The dynamics of the Jones R & D growth model

The dynamics of most prominent endogenous growth models are well understood. One notable exception is the Jones R & D growth model [Jones, C.I., 1995. R & D based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy 103, 759–784]. This paper provides an analytical treatment of this model's transitional dynamics. It is shown that, given constant returns to labor in R & D (as conventionally assumed in R & D growth models), a unique trajectory converging to the balanced growth path exists. The equilibrium growth path can be monotonic or oscillatory. Moreover, applying a theorem from [Arnold, L.G., 2005. The dynamics of multi-country R & D growth models. University of Regensburg Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 404. February], this result can be used to characterize the dynamic behavior of the multi-country open-economy version of the model.     

The determinants of research and development intensity in the UK

The primary purpose of this paper is to discover whether research and development expenditures are related to firm size, market structure and technological influences in the UK. After providing a preliminary analysis of R & D activity, the paper tackles the problem of the rather limited data set. Two approaches are adopted: first, analysing part of the relationship using a broadly based sample, and second, providing data on a more narrowly based sample over three years. The results suggest that firm size and concentration have virtually no influence on R & D intensity in the UK among firms with R & D programmes.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

Demand Shift Effect of R&;D and the R&;D Organization

We assume that R&D investment by a firm improves the quality of the product. This is reflected in an upward shift of the demand function. Firms can do R&D either independently or cooperatively. We show that cooperative research strictly dominates non-cooperative research, both in terms of profitability and welfare. Also, R&D investment by each firm under cooperative research is larger for a relatively high R&D output elasticity. The higher the degree of product differentiation and/or larger the R&D output elasticity is, the larger the increase in quality level under cooperative research, compared to non-cooperative research, will be.     

THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D*

The precompetitive R&D literature has viewed cooperative and noncooperative R&D as substitutes. In this paper a more realistic approach is taken, where both cooperative and noncooperative R&D are performed in parallel. In the first stage, firms determine the optimal investments in both types of R&D and in the second stage they compete in output. It is found that information sharing between cooperating firms contributes not only to cooperative R&D, but also to noncooperative R&D. The two types of R&D reinforce each other. The level of cooperative R&D may be higher or lower than noncooperative R&D. In a Cournot duopoly, the share of cooperative R&D lies between 20% and 80% of total R&D and this share increases with spillovers and information sharing. It is always optimal to subsidize half the costs of cooperative R&D, while the subsidy to noncooperative R&D is unchanged from the standard model. Consumers prefer intermediate levels of spillovers and information sharing, while firms prefer higher levels of spillovers, which entail lower levels of information sharing.     

Knowledge flows,changing firms’ competences and patent citations: an analysis of the trajectory of IBM

We show for a widely-used class of models for strategic R&D that optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of private R&D investments. We then highlight the limitations of the framework that are responsible for this finding and conclude that policy recommendations based on the type of model used here should be treated as highly tentative.     

Synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities: the effects of organisational slack and absorptive capacity

Firms undertaking independent and cooperative research and development (R&D) activities simultaneously often have difficulties to realise their synergistic effects. This study contends that such difficulties are caused by tensions between two types of R&D activities in terms of resource competition and knowledge leakage. Moreover, organisational slack and absorptive capacity may affect these tensions and thereby play important role in synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities. Based on a survey data of 286 firms, this study finds that such two types of R&D activities jointly have a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, organisational slack aids in synergizing them, while absorptive capacity has an adverse impact. These findings enrich our knowledge on the interrelation of independent and cooperative R&D activities and shed light on how firms can synergize them.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

Endogenizing technological progress: The MESEMET Model

This paper endogenizes technology and human capital formation in the MESEM model that was developed by van Sinderen (Economic Modelling, 1993, 13, 285–300). Tax allowances for private R & D expenditures and public expenditures on both education and R & D are effective instruments to stimulate economic growth. Simulations with respect to market clearing, the importance of supply-side elements and key parameters (such as the magnitude of spillovers and substitution elasticities) reveal that tax allowances for private R & D are the most robust instrument to increase economic growth through the accumulation of knowledge. Contrary to other studies that find that technology policies typically reduce employment, we find that overall employment rises.     

On the incentives for cooperative research

This paper analyzes incentives for cooperative research for firms competing in the product market. Contrary to the literature, we portray situations to show that non-cooperative R&D can occur even if the probability of success in R&D is large. We then model synergy in cooperative R&D and show that when the innovation size is large, cooperative research is likely to occur.     

Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly

This article analyzes cost-reducing R&D investments by firms that behave non-cooperatively or cooperatively. Firms face a trade-off between allocating their R&D investments to innovate or to imitate (absorb). We find that the non-cooperative behavior not only induces more imitation (absorption) but also, for the most part, more innovation investments. Only the cooperative behavior, however, ensures that R&D investments are allocated efficiently to innovation and to imitation (absorption) in the sense that any given amount of industry-wide cost reduction is obtained for the minimum overall R&D costs.     

Assessing structural change: the case of Austria

In recent years in many OECD countries the view became popular that a country has a healthy industrial structure if it has a high share of high-tech industries and a low share of traditional industries like textiles and steel. Therefore, industrial policy in these countries introduces programmes for reallocating from traditional sectors to high-tech sectors in order to increase national welfare. This paper questions this view by taking into account recent insights of international trade theory and shows, in the case of Austria, why conventional concepts of measuring and assessing structural change (used, e.g. by the OECD) are misleading and thus lead to wrong conclusions in the assessment whether structural adjustment has gone in the ‘right’ direction. More specifically, the ‘popular’ criteria ‘share and shift’, ‘high-tech versus traditional products’, and ‘R & D intensity’ are discussed and an alternative interpretation suggested by economic theory is given. Additionally, the paper illustrates the alternatie interpretation of these popular criteria on the example of the textile industry which, as a traditional consumer goods industry, managed to modernize largely without R & D of its own and was able to meet international competition successfully.     

Is Private R & D Spending Sensitive to Its Price? Empirical Evidence on Panel Data for Italy

In this paper empirical evidence is presented on theelasticity of private R & D spending on its price. Acensored panel-data regression model with random effectsis applied to a balanced panel of 726 Italian firms overthe 1992–1997 period. Implied estimates point out thatItalian firms' response to policy measures (including taxcredits), aimed at reducing the user cost of R & D capital,is likely to be substantial (1.50–1.77). Furthermore, wealso find that the elasticity of R & D spending is higherin recession (2.01) than in expansion (0.87).     

What drives the choice of the type of partner in R&D cooperation? Evidence for Spanish manufactures and services

We analyse the heterogeneity in firms’ decisions to engage in R&D cooperation, taking into account the type of partner (competitors, suppliers or customers, and research institutions) and the sector to which the firm belongs (manufactures or services). We use information from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for Spanish firms and estimate multivariate probit models corrected for endogeneity which explicitly consider the interrelations between the different R&D cooperation strategies. We find that placing a higher importance to publicly available information (incoming spillovers), receiving public funding and firm size increase the probability of cooperation with all kind of partners but the role is much stronger in the case of cooperative agreements with research institutions and universities. Our results also suggest that R&D intensity and the importance attributed to the lack of qualified personnel as a factor hampering innovation are key factors influencing positively R&D cooperation activities in the service sector but not in manufactures.     

Cooperative R&D and Commitment to A Policy of Know-how Trading

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of adopting a strategy of know-how trading on the degree of research and development (R&D) cooperation. We show that the consequences of cooperation in know-how sharing under the conditions of the model are similar to a policy of cooperation in R&D investments in areas with large spillovers. An industry-wide policy of cooperation among competitors with respect to R&D investment and sharing would simply result in maximal joint profits. This cooperative R&D outcome could be generalized to any degree of spillover other than 100%. In this paper, the commitment to a policy of know-how trading by the participants in an industry is explained by the firm’s attempt to induce the equilibrium of a single industry-wide cooperative research joint venture. In a repeated game framework, we show that pre-commitments by non-cooperative firms to disclose their own know-how to the industry can be effective in inducing cooperative R&D investments by the participants.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Market structure and R&D investment spillovers

This paper examines research and development (R&D) investment spillovers across different market structures. In particular, we extend the recent work in Matsumura et al. (2013) to incorporate R&D investment spillovers. When the market is a duopoly, noncooperative (cooperative) R&D investment is preferred for small (large) spillovers of less (more) than half. We show that as a market structure becomes more competitive, noncooperative R&D investment is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, noncooperative R&D is not always decreasing with the intensity of competition, even though it is ultimately zero with perfect competition. Our theoretical results fit well with existing empirical findings.     

Technology and regional policy: a case study of Northern Ireland

The importance of technical change, through the innovative activity of industry, has received a lot of attention in the regional economic literature. Regional policy has now begun to reflect the changing emphasis in the recent literature, and especially the key role of inventive activity in achieving long-run self-sustaining regional growth. This paper concentrates on research activities in terms of inventive inputs (R&D) and innovative outputs (especially patented innovations). In general the results suggest that there is a low level of technological activity in Northern Ireland, especially in industries that are characterized as being technologically advanced. This is partly because external ownership reduces R & D activity which in turn reduces innovation outputs but there is also a problem in that companies in Northern Ireland are relatively unsuccessful at producing new products and processes of the type and quality required in the market place. The availability of government-sponsored R & D grants since 1977 has begun to redress the imbalance in terms of R & D activities but there is, as yet, little information to show that the level of technological success has increased.     

Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.     

R&D competition, absorptive capacity, and market shares

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducting R&D activity to maximize their market shares. The existence and uniqueness of a feedback-Nash-optimal R&D strategy for each firm are discussed. Our simulations highlight that variations in spillovers hardly influence the firms' R&D investment, if their absorptive capacities to exploit extramural knowledge depend on their R&D efforts. Moreover, extramural knowledge cannot completely replace in-house R&D. However, a high level of public R&D favors the firm with the most restrictive R&D expenditure constraint and/or with the lowest initial R&D stock, provided it invests in R&D.