巴塞尔Ⅲ宏观审慎资本监管工具的作用机理探析——基于商业银行实施内评法的视角

巴塞尔Ⅲ强调宏观审慎监管,并针对系统性风险提出了许多宏观审慎监管要求,一方面提高银行业自身的抗冲击能力,另一方面限制银行经营中的高风险行为。本文采用内部评级法计算资本要求引发的顺周期性和系统性风险的时空特性,并分析了杠杆率、留存超额资本、逆周期超额资本、系统重要性附加资本等宏观审慎资本监管工具的作用机理,最后提出宏观审慎资本工具实施过程中需注意的协调问题。     

巴塞尔委员会逆周期资本框架在我国银行业的实证分析

2010年12月16日,巴塞尔委员会公布了《第三版巴塞尔协议》和《各国监管当局实施逆周期资本缓冲指引》,要求各国监管当局参照制定逆周期资本缓冲政策框架,并视需要要求银行计提逆周期资本缓冲。本文采用我国银行业的数据,对该资本缓冲政策框架进行了实证分析,并就我国实施逆周期资本缓冲政策提出了政策建议。     

巴塞尔新协议下中国银行业问题前瞻

宏观审慎监管是巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的主要突破,代表了国际银行监管理念的更新。本文主要针对中国银监会有关前瞻性贷款损失拨备、逆周期资本附加、资本留存缓冲、系统重要性银行资本附加和杠杆率工具等机制,以及央行动态差异准备金机制进行分析。     

基于巴塞尔Ⅲ的商业银行关系型贷款定价研究

2010年巴塞尔Ⅲ的出台,在宏观审慎监管方面弥补了巴塞尔II的缺陷,对商业银行的资本监管更加严格,不仅提高了资本充足率水平标准,而且还提出了资本缓冲、逆周期资本缓冲和系统重要性银行附加资本要求,同时强化外部监管和市场约束。本文在2010年巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的背景下展开对商业银行中小企业贷款定价的研究,在综合前人的分析基础上,推导出了基于巴塞尔协议Ⅲ并符合我国实际的中小企业贷款定价模型——修正后RAROC贷款定价模型,并通过案例测试,发现巴塞尔Ⅲ对我国中小企业贷款定价的影响是复杂的,很大程度上还要取决于银企关系的密切程度。     

宏观审慎政策视角下商业银行系统性风险监管研究——基于VAR模型分析

宏观审慎监管政策框架作为系统性风险调控的重要方式,已成为世界各国金融监管体系研究的重要课题。为完善我国宏观审慎监管研究,本文基于商业银行2009—2017年数据,构建了逆周期资本缓冲模拟并运用VAR模型检验了我国宏观审慎政策对商业银行系统性风险的监管效果。研究表明,逆周期资本缓冲模拟与我国经济运行状况相符,VAR模型结果表明长期资本充足率存在逆周期效应,流动性比例在短期内有助于降低系统性风险,逆周期资本缓冲对系统性风险反应迅速,在降低系统性风险方面起关键作用。在此基础上,本文对完善我国商业银行宏观审慎监管、防范系统性风险提出建议。     

基于宏观压力测试方法的逆周期资本监管框架研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文提出了具有前瞻性的逆周期资本测算方法,该方法不同于《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》将信贷/GDP指标作为逆周期超额资本提取的参考基准,为金融监管部门提供了一种新的宏观审慎管理工具:依据发放相同数量贷款所需的监管资本不出现波动这一逆周期调整原则设置宏观压力情景,监管资本等于8%的最低监管资本要求加上根据宏观压力测试结果计提的逆周期超额资本。实证研究结果及其相关分析可与《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》逆周期资本监管框架相互佐证。     

银行资本监管标准与信贷顺周期波动研究

随着资本监管在全球范围内的普遍实施,资本充足率成为影响银行信贷行为的一个重要约束条件。次贷危机后,出于宏观审慎监管的考虑,巴塞尔协议提高了银行监管资本充足率监管要求,并主张建立逆周期资本缓冲机制。通过建立监管资本约束下的银行信贷最优选择行为的比较静态分析表明,银行资本金下降或资本充足率要求提高,那么在宏观经济波动时,银行信贷的波动幅度会更大。银行的实际资本充足率与资本监管标准和银行信贷供给对经济波动的敏感性紧密相关,而银行的资本缓冲是信贷顺周期波动幅度的决定性影响因素。该分析表明巴塞尔协议Ⅲ提高资本充足率要求会增强银行资本监管的顺周期效应;在宏观审慎监管框架下,经济扩张时期要求银行提高资本缓冲数额,是比提高资本充足率监管标准更为审慎和稳健的政策措施。     

新资本协议对我国商业银行贷款定价行为影响研究

本文结合巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的新监管要求,构建了我国商业银行贷款利率定价模型,从而量化了微观审慎政策与宏观审慎政策变化对商业银行贷款利率的影响。实证结果显示,提高资本要求无论对商业银行的信贷收缩还是贷款价格上升都十分显著,而实施资本留存缓释对贷款价格波动并不明显。     

关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨

理论和实务界总结此次国际金融危机的经验教训,一致认为应当对金融监管理念和方式进行重大调整。加强宏观审慎监管,并将其与微观审慎监管进行有机结合,将成为后危机时代各国金融监管的主要发展趋势。本文认为,现阶段实施宏观审慎监管的一项重要任务,就是要针对金融体系的顺周期性,特别是对资本监管、贷款损失准备计提和公允价值会计准则等外部规则强化金融体系顺周期性的机理进行研究,一方面对这些规则进行修改完善,降低其顺周期效应;另一方面引入逆周期政策工具,如逆周期资本要求、杠杆率指标和前瞻性的拨备计提规则等,在金融体系中建立适当的逆周期机制,从而通过降低信贷活动、资产价格以及整个经济的周期性波动来减小金融失衡,缓解系统性风险,最终达到维护金融稳定的目标。     

金融监管政策动态

<正>各国(地区)监管当局1.美国联邦储备委员会批准细化逆周期资本缓冲设定框架的最终政策声明2016年9月,美国联邦储备委员会公布了一份政策声明,该声明详细说明了委员会将在为美国私营部门信用风险敞口设定逆周期资本缓冲方面所遵循的框架。逆周期资本缓冲是一种宏观审慎工具,当超过正常损失范围的风险升高时,通过提高对国际活跃银行机构的资本要求,     

美国商业银行资金来源结构的变迁及启示

本文介绍了美国商业银行资金来源管理的发展历程和不同规模商业银行筹资策略的选择,发现不同规模的商业银行结合自身特点在筹资中形成了各具特色的筹资渠道,如美国大型银行依靠股票溢价和留存收益补充权益资本,而中小银行主要依赖留存收益补充权益资本;大型银行主动性负债的占比要高于中小银行,中小银行对核心存款的依赖程度要高于大型银行等.通过与中国商业银行的对比分析,作者对中国商业银行的资本和负债管理提出以下建议:增强造血性权益资本补充渠道;正确认识发行次级债券的资本补充功能;关注中小银行资金来源结构中的经营风险.     

Capital regulation and bank balance sheet adjustments: a simultaneous approach

This study examines the balance sheets of banks in 15 Asian countries from 2004 to 2016 to explore how they respond to stricter capital regulation. We consider the simultaneity of balance sheet adjustments. Employing a normalisation method, the study found that Asian banks increased regulatory capital, primarily through retained earnings, and expanded assets over the study period. However, the two-step system Generalised Method of Moments results do not support the positive effect of capital regulation on regulatory capital components adjustments. In addition, stricter capital regulation even induces banks to reduce lending.     

Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?

U.S. banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. We test competing hypotheses regarding the reasons for this “excess” capital, using an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows estimated BHC-specific capital targets and adjustment speeds to vary with firm-specific characteristics. We apply the model to annual panel data for publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1992 through 2006, an extended period of increasing bank capital that ended just before the subprime credit crisis of 2007–2008. The evidence suggests that BHCs actively managed their capital ratios (as opposed to passively allowing capital to build up via retained earnings), set target capital levels substantially above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and (especially poorly capitalized BHCs) made rapid adjustments toward their targets.     

THE ROLE OF LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT,CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,AND SIGNALING: THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE

While much research has been conducted in the United States on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) as a mechanism for managing earnings, managing capital, and as a tool for signaling future earnings strategies, there is a paucity of research in Europe. In this research, we replicate methodology used by Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1998) and examine the relative importance of key factors affecting the LLP decisions of Spanish depository institutions. Among others, we focus on the role of organizational structure. We specifically examine if and how LLPs are used prior to and after the implementation of capital adequacy regulations in the Spanish depository industry in 1992. Our results indicate that while LLPs were not used as a tool for managing capital after the new regulation came into effect, banks have now adopted a more aggressive earnings management strategy. This appears to be because the capital adequacy regulation of 1992 removed any capital constraint that hitherto acted as a disincentive to aggressive earnings management. Commercial banks appeared to adopt a more aggressive earnings management as well as capital management strategy than savings banks in the post regulatory era. Finally, we did not find evidence that LLPs were used as a signaling tool by Spanish banks to portray their intentions about future earnings.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

Earnings versus capital ratios management: role of bank types and SFAS 114

We document in this paper that large banks use Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) more than small banks to manage reported earnings, but we find no significant difference in the use of LLP to manage capital ratios between large and small banks. Additionally, we document that banks with high risk asset portfolios use more LLP to manage reported earnings as well as capital ratios compared to the banks with low risk asset portfolios. Our findings also show that SFAS 114 has a moderating effect on the use of LLP to manage reported earnings, especially by large banks, but there is no conclusive evidence on the impact of SFAS 114 to manage capital ratios. Furthermore, the findings show that there has been significantly more earnings management during the 2007–2008 financial crisis compared to earlier periods.     

Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.     

The bank capital channel and bank profits

This paper develops a microeconomic model of banking to highlight an endogenous loan creation process that emerges from bank profits via the capital accumulation of retained earnings and uses a simple bank capital‐loan multiplier to illustrate constraints on lending. The study also analyzes how sufficient net interest margins are important for banks to maintain lending portfolios and avoid financial fragility. The model offers support to bank capital channel (BKC) economists by illustrating how changes in interest rates may influence bank lending through the bank's internal capital accumulation growth rate and on a bank's portfolio choices.     

SOME EVIDENCE THAT BANKS USE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS TO LOWER CAPITAL COSTS

To the extent raising external capital is especially costly for banks (as the preceding article suggests), bank managers have incentives to manage their internal cash flow in ways that minimize their need to raise external equity. One way to accomplish this is to establish bank holding companies that set up internal capital markets for the purpose of allocating scarce capital across their various subsidiaries. By “internal capital market” the authors mean a capital budgeting process in which all the lending and investment opportunities of the different subsidiaries are ranked according to their risk-adjusted returns; and all internal capital available for investment is then allocated to the highestranked opportunities until either the capital is exhausted or returns fall below the cost of capital, whichever comes first. As evidence of the operation of internal capital markets in bank holding companies, the authors report the following set of findings from their own recent studies:

• ? For large publicly traded bank holding companies, growth rates in lending are closely tied to the banks' internal cash flow and regulatory capital position.
• ? For the subsidiaries of bank holding companies, what matters most is the capital position and earnings of the holding companies and not of the subsidiaries themselves.
• ? The lending activity of banks affiliated with multiple bank holding companies appears to be less dependent on their own earnings and capital than the lending of unaffiliated banks.

The authors also report that, after being acquired, previously unaffiliated banks increase their lending in local markets. This finding suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics of bank consolidation, geographic consolidation may make banks more responsive to local lending opportunities.