Dual market competition and deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional banks

This paper addresses the issue of competition in dual banking markets by analyzing the determinants of deposit rates in Islamic and conventional banks. Using a sample of 20 countries with dual banking systems over the 2000–2014 period, our results show significant differences in the drivers of Islamic and conventional banks' pricing behavior. Conventional banks with stronger market power set lower deposit rates but market power is not significant for Islamic banks. In predominantly Muslim environments, conventional banks set higher deposit rates and further higher when their market power is lower. Whereas conventional banks are influenced by the competitiveness of Islamic banks, Islamic banks are only affected by their peers in predominantly Muslim countries. Our findings have important implications regarding competition and bank stability in dual banking markets.     

Desperately seeking cash: Evidence from bank output measurement

We examine the impact of a “near-zero” interest rate policy on bank output. Specifically, we document the existence of negative banking output on deposits for French banks from 2009. We show a structural break in banks' long run interest rate pass-through that explains this change in their business model during the 2003–2012 period. Since the crisis, banks are desperately seeking cash, and deposits have become a cost center. This is due to the new monetary policy and reveals banks' adaptation to the new banking regulation on liquidity. This new environment raises questions about banks' increasing exposure to interest rate risk and shows the necessity of coordinating monetary and regulatory policies.     

Small business lending and credit risk: Granger causality evidence

Because of their opaque nature, SMEs are overly reliant on bank lending. Therefore, we examine whether banks' credit supply to SMEs are affected by their financial conditions. To this end, we employ a Granger causality analysis to examine whether there is an indication of a significant direction of determination between SME lending and non-performing SME loans. The results reveal no bidirectional relationship between SME lending and NPL for the entire banking sector. For Islamic banks, however, we find two-way linkages between these two parameters: a negative causation is running both from SME lending to NPL growth and from NPL to SME lending. Given Islamic banks' deposit-oriented funding practices and their adherence to profit-and-loss sharing principles, this finding suggests the presence of heightened market discipline within the Islamic banking system.     

Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant‐Bank Model

This study utilizes a dominant‐bank model to investigate whether an increase in retail loan and deposit‐market concentration increases the incentives for both dominant and fringe banks to monitor their loans and thereby improve the quality of their loan portfolios. It shows that the effects on banks' incentives to engage in monitoring aimed at eliminating loan default losses in response to increased concentration of retail market shares of loans and deposits depend critically on whether the banks' asset and liability choices are interdependent. When the asset and liability decisions of both dominant and fringe banks are independent, a shift in market shares in favor of the dominant bank generates a straightforward increase in the incentives of all banks to monitor their loans. Under portfolio interdependence, the effects on monitoring outcomes at dominant banks and at banks within the competitive fringe depend on more complicated configurations of parameters. This fact helps explain mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between bank competition and measures of bank risk and soundness.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

The welfare cost of banking regulation

The Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking sector's stability. Unfortunately, this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive, risky investment projects toward less productive but safer projects. This paper introduces banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a banking crisis is initiated by an aggregated shock (in the risky sector) in a banking system with implicit bailout, and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximal share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off, inherent in this type of regulation, between ensuring banking stability and fostering economic growth. The model implies an optimal level of regulation that prevents crises but at the same time is detrimental to growth. We find that the overall effect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when productivity shocks are sufficiently high (for example, in the subprime banking crisis episode) and economic agents are sufficiently risk-averse. Finally, we find that there is a trade-off between regulating the economy upfront (i.e. before the shock) and facing the challenge of making a huge bailout after the crisis.     

Relationship lending and innovation: empirical evidence on a sample of European firms

This paper investigates the impact of relationship lending on innovation (the probability to innovate and the intensity of innovation). Using a unique dataset providing detailed information on bank–firm relationships across European firms, we relate different proxies of relationship lending (soft information, long-lasting relationships, number of banks and share of the main bank) to innovation. We find a very strong and robust positive effect of ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships, a less robust positive effect of long-lasting relationships and a negative effect of credit concentration as measured by the number of banking relationships. We also find that ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships reduce credit rationing for innovative firms, while long-lasting relationships seem to favour innovation via other relational channels. These results raise some concern on the impact of screening processes based on automatic procedures, as those suggested by the Basel rules, on firms' capability to finance innovative activities in Europe.     

CURRENCY UNION WITH OR WITHOUT BANKING UNION

We build a symmetric two‐country monetary model with credit to study the interplay between currency integration and credit markets integration. The currency arrangement affects credit availability through default incentives. We capture credit markets integration by the extra cost incurred to obtain credit for cross‐border transactions and, with the euro area context in mind, label as banking union a situation where this cost is low. For high levels of the cross‐border credit cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more credit rationing and lower welfare. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.     

Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model

Summary. This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in all respects, except for the organization of their financial systems: in particular, one has a competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition, the sources of inefficiencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit financed investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system. Received: September 20, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Cyclical behavior of price–cost margins in the Turkish banking industry

Using a dynamic panel data framework, the cyclical behavior of the banks' price–cost margins in Turkey over the period 2002Q1–2008Q2 is analyzed. The findings provide evidence towards countercyclical behavior of the margins. This is important for the Turkish economy since the countercyclicality of banks' margins may deepen the contraction by constraining the credit opportunities over economic downturn periods. Furthermore, the control variables, monetary policy, market structure and financial deepening of the economy indicate significant effect on the price–cost margins of the banks. The findings also serve as evidence towards the “financial accelerator” mechanism in Turkish economy over the sample period.     

流动性过剩、法定存款准备与信用配给

本文旨在研究调整存款准备带来的信用配给问题,考虑银行对企业的监督机制,分析借贷市场均衡时调节法定存款准备率对利率、投资和经济增长等宏观变量以及经济主体的影响,利用模型检讨我国货币政策的实施,并进而提出完善我国货币政策实施的相关建议。     

Household sectoral choice and effective demand for rural credit in India

An analysis of the ICRISAT data from three Indian villages raises concern about the extent of rationing mechanism inhibiting the spread of formal credit in rural India where a significant proportion of households do not have any outstanding loan or borrow from the informal sector only. A limited-dependent econometric analysis of the factors jointly determining household sectoral choice and effective demand for informal loan conditional on whether a formal loan is available suggests that compared to formal loan easy and adequate access and prompt recovery are significant determinants of the popularity and viability of informal rural credit among sample households; also some households substitute labour income to ease the extent of credit. Thus, rationing of the formal credit is not the only factor inhibiting the spread of formal credit in the study villages.     

Do people respond to tax incentives? An analysis of the Italian reform of the deductibility of home mortgage interests

Before 1992 mortgage interests in Italy were fully tax deductible up to 3500 Euro (7000 for two cosigners). In 1992-1994 the government implemented a series of tax reforms whose ultimate effect was to eliminate the relation between the after-tax mortgage rate and the marginal tax rate. Using data from the 1989-2002 Survey of Household Income and Wealth we test if the elimination of incentives has affected the sensitivity of the decision to borrow and the amount borrowed with respect to the marginal tax rate. Regression analysis and difference-in-differences estimates indicate that tax considerations have not affected the demand for mortgage debt, neither at the extensive nor intensive margin. These results are consistent with lack of financial information and credit rationing during the sample period.     

Determinants of Interest Rate Pass-through for Emerging Market Economies: The Role of Financial Market Structure

It is essential for central banks to assess whether or not the pass-through from monetary policy rates to credit and deposit interest rates is complete in order to ensure price stability. In this article, we analyze interest rate pass-through process for emerging market economies. Since emerging market countries lack large panel data sets that are typically available for developed countries, it is hard to analyze the determinants of pass-through coefficients for emerging market countries. To overcome the data issue, we developed a country selection procedure that minimizes heterogeneity among the countries included in the analysis. Our findings indicate that banking sectors?? competition plays a more important role for emerging market countries than their developed counterparts.     

Why don't banks lend to Egypt's private sector?

Bank credit to Egypt's private sector decreased over the last decade, despite a recapitalized banking system and high rates of economic growth. Recent macro-economic turmoil has reinforced the trend. This paper explains the decrease based on credit supply and demand considerations by 1) presenting stylized facts regarding the evolution of the banks' sources and fund use in 2005 to 2011, noting two different cycles of external capital flows, and 2) estimating private credit supply and demand equations using quarterly data from 1998 to 2011. The system of simultaneous equations is estimated both assuming continuous market clearing and allowing for transitory price rigidity entailing market disequilibrium. The main results are robust to the market clearing assumption. During the global financial crisis, a significant capital outflow stalled bank deposit growth, which in turn affected the private sector's credit supply. At the same time, the banking sector increased credit to the government. Both factors reduced the private sector's credit supply during the period under study. After the trough of the global crisis, capital flowed back into Egypt and deposit growth stopped being a drag on the supply side, but bank credit to the government continued to drive the decrease in the private sector's credit supply. Beginning in the final quarter of 2010, capital flows reversed in tandem with global capital markets, and in January 2011 the popular uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak added an Egypt-specific shock that accentuated the outflow. Lending capacity dragged again, accounting for 10% of the estimated fall in private credit. Credit to the government continued to drain resources, accounting for 70–80% of the estimated total decline. Reduced economic activity contributed around 15% of the total fall in credit. The relative importance of these factors contrasts with that of the preceding capital inflow period, when credit to the government accounted for 54% of the estimated fall, while demand factors accounted for a similar percentage.     

Bank ownership of multilateral trading facilities and implications for historical exchanges: An industrial economics approach

The aim of this paper is to address bank ownership in Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and its implications for historical exchanges. We propose an oligopoly model with network effects to account for an exchange industry that consists of two MTFs and an historical exchange. Based on the observation that banks are both owners and clients of MTFs, we examine banks' incentive to influence the pricing policy of MTFs. We show that when brokerage and trading activities are particularly important for banks' revenue relative to their profit as MTF operators, certain market outcomes may emerge whereby both MTFs include banks' interest as clients in their objective function. We also demonstrate that accounting for banks' interest in MTFs' objective function acts as a competitive device that reduces the price and the profitability of the historical exchange.     

Endogenous money and shareholders' funds in the classical theory of banking

By its nature, bank money is endogenous, but its issuing is risky and presupposes the presence of banks' shareholders' funds. Shareholders' funds give banks the means of dealing with the difficulties involved in the process of money creation and which are inherent to the banking activity: convertibility constraint, credit and liquidity risks. Unlike the Richardian paradigm, Smith's ‘real bill theory’ and Thornton's ‘lender of last resort theory’ point out the functions of shareholder's funds. Therefore their monetary-banking approachs seem more complementary than contradictory. In other respects, the theory of endogenous money and credit introduces risks and capital in the analysis of exchange and lead to questioning the classical market theory constructed on the model of bartering     

ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS ON CREDIT AND STABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

We examine policy‐related economic uncertainty effects on the availability of credit, non‐performing loans and loan loss provisions using a panel of 18 countries. We provide significant evidence that uncertainty reduces the availability of credit while leading to increases in banks' non‐performing loans and loan loss provisions, distorting sectoral stability. Our findings are economically meaningful.     

A socio-economic study of the borrowing process: the case of microentrepreneurs in Jordan

This paper investigates the socio-economic determinants of four stages of borrowing process of the Jordanian microfinance market. The equations and functions corresponding to the stages of the borrowing process are estimated using a sample of 474 microentrepreneurs. The main results are as follow: variables that reflect the repayment ability are the main determinants of credit rationing in the microfinance market; religious beliefs, social responsibilities, availability of local microfinance provides, application costs, level of knowledge about microfinance providers significantly affect the borrowing process of microentrepreneurs. Credit rationing is found to be a problem for some applicants, but not for the majority.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.