Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt leverage stands as a key variable in the design of a control contract as it has a strong disciplinary role. A simple option valuation model is used to show that debt is also a governance variable because it can moderate or enhance private benefits. It is argued that an asymmetrical self-regulation mechanism may develop in the case of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of control, private benefits, and debt levels are linked within an inside corporate governance framework. At low levels of leverage, debt is relatively less disciplinary compared with a non-private benefits case. When leverage exceeds a threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. We show that under given conditions, a self-regulation mechanism develops where the controlling shareholder is incentivized to hold less debt when he/she wants to increase his/her private appropriation rate.     

制度环境、所有权性质与负债的治理效应

已有证据发现制度环境对企业债务融资具有重要的影响,但就制度环境对不同所有制之间负债治理效应差异的影响尚不明了。本文以我国上市公司2003—2007年的数据为样本,初步检验了国有上市公司和民营上市公司在负债治理效应方面是否存在显著差异以及制度环境对两者关系的影响。结果发现,整体上国有上市公司在负债治理效应上显著弱于民营上市公司,但是随着政府干预的减少、市场化进程的加快和法制水平的提高,国有上市公司相比民营上市公司在负债治理效应方面的差异将会逐渐缩小。这一研究成果不仅丰富了国内外学者对负债治理效应的相关经验研究,而且有助于我们更加深入地理解导致负债治理效应差异的制度根源。     

How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? Evidence from recent anti-corruption efforts in China

This paper investigates the effect of anti-corruption on the financing of and investing in innovation by using a detailed data set of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2015. We find that stronger anti-corruption efforts make firms more likely to acquire external funds, mainly the long-term debt. Moreover, we show that firms located in provinces with stronger anti-corruption efforts invest significantly more of their newly acquired funds in R&D and generate more patents. Further empirical tests suggest this positive and statistically significant effect almost comes entirely from the current massive anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi Jinping since 2013. We further test two mechanisms regarding the corruption-innovation nexus: the expropriation hypothesis and the rent-seeking hypothesis. The results show that only firms without political connections, non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), firms operating in non-regulated industries and younger firms benefit from the stronger anti-corruption efforts, all supportive of the former mechanism.     

Debt maturity and firm productivity—The role of intangibles

Does the maturity of debt matter for productivity? Using data on Italian firms from 1997 to 2015, we study the relationship among debt maturity, productivity, and firm characteristics. We find that productivity is positively associated with short-term debt and negatively associated with long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis that the less intense monitoring of firm performance and fewer liquidation fears stemming from the long maturity of debt causes a moral hazard, while short-term debt serves as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance in the short run. This effect is evident in small- and medium-sized enterprises and old firms. In contrast, large firms can utilize long-term financing to improve productivity through long-term investments. Firms improve productivity by purchasing intangible assets financed by short-term debt.     

上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值

本文就上市公司的债务融资与公司治理、公司市场价值的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验 ,发现我国上市公司债务融资占总资产的比重不大 ;总体上债务融资具有加强公司治理、增加公司市场价值的作用 ,但是对于少数资产负债率非常高的公司 ,这种作用并不显著 ;市场对公司发行债券有积极的反应 ;同时债务融资起到了传递公司业绩的信号作用。     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

IS THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL HIGHER FOR YOUNGER FIRMS?

Not much is known about the returns to aging (maturing) in the market for small business finance. Using a large panel of closely held micro firms, we document that the cost of debt capital is higher for young firms. The main finding of this paper is that this negative qualitative relation is also obtained when cross‐sectional variation in unobservable creditworthiness of small businesses and within‐firm (i.e., inter‐temporal) variation in their observable creditworthiness are held constant. We control for the former by firm‐specific fixed effects and for the latter by a commercial credit score. We also provide an estimate of the quantitative magnitude of the aging effect, on which both economic theory and earlier empirical research are silent. We find that when a small business ages one year, its cost of debt capital decreases by 1–2 basis points. The effect is neither negligible nor alarmingly large.     

债务融资和掠夺-来自中国家族上市公司的证据

以295家公司为样本,本文重点探讨我国家族上市公司债务融资的动机。结果发现,无论是用短期债务融资还是长期债务融资来衡量,银行借款行为都反映了家族终极控制人的掠夺动机。具体表现为:终极控制权和所有权的分离程度越大,负债融资的比例越高;在治理环境不完善的地区,这一特征尤其明显。这说明上市公司进行银行融资的目的不是为了发挥债务的治理效应,而是为了增加其可以控制的资源,为终极控制人的掏空行为提供便利。本文的分析有提醒金融监管当局防范金融风险的政策含义。     

Diversification and tunneling: Evidence from Indian business groups

We provide evidence suggesting an important yet largely unexplored motive for the diversified structure of emerging economy business groups is to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders through tunneling. Using firm level panel data from India, and defining the core firm of a group as the one with the largest asset base, we find that the relatedness of the activity of a group affiliate to the activity of the core firm is correlated with the wedge between control and cash flow rights of insiders as well as with the opacity in insider ownership. Firms with ownership-control wedge lower and ownership opacity higher relative to a group’s core firm are more likely to be in activities unrelated to that of the core firm. Our findings are strengthened by evidence of tunneling in the same direction, from affiliates with wedge equal to or higher than that of the core firm to affiliates with wedge lower than that of the core firm. Taken together this suggests an expropriation motive for diversification: affiliate firms are located away from a business group’s core firm to serve as destination points for funds tunneled from the group’s core.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

Convertible bonds issued in the bear market period: evidence from Taiwan

We argue that the behaviour of enterprises might be modified or even changed completely after black swan events occur. We explore why high-tech firms preferred to issue convertible bonds in 2001–2003, the bear market period after the tech bubble in Taiwan. We show that firms issuing convertible bonds are those with low directors’ holding ratio and high debt ratio. Results also reveal that corporate governance was worse in the firms that issued convertible bonds, as revealed by the finding that the directors’ holding ratio of these issuing firms declined considerably. This finding also implies that corporate governance issues become more serious after black swan events.     

Financial globalization and debt maturity in emerging economies

This paper studies how financial globalization affects debt structure in emerging economies. We find that by accessing international markets, firms increase their long-term debt and extend their debt maturity. In contrast, with financial liberalization, long-term debt decreases and the maturity structure shifts to the short term for the average firm. These effects are stronger in economies with less developed domestic financial systems. The evidence is consistent with financial integration having opposite effects on the firms that are able to integrate with world markets and obtain financing globally, relative to the firms that rely on domestic financing only.     

负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国上市公司为研究对象,考察负债融资及负债来源对企业投资行为的影响,从而揭示我国上市公司中股东-债权人冲突和负债作为治理机制所带来的经济后果。实证结果表明,负债比例越高的企业,企业投资规模越小,且两者之间的相关程度受新增投资项目风险与投资新项目前企业风险大小关系的影响———低项目风险企业比高项目风险企业,投资额随负债比例上升而下降得更快。此外,本项研究还发现,不同来源负债对企业投资规模的影响程度不尽相同。     

Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China

We employ a unique data set to explore the role of ownership structure and institutional development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese firms. We show that state ownership is positively associated with leverage and firms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign ownership is negatively associated with all measures of leverage. Surprisingly, firms in better developed regions are associated with reduced access to long-term debt, suggesting the availability of alternative financing channels and the tightening of the lending standards under the on-going banking reform. The combination of ownership structures and institutions explains up to 6% of the total variation in firms’ leverage decisions, while firm characteristics alone explain no more than 8% of the variation. Further, we show that non-state-owned firms tend to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-owned counterparts in less developed regions. Finally, we show that state-owned firms’ easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term investment and negatively associated with firm performance.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country's banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms’ bank debt decisions.     

银行负债、制度环境与控股股东代理成本

债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。文章就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2011年的面板数据,研究表明:企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。文章所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,又对银行与国有企业产权改革以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。     

The impact of debt restructuring on firm investment: Evidence from China

This paper empirically investigates the causal effects of debt restructuring on firm investment using the propensity matching score with difference-in-difference (PSM-DID) method based on the panel data of listed companies in China from 2005 to 2016. The results show that the impact of debt restructuring on firm investment are heterogeneous among different property rights, industry natures, restructuring payment modes and amounts, and debt renegotiation characteristics. Our analyses indicate that debt restructuring has a more significant impact on promoting investment efficiency for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), firms in industries with excess capacity, and debt-restructuring firms that pay off debts with assets. Debt restructuring significantly aggravates overinvestment when the amount of debt restructuring is large. When shareholder bargaining power is higher than that of debtholders in the debt renegotiation, debt restructuring has a significant inhibitory effect on underinvestment. Smaller debt renegotiation frictions exacerbate underinvestment and help mitigate overinvestment. This paper provides a new perspective for understanding the rationality of debt restructuring and has implications for policymakers and corporate decision makers aiming to improve debt governance and investment efficiency.     

MARKET REACTIONS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY ACT IN TAIWAN

Abstract. We examine how financial institutions react to various events surrounding the passage of Taiwan's Financial Holding Company Act in June 2001. Empirical results indicate that the financial system experiences significant abnormal returns along the legislative process. Smaller firms have significantly higher abnormal returns, thus lending no support for the hypothesis that larger firms benefit more from the Act. Further analysis shows that the significance of market value is replaced by a significant securities industry effect, thereby consistent with the observation that Taiwan's securities firms are generally smaller in market values and are potential target firms for financial holding companies.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.