Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives

Traditional human capital theory based on the work by Gary Becker shows that firms do not invest in general human capital but offer firm‐specific training that is only useful for the training firm. I extend the traditional approach by adding two natural assumptions—workers cannot be forced to acquire new knowledge, and they exert unobservable effort to produce valuable output for their employer. I show under which conditions firms do not offer firm‐specific training but invest in general human capital, which increases the workers' outside option. This investment behavior is well in line with the documented prevalence of industry‐specific and occupation‐specific human capital over firm‐specific human capital.     

The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry*

abstract Syndicates are a form of inter‐firm alliance in which two or more venture capital firms co‐invest in an investee firm and share a joint pay‐off. Syndication is a significant part of the venture capital market yet little research has been conducted into the process of structuring syndicate deals and the management of syndicates following deal completion. This paper analyses the neglected issues concerning the structuring and management of syndicated venture capital investments from the perspectives of both lead and non‐lead syndicate members using two surveys of venture capital firms and examination of syndication documents. Lead investors typically have larger equity stakes and the syndicated investment agreement is a document that enshrines the rights of participants rather than specifying behaviour. Contractual arrangements typically serve as a back drop to relationships as non‐legal sanctions are important and decisions are typically reached following discussion and consensus, but lead venture capital investors’ residual and specific powers are important in ensuring timely decision‐making. The findings extend previous work on alliances by emphasizing the importance of non‐legal sanctions, especially reputation effects, in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by dominant equity holders. The paper also adds to the limited research on the dynamics of alliances by highlighting the role of repeat syndicates.     

Firm Productivity Moderated Link Between Human Capital and Compensation: The Significance of Task‐Specific Human Capital

The human capital of a firm as manifested by employee knowledge and experience represents a key resource of a firm's capabilities. Prior empirical studies have found that firms composed of high levels of human capital experience superior firm performance. Human capital theory proposes that an individual's general or firm‐specific human capital is positively related to compensation. However, empirical studies examining firm‐specific human capital's association with higher employee compensation have been inconclusive. The current study proposes that firm‐specific human capital be categorized as task‐specific and non‐task‐specific. Employees accumulate task‐specific human capital through duties conducted in their current position. Non‐task‐specific human capital represents experiences gained in prior positions to an employee's current job within the firm. Utilizing human capital data from 38,390 employees representing 76 firms in the IT sector, this study examines the association between forms of human capital and employee compensation at different levels of firm productivity. Results show that task‐specific human capital is associated with higher employee compensation. In addition, firm productivity moderates this association.     

A Knowledge Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances

ABSTRACT The emerging knowledge‐based view of the firm offers new insight into the causes and management of interfirm alliances. However, the development of an effective knowledge‐based theory of alliance formation has been inhibited by a simplistic view of alliances as vehicles for organizational learning in which strategic alliances have presumed to be motivated by firms’ desire to acquire knowledge from one another. We argue that the primary advantage of alliances over both firms and markets is in accessing rather than acquiring knowledge. Building upon the distinction between the knowledge generation (‘exploration’) and knowledge application (‘exploitation’), we show that alliances contribute to the efficiency in the application of knowledge; first, by improving the efficiency with which knowledge is integrated into the production of complex goods and services, and second, by increasing the efficiency with which knowledge is utilized. These static efficiency advantages of alliances are enhanced where there is uncertainty over future knowledge requirements and where new products offer early‐mover advantages. Compared with alternative learning‐based approaches to alliance formation, our proposed knowledge‐accessing theory of alliances offers the advantages of greater theoretical rigour and consistency with general trends in alliance activity and corporate strategy.     

Antecedents of New Director Social Capital

Prior research shows that firms benefit from the social capital of their boards of directors but has not explored the antecedents of new director social capital. We argue that firms can attract directors with social capital by offering more compensation. We also argue that more complex firms (firms with a greater scale and scope of operations) are more attractive to such directors because of the greater experience and exposure that such directorships provide. Similarly, we argue that firms with high‐status directors on their current boards will be more attractive to directors with social capital. We analyse the social capital of new outside directors added to boards of semiconductor firms between 1993 and 2007. Surprisingly, we find no support for the hypothesis that higher compensation is associated with adding directors with high status or board ties. However, firm complexity is associated with the ability to add new directors who have social capital, and the status of current board members is associated with the ability to add new directors who also have high status.     

Firm and Group Influences on Venture Capital Firms’ Involvement in New Ventures

abstract Drawing on expectancy, equity, and collective effort theories, we argue that the level of involvement of individual firms in multifirm alliances depends on both individual firms’ self‐focused interests and factors stemming from the firms’ membership in the alliance group. We apply our theoretical arguments to the context of venture capital syndicates and test the hypotheses using data about 160 venture capital firms (VCFs) drawn from a survey instrument and a secondary data source. The results show that individual firms’ involvement in a multifirm alliance is somewhat dominated by group effects; specifically, financial stake relative to that of the group and the reputation of the other group members significantly influence the focal firm's involvement. However, focal firms’ involvement relates negatively to their own reputation. We discuss the implications of these findings for future research. Our results imply that firms in multiparty alliances pay attention to the characteristics of their alliance partnership to calibrate their own behaviour. In our specific setting, VCF involvement in syndicates depends more on relative syndicate characteristics than on the focal firm's absolute level of investment. Further, because reputation is negatively associated with involvement, entrepreneurs and potential syndicate entrants should ensure that they fully leverage VCF reputation to achieve their goals.     

The Influence of Technological Knowledge Base and Organizational Structure on Technology Collaboration

This study investigates how an incumbent company's internal characteristics influence its propensity to form learning alliances. A firm may be reluctant to enter a research alliance when it has deep knowledge in a certain technological field due to concerns about knowledge leakage and the low possibility of being able to learn much from collaboration. On the contrary, when the firm has a broad knowledge base, it may have high propensity to enter alliances due to more self‐confidence in its ability to learn fast from partners. In addition, we argue that when a firm concentrates its R&D at a central location, this neutralizes the positive and negative influences of the two knowledge base features on alliance formation. We tested and found support for the hypotheses using a database of 1550 alliances undertaken by 78 large incumbent pharmaceutical, chemical, and agro‐food companies active in the biotechnology sector during 1993–2002.     

Determinants of Capital Structure: United Kingdom Versus Continental European Countries

In this paper, we analyze how country‐specific differences influence capital structure indirectly through firm‐specific variables. We apply a system Generalized Method of Moments technique to a panel data sample of companies from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) during the period 1998–2008. As the different financial systems of European economies (bank‐oriented or market‐oriented) may influence capital structure differently through firm‐specific variables, we first examine the determinants of capital structure for each country separately and we then analyze whether the observed differences between the United Kingdom and the continental European countries are relevant. The results show that there are substantial differences in the capital structure choices of firms across five major European countries. These differences are motivated by the type of financial systems of the countries (bank‐oriented and market‐oriented) and influence the capital structure indirectly through the firm‐specific variables. Overall, our results support the relevance of the differences in the capital structure choices of firms across five major European countries, and in particular, the singularity of the United Kingdom (a market‐oriented economy) as opposed to continental European countries (bank‐oriented economies).     

实时财务报告技术采纳与资本成本——基于“创新接受”视角的理论模

在资本市场中,公司与其对手为获得更低的资本成本展开竞争。为了达成目标,公司都尝试采用新的信息技术来提高信息披露的透明度。扩展组织"创新接受"理论的内容并整合影响实时财务报告技术采纳和资本成本的主要因素,利用数学模型建构两者之间的约束关系,结果发现,资本成本的节省、不确定性、风险规避、交易、转换成本以及公司治理政策等都对公司何时以及是否采纳实时财务报告技术产生影响。     

Capital structure,product market competition and firm performance: Evidence from South Africa

This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm performance, paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition. The paper applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-performance relationship. Using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998–2009, this paper examines the effect of capital structure on firm performance and investigates the extent to which the relationship depends on the level of product market competition. The results suggest that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that product market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage.     

Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments

We show that asymmetric information may prevent firms with pure discount bonds from renegotiating their capital structure prior to the maturity of the debt, although this would increase the value of the firm when its prospects are poor. This inefficiency can be reduced if the firm issues debt with a risky intermediate debt payment, such as a coupon or a sinking fund payment. We also demonstrate that bankruptcy institutions leading to deviations from absolute priority can improve the timing of recapitalizations by financially distressed firms. Finally, we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal capital structure adjustment during financial distress consists of a convertible debt-for-straight debt swap.     

Strategic HR system differentiation between jobs: The effects on firm performance and employee outcomes

The purpose of this research was to understand whether firms apply different human resource management systems to different occupations within the same organization (HR differentiation) and how the extent to which they do so may influence firm and employee outcomes. We conducted two studies pertaining to these questions. The first study was based on data collected from managers, and the results suggest that firms differentiate their HR investments based on the strategic value of occupations to the firm, which was further associated with the human capital of those occupations. Differentiation in human capital was also associated with firm performance. The second study was based on data obtained from nonmanagement employees. The findings indicated that employees who were recipients of less HR system investment had lower fairness perceptions, which were further associated with higher turnover intentions and lower organizational citizenship behavior. Although the evidence from these studies suggests that firms may realize benefits from strategic HR system differentiation, managers should carefully consider how to balance the effects of differentiation on firm performance and employee well‐being before implementing such systems.     

The Relationship between Slack Resources and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms: The Role of Venture Capital and Angel Investors

In this study, we seek to further delineate factors that condition the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. To do so, we develop and test a model that establishes the role of venture capital (VC) and angel investors as powerful external stakeholders who positively moderate the slack–performance relationship. In addition, we provide more insight into this relationship by examining differences between these two types of private investors and by examining the role of their ownership stakes. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1215 private firms, including VC‐backed firms, angel‐backed firms, and similar firms without such investors. We find that the presence of VC investors positively moderates the relationship between both financial and human slack resources and firm performance, while angel investors only positively moderate the effect of human resource slack. Further, VC investors are only marginally better at helping entrepreneurs to extract value from human resource slack than angel investors and they are no better when it comes to financial slack. Finally, we find that the impact of financial and human resource slack on firm performance is more positive in VC‐backed firms when investors hold high ownership stakes, an effect which is significantly stronger than when angel investors hold high ownership stakes.     

Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that regulated firms issue more debt, invest more, and enjoy higher regulated prices when they face more independent regulators, are more privatized, and when regulators are more pro‐firm. Moreover, regulatory independence, higher degree of privatization, and pro‐firm regulatory climate are associated with higher social welfare.     

Residual income claimancy,monitoring, and the R&D firm: Theory with application to biotechs

This paper models the assignment of residual income claimancy to an R&D manager and applies the model to biotechnology firms. Residual income claimancy provides incentives for the manager to monitor the R&D process. Since the nature of R&D and of monitoring scientific effort is different, our model predicts stark differences in the residual income claimancy of managers and in other aspects of organization for innovative R&D firms like biotechs. In particular, R&D firms are expected to be more owner‐managed, more expert‐managed, and smaller in size. Cross‐sectional data on biotechnology firms is consistent with these implications. Additionally, longitudinal data indicate that as firms alter their focus on biotech research, their organizational structure changes as expected. Our approach suggests a process of firm and industry evolution related to technological maturity and points to the importance of incentives rather than risk sharing in determining organizational form, similar to the original analysis of franchising. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multinationals' Offshore Operations,Tax Avoidance,and Firm‐Specific Information Flows: International Evidence

Using a large sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs) over the period 1999–2009, this study investigates whether and how offshore operations via offshore financial centers (OFCs) impact the extent to which firm‐specific information is incorporated into stock price, relative to common information. Our analyses show that, irrespective of whether a firm is a Type I offshore firm (directly having headquarters registered in OFCs) or a Type II offshore firm (indirectly setting up subsidiaries in OFCs), the amount of firm‐specific information flowing into stock price is lower for offshore firms than for non‐offshore firms. We also find that as offshore firms become more aggressive in their tax avoidance strategies, their stock prices impound a lower amount of firm‐specific information relative to common information. Finally, we find that a strong offshore proclivity also deters firm‐specific information flows, thereby driving up stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that the opaque and complex nature of business and financial transactions in OFCs, coupled with their institutional characteristics, that is, weak and flexible legal enforcement, zero or extremely low taxation, and low litigation risk, provide offshore firms with not only stronger incentives but also the opportunities and means to adopt opaque disclosure policies and aggressive earnings management.     

Causality Rules: Performance Feedback on Hierarchically Related Goals and Capital Investment Variability

We extend March and Simon’s (1958) analysis of strategic decisions by distinguishing between two rules for allocating attention – priority versus causality. We develop theory concerning causality rules which have been largely overlooked in prior literature. Specifically, we examine how performance feedback on the intermediate productivity goal and the higher‐order profitability goal independently and jointly influence the variability of firm capital investments. Panel analysis of 2,477 Spanish manufacturing firms reveals that these goals jointly affect the variability of capital investments through both priority and causality attention rules. Our study provides new insights on how firms handle multiple goals, deconstruct performance feedback, and cope with the attentional constraints of bounded rationality.     

Capital utilization and capital accumulation: Theory and evidence

A firm may acquire additional capital input by purchasing new capital or by increasing the utilization of its current capital. The margin between capital accumulation and capital utilization is studied in a model of dynamic factor demand where the firm chooses capital, labour and their rates of utilization. A direct measure of capital utilization-the work week of capital-is incorporated into the theory and estimates. The estimates imply that capital stock is costly to adjust while the work week of capital is essentially costless to adjust. The estimated response of the capital stock to changes in its price and in the required rate of return is more rapid than found in other estimates.     

Corporate Capital Budgeting Decisions and Information Sharing

Firms must overcome agency and information asymmetry problems to make efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions; this is particularly true for firms with multiple units dispersed across geographic locations. Internal communication and coordination may therefore be crucial in reducing information asymmetry and achieving efficient resource allocation. We examine the relationship between corporate capital budgeting decisions and the degree of internal information sharing using a dataset of 342 U.S. firms from 1993 to 2002. Information sharing is measured by the internal linkages observed in firms’ research and development activities worldwide. The efficiency of a firm's capital budgeting decisions is measured by the deviation of the firm's estimated marginal q from the theoretical tax‐adjusted benchmark. We observe a significant relationship between value‐enhancing capital budgeting decisions and stronger internal linkages. Specifically, corporate overinvestment is significantly reduced with better information sharing across units. All results are robust to firm‐ and industry‐level controls.     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.