排序方式: 共有19条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director. 相似文献
2.
3.
4.
An examination of the housing decisions of a group of elderly (n= 43) was undertaken to establish the nature of information used throughout the life course and to determine the degree of success of a variety of sources of information in promoting housing satisfaction. A purposive sample of elderly men and women in different tenure groups and house types, from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds and encompassing ‘young old’ as well as ‘old old’ were interviewed to establish patterns of formal and informal information flow and to determine, as far as is possible, whether information was actively or passively acquired. As would be perhaps expected, elderly owner occupiers, and particularly those from socioeconomic groups I, II and IIIN had used, and continue to use, formal sources of information to a far greater extent than did elderly tenants who had been in manual occupations, who preferred (and had always preferred) to look to family and friends to satisfy their housing information needs. Written information on housing choices appeared to be of limited value to most elderly, although it may be the case that leaflets and booklets are inappropriate sources of housing information for all age groups, not simply the elderly. 相似文献
5.
6.
We show empirically that analysts who display more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy. These results lead to three implications. First, consistent analysts are less likely to be demoted and are more likely to be nominated All Star analysts. Second, analysts strategically deliver downward‐biased forecasts to increase their consistency (if at the expense of stated accuracy). Finally, the benefits of consistency and of “lowballing” (accuracy) are increasing (decreasing) in institutional investors’ presence. 相似文献
7.
We study, in a simple model, the partial equilibrium of an industry with n firms endowed by different Cobb‐Douglas technologies which have different pollution effects. The price of input (labour) and the demand curve to the industry are given. Pollution is restricted by a tradeable market of permits in the industry. Each firm is characterised by a parameter combining production efficiency and pollution effect, its e‐characteristic. The equilibrium depends mainly on these e‐characteristics which are linked to the performance of the technologies. In the long run performances are defined per unit of capital. Last, we analyse the consequences of permits’ allocations on the profitability of the firms. 相似文献
8.
9.
What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort. 相似文献
10.