Optimal Consumption Taxes and Social Security Under Tax Measurement Problems and Uncertainty

A representative individual lives for two periods; works when young and depends on savings and a government operated social security system when old—the returns on both sources of income, when old, are random. Due to administrative problems the returns to savings are observed with some measurement error. Two alternative consumption tax systems are considered; the Registered Asset Treatment (RAT) and the Non-Registered Asset Treatment (NRAT). The advantage of the RAT is that it can perform a social insurance role while the disadvantage is that it imposes measurement error risk. Correlation between the random return on saving and its measurement error can provide a risk-hedging role that can be further strengthened by the RAT version. The NRAT version neither provides social insurance nor imposes measurement error risk. Both tax systems hedge against the uncertainties in the social security system. The taxpayer engages in precautionary saving in response to future uncertainty.     

Corporate Real Estate and Stock Market Performance

An interesting question in corporate real estate literature is whether real estate can improve the stock market performance of property-intensive non-real estate firms. Using a data set comprising 75 non-real estate corporations that own at least 20 percent properties, this paper empirically assesses and compares the pair-wise return, total risk, systematic risk and Jensen abnormal return performance of composite (with real estate) and hypothetical business (without real estate) firms. We employed Morgan Stanley Capital International world equity index instead of a local market index to provide some insights into the performance of the local market relative to the global market during the 1997–2001 volatile periods experienced by many Asian countries. Our results suggest the inclusion of real estate in a corporate portfolio appears to be associated with lower return, higher total risk, higher systematic risk and poorer abnormal return performance. It is therefore likely that non-real estate firms own properties for other reasons in addition to seeking improvement in their stock market performance. Further research is needed to explore the main factors contributing to corporate real estate ownership by non-real estate firms.     

The impact of settlement period on sales price

This study is an empirical investigation of the impact of settlement period on sales price while controlling for marketing period and standard explanatory variables. The hypothesized positive relationship between settlement period and sales price is confirmed by the results of this study. The estimated coefficient on settlement period is 0.0008 meaning that our market, on average, exacts a premium of 0.08 percent per day of settlement period beyond a norm of 60 days. The estimated coefficient on marketing period (a control variable) is –0.0003 meaning that our market, on average, requires a discount of 0.03 percent per day of marketing period. Our findings show the relative importance of settlement period in making real estate pricing decisions.     

Heterogeneity in Financial Market Participation: Appraising its Implications for the C-CAPM

This paper presents empirical evidence that accounting for heterogeneity in financial market participation is important for evaluating the empirical performance of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey as a common testing ground, I re-assess three well-known characterizations of the equity premium puzzle (i) the inconsistency of the representative agent's IMRS with Hansen and Jagannathan bounds; (ii) Mehra and Prescott's calibration of a large representative agent's risk aversion; (iii) Hansen and the Singleton's large structural estimates of the preference parameters based on aggregate data. In all three cases, the estimates of risk aversion conditional upon financial market participation are not as far from reasonable values as the corresponding unconditional ones. The differences suggest that part of the equity premium puzzle can be accounted for by the use of a representative agent assumption rather than a more appropriate "representative stockholding agent assumption.     

“Investor sentiment” and the closed-end fund puzzle: A 7 percent solution

Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the irrational noise trader model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ... is consistent with the published evidence on closed-end fund prices. ... However, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler provide no indication of how much of the variability of a closed-end fund's discounts and premiums is due to such investor sentiment. Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise, this article estimates that on average only 7 percent of the variance of a standardized measure of weekly changes in discounts and premiums can be attributed to noise-trading activity. Investor sentiment, therefore, seems to account for very little of a closed-end fund's discount and premium variability over time.     

Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment

As well known, companies shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Typically, profit shifting is achieved by direct financing structures whereby companies use debt finance in the high tax entity and equity finance in the low tax entity. However, certain tax policies can lead to indirect financing structures whereby a conduit entity provides an opportunity to achieve at least two deductions for interest expenses for an investment made in the host country. The effect of direct and indirect financing structures on real investment is compared.     

What is the Truth About the Scale of Japanese Banks' Bad Debts? Is the Situation Manageable?

In January 1998, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF, 1998) released figures which suggested that the Japanese banking industry';s bad debts might be as high as ¥77 trillion (since revised upward to ¥87.5 trillion, if cooperative-type institutions are included; Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), 1998). This compared with the previous official estimate of ¥28 trillion. The revelation was designed to do three things: (1) to convince investors, at home and abroad, who had long suspected that the true level of bad debts was much higher than the authorities (and the banks) were willing to admit to, that the authorities were sincere in their quest to enhance disclosure by local financial intermediaries; (2) to stifle opposition to the government's plans to use up to ¥30 trillion (since increased to ¥60 trillion) of public funds to stabilize the financial system¹ by underlining the gravity of the situation facing the Japanese economy; and (3) to pave the way for the introduction of more transparent reporting by the banks in April 1998 when a regime of prompt corrective action (PCA)² was scheduled to commence. This article explains the evolution of bad debt disclosure by the Japanese banking industry and assesses the significance of the latest figures. In particular, it highlights the extent to which accounting forbearance has been, and continues to be, used to mask the true level of the banks' bad debts and refutes the claim that the industry's bad debt burden peaked in 1995. The banking industry's ability to handle the continuing bad debt problem, in the face of a significant impairment of economic capital and the market's relentless drive for full disclosure and transparency, also is assessed.     

Tax Competition, Income Differentials and Local Public Services

This paper examines strategic tax setting between fiscal authorities in the presence of mobile workers who locate across these jurisdictions in response to differing tax structures and congestable local public amenities. We find that the nature of the tax setting outcomes depend crucially on the proximity between cities. For distant cities with the same size populations, the pressure on tax rates of a more mobile workforce depends on the whether mobile workers are net beneficiaries or net contributors. If mobile workers are either high or low income earners, cities lower tax rates. If mobile workers are middle income earners, cities raise tax rates. For close or neighbouring cities, workers locate in one of the cities and tax rates and local public amenities are dispersed.     

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.     

Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?

In recent years, two distinct but related questions have been raised with respect to value-added taxes (VATs). Concern has been expressed over whether it is desirable or even possible for both national and subnational governments in federal countries such as India, Argentina, and Russia to impose VATs. One reason for thinking that such subnational VATs are unlikely to be workable on a destination basis is the problem of cross-border trade. Of course, this same problem also arises within the European Union, where there is no EU VAT. Drawing upon Canadian experience, we argue that not only is it possible to have two-tier or dual VATs on a destination basis in a single country but that the existence of dual VATs may help deal with some of the problems of cross-border trade.     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

The Effect of Mortgage Price and Default Risk on Mortgage Spreads

Variations over time in mortgage yield spreads should reflect changes in the underlying prepayment option value; moreover, the relationship between mortgage yield spreads and interest rate dynamics should weaken as the value of the borrowers prepayment option declines. We verify this hypothesis through an empirical analysis of residential mortgage yield spread behavior, and we also present evidence that the strength of the relationship between mortgage spreads and interest rate dynamics weakens (strengthens) as the level of default risk increases (decreases). This result is consistent with the competing risks effect between a borrowers option to prepay or default. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for mortgage price discount to par as well as default risk when developing time series of mortgage yields.     

Commercial Mortgage Default: A Comparison of Logit with Radial Basis Function Networks

This article explores the use of artificial neural networks in the modeling of foreclosure of commercial mortgages. The study employs a large set of individual loan histories previously used in the literature of proportional hazard models on loan default. Radial basis function networks are trained (estimated) using the same input variables as those used in the logistic. The objective is to demonstrate the use of networks in forecasting mortgage default and to compare their performance with that of the logistic benchmark in terms of prediction accuracy. Neural networks are shown to be superior to the logistic in terms of discriminating between good and bad loans. The study performs sensitivity analysis on the average loan and offers suggestions on further improving prediction of defaulting loans.     

On Transitory Earnings

The paper develops a concept of transitory earnings and contrasts this source of earnings to core (or recurring) earnings. It is shown that any two of the following three attributes of transitory earnings imply the third: (i) forecasting irrelevance with respect to next-period aggregate earnings, (ii) value irrelevance, and (iii) unpredictability. The paper makes the case that the current dirty surplus items make sense, especially if one expands the valuation perspective to also allow for agency considerations.     

Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax NPV-maximization (goal congruence) for each decision problem in isolation. However, this metric fails if both decisions are nontrivial, since it requires asset-specific hurdle rates and hence precludes asset aggregation. After-tax residual income metrics (e.g., EVA) allow the firm to consistently apply its after-tax cost of capital as the hurdle rate to its aggregate asset base. We show that existing tax depreciation schedules may explain why firms in practice use more accelerated depreciation schedules than those suggested by previous studies. Our findings also rationalize the widespread use of dirty surplus accounting for windfall gains and losses for managerial retention purposes.     

Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union

This article argues that present financial regulatory arrangements within the European Monetary Union are not adequate either to preserve stability or to foster financial integration. Reform of financial regulation should concentrate on establishing clear procedures for crisis lending and management, with the European Central Bank at the center; preparing the ground for more centralized supervisory arrangements in banking, insurance, and securities; and establishing and consolidating an active domestic and European Union-wide competition policy that limits local market power and national champions that are too big to fail.     

The impact of tax on foreign direct investment: Empirical evidence and the implications for tax integration schemes

We estimate the impact of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, using data on flows between seven countries for 1984 through 1989, and a sophisticated measure of the cost of capital. We find that the choice between domestic investment and total outward FDI is not significantly affected by taxation but that taxation does affect the location of outward FDI. These results are used to examine the impact of tax integration systems. Giving a tax credit to foreign shareholders may induce a large increase in inward FDI from exemption countries but not from partial-credit countries. For the United States, the total effect would be small.     

Rationalizable and Coalition Proof Shareholder Tendering Strategies in Corporate Takeovers

This paper determines the set of rational responses by shareholders to unconditional takeover offers at prices between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition price of the firm. Two cases are considered. In the first case, coordination across shareholders is not presumed. In this case, the game is analyzed using the Rationalizability criteria (Bernheim, 1984). It is demonstrated that the Rationalizable strategy vectors include all pure strategy vectors. In the second case, the set of strategies consistent with coordination through preplay communication, the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) are analyzed. It is shown that, given even a minimal degree of divisibility of shareholdings, the raider's per share profit is bounded from below by a positive constant independent of the number of shareholders. These results imply that preplay coordination between shareholders eliminates the free-rider problem.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm

The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the agency paradigm and the corporate restructuring paradigm of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent with corporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and that takeover targets' investment levels are below or at the average (Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flow theory is also consistent with this model.