An application of the two-stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to corporate financing decisions

Most of the previous studies on the firms’ debt-equity choice utilize the standard single equation Probit (or Logit) model as if firms face a single dichotomous decision to issue debt or equity, but not both. The main purpose of this study is to use a two stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to examine the factors affecting the choice between internal and external funding and between debt and equity as well as the size of issues. Our results indicate that the Bivariate-Probit estimation is more efficient than that of two independent Probit equations. An examination of factors that affect the choice of financing form and the size of issue support the predictions of trade-off theory. The pecking order’s prediction that, if external funding is needed, firms issue debt first and then equity finds no support in this study as firms with higher information asymmetry have propensity to issue equity rather than debt. While information asymmetry affects the choice between debt and equity, we find no evidence that it influences the size of issue.     

External financing and earnings management: Evidence from international data

Corporate financing conditions in the external capital market are significantly affected by information asymmetry, while internal financing is not. Given that earnings information influences market perceptions regarding firms’ quality, firms relying on external financing should have incentives to manage earnings to improve their financing conditions. This study investigates the effect of corporate external financing behavior on earnings management. Using a sample comprising 75,790 observations of 12,874 firms in 43 countries, we find that accrual-based and real earnings management are positively associated with firms’ reliance on external financing. This positive relationship holds especially true for firms that rely on equity rather than debt financing. We argue that reliance on external financing (especially equity financing), which is subject to problems arising from information asymmetry, generates a motive for earnings management.     

Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions

We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.     

Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.     

Corporate financing and anticipated credit rating changes

Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make timely revisions to their ratings, thereby increasing information asymmetry between firms and the market. We examine whether firms time the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its decision to change a firm’s credit rating. Using quarterly data, we show that firms adjust their financing structures before credit rating downgrades are publicly revealed. Specifically, firms on average increase their debt financing by 1.29 % before the disclosure of a rating downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, firms do not take significant financing actions before credit rating upgrades.     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

The profit versus loss heuristic and firm financing decisions

This paper examines the extent to which the profit versus loss heuristic directly affects debt issuance decisions. We hypothesize that reporting a loss and its use as a heuristic rather than firms’ economic fundamentals has an impact both on the decision to raise external debt finance and on the choice between debt and equity financing. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. We find that there is a sharp and economically-significant discontinuity around the zero-earnings threshold in the level of debt issues. Firms reporting small losses issue significantly less debt than firms reporting small profits. We also find that the loss heuristic has an impact on the choice between debt and equity in that loss firms issue less debt relative to equity. Taken together the results are consistent with the notion that profit versus loss heuristic impacts the debt issuance decision and provide explanations that add to those offered by the traditional theories.     

The corporate choice between public debt,bank loans,traditional private debt placements,and 144A debt issues

The main purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the corporate choice between different forms of debt financing. By analyzing the most comprehensive sample of US corporate debt issues to date, I find that firms that issue 144A debt have significantly lower credit quality and higher information asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank private debt. Further, the study shows that traditional private placements, rather than bank loans, are the favorite private debt source for firms with good credit quality. I also show that the firm characteristics of traditional private debt issuers have significantly changed after 1990 through to 2003. My results suggest the following pecking order of debt choices which is conditional on credit quality. In other words, high credit quality firms prefer public bond offerings and small firms, with good credit quality, are more likely to issue traditional private debt. A large group of firms characterized by moderate credit quality make extensive use of bank loans and poor credit quality firms preferentially issue 144A debt.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.     

Management Quality and Equity Issue Characteristics: A Comparison of SEOs and IPOs

We use hand-collected data on the management quality of firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) or initial public offerings (IPOs) to analyze the relationship between management quality and equity issue characteristics, and to compare the effect of management quality on SEOs versus IPOs. We hypothesize that higher quality managers are more credible to equity market investors, thereby reducing the information asymmetry they face in the market and outsiders’ information production costs. Therefore, the equity issues of higher management quality firms will have more reputable underwriters, smaller underwriting spreads, and other expenses, and smaller SEO discounts. Further, since better managers will be able to select better projects, higher management quality firms will have larger offer sizes. Finally, since SEO firms are likely to suffer from less information asymmetry compared to IPO firms, these effects will be smaller for SEOs than for IPOs. Our findings support the above hypotheses. Our direct tests of the relationship between management quality and information asymmetry, and our comparison of information asymmetry in SEOs versus IPOs provide further support for these hypotheses.     

Institutional arrangements and debt financing

I find that institutional arrangements have an impact on the real economy by affecting firms’ choice between private and public debt and the subsequent financing costs. Using new debt issued by firms in 26 non-US countries, I find, after controlling for firm characteristics predicted by debt agency and information asymmetry theories, that the level of financial market development, the efficiency of bankruptcy procedure, the integrity and enforceability of laws, and the transparency of financial information have significant impacts not only on firms’ debt choice and yield to maturity in domestic debt market, but also their issuance choice in the international debt market.     

Equity issues and aggregate market returns under information asymmetry

We propose a simple time-series model based on information asymmetry that allows us to test the predictive power of equity and debt issues with respect to future market returns. Using this method, we find that managers’ new equity and debt issue decisions have predictive power for future market returns, when we take into account potential feedback from past market returns and structural breaks. We also take into account a cointegration relation among stock prices, equity issues and debt issues. This finding is robust with respect to various measures of market returns and consistent with the managerial timing hypothesis.     

International Cross‐Listings and Subsequent Security‐Market Choices: Evidence from ADRs

We study the link between the attributes of American depositary receipt (ADR)‐listed firms and their post‐listing security‐market choices. We find that developed market firms are more likely to issue equity and debt than their emerging market counterparts. Furthermore, we find that large firms are more likely to issue debt and less likely to issue equity. When we examine locations where ADR firms raise their capital, we find that firms originating from countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak are more likely to issue debt on their home markets and less likely to issue debt on international markets (excluding U.S. markets). Furthermore, ADR firms originating from developed (emerging market) countries are more (less) likely to issue their equity on their domestic markets and less (more) likely to issue equity on international markets (excluding U.S. markets).     

Equity issues and temporal variation in information asymmetry

We investigate the intertemporal relation between information asymmetry and equity issues, and particularly focus on which firms drive this relation. We find that when information asymmetry for a particular firm is low compared to the recent past, the firm is more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. Importantly, this intertemporal association is driven by firms with high levels of information asymmetry. These firms are more prone to adverse selection costs and thus have more to gain by issuing equity after a narrowing of the information gap between managers and investors. Our findings are robust to various firm-specific proxies for information asymmetry.     

Do multinational and domestic corporations differ in their leverage policies?

This paper examines the leverage policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) in comparison to those of domestic corporations (DCs). Prior studies document that MNCs have lower leverage levels. However, our analysis of U.S. firms over the period 1981–2010 reveals that the leverage levels of MNCs are not significantly lower than those of DCs if we control for key firm characteristics related to leverage levels. We also find that MNCs and DCs do not differ significantly in terms of their debt maturity structure, the speed of leverage adjustments, or the propensity to issue debt vs. equity (or vs. not to issue debt). The results suggest that MNCs' financial policies at the corporate level are not significantly influenced by their greater exposures, in comparison to DCs, to market imperfections such as taxes and regulations. Interestingly, however, our additional analysis of MNCs from outside the U.S. reveals that non-U.S. MNCs issue securities more frequently and adjust leverage faster than their domestic peers.     

Institutional Liquidity Needs and the Structure of Monitored Finance

A financial institution that finances and monitors firms learnsprivate information about these firms. When the institutionseeks funds to meet its own liquidity needs, it faces adverseselection ("liquidity") costs that increase with the risk ofits claims on these firms. The institution can reduce its liquiditycosts by holding debt rather than equity. Conversely, exceptin a limited setting resembling venture capital, firms thatdepend on monitored finance prefer to give the monitoring institutiondebt rather than equity. Institutions with less frequent orless severe liquidity needs have greater appetite for equityand for the debt of more risky borrowers. These predictionsare consistent with general patterns of monitored finance.     

Financial statement comparability and credit risk

Prior research shows that firms’ financial statement comparability improves the accuracy of market participants’ valuation judgments and thus may reduce firms’ costs of capital. Distinct from prior research focusing on the equity market, we develop measures of comparability relevant to debt market participants based on the within-industry variability of Moody’s adjustments to reported accounting numbers for the purposes of credit rating. We examine two sets of adjustments: (1) to the interest coverage ratio and (2) to non-recurring income items. We validate these comparability measures by providing evidence that greater comparability is associated with lower frequency and magnitude of split ratings by credit rating agencies. We predict and find that greater comparability is associated with (1) lower estimated bid-ask spreads for traded bonds, (2) lower credit spreads for both bonds and five-year credit default swaps, and (3) a steeper one- to five-year credit default swap term structure. Our results are consistent with financial statement comparability reducing debt market participants’ uncertainty about and pricing of firms’ credit risk.     

Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital – Evidence from Germany

This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.     

The Differential Impact of IFRS Adoption on Aspects of Seasoned Equity Offerings in the UK and France

We examine the potential for IFRS to influence the market for SEOs in the UK and France. The divergence between the UK domestic accounting standards and IFRS is minor (low-divergence firms) whereas domestic accounting standards in France differ materially from IFRS (high-divergence firms); however, both countries have similar legal enforcement and institutional settings that might confound the effect of IFRS adoption. We argue that IFRS adoption serves to mitigate information asymmetry and improve accounting quality. Accordingly, we find that, following IFRS adoption, earnings management activities decrease among high-divergence firms prior to issuing SEOs. As a result of the lower levels of earnings management and information asymmetry, we predict and find that the market reaction to issuing SEOs improves significantly for high-divergence firms following IFRS. Given that equity financing becomes less costly, we find that the propensity to issue new SEOs increases among high-divergence firms after IFRS adoption. We find no similar changes among low-divergence firms. The results persist after running a matched-sample analysis and controlling for potential self-selection bias.