Why did the Tariff–Growth Correlation Change after 1950?

This article uses a new database to establish a key finding: high tariffs were associated with fast growth before World War II, while they have been associated with slow growth thereafter. The paper offers explanations for the sign switch by controlling for novel measures of the changing world economic environment. Rejecting alternative explanations based on changing export market growth or transportation cost declines, it shows how the modern negative correlation could be reversed in a world environment characterized by a moderately higher generalized tariff protection such as that which prevailed before 1914. We show that an increase in average tariff rates among trading partners by just one third might suffice to reverse any negative relationship between an average country's tariffs and its growth. An increase in own tariffs after 1950 hurt or at least didn't help growth, but it might have helped growth in a world where average trading partners' tariffs were moderately higher and retaliation was the best strategy. The world environment matters. Leader-country reaction to big world events matters.     

A Classroom Tariff-Setting Game

The author outlines a classroom tariff-setting game that allows students to explore the consequences of import tariffs imposed by large countries (countries able to influence world prices). Groups of students represent countries, which are organized into trading pairs. Each group's objective is to maximize welfare by choosing an appropriate ad valorem tariff that may be changed intermittently throughout the game. The game is built on a computable general-equilibrium model, which allows each nation's utility and terms of trade under alternative tariff regimes to be expressed quantitatively. The exercise encourages students to consider terms-of-trade improvements and efficiency losses resulting from large-country tariffs and provides a framework to discuss the Nash equilibrium of a tariff war. The game is a useful supplement to traditional teaching methods.     

Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12     

Quality upgrades and bypass under mandatory access

We analyze the interaction between the incumbent’s incentive to upgrade the quality of its network and the entrant’s incentive to build a bypass network when the regulator sets a two-part access tariff to the incumbent’s network. Under this context, the entrant’s investment in a bypass network is delayed with a higher incumbent’s investment in quality. Moreover, the possibility of investment in a bypass network by the entrant has a positive effect on the incumbent’s incentive to upgrade quality. We show that a regulator cannot achieve the first best with a constant access tariff. If he wants to design an alternative welfare improving access tariff, he should set an access fee increasing (decreasing) in quality if the business-stealing effect of quality upgrades is weak (strong). The analysis suggests that if the entrant’s investment costs are declining or its market share is increasing over time, it is not always optimal to require the incumbent to lease facilities at cost-based prices.     

中国环境关税体系建立的初步构想

环境关税体现了关税的环境保护职能,而且完全符合WTO的原则。目前,美国和OECD成员国等都已成功实施了环境关税措施。然而,中国还没有将环境保护作为一种指导思想贯穿到整个关税制度改革中。本文在简要介绍国外环境关税的实施现状和分析中国建立环境关税体系必要性的基础上,借鉴国外的成功经验,并结合中国的实际情况,提出了建立中国环境关税体系的初步构想。     

关税减让政策对我国进口的影响

中国加入WTO后,关税减让协议的逐步实行对我国进口贸易产生了极大影响.研究结果表明,关税与我国进口贸易额之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国进口效应的诸多因素中.关税起到了主要作用,但并非唯一因素.而关税减让在影响我国进口商品结构方面的作用不大.可见,在优化我国进口商品结构方面还需要其他政策措施的辅助与调整.     

Testing tariff endogeneity in Japan: A comparison of pre- and post-war periods

This paper tests an endogenous tariff model for Japan (1890–1970). Using a vector autoregression (VAR), I find that tariff changes are endogenous in the post-war period. Rather than being designed to promote economic activity, this suggests that tariffs respond to macroeconomic disturbances.     

我国关税调整对广东经济贸易的影响分析

2011年以来,我国对进口关税进行了一系列新的结构性调整。这是我国外贸政策调整和转变的一次具体表现,从我国外贸战略角度看,贸易平衡发展和转型升级是当前我国外贸发展面,晦的紧迫任务。本文收集近年我国关税调整方案及其对广东经济贸易的影响,首先是对近年来我国关税调整政策内容进行了归纳和总结,提炼了关税调整政策的指导思想和主要特征,进而分析了这一系列调整对广东的经济特别是对外贸易增长和发展转型所造成的影响,最后从政府和企业两个层面提供了政策建议。     

Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

The Moral Hazard Play: A Review of The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF

We estimate the influence of trade preferences granted by Argentina on the origin of its imports. We try to identify if changes in Argentina's trade policy toward a set of countries had a differential effect, depending on whether goods were already traded, or on the contrary, if tariff changes affected mostly imports of new goods. We distinguish between the effects of changing tariffs and changing trade preferences. The econometric evidence shows that the effect of changes in tariff preferences on the probability of Argentina importing from other Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) members has been rather small, with most of the effect being explained by changes in tariff rates levied on imports from these countries. This result is stronger in the case of imports from Brazil.     

Critical mass of users versus critical mass of services in a multiproduct information service system

In this paper we study the economic behaviour of the suppliers of a set of advanced telecommunications services with a joint adoption cost (common access facilities, learning process, etc.). In fixing the two-part tariffs for their services the suppliers have to share the burden of leaving to the users a surplus sufficient to cover the adoption cost. The lack of coordination in supplying a critical mass of services or in the pricing decisions has high changes to result in suboptimal or unviable diffusion of the new technology as a whole. We present a static optimization model of user behaviour, and derive access and usage demand with a two-part tariff and a joint adoption cost. We compare noncooperative and cooperative market equilibria in a duopoly with perfect information; finally we discuss the extension of our analysis to the case of imperfect information in a dynamic setting.     

全球价值链影响下的中国关税水平*——来自中国制造业的证据

本文基于中国政治经济背景,构建了一个关税影响因素理论模型,且利用2005—2011年中国制造业134个部门的数据,通过OLS和Tobit方法进行了经验验证。结果表明：（1）外国最终产品中的中国增加值越高,或者中国最终产品中的外国增加值越高,则中国对于该产品的关税水平越低;（2）贸易协定的签署不仅会直接降低中国的关税,还会扩大中国增加值上升对关税的负影响,削弱外国增加值上升对关税的负影响。     

Asymmetric trade protection leading not to productivity but to export share change

This article revisits a classical theme in economics, that is, the relationship between trade protection and economic performance, with an improved treatment of the endogeneity of tariffs and with consideration of alternative performance criteria. This paper also considers the effects of asymmetric protection, such as higher tariffs on consumer goods and lower tariffs on producer goods. Using sectoral data on Korean manufacturing during the period from 1967 to 1993, this study finds that the effect of trade protection by tariff tends to show up not in terms of total factor productivity but in terms of revealed comparative advantage and export shares of sectors. Such an effect tends to be greater in consumer goods, which are the main targets of promotion by higher tariffs. This study verifies the potentially positive role of tariffs under certain conditions, especially under discipline from world markets.     

The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy*

We introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff/quota structure. Our index overcomes the problems of the trade‐weighted average tariff: It avoids substitution bias, correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers, and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark. Empirical applications to international cross section and time‐series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results: Trade‐weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade‐volume‐equivalent index; this in turn always underestimates the welfare‐equivalent index.     

Labour protection in Western Europe

This paper represents an attempt to pinpoint the factors influencing the shape of tariff walls in the Common Market countries. Specifically, it tests the correlation between tariffs and factor intensities of the protected industries; it is found that there is a strong positive correlation between tariff and unskilled labour intensiveness. However, this correlation may be concealed if other factors affecting commercial policy are not taken into consideration (such as the desire for self-sufficiency in food and energy and the determination to foster research- and development-intensive industries) or the use of alternative means of promotion (subsidies) is neglected.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.     

Should Tariff Reductions be Announced? An Intertemporal Computable General Equilibrium Analysis

In this paper the macro and structural implications of three alternative tariff-reduction strategies are examined. Under the first strategy, which is similar to that adopted in Australia in 1973, the tariff cut is implemented without warning. The second strategy is consistent with the current approach of phasing in tariff cuts according to a previously announced schedule. Under the third strategy the tariff cut is implemented several years after it is announced. Our results suggest that if tariffs are to be reduced then it is preferable to implement the policy without warning.     

Optimum tariffs and patent length in a model of North–South technology transfer

We study a developing country's choice of optimum tariffs and patent length in a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer. A Northern firm chooses whether to export or produce a new good in a Southern country. In the absence of patent protection, a high tariff is required to induce FDI. This reduces Southern welfare when the good is imported. The Southern government can combine a positive patent length with tariffs to reduce this loss and induce FDI. Thus Southern countries may have an incentive to protect patents, although never to the same extent as Northern countries.