Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

The BMW Model: A New Framework for Teaching Monetary Economics

Abstract: Although the IS/LM-AS/AD model is still the central tool of macroeconomic teaching in most macroeconomic textbooks, it has been criticized by several economists. Colander (1995) demonstrated that the framework is logically inconsistent, Romer (2000) showed that it is unable to deal with a monetary policy that uses the interest rate as its operating target, and Walsh criticized that it is not well suited for an analysis of inflation targeting. The authors present a framework that develops the Romer approach into a very simple but, at the same time, comprehensive macroeconomic model. In spite of its simplicity, it can carry the main insights of the New Keynesian macroeconomics to an intermediate level and deal with issues like inflation targeting, monetary policy rules, and central bank credibility.     

Inflation volatility,economic growth and monetary policy in Bangladesh

This article provides an overview of the trends and movements of CPI-inflation in Bangladesh since the early 1950s and examines the key issues in rule-based monetary policy for price stability, implying low and stable inflation, in this country. Under a fixed exchange rate system, inflation in Bangladesh was moderately high and volatile during the 1950s and 1960s. Since the country’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, inflation in Bangladesh has remained moderately high on average and highly volatile and persistent under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system or under a managed floating system since 2003. Using data from the early 1970s or earlier depending on data availability, the article undertakes both Granger-causality and the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis with two models. The first model is comprised of such variables as inflation, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate and output growth, and the second model is comprised of the volatilities of money growth, real output growth and inflation. Then, based on the empirical findings, the article concludes that a rule-based monetary policy, namely monetary targeting or inflation targeting, remains appropriate for Bangladesh provided that it adopts a more flexible, if not freely floating, exchange rate system. The article suggests that the use of monetary policy to achieve multiple objectives under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system creates a time-inconsistency problem, reduces monetary policy credibility and makes it (monetary policy) ineffective in lowering inflation and its volatility. Low credibility of monetary policy in particular raises inflation persistence. Within the present monetary-policy framework in Bangladesh, the article illustrates how the fixed-pegged exchange rate system has generated money growth volatility in the presence of large-scale inflows of overseas workers’ remittances and readymade garments export earnings. This does not seem to be a concern of the central bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank); rather, it (Bangladesh Bank) pursues monetary-base targeting to keep inflation low and stable after considering economic growth. The consequent diminishing credibility of monetary policy has kept inflation volatile and persistent, which has adversely affected economic growth.     

How credible is inflation targeting in Asia? A quantile unit root perspective

This article examines the dynamic behavior of the inflation rate for eight Asian countries using a quantile unit root test. We advocate a three-way definition of inflation targeting based on perfect, imperfect and zero credibility and advance the analysis by incorporating a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In doing so, we offer new insights by showing that the credibility of inflation targeting and the alternative monetary policy frameworks in Asia are imperfect, except for Malaysia and South Korea under a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In contrast to past studies that focus on the mean-reversion in inflation rates, we also consider trend-reversion and find that Asian inflation targeting countries have been building up their monetary policy credibility more than the non- inflation targeting countries in terms of a faster rate of decline in inflation rate changes. Our results generally indicate the presence of mean reversion at the lower quantiles only. Where stationarity is present, we find evidence of a varied speed of adjustment process across the quantiles. Finally, we determine the threshold levels whereby inflation becomes stationary and demonstrate that Asian inflation rates generally display stationary behavior during periods of inflation declining or slowing down.     

Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the fear of floating?

Based on the argument that monetary policy credibility can reduce the fear of floating, we analyze this hypothesis for a set of 47 countries (of which, 32 are developing countries, 26 are Inflation Targeting countries and 16 are Inflation Targeting developing countries). Our study is the first to empirically assess the impact of monetary policy credibility (defined as the central bank's ability to anchor inflation expectations to the target) on the central banks' reaction through the basic interest rate due to exchange rate fluctuations (fear of floating). Based on panel data methodology applied to different samples, the most important result of this paper is that monetary policy credibility is able to mitigate the fear of floating. However, this effect is weaker after the crisis. Our estimates also reveal that Inflation Targeting developing countries present stronger fear of floating, which is justified by the fear of inflation in these countries.     

The Simple Post-Keynesian Monetary Policy Model: An Open Economy Approach

Monetary policy with an inflation targeting rule is analyzed through a simple small-scale Post-Keynesian model that incorporates open economy issues. In contrast with previous Post-Keynesian attempts, the model embodies policy authorities that are committed not only to hitting inflation and/or output targets, but also to the achievement of the external balance. To take account of the external balance objective, we model the real exchange rate as an endogenous and moving target, with the nominal exchange rate being the instrument of that target. The model shows that in response to an adverse external shock the central bank has to consider first the required real exchange rate adjustment that will preserve the external balance, and secondly the level at which the interest rate must be set in order to maintain inflation stabilization. Keeping inflation to target requires higher interest rates and strong reliance on the unemployment channel which, under certain circumstances, also has adverse side effects on income distribution. We show that to deal with an exogenous external shock a policy mix of real exchange rate targeting and income distribution targeting outperforms inflation targeting.     

The effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the real interest rate in the United Kingdom

This paper studies the effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the stochastic properties of the real interest rate in the U.K. The empirical analysis suggests a constant mean of the real interest rate that shifts with the monetary policy regime change to inflation targeting in October 1992. The mean-reverting level of the real interest rate has decreased from 5.1% to 2.3% per annum with the change in monetary policy to inflation targeting. In addition, the shift in monetary policy regime to inflation targeting has reduced the volatility of the real interest rate and increased the persistence of real interest rate deviations from the mean. The results suggest that the central bank can affect the stochastic properties of the real interest rate through the choice of monetary policy regime over a long period of time.     

Monetary policy uncertainty and interest rate targeting

This paper studies the issue of monetary delegation in the case where central banker’s preferences are uncertain. A distinctive feature of the analysis is that it introduces nominal interest rate targets to the monetary delegation scheme in addition to linear contracts, quadratic punishments, and inflation targets. This paper shows that the implementation of interest rate targeting will improve social welfare since it leads the central bank to make smaller interventions, which limits the scope for the central bank’s uncertain preferences to impact the economy.     

Macroeconomic environment,country risk and stock market performance: Evidence for Brazil

The paper aims at providing empirical evidence about (i) the influence of macroeconomic variables and economic policies on country risk and (ii) the influence of macroeconomic variables and country risk on the main Brazilian index of the stock market (Ibovespa). The study analyzes the role that macroeconomic fundamentals plays, but also the role that the credibility of the regime of inflation targeting and the reputation of the central bank play in lessening country risk and in the improvement of the stock market performance. The empirical evidence was obtained through the application of ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized method of moments (GMM) and GMM systems. The results found suggest that monetary policy and public debt management, as well as credibility and reputation affect country risk and the performance of the Brazilian stock market.     

The Taylor rules and macroeconomic fluctuation in China: 1994–2006

The correlation and controllability of money supply as the intermediate object of monetary policy is gradually weakening, the argument that interest rate substitutes the money supply for the alternative object is hotly discussed. According to the Taylor rule and its extensions, this paper has a positive analysis on the efficiency of Taylor-type rules in China through historical analysis, policy reaction function approach and co-integration technology of time series analysis. This paper draws a conclusion that Taylor rule is unstable in China, and less correlation can be found between interest rate and the output gap, and the central bank focus on the inflation target rather than economic growth. Therefore, the central bank should abide by the simple rule of inflation targeting.     

Are speed limit policies robust?

Both price level targeting and speed limit policies have been suggested as alternatives to inflation targeting that may confer benefits when a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss function is specified in terms of inflation volatility. Here we show that price level targeting dominates a speed limit policy under perfect credibility and rational expectations. However, a speed limit policy is more robust than a price level target. Even for small deviations from either rational expectations or perfect credibility, a speed limit policy dominates a price level target.     

Fixed exchange rates,independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are used by governments to achieve stable prices. This article analyzes the mechanisms through which the two monetary institutions could work: Indirectly via a disciplinary effect on money growth rates or via an additional credibility effect on inflation expectations and the cost of capital. I further explain how both discipline and credibility are affected by the distinct flaws of independent central banks and fixed exchange rates: central banks lack transparency and fixed exchange rates take many shapes and are routinely devalued. The argument is tested with quarterly data from postcommunist countries for years 1991 to 2007. The findings show a strong disciplinary effect of monetary institutions on rates of M2 change and an effect on inflation controlling for money growth, but credibility does not extend to lower real short‐term market interest rates. Political institutions do condition the effect of central bank independence, while the types of fixed exchange rates affect money growth rates and inflation to different degrees.     

Neo‐Fisherism and inflation control

According to conventional central banking wisdom, an inflation‐targeting central bank should increase (decrease) its nominal interest rate target when inflation is above (below) its target. According to neo‐Fisherites, conventional central bankers have the sign wrong. Essentially all mainstream macroeconomic models tell us that increases in nominal interest rates increase inflation—in the short run and in the long run. This paper reviews neo‐Fisherian theory and evidence and addresses issues relating to inflation control in low real interest rate environments.     

A small-scale DSGE-VAR model for the Romanian economy

This paper describes the theoretical structure and the estimation results for a DSGE-VAR model for the Romanian economy, an inflation targeting country since 2005. Having as benchmark the New-Keynesian model of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005), the main additional feature introduced refers to the extension to a small open economy setting in order to account for this specific aspect of the Romanian economy.Within the inflation targeting monetary policy regime, forecasts of central macro variables, inflation in particular, play an important part. Because inflation reacts to monetary measures with a considerable lag, the central bank's policy has to be forward-looking. Based on univariate measures of forecast performance, it is shown that the VAR with DSGE model prior produces forecasts that improve on those obtained using an unrestricted VAR model and the popular Minnesota prior in case of inflation, real exchange rate and nominal interest rate. Moreover, the DSGE-VAR model is informative about the structure of the economy and can help the “story-telling” in the central banks.     

Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq

This paper theoretically investigates optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing countries. We analyze credibility and reputation of the Central Bank and macroeconomic dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes. We construct a detailed and realistic model that can be used to analyze macroecomic structure and expectation dynamics of an oil producing open economy. We take into account the asymmetric information between the public and the central bank and theoretically investigate how this asymmetric information impacts the real economy and the credibility of the central bank. The simulation results indicate that central bank achieves higher credibility and lower inflation under dollarization and higher output levels under currency board regime. The model constructed in this paper has many policy implications for oil producing open economies. Using the implications of the model, we make monetary policy regime recommendations for post-war Iraq.     

Does wage-inflation targeting complement foreign exchange intervention? An evaluation of a multi-target,two-instrument monetary policy framework

We assess the inclusion of wage inflation as an intermediate target of an emerging central bank using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky wages and prices calibrated for the South Korean economy. The model includes wage inflation as an additional target jointly with domestic price inflation and the output gap in a Taylor- type interest rate rule operating with a sterilized foreign exchange (FX) intervention rule. Our results show a complementary relationship between wage inflation targeting and price inflation targeting. That is, by supplementing price inflation targeting with wage inflation targeting, welfare improves for cases with and without sterilized FX intervention. When intervention is in place, wage inflation targeting has the added advantage of reducing the volatilities of nominal exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves thereby promoting a more sustainable conduct of FX intervention.     

Is inflation targeting a good remedy to control inflation?

Since the 1990s inflation targeting (IT) has been adopted by several central banks as a strategy for monetary policy. It is expected that the adoption of this monetary regime can reduce inflation and inflation volatility. This article is concerned with these issues and makes use of the Propensity Score Matching methodology on a sample of 180 countries for the period from 1990 to 2007. For analysis, the sample is split into two sets of countries (advanced and developing). The findings suggest that the adoption of IT is an ideal monetary regime for developing economies and, in addition to reducing inflation volatility, can drive inflation down to internationally acceptable levels. Regarding advanced economies, the adoption of IT does not appear to represent an advantageous strategy. In brief, the empirical results indicate that the adoption of IT is useful for countries that must enhance their credibility for the management of monetary policy.     

The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt: empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy

This study relates to the literature regarding credibility effect on public debt for developing economies under inflation targeting. The novelty is the investigation of effects of both monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt and its management. The main idea is that high credibility might improve public debt management. With this purpose, this paper addresses empirical evidence based on the Brazilian experience. The findings denote that credibility is an important instrument to improve the public debt management under inflation targeting.     

The exchange rate and optimal monetary policy rules in open and developing economies: Some simple analytics

Using a simple, tractable model, this paper revisits and expands upon issues relating to optimal monetary policy rules (MPRs) in open economies. The optimality of the rule is explored through various specifications of a central bank loss function as it is the loss function that offers insight into central bank preferences. Many of the issues on this topic have centred on the role of the exchange rate: Is it optimal for the policy instrument to react to the exchange rate? What is the role of the exchange rate in a domestic inflation targeting vs CPI inflation targeting? Does a fear of floating have any bearing on the way optimal MPRs are constructed? While this paper is not empirical, the analysis is relevant for central banks in open and developing economies that face a choice between allowing exchange rates to float (and adopting an inflation targeting regime) and engaging in some degree of exchange rate fixity.     

Optimal monetary rules: the case of Brazil

Within a dynamic programming approach, an optimal rule for the central bank to attain its inflation targeting goals is derived. The short-run nominal interest rate is used as an instrument to achieve monetary objectives. The model is tested for the Brazilian economy and compared with results found for other countries. Evidence for the estimated feedback interest rule for the Central Bank suggests that the cost of reducing inflation in an open economy is lower than that of a closed economy.