质量成本核算是质量成本管理的关键

质量成本核算是企业开展质量成本分析、撰写质量成本报告、制定质量成本计划、实施质量成本控制以及反映企业质量管理工作绩效的基础。它是质量成本管理的重要环节,其目的是用货币形式综合反映企业质量管理活动的状况和成效,为提高企业质量管理水平、减低成本、增加经济效益提供依据。由于企业一般的财务会计核算体制不能完整、准确地反映质量成本,所以必须建立适应本企业质量成本管理的会计核算制度,对企业质量成本进行单独的成本核算,以促进企业质量管理工作顺利开展。一、质量成本核算与会计成本核算的区别在企业整个经营过程中,资源的投…     

浅议质量成本的管理

阐述了质量成本的概念,指出企业进行质量成本管理的意义在于提高质量、降低成本、增加经济效益;对质量成本的内容进行了科学分类,提出进行质量成本管理的原则和程序;论述了如何通过"质量成本特性曲线示意图"这一直观的方法,来确定适宜的质量成本水平.指出,确定适宜的质量成本水平并结合企业实际确定适宜的质量水平,是讨论质量成本管理的根本意义所在;最后简要分析了如何进行质量成本的统计与计算、分析与控制,指出质量成本控制有助于质量成本管理目标的顺利实现.     

施工企业项目隐性成本管理研究

加强隐性成本管理对于施工企业提高市场竞争力和效益是十分必要的。本文首先在对前人研究成果的基础上,阐述了隐性成本的构成、特征;其次使用文献研究的方法归纳分析了隐性成本的影响因素,以此为基础构建建筑施工企业项目隐性成本指标,结合这些指标提出针对性的管理控制措施：最后对模糊综合评价法和作业成本法的优缺点进行比对,提出以作业成本法作为建筑施工企业项目隐性成本管理措施的评价方法。     

施工企业质量成本控制研究

当前建筑施工企业忽视质量成本的管理和控制，不能正确处理质量与质量成本之间关系，施工企业应加强质量成本控制，建立和健全质量成本组织体系，加强质量损失成本源分析，找出导致质量问题的原因，建立和健全质量成本核算体系，以及重视质量成本分析和改进质量成本的分析方法。     

建筑工程项目成本控制与优化

建筑施工企业要想适应激烈的市场竞争,就必须抓好项目管理,而项目管理的核心是项目成本控制。本文就是针对建筑施工企业项目成本控制,减少成本支出提出了相应的措施。并着重强调了质量成本控制的重要性。     

隐性成本:企业成本管理的战略难题

在企业中,会计成本是记录在账的历史成本,所涉及的会计业务都是已经发生的事情,因此比较容易分析和控制。而对于大多数企业管理者来说,成本管理和控制的重点和难点在于企业中的隐性成本。     

知识经济时代企业成本管理的创新

一、知识经济对现行企业成本管理的挑战目前，工业经济逐步转向知识经济，这种客观经济环境的变化对现行企业成本管理提出了严峻挑战，主要表现在以下几方面。１．成本管理范围狭窄。现行成本管理的目标是少耗费多产出，表现为对物耗和能耗的反映与控制。然而在知识经济下，成本的范围除了物耗、能耗等显性成本外，还包括企业信誉成本、职工素质成本等隐性成本。而现行成本管理体系对隐性成本基本忽略，成本管理视野狭小，因此，现行成本管理重点应由显性成本向显性成本与隐性成本并重过渡。２．片面强调降低成本。在市场经济条件下，企业受…     

现代质量观下质量成本管理体系构建研究

质量成本是产品成本的一部分,越来越多的企业认识到开展质量成本管理的必要性和紧迫性.随着6Sigma管理和卓越绩效理念在全世界的传播,质量管理哲学已经开始悄然改变,原来那种适应性质量的概念逐渐为"卓越质量","零缺陷"的现代质量现所取代.一种更具实际应用价值的新的质量成本管理体系急待建立.     

企业研发项目的质量成本管理

基于项目质量成本管理理论，论述了企业研发项目的质量成本构成，分析了各质量成本之间的关系，提出了质量成本的核算和控制方法。     

油田矿区物业服务企业质量成本初探

对油田矿区物业服务企业质量成本构成、物业服务企业质量成本控制思路进行了初步探索,以辽河油田兴隆台公用事业处为例,对其"十一五"期间质量成本变化趋势做出简要分析,并结合工作实践就如何做好油田矿区物业服务企业质量成本控制提出了一些方法和建议。     

QHR在国际地震勘探项目管理中的应用及效果

质量隐患报告(QHR)的理念要求全体员工善于发现质量隐患、制定预防措施,并及时向总部报告,总部对数据进行统计分析,根据分析结果制定质量管理方面的预防和改进措施,以预防质量事故和提高工程质量。阐述了QHR理念从引入到推广、执行和应用的全过程,以及QHR能较好地预防质量事故的效果,给其他工程项目提供借鉴作用。     

Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: The interplay of complexity,organizational design,and experience

This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of implementation that are neglected in strategic decision‐making processes—in the context of services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision makers are more likely to make cost‐estimation errors given increasing configuration and task complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that experience and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy reduce the cost‐estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

知识经济条件下企业治理结构中权威关系的变化

企业内部权威关系的形成是由内部成员根据企业经营失败时可能受到的损失相对大小来决定。企业成员遭受的损失中包含沉淀成本。物质资本与人力资本的沉淀成本在不同的经济条件下是变化的。知识经济以前，由于人力资本的沉淀成本可以忽略，而物质资本的沉淀成本存在，企业的权威关系是物质资本所有者拥有权威。知识经济时代，由于人力资本的沉淀成本不可忽略及物质资本的沉淀成本的减少和转移，企业的权威关系则应该是人力资本所有者拥有权威。     

The Hidden Costs of Accelerated Product Development

Rarely has a strategic management option captured American industry as has the thrust of accelerated product development. When accompanied by the goals of lowered cost and increased new product quality, it seems almost unstoppable. However, industry may have been swept up in the enthusiasm. Any strategic option so tempting (with long lists of advantages and no suggested limitations) needs to be viewed critically. Merle Crawford reveals several "hidden costs" of accelerated development. He does not oppose the new strategy, and indeed endorses it highly, but urges that it be considered carefully before application. His analysis suggests that acceleration is far more widely applied than is good for any industrialized economic system.     

国际贸易中的交易成本：一个文献综述

传统贸易理论所讨论的形成比较优势的成本,主要为生产成本。但是,在现实国际贸易活动中,交易成本在塑造一国比较优势时也发挥着重要作用。通过回顾国际贸易中的交易成本及其与生产成本和贸易成本的关系、国际贸易中的交易成本的影响因素及其度量、引入交易成本分析的国际贸易变化之相关文献,指出：现有文献未严格区分＂贸易成本＂和＂交易成本＂,迄今为止新制度经济学中对交易成本的测度与贸易理论中基于引力模型的贸易成本测度还缺乏必要的沟通和融合。     

Resources and transaction costs: how property rights economics furthers the resource‐based view

Property rights economics furthers the resource‐based view of strategic management in a number of ways. First, resources are conceptualized as being composed of multiple attributes for which property rights may be held. Second, a resource owner's ability to create, appropriate, and sustain value from resources depends on the property rights that he or she holds and on the transaction costs of exchanging, defining, and protecting them. While transaction costs are a major source of value dissipation, reducing such dissipation may create value. Implications for the RBV analysis of sustained competitive advantage are derived. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.     

Distinguishing costs of cooperation and control in alliances

Firms simultaneously face the need to cooperate with and control an alliance partner. To complement the transaction cost perspective's emphasis on the need to control and limit opportunistic behavior, we examine the sources and impact of the cooperation costs incurred in order to work with a partner. We propose that these costs increase with greater joint task complexity and interpartner diversity, and perceptions of equitable behavior affect the perceptions of these costs. Hypotheses derived from the framework are tested in a sample of 231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors in the Hong Kong construction industry. We find that both cooperation costs and transaction costs affect the level of time and effort a manager expends on an alliance, supporting our fundamental proposition that the costs of cooperation and control are conceptually and empirically distinct. We argue that cooperation costs should be incorporated into studies that compare the choice of alternative partners and alliance structures, as well as among the broader categories of market, hierarchy, and hybrid governance forms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs,Switching Costs,and Market Power

A number of authors have argued that the divestiture of AT & T did not reduce the rates of long distance telephone companies as often believed. However, the literature has offered few explanations as to why competition has not lowered rates. This study argues that rates have failed to fall due to the importance of search and switching costs in the industry. Using a panel data set of rates for the three largest long distance carriers, stretching from 1984 to 1993, a reduced form equation is specified to empirically test for the influence of search and switching costs on the price cost margin of the three carriers. The results illustrate that both search and switching costs have provided long distance carriers with market power.     

信息技术应用与企业边界的变动

信息技术通过节约企业的内部生产成本和市场协调成本影响企业边界的变动,而变动的方向则受到企业组织特征的影响。对于资本密集型企业来说,其组织特征有利于应用信息技术后更显著节约内部生产成本,从而边界朝扩大的方向发生变动;而对于知识密集型企业来说,其组织特征有利于应用信息技术后更显著节约市场协调成本,从而边界朝缩小的方向发生变动。