Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

How much does schooling disutility matter?

Studies on structural education choice models are often inconsistent in choosing whether and how to include a disutility of education, especially in an environment with risk and wealth inequality. We show that adding a disutility term to the education decision, a human capital investment option, is equivalent to assuming a relationship between wealth, risk, and education. Utility gain from education is increasing in the riskiness of future consumption. A riskier environment further propels an agent to choose the human capital investment option that maximizes future income. If the degree of risk increases heterogeneously across multiple human capital investment options, risk aversion and the precautionary savings motive can compound or negate each other depending on which option has a greater increase in risk.     

Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

Growth and welfare effects of business cycles in economies with idiosyncratic human capital risk

This paper uses a tractable macroeconomic model with idiosyncratic human capital risk and incomplete markets to analyze the growth and welfare effects of business cycles. The analysis is based on the assumption that the elimination of business cycles eliminates the variation in idiosyncratic risk. The paper shows that a reduction in the variation in idiosyncratic risk decreases the ratio of physical to human capital and increases the total investment return and welfare. If the degree of risk aversion is less than or equal to one, then economic growth is enhanced. This paper also provides a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects of business cycles based on a calibrated version of the model. Even for relatively small degrees of risk aversion (around one) the model implies that the elimination of business cycles has substantial effects on investment in physical and human capital, economic growth, and welfare.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Parental preferences,production technologies,and provision for progeny

This paper theoretically explores the implications of the recent developments in the study of human capital production technologies (Cunha and Heckman, 2007) in intrahousehold human capital investment in children (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Behrman et al., 1982). When credit constraints are not binding, parents adopt a reinforcing intrahousehold investment strategy. When credit constraints are binding, the trade-off between the degree of parental aversion to inequality and the degree of complementarity between pre-natal endowments and family investments determines the parental strategy. The observed investment pattern of reinforcement or compensation does not necessarily reveal the underlying preference or technological parameters. Finally, we discuss empirical methods that may separately identify the preference and technological parameters and discuss the econometric challenges associated with these methods.     

Will Self‐Managed Superannuation Fund Investors Survive?

The relative risk aversion coefficient that characterises the representative self‐managed superannuation fund (SMSF) investor reveals not only how much that investor dislikes risk but also other information about the investor's economic characteristics, including how his or her allocations to risky assets change as his or her wealth changes. Determination of the relative risk aversion coefficient for the average SMSF investor reveals a value of 5.05. This value is too high to be consistent with logarithmic utility. This is significant because it implies that SMSF investors may be too risk averse to maximise the expected growth rate of wealth share accumulation. We are left to consider a very important question: Will SMSF investors survive?     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

收入不平等对经济增长影响的实证研究

采用联立方程分析方法,实证分析了收入不平等对经济增长影响的三种机制,探讨了收入不平等如何通过影响物质资本投资、人力资本投资和居民消费来作用于经济增长。结果表明,从长期看收入不平等的扩大会刺激物质资本投资,但不利于人力资本投资和居民消费增长,收入不平等对经济增长的长期影响为负。因此,从经济发展的角度政府不应容忍收入不平等的过分扩大。     

The Optimal Provision of Curative Goods

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk neutral regulator providing a curative goods and a risk averse patient who learns the realized value of his/her health status after the contracting stage. Consumption of a curative good (healthcare) reduces the disutility associated with a disease. We show that the consumption of curative goods is larger than in the complete information case, that this overprovision increases with the degree of patients’ risk‐aversion and the marginal cost of treatment. Ceilings on the amount of healthcare are part of the optimal contract when risk aversion is important.     

TESTING THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF A RISK AVERSION PARAMETER IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET*

This paper empirically investigates the structural stability of a risk aversion parameter in a model in which risk premia exist in forward foreign exchange. To maximize his or her lifetime utility, a representative investor invests in a riskless bond denominated in each major currency: dollar, DM and pound. We test the structural stability of the risk aversion parameter in Japanese data using Euler equations. The results show that the risk aversion parameter was invariant from 1973 to 1991.     

基于价值函数的行为风险投资组合模型研究

从人的有限理性出发,强调风险投资者的实际心理感受对风险投资决策的影响,针对投资者对同等数量的损失比收益更加敏感的心理特征,运用价值函数将投资者的这种心理上的损失和收益引入风险投资决策中,同时用下偏矩来度量组合的风险,认为下偏矩更能反映投资者关心损失程度是否在自己能力承受范围内甚于关心损失概率的心理特征。在此基础上,建立了基于价值函数的单心理账户和多心理账户行为风险投资组合模型。     

教育体系、收入分布与经济增长

本文使用一个包含物质资本与人力资本积累的世代交叠模型,研究不同的教育体系对经济增长的影响.我们发现,在公立教育体系下,最优的教育投资水平高于私立教育体系,收入差异也将会比在私立教育体系下下降得更快.因此,与私立教育体系相比,公立教育体系更有利于人力资本积累,在公立教育体系下一个国家将会有更高的经济增长率与更为平等的收入分布.     

Trust, trustworthiness, and risk in rural Paraguay

This dissertation looks at the relationship between trust, trustworthiness, and risk aversion in a rural Paraguayan setting. The first chapter of this dissertation looks at theft between farmers. Rural areas of developing countries often lack effective legal enforcement. However, villagers who know each other well and interact repeatedly may use implicit contracts to minimize crime. I construct a dynamic limited-commitment model in which a thief cannot credibly commit to forego stealing from his fellow villagers but may be induced to limit his stealing by the promise of future gifts from his potential victim. Using a unique survey from rural Paraguay which combines traditional data on production with information on theft, gifts, and trust, as well as with experiments measuring trust and trustworthiness, I test whether the data is consistent with predictions from the dynamic model. The results provide evidence that, in contrast with predictions from a one-period model with an anonymous thief, farmers do implicitly contract with one another to limit theft. Farmers who have more close family members in their village give fewer gifts, and farmers with plots which are more difficult to steal from give fewer gifts, experience less theft, and trust more. Gift-giving increases when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater, turning the social capital literature on its head. The second chapter of this dissertation looks at a different linkage between trust, trustworthiness, and risk. Trusting behavior in general and play in the traditional trust experiment specifically depend both on trust beliefs and on levels of risk aversion. I ran two experiments with a diverse set of subjects in fifteen villages of rural Paraguay, the traditional trust experiment and a new experiment measuring only risk aversion. I find that risk attitudes are highly predictive of play in the trust game. In addition, omitting risk aversion as a regressor in trust regressions significantly changes the coefficients of important explanatory variables such as gender and wealth. The chair of this dissertation committee was Ethan Ligon and the other committee members were George Akerlof and Elisabeth Sadoulet.     

人力资本风险投资:一个人力资本持续投资的分析框架

市场经济条件下人力资本投资具有高风险性,如何促使人力资本各投资主体将更多的资本转移到人力资本投资领域并得以持续投资,显然需要一种新的理念,人力资本风险投资及其分析框架的构建是符合现阶段经济实际的一个重要命题假说。论文基于人力资本投资的不确定性和损失性,提出并界定人力资本风险投资概念,分析人力资本风险投资主体选择及其相互关系,着力构建人力资本风险投资周期及风险管理理论和技术模型,为人力资本投资风险分散提供一种新的分析框架。     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Economic implications of better information in a dynamic framework

Summary. We consider an OLG model with accumulation in human capital and analyze the economic implications of information about individual skills. Agents in each period differ by the random innate ability assigned to each individual. When young, all agents are screened for their abilities and this screening process (signal) constitutes a public information which is used in choosing the level of private investment in education. We demonstrate that in the presence of risk sharing markets better information may be harmful for all in equilibrium, and find conditions under which better information either enhances growth or reduces growth.Received: 8 September 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D80, J24.Correspondence to: Bernhard EckwertWe are pleased to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of R. Benabou, Z. Eckstein, E. Helpman, B. Ravikumar and D. Tsiddon. Also, special thanks are given to two anonymous referees. This research was supported by a Grant from G.I.F., the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.     

Impact of Human Capital Endowments on Inequality of Outcomes in Cameroon

This paper evaluates the impact of human capital endowments on measured inequality in Cameroon. We first estimate determinants of household economic well‐being (HEW) in which human capital endowments are considered as endogenous effort‐related regressors, while controlling for exogenous circumstance‐related variables. Second, we simulate alternative counterfactual distributions of HEW: one in which human capital endowments are equalized; and the other in which variations are entirely attributable to the unobservable terms. Finally we compare inequality in the factual distribution of household well‐being with inequality in each of the simulated distributions. Direct and indirect exogenous opportunity‐inducing circumstances are inequality‐augmenting, whereas human capital endowments are inequality‐reducing in the actual distribution. Education and health interventions will ameliorate well‐being and mitigate inequality. Thus, leveling the playing ground for individuals to have equitable exposure to education, health and labor market participation is required for a low‐income country like Cameroon to enhance equity and sustainable household economic growth.     

运动员人力资本投资风险分析及应用

本文从运动员人力资本投资风险的概念入手,根据运动员职业过程和人力资本投资的特征将运动员人力资本投资风险分为:职业选择阶段的风险、成长阶段的风险和再就业阶段风险.并以可持续生计理论、可行能力理论为基础构建了运动员人力资本投资风险形成及其规避分析的理论框架,论述了信息不完全、不完全竞争、委托代理、失业和社会保障等经典理论在运动员人力资本投资风险形成与规避分析中的运用.这一论述为深入剖析运动员人力资本投资风险问题奠定了基础,为进一步解决运动员群体的职业风险与保障问题提供了可借鉴的理论参考.     

基于资本形成机制的林业金融支持体系构建研究

现阶段我国林业发展面临严峻的资本形成不足、资金短缺的困境,林业金融正是为弥补严重资金缺口而出现的一种创新制度安排,其基本职能在于实现对林业资本的动员和配置,林业投资风险规避与防范,以保证林业资本的顺畅循环、周转和有效流动,满足林业发展日益增强的资金需求。通过金融改进与金融创新,林业金融支持理应成为推进我国林业可持续发展的战略性机制和基本途径。本文基于金融战略视角,从林业资本形成、投资效率、金融运行三个维度进行分析,通过林业资本形成缺口模型梳理林业产业发展进程中金融支持的内生逻辑,为林业金融支持框架构建提供了理论依据,提出通过构建林业融资支持体系、林业金融工具创新体系、林业风险防范管理体系和林业收益保障四大体系解决林业资本形成不足的困境。