INFLATION AND THE DISPERSION OF REAL WAGES*

The article studies the effects of inflation on real wage dispersion in a search‐monetary framework. The economy is characterized by frictions in both the goods and the labor markets. In the goods market, buyers and sellers bargain over prices, whereas in the labor market firms post wage offers. In equilibrium, a lower inflation rate increases the dispersion of real wages. This result is consistent with both the observed trends in wage dispersion and the inflation rate witnessed in the 1980s and the 1990s in the United States and the empirical literature linking reduced inflation to greater wage dispersion.     

Involuntary unemployment,macroeconomic policy,and a behavioral model of the firm: Why high real wages need not cause high unemployment

The perspective of modern macroeconomic theory, be it new classical or old and new Keynesian, is that unemployment can be reduced only if real wages are cut. The modern Keynesians, basing themselves upon the microfoundations of efficiency wage theory, argue that real wages cannot and will not be cut by firms for efficiency wage reasons. This generates involuntary unemployment based on a market coordination problem. A behavioral model that contrasts with efficiency wage theory is presented here which suggests that reducing real wages need not affect the marginal cost of labor and, therefore, the number of individuals employed. In the behavioral model, wherein there exists some linearity in the relationship between real wages and working conditions and labor productivity, a lower real wage rate is not a necessary condition for reducing the unemployment rate nor is a higher real wage an obstacle to reducing it. In this scenario, unemployment, to the extent that it is demand-side induced, is not related to movements in real wages. Therefore, restoring full employment after a negative demand shock becomes a matter for demand management, not demand management that must be coordinated with measures designed to reduce real wages.     

MNEs and wages: The role of productivity spillovers and imperfect labor markets

Disentangling the labor market implications of increased foreign capital flows remains important. This paper provides a unifying framework allowing to study the wage implications of multinational enterprise (MNE) activities, pointing to the importance of controlling for both labor market imperfections and productivity spillovers from foreign to local firms. Results show that increased MNE activities increase average wages in the local economy while contributing to a larger wage dispersion between the MNE and local firms. While the results pertaining to average wages depends heavily on the frictions in the labor market, how much the wage dispersion alters also depends on the extent of productivity spillovers from the MNEs to the local firms and the complementarity between domestic and foreign capital.     

Heterogeneous Matching with Transferable Utility: Two Labor Market Applications*

A labor market model under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneous in productivity and the decision of which type of agents to match with is endogenized. Two applications are studied. It is observed that countries with high (low) unemployment tend to exhibit low (high) wage dispersion. And there is evidence showing that individual and firm characteristics have more explanatory power for the French than for the American wage data. Matching patterns can account for these two observations. In the absence of a minimum wage, I thus provide a theory of endogenous wage compression.     

The Welfare and Employment Effects of Centralized Public Sector Wage Bargaining

In many countries, the government pays almost identical nominal wages to workers living in regions with notable economic disparities. By developing a two‐region general equilibrium model with endogenous migration and search frictions in the labor market, I study the differences in terms of unemployment, real wages, and welfare between a regional wage bargaining process and a national one in the public sector. Adopting the latter makes residents in the poorer region better off and residents of the richer region worse off. Private sector employment decreases in the poorer region and it increases in the richer one. Under some conditions, the unemployment rate in the poorer region soars.     

Can Countries with Severe Labor Market Frictions Gain from Globalization?

The interaction between increased Southern trade integration (globalization) and labor market frictions is analyzed in a dynamic general-equilibrium North–South nonscale growth model with endogenous Northern innovation and endogenous Southern imitation. The qualitative employment, growth, and relative-wage effects of globalization are shown to depend crucially on the degree of Northern labor market frictions. I demonstrate that only Northern countries with particularly large labor market adjustment costs for both firms and workers benefit from globalization in terms of permanently lower unemployment, temporarily faster growth, and permanently higher wages. This is because of the resulting general-equilibrium feedback effects of Northern labor market frictions that deter Southern imitation incentives. The result does not imply the recommendation to increase Northern labor market rigidities, but it challenges the common belief that labor market flexibility helps Northern countries to better adjust to the "globalization threat" coming from the South.     

Relative Price Changes, Wages and Unemployment in a Specific Factors Model with Search Frictions

This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the relative product price on wages and unemployment of a small open economy in a specific factors model characterized by search frictions. It shows that unemployment and wages move in opposite directions, i.e., high unemployment is associated with low wages and low unemployment with high wages. The reason for the employment effect is found to be individual wage bargaining.     

Labor market frictions and the international propagation mechanism

The paper studies the role of labor market frictions in accounting for international business cycle comovement. To this aim, we embed labor market search and matching frictions in a two-country New Keynesian model. We show that labor market frictions amplify the international propagation of supply and demand shocks. In terms of cyclical properties then, they raise the cross-country output correlation. Adding labor market search in the New Keynesian model thus improves its ability to account for the business cycle comovement observed in G7 countries in the recent decades. Nominal wage rigidity substantially contributes to this result. Labor market institutions also play a role. Yet, their impact is not unequivocal depending on the institution considered. Business cycle synchronization is thus found to increase with the generosity of the unemployment benefits system, whereas it decreases with the strictness of employment protection.     

On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.     

Migration and imperfect labor markets: Theory and cross-country evidence from Denmark,Germany and the UK

We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark.     

Exploring different measures of wage flexibility in a developing economy context: the case for Turkey

In this paper we use Turkish household labor force data to address a number of conceptual issues pertaining to the wage curve, an empirically derived negative relationship between the real wage level and the local unemployment rate. First, we show that in developing economies where labor markets are prone to high degree of segmentation by skill level, local unemployment rates disaggregated by education provide more accurate measures of the degree of group-specific wage competition and hence yield more robust results of the wage curve analyses. Second, we estimate the wage curve using various definitions of the unemployment rate, including discouraged and marginally attached workers, and the long-term unemployment rate to explore the most relevant measure of local labor market tension in the wage setting process. We find that broader definitions of unemployment serve as a more effective reference point in measuring wage flexibility for women, whose attachment to the labor market is substantially weak in the Turkish context; while for men the official and long-term unemployment rates perform well. Finally, using quantile regression we show that wage responsiveness to unemployment cannot be assumed to be constant along the wage distribution. In the Turkish case, we find a higher unemployment elasticity of wages around the median segment of wage distribution. This effect is more pronounced for women.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion,Firm Size,and Growth

This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41.     

Monopolistic Competition and Different Wage Setting Systems

In this paper, we present a disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market frictions and monopolistic competition in the goods market within an infinite horizon model of growth. We consider different wage setting systems and compare wages, the unemployment rate, and income per capita in the long‐run at firm, sector, and national (centralized) levels. The aim of this paper is to determine under which conditions, the inverted‐U hypothesis between unemployment and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, reported by Calmfors and Driffill [Economic Policy, 6, 14–61, 1988], is confirmed. Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted‐U shape for unemployment. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverted‐U shape can be reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of social services is great enough at sector level.     

BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL SHOCKS, RELATIVE WAGE RIGIDITIES AND LOW-SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT

The contrast between the evolution over the last decades of the European Union (EU) and the US unemployment rates, especially for the low-skilled, is well known. A consensus view is that these different outcomes can be explained by the interactions between common shocks and specific institutional setups. In this paper, we emphasize the interactions between technological changes and wages rigidities. We construct a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two types of workers, and with search unemployment. Our simulations show that with wage rigidities, technological changes suffice to generate a continuous rise in the low-skilled unemployment rate and an almost unchanged high-skilled unemployment rate. Without wage rigidities, the unemployment rates remain unchanged but the wage dispersion widens.     

Capital tax,minimum wage,and labor market outcomes

Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output.     

Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

The Choice of Technology and Equilibrium Wage Rigidity

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. Second, the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock. Third, a higher level of capital stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. That is, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate.     

The labor wedge as a matching friction

We use a search and matching model to decompose the labor wedge into three classes of labor market frictions and evaluate their role for the labor wedge and unemployment. We find that there is an asymmetric effect of labor market frictions on the labor wedge and unemployment. While the wedge is to a large extent explained by changes in matching efficiency, unemployment is accounted for by the combination of frictions to matching efficiency, job destruction and bargaining. If search and matching frictions give rise to the labor wedge, then it is relevant for explaining unemployment mainly through changes in matching efficiency.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.