There is a need for immediate action to improve women's status and to make education, family planning, and primary health care more available. Although economic and social progress help to slow population growth, rapid population growth hinders development. Thus, governments must act simultaneously on both fronts. Accumulating evidence on population growth in developing countries shows that is the combination of social development and family planning that reduces fertility.     

On the robustness of the trade-inducing effects of trade agreements and currency unions

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and currency unions (CUs) are potentially endogenous trade cost proxies in equations estimating their effects on bilateral trade. In case of both, this problem is magnified by the paucity of reliable instruments. Instead of resorting to the oft-employed alternative of panel data to address selection on just the time-invariant unobservables, this paper assesses the extent to which a positive association between CU or RTA membership and bilateral trade can be considered causal. In addition, it attends to recent concerns over the extensive margin of trade (at the country-level) and the issue of zero trade observations in log-linearized gravity models by relying more on a bivariate probit analysis. Despite not identifying point estimates, striking results are obtained. While most cross-sections exhibit a positive association between both RTAs and CUs and trade, the evidence in favor of a robust causal effect is strong mainly for CUs. However, the magnitude of the CU effect is still sensitive to the amount of selection on unobservables. Moreover, selection into RTAs (CUs) is mostly found to be positive (negative). Finally, the presence of spillovers across the policy regimes is also detected.     

Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo

A public decision model specifies a set of alternatives, a variable population, and a common set of admissible preferences. We study the implications of the principle of solidarity, for social choice functions in all such models. The principle says that when the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. Under weak additional requirements, but regardless the domain of preferences, each of two formulations of this principle, population-monotonicity and replacement-domination, imply coalition-strategy-proofness; that the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the society, but not on the number, nor on the labels of agents having particular preferences; and that there exists an alternative always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule. Replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as population-monotonicity.     

Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption–saving decisions

We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of ‘over-consuming,’ or alternative control processes which require internal commitment but are immune to such temptations. Standard models in behavioral economics ignore such internal commitment mechanisms. We justify our model by showing that much of its construction is consistent with dynamic choice and cognitive control as they are understood in cognitive neuroscience.The dynamic consumption–saving behavior of an agent in the model is characterized by a simple consumption–saving goal and a cut-off rule for invoking control processes to inhibit automatic processes and implement the goal. We discuss empirical tests of our model with available individual consumption data and we suggest critical tests with brain-imaging and experimental data.     

CHINESE POVERTY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS

This paper investigates how estimates of the extent and trend of consumption poverty in China between 1990 and 2004 vary as a result of alternative plausible assumptions concerning the poverty line and estimated levels of consumption. Our methodology focuses on the following sources of variation: purchasing power exchange rates (used to convert an international poverty line), alternative levels and distributions of private incomes, alternative estimates of the propensity to consume of different income groups, and alternative spatial and temporal price indices. We report national, urban and rural poverty estimates corresponding to distinct assumptions. It is widely believed that substantial poverty reduction took place in China in the 1990s, and we find this conclusion to be largely robust to the choice of assumptions, although estimates of the extent of Chinese poverty, and therefore of world poverty, in any year are greatly influenced by this choice.