规制承诺不确定条件下的电网投资效应及其政策设计

本文研究规制政策不确定条件下电网投资效应问题。通过对投资回报率规制政策下规制机构与电网企业的完全信息博弈模型分析．得出了电网企业和规制机构分别限制投资和改变规制政策或承诺的最优均衡解．从而得出了规制承诺或政策不确定条件下存在投资不足效应的结论。为了促进电网投资均衡，实现社会福利最大化，规制机构应该用效用函数重新定义投资均衡，将供求均衡状况因素引入投资回报率规制政策中．制定和执行弹性而可信的规制政策。     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

国有企业主导与行政性垄断下的价格合谋——“京沪空中快线”引发的若干思考

本文基于民航产业的价格同盟进行的模型分析和经验研究，在一定程度上解释了行政垄断和企业间合谋的关系。研究发现，在规制缺失或默许的条件下．包含惩罚方式的价格合谋是一个可行和可实施的机制安排，而寡头垄断和行政垄断的结合是诱发规制者干预价格竞争，最终形成所谓“价格同盟”的结构和制度条件。规制者和垄断国有企业关系的交织和错位下的反竞争行为，是未来《反垄断法》实施的主要障碍。     

财政分权、 所有权性质与企业税收规避

财政分权作为一种制度设计对微观企业行为产生了深远影响，然而却很少有研究对其微观经济后果进行分析。本文从分权视角切入，实证评估了财政分权对企业税收规避的影响。研究发现：财政分权的提高会降低企业进行税收规避的意愿，并在不同产权企业间表现出明显的异质性，这一结论在一系列稳健性检验后依旧存在；进一步研究发现，财政收入分权降低会增加企业税收规避意愿，而财政支出分权降低则会表现出相反的效果；同时，本文研究还发现，在不同的市场发展阶段、法律制度等多个方面，财政分权的提高会对企业避税产生差异化的影响。本文研究不仅拓展了财政分权经济后果等方面的研究，还可以为新时期政府间事权改革提供一定参考。     

政府环境规制、 企业环境治理与银行利率定价——基于演化博弈的理论分析与实证检验

本文构建了包括政府、 银行与企业在内的三方演化博弈模型， 推演得出政府环境规制、企业环境治理与银行利率定价之间的关系， 并在此基础上利用重污染上市公司 2012～2018年数据对理论分析结论进行实证检验。 研究结果表明： 政府环境规制对企业环境治理有显著正向影响， 对银行利率定价有显著负向影响； 企业环境治理会显著降低银行利率定价； 企业环境治理在政府环境规制和银行利率定价之间发挥了中介作用； 相比于低质量环境信息披露企业， 在环境信息披露质量较高的企业中， 环境治理的中介效应更强。     

中国煤矿安全规制效果实证研究

本文在煤矿安全规制效果理论分析基础上,采用VAR模型实证检验中国煤矿安全规制效果。研究结果表明,中国煤矿安全规制在长期是有效的,体现在长期可以显著降低煤炭百万吨死亡率。但是,这种有效性在短期内会被煤矿工人的逆向行为所抵消,从而意味着规制机构在煤矿安全规制中面临短期效果和长期效果之间的权衡。实证分析还发现,煤炭产量增加在短期内会降低煤炭百万吨死亡率,而在长期则会提高煤炭百万吨死亡率。在上述实证结果基础上,本文提出了改善中国煤矿安全规制效果的政策建议。     

政府约束机制下环境质量监管三方演化博弈分析及仿真研究

本文研究环境检测领域政府监管部门、第三方环境检测机构、排污企业3个主体在信息不对称与有限理性情况下的行为选择问题， 为政府加强环境质量管理提供重要的指导意义。本文基于演化博弈理论， 构建第三方与排污企业之间的协调均衡博弈模型和第三方与排污企业合谋构成的利益集团与政府监管部门之间的非对称演化博弈模型， 研究行为主体的策略选择问题并利用Matlab仿真不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。结果表明： 惩罚额度、监管力度、监管成本是分别影响监管部门、排污企业、第三方检测机构演化稳定策略的关键因素， 最后从资格审查、竞争机制、信息系统、奖惩机制方面给出政府加强环境质量监管的建议， 从而更加有效地抑制环境测领域数据造假行为。     

中国电力产业规制效果的实证研究

本文利用1978--2005年相关数据对中国电力规制效果进行了全面的实证检验。计量结果表明，改革开放以来，明确的规制框架、独立规制机构和不断成熟的规制对象在统计意义上显著地提高了电力产业总量和效率，降低了价格水平和垄断利润．但在改善服务质量方面尚未发挥有效作用。总体看，中国电力产业规制效果是明显的．良好的规制设计不仅在理论上有利于电力产业提高绩效，在实践中也是电力产业绩效改善的推动力。     

制度偏好差异与电力产业规制放松的困境--"厂网分开"引发的深层思考

本文利用“芝加哥”学派利益集团理论的基本假设，对我国电力产业内部人势力的形成、强化及其行为对市场交易的扭曲进行了详尽的分析，从而为当前电力产业规制困境的发生提出了一个基于制度偏好和企业行为的解释。结果表明，在缺乏有效规制的背景下．对自然垄断产业实施等同于一般产业的“放权让利”武改革，为利益集团的成长提供了制度条件和资金支持。由于管制权力分散在诸多的“条块”之间。“厂网分开”后也没有建立权威性的专业机构．不同利益取向的参与者之间的博弈使电力产业的规制放松陷入困境。     

阻止审计合谋 提高注册会计师的独立性

审计合谋是指审计机构(会计师事务所)或审计人员(注册会计师)与被审计单位经营者勾结起来,采取不正当手段欺骗委托人(股东)、社会公众以从中渔利的一种社会行为.本文剖析了审计合谋的根源,提出治理合谋的对策.     

Collusion,entry, and market shares

This paper analyzes market entry and collusion in a model of duopoly with product-specific-set-up costs. The analysis demonstrates that collusion can alter the incentives for entry deterrence. We find conditions under which an established firm will permit entry and collude with a potential entrant even though entry deterrence is a viable option under noncooperative oligopoly rules. Conditions are also specified in which entry will be effectively impeded and collusion will not be undertaken.     

COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*

I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.     

Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation,cost-based and retail-minus

In this paper, two instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, are compared with the full deregulation hypothesis. For this purpose, a model that considers an upstream monopolist firm that sells a vital input to an independent firm and to a subsidiary firm in the downstream market is developed. The main conclusion of the paper is that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus. Moreover, retail-minus regulation allows a higher consumer surplus than deregulation of access price as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus instrument.     

Vertical integration and downstream collusion

We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors. The integrated firm, accessing the input at marginal cost, faces higher profits in the deviation phase and in the non-cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care of the increased incentive to deviate of the integrated firm, while optimal punishment erases the difficulty related to the asymmetries in the non-cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion.     

Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding and Firms’ Incentives to Collude

Collusion seems to be a pervasive problem when regional monopoly rights are auctioned to private firms. This leads us to study whether firms may collude if the regulator uses yardstick competition to simulate competitive forces, and how collusion is affected when both schemes are used. Using an infinitely repeated game framework, we find that collusion is sustainable when firms are sufficiently patient under yardstick competition. An additional franchise bidding mechanism can even help firms sustain collusion when they are impatient. When temporary monopoly rights are assigned for sufficiently long periods of time, collusion may not be sustainable even when firms are patient.     

Privatization,corporate control and regulatory reform: the case of Telefonica

This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a dispersed ownership and give managers a high level of discretion in running the company. This effectively created an agency problem inside the firm. There were no powerful shareholders to constrain the managers, and the threat of a takeover was not a credible one, since the government kept a golden share. There is no overall evidence of capture of politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although evidence suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. The authors interpret the political interference with the firm's control (a well-documented phenomenon both in this study and in the cross-country literature on privatization; e.g. political ends in privatization, influence in appointments, golden shares) as the most visible part of such collusion. Liberalization and multi-level regulation will likely make any type of collusion or capture more difficult in the future.     

Motivating regulated suppliers to assess alternative technologies,protocols, and capital structures

Regulated firms can be tempted to adopt cost-saving technologies, operating procedures, or capital structures without fully assessing the associated risks. We demonstrate how a regulator can costlessly preclude such behavior if she can impose substantial penalties on the firm in the event of poor realized performance. When these penalties are more limited, the regulated firm secures rent from its privileged ability to assess the riskiness of potential technologies. If these penalties are sufficiently limited, the regulator optimally affords the firm no choice among technologies. Consequently, the regulated firm prefers moderate penalties to very limited penalties.     

A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion

We develop a model of hub-and-spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers. Demand is stochastic, and collusion between retailers is difficult; the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)). In the hub-and-spoke collusive agreement, retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier. The supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price. By organizing the collusion, the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain. We show that, surprisingly, this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare.     

Alfred E. Kahn, 1917–2010

Our introduction to this compendium reviews Alfred Kahn’s academic and policy interests, his activities as a regulator and advisor to governments and companies, and the interactions between these aspects of his life as an economist. Although best known for his research on the economics of regulation and his application of microeconomic principles in his role as a regulator and advisor, Kahn’s academic research portfolio was much more diverse. He wrote about patent policy, economic development, antitrust policy, and other topics, in addition to his work on regulation and deregulation. Even before becoming a regulator he was actively involved in applying economic principles to regulatory problems as an advisor and consultant. In all of his work Kahn recognized that markets were imperfect, but that policies aimed at improving market performance often made things worse. His experience as a regulator and consultant strengthened his recognition that the costs of imperfect regulation had to be carefully balanced against the costs of imperfect markets. One had to search for the best that could be done in an imperfect world. Kahn was particularly fascinated by the challenges of designing and implementing policies to govern the transition from regulated monopoly or oligopoly to an industry that would ultimately rely primarily on competitive markets to govern firm behavior and performance. Fred Kahn was an extraordinary man who is missed greatly by his many friends and colleagues representing a wide range of political orientations and approaches to economic and public policy analysis.     

论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制

在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。