Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

The Performance Differential between Private and State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership,Management and Market Structure

abstract This article examines differences in performance between private companies (POEs) and state owned enterprises (SOEs), with an emphasis on the effects of market structure. The study uses a comprehensive panel covering in principle all registered companies during the 1990s in Norway, a country where SOEs play an important role in regular markets. Return on assets as well as costs relative to sales revenue are used as measures of performance in markets where SOEs and POEs compete with each other. Overall, POEs perform significantly better than SOEs. The study tests the hypothesis that SOE managers may learn from POE managers in environments with stronger competition, but finds only weak empirical support for such a learning mechanism.     

Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Because firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.     

Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets

Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market under demand uncertainty. The main results are as follows. When the correlation between firms' demands is positive and sufficiently high, disclosure of information on demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare, given that the quality of firms' private information is constant. However, in the setting where firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because, when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared with the case where the acquired information is not disclosed; hence, their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to unintended consequences such that disclosure regulation decreases social welfare.     

竞争市场约束下上市公司信息披露行为实证研究

竞争性市场对中国上市公司治理形成了显著约束,实证分析表明,上市公司内部控制机制对信息披露质量影响较小,市场竞争能够对公司内部控制机制形成约束,在内部治理结构不完善情况下,市场竞争会进一步降低信息披露质量.市场竞争等外部控制机制作用的积极发挥依赖于公司内部治理机制的良好建立.     

专有性成本与公司自愿性信息披露策略

运用数学模型,对专有性成本与上市公司自愿性信息披露水平、产品市场竞争策略与公司自愿性信息披露决策之间的关系进行分析。分析结果发现,专有性成本是公司信息披露决策中的重要影响因素。由于专有性成本的存在,公司在进行自愿性信息披露时,需要权衡其在资本市场上获得的收益和其在产品市场上保持的竞争优势这两者之间孰轻孰重。上市公司在产品市场中的竞争策略的选择也将影响其自愿性信息披露决策。     

产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率：一个经验分析

文章以我国2004-2005年深沪两市上市公司为样本,检验我国产品市场竞争与代理成本及代理效率之间的经验关系。研究发现:产品市场竞争能够有效降低企业代理成本,提高企业代理效率,并且对于我国国有企业作用效果尤其显著。     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

实时财务报告技术采纳与资本成本——基于“创新接受”视角的理论模

在资本市场中,公司与其对手为获得更低的资本成本展开竞争。为了达成目标,公司都尝试采用新的信息技术来提高信息披露的透明度。扩展组织"创新接受"理论的内容并整合影响实时财务报告技术采纳和资本成本的主要因素,利用数学模型建构两者之间的约束关系,结果发现,资本成本的节省、不确定性、风险规避、交易、转换成本以及公司治理政策等都对公司何时以及是否采纳实时财务报告技术产生影响。     

瘦身健体改革抑制了国有企业成本粘性吗？

降本增效是深化国有企业改革和实现国有企业做强做优做大目标的重要举措之一。利用2016年国务院审议通过的《中央企业深化改革瘦身健体工作方案》这一外生事件作为准自然实验,采用双重差分模型系统地检验政府干预对国有企业成本粘性的影响及作用机制。实证研究结果表明,瘦身健体改革方案实施对国有企业成本粘性具有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性这一现象并不因企业层级、盈利能力和市场竞争程度差异而发生显著变化。作用渠道检验发现,无论企业信息环境透明度和资产专用性情况如何,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性的现象均依然存在,但在信息透明度低、资产专用性强的国有企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了国有企业改革经济后果方面的研究,拓展了企业成本粘性影响因素的文献,而且有助于从国有企业降本增效的角度为推进供给侧结构性改革提供政策建议。     

The influence of co-location in higher education institutions on small firms’ perspectives of knowledge transfer

Since 1980, the UK has experienced a dramatic growth in firms and employment in information–intensive business services, such as management consultancy and market research. Recent expansion of new and small firms operating in these sectors is the focus of a major ESRC–sponsored research project currently under way at Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre.

Small business service firms are able to compete successfully with large firms due to the imperfect nature of the market which characterizes business services demand and supply, together with specialization of expertise. The success of small business service firms depends on informal person–to–person networks, word–of–mouth recommendation and repeal business based on successful earlier assignments or personal contacts acquired, for example, while working in a large consultancy or market research company. This paper examines the types of networks utilized by small business service firms and argues that two distinct types exist: demand– and supply–related networks; the former involves links with clients, the latter links and co–operation between complementary small business service firms.     

社交媒体信息披露如何影响审计师选择？——基于公司新浪微博的经验证据

作为互联网信息技术下的代表性产物，社交媒体的涌现对市场参与者的经济行为产生了重要影响。从审计师选择视角，研究公司微博信息披露如何通过影响市场参与者进而作用于管理层的决策行为。研究发现，微博信息披露越多的公司越倾向于选择高质量的审计师，并且微博信息披露主要通过外部关注压力（分析师、媒体）和内部监督压力（董事会、审计委员会）两种渠道促使管理层选择高质量的审计师；异质性分析发现，对于投资者信息需求更高、内部控制水平更高、市场竞争更激烈的公司而言，微博信息披露对审计师选择的影响更为明显。该研究结论有助于投资者和监管方更好地理解社交媒体信息的作用机制，对进一步完善信息披露制度促进资本市场健康发展具有一定的启示。     

The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on information disclosed by Spanish firms

Accounting information is subject to two different influences: market pressures and pressure from regulatory bodies. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the influence of both these forces on information disclosure by Spanish firms. To test hypotheses concerning the influence of regulation, annual reports of three different years for 49 companies have been analysed. Given that new Spanish accounting rules have been in force since 1990, annual accounts of a sample of quoted companies have been analysed for the period 1989–1991. In order to consider the influence of positive accounting theory, several characteristics relating to company attributes were selected and tested empirically for the sample of 49 companies. The information disclosed by the sample companies was measured through an information index, based on a list of 50 items of information, and it was regressed on the variables related to company characteristics. The influence of regulation was analysed through a panel data analysis including time effects. The results suggest that time as a surrogate for regulation explains the level of information disclosure, although it does not influence the amount of voluntary information disclosed. However, several firm characteristics were also found to influence the level of disclosure, namely size, auditing and stock exchange.     

Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly

We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.     

连接外部性、横向联盟和市场竞争

分析了横向关系的双寡头企业具有连接外部性条件下的联盟决策,得出结论,横向企业的联盟降低了企业自身的成本,同时也降低了竞争对手的成本,具有正的连接外部性。企业先决定是否联盟,然后在市场上进行竞争;证实了市场竞争比较缓和时,横向企业联盟;市场竞争比较激烈时,横向企业不联盟。当存在产品差异化时,结论仍然不变;比较了企业联盟决策和社会计划者决策,论证得出市场竞争比较缓和时,企业和社会计划者联盟决策一致;市场竞争比较激烈时,企业联盟决策背离社会计划者的决策。     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.     

Corporate carbon risk,voluntary disclosure,and cost of capital: South African evidence

The study examines the interplay among corporate carbon risk, voluntary disclosure, and cost of capital within the context of South Africa, a “rising power” in the climate policy debate. We develop a system of simultaneous equations models and analyze data drawn from firms traded on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE), for the period 2010 to 2015, using the three‐stage least squares procedure. We find that voluntary carbon disclosure is associated with lower overall (and equity) cost of capital, after controlling for corporate carbon risk. We also find that firms with higher carbon risk tend to provide better quality carbon disclosure and signal the possibility of high carbon risk to avoid negative market reactions resulting from concealing carbon information. Although the capital market does not appear to incorporate individual firm's carbon risk exposure into the required cost of capital, we find that it generally requires higher returns for companies operating in carbon‐intensive sectors. These findings suggest that firms could exploit the virtues of voluntary carbon disclosure to reduce their overall (and equity) cost of capital. Our findings also imply that regulators and policymakers could point to the cost of capital reducing role of voluntary disclosure to lure firms into voluntarily providing superior quality carbon disclosures.     

Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

We investigate the association of foreign share ownership with firm‐level disclosure and corporate governance structures in Zimbabwe, a developing country in Southern Africa. Our motivation for the study derives from the literature, which suggests that foreign investors: (1) generally have a preference for companies in which they are well informed and where their investments are more likely to be protected, and (2) avoid companies in developing countries because of weak corporate governance structures and low disclosure. Using data drawn from companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, we examine the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on foreign share ownership. We find that disclosure, proportion of non‐executive directors, institutional share ownership and audit committee independence are all positively and significantly associated with foreign share ownership. Our results also demonstrate that market capitalization, return on equity and liquidity ratios are significantly associated with foreign share ownership. These results are consistent with the notion that foreign investors have a preference for companies with effective corporate governance structures, companies with less information asymmetry, as well as companies with healthy cash positions. The results have implications for policy‐makers in developing countries in their endeavour to improve liquidity on stock markets through the participation of foreign investors. The results are also useful to managers in developing countries who are keen to increase the market value of their company, thereby reducing their cost of capital.     

The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Uncertainty

This paper analyzes a duopoly model with stochastic demand in which firms first commit to a strategy variable and compete afterwards. We find that in equilibrium the relative magnitude of demand uncertainty and the degree of substitutability determines firms' variable choice. Firms set prices if uncertainty is high compared to the degree of substitutability and quantities if the reverse holds true. The reason is that demand uncertainty and the degree of substitutability have countervailing effects on variable choice: Prices adapt better to uncertainty while quantities induce softer competition. If no effect dominates, firms choose different strategy variables in equilibrium.     

The effects of environmental,social and governance disclosure on the cost of capital in small and medium enterprises: The role of family business status

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure has become a critical component of corporate reporting. However, the effectiveness of this type of disclosure remains poorly explored among small and medium enterprises (SMEs), despite the fact that these businesses represent the majority of firms around the world. By leveraging on a dataset of Italian listed SMEs, we fill this gap to shed new light on the effects of nonfinancial disclosure on the cost of capital. The study reveals that, in stark contrast with the evidence on large companies, environmental disclosure for SMEs is bound to provoke an increase in the cost of capital. Yet this pattern is capsized when the company is a family SME, as it benefits from environmental disclosure, as large companies do.