Distributional aspects of the divisibility of money: an example

Summary. I highlight the importance of the distributional aspects of moneys divisibility by comparing a search-theoretic model with random transfers of indivisible money balances, to one with deterministic transfers of partially divisible balances. Randomization allows price flexibility, as if money were fully divisible. Partial divisibility does not, but allows money redistributions. An example of the relevance of such extensive margin aspects of divisibility is provided.JEL Classification Numbers: D30, D83, E40.I thank Dean Corbae and seminars participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, University of Texas at Austin, Purdue University, the Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings, the Central Bank Institute of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and the meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, where this work has been presented during the years 2002 and 2003.     

The Regulation of Private Schools Serving Low-Income Families in Andhra Pradesh,India

This paper sets out some findings of a research project carried out in private unaided schools in low-income areas of Hyderabad, India. The part of the research project documented here was designed to examine the question: Is the regulatory regime conducive to entrepreneurial action and market discovery with particular reference to the low-income schools in Hyderabad. This paper is narrowly focused, setting out the results of pattern matching empirical data with the Austrian economic concepts of entrepreneurship, rivalry, and market discovery. The research discovered that two regulatory regimes exist, one that is set out on paper in the Education Acts and associated rules, and another that operates in practice. That is, there is a combination of regulations on paper and regulations existing in an extra-legal sector. Generally it was found that the regulations in practice are consistent with market principles. Conversely the regulations set out on paper are not conducive to entrepreneurial innovation and market discovery. Recommendations for potential policy initiatives include the possibility of legitimising the extra-legal sector by introducing self-regulation possibly via self-evaluation systems for the private unaided schools.     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.     

Environmental market creation: saviour or oversell?

In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the notion of market creation for the conservation of environmental assets. Market creation establishes a market in the external benefit or cost in question (e.g. biodiversity or pollution reduction) and leaves the relevant parties to adjust their behaviour accordingly. While most attention has been paid to market creation through tradable permits and taxes (the polluter-pays), it is less easy to secure a perspective on beneficiary-pays initiatives. Both polluter-pays and beneficiary-pays initiatives are examples of modified Coaseian bargains in which governments intervene in the bargains to lower transactions costs, establish property rights, deal with public goods issues, or act on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This paper reviews four major initiatives in this respect - debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting and the Global Environment Facility at the global level, and the Costa Rican Forest Law at the local level. It finds that while there is much to applaud in initiatives in these new markets, serious questions remain about the modest flows of funds associated with such global bargains, and the extent to which they secure environmental improvements relative to the baseline of business-as-usual.JEL Classification: D49, D62, H41, O19, Q57, Q2I am indebted to members of the Wildlife Conservation Research Unit at Oxford University and to David Simpson of Resources for the Future and University College London for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.     

Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: a ‘Basic Needs’ Approach

The groundzero premise (so to speak) of the biological sciences is that survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the paradigmatic problem for human societies as well; it is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term adaptation is also familiar to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very imprecisely. Here a more rigorous and systematic approach to the concept of adaptation is proposed in terms of basic needs. The concept of basic human needs has a venerable history – tracing back at least to Plato and Aristotle. Yet the development of a formal theory of basic needs has lagged far behind. The reason is that the concept of objective, measurable needs is inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions that have dominated economic and social theory for most of this century, namely, valuerelativism and cultural determinism. Nevertheless, there have been a number of efforts over the past 30 years to develop more universalistic criteria for basic needs, both for use in monitoring social wellbeing (social indicators) and for public policy formulation. Here I will advance a strictly biological approach to perationalizing the concept of basic needs. It is argued that much of our economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences and subjective utility assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments, are either directly or indirectly related to the meeting of our basic survival needs. Furthermore, these needs can be specified to a first approximation and supported empirically to varying degrees, with the obvious caveat that there are major individual and contextual variations in their application. Equally important, complex human societies generate an array of instrumental needs which, as the term implies, serve as intermediaries between our primary needs and the specific economic, cultural and political contexts within which these needs must be satisfied. An explicit framework of Survival Indicators, including a profile of Personal Fitness and an aggregate index of Population Fitness, is briefly elucidated. Finally, it is suggested that a basic needs paradigm could provide an analytical tool (a biologic) for examining more closely the relationship between our social, economic and political behaviors and institutions and their survival consequences, as well as providing a predictive tool of some value.     

Giffen goods and market making

Summary. This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Giffen goods anomaly affecting traders demands in multi asset noisy, rational expectations equilibrium markets. The role that information plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual trading motive: speculation and market making. The former entails using prices to assess the effect of error terms; the latter requires employing them to disentangle noise traders demands within aggregate orders. In a correlated environment this complicates the signal extraction problem and may generate upward sloping demand curves. Assuming (i) that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or that (ii) uninformed traders risk tolerance coefficient grows unboundedly, removes the market making component from informed traders demands rendering them well behaved in prices.Received: 30 April 2002, Revised: 3 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G100, G120, G140.Support from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and the Ente per gli Studi Monetari e Finanziari Luigi Einaudi, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Anat Admati, Jordi Caballé, Giacinta Cestone, and Xavier Vives for useful suggestions. The comments provided by the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee greatly improved the papers exposition.     

A Survey and a Theoretical Model of Distance Education Programs

In search of a distance education programs crucial success factors, this research was conducted through a designed survey and evaluation instrument, for a predominantly doctoral program at DE University (DEU, an adopted name). Also, the survey has identified some challenging factors along with students most crucial reasons for adopting distance education programs. The author has presented a Testable theoretical model of distance education programs. The top four success factors were revealed to be program quality, general recognition and academic integrity, students satisfaction, and students progress toward the ultimate goal of graduation. Lack of time and worries about the degree recognition by prospective academic and nonacademic employers were the most crucial challenging factors.The 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14. This research is appreciably funded by a research grant from Walden University.     

Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications

Many developing countries have given newly privatized incumbent network utilities, especially telecommunications, exclusive rights to serve particular markets. Research to date has explored privatization, competition, and to a lesser extent, regulation. We know little, however, about the effects of the privatization transactions themselves and, in particular, how these exclusivity periods matter. I use original data to investigate this approach to privatization. I find that exclusivity periods are associated with significant increases in the firms sale price. Exclusivity periods are also, however, correlated with a significant decrease in the incumbents investment in the telecommunications network, payphones, mobile telephone penetration, and international calling.JEL Classification: L1, L5, L96, O12I am grateful for the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Luke Haggarty, Tom Hazlett, Phil Keefer, Roger Noll, Russ Pittman, Greg Rosston, David Sappington, Mary Shirley, Lixin Colin Xu, and two anonymous referees. I thank Troy Kravitz for research assistance. I am solely responsible for all mistakes.     

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Summary. A model is presented in which banks update public records, accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. I show that inside money is more liquid than outside money, increasing the turnover rates of idle capital. The model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are monitored and can issue nominal assets upon request, which helps them to transfer capital in sufficiently high rates and to also become intermediaries. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig [5], and Kiyotaki and Wright [7].Received: 18 February 2003, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E51, G21, G24.Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti: I thank two anonymous referees, Susumu Imai, B. Ravikumar and Neil Wallace, as well as participants at the Economic Theory symposium Recents Developments in Money and Finance, and seminar participants at the Richmond Fed, Queens University, and Sabanci University for comments on an early draft. The hospitality and financial support of the Cleveland Fed Central Bank Institute and CNPq are greatfully appreciated. The authors opinions are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.     

Schumpeterian endogenous growth theory and evolutionary economics

In this paper, we aim to discuss whether Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth can accommodate Schumpeters vision of development through creative destruction. Taking a methodological approach, our focus is on individual decision-making, technology, general equilibrium and welfare, and steady state dynamics as the fundamental principles underlying endogenous growth theory. In particular, the Aghion-Howitt model of Schumpeterian growth in various extended versions is analyzed in the light of Schumpeters work. Therefore, we also try to root Schumpeters work in historical context. We find endogenous growth theory far from carrying Schumpeters idea of an evolutionary approach to change and development. Rather the emergence of numerous models of an evolutionary type can be observed to provide for the formal structure appropriate to keeping Schumpeters legacy alive.JEL Classification: B1, B2, B4, O3, O4Corespondence to: Thomas Kuhn     

The measurement of entry rates: Recondiseration and resolution

This paper extends the recent analysis of Audretsch and Fritsch on entry rates, and suggests a resolution to the possible policy confusion which they discuss. British data also show very different results for the determinants of entry depending on whether the ecological or labour market entry rate is used. It is shown that, in addition to the static, size-distribution effect discussed by Audretsch and Fritsch, there are dynamic factors at work which may lead to this result. However, there need be no conflict in policy signals arising from this, because the labour market approach can be shown to be a superior measure of entry rates where spatial analysis is undertaken.     

Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons

The paper relates John. R. Commons view on the roleof human design in institutional evolution to the views thathave been advanced on this matter by F. A. Hayek, in German ordo-liberalism,and in constitutional political economy. It is argued that Commonsconcept of purposeful selection points in the direction ofa theoretical perspective that consistently integrates the notionsof institutional evolution and constitutional design.     

Information processing for a finite resource allocation mechanism

Summary deal with an organization havingm individual agents (the agents) and one central agent or agency (the coordinator), and the problem of allocating a fixed supply ofn commodities among the agents. The coordinator wishes to distribute the commodities in such a way as to maximize an objective function whose arguments are functions known (implicitly) to the individual agents, but not to the coordinator. The more information the coordinator obtains about the individual agents' functions, the better the allocation decision he or she can make; however, gaining such information is costly, so that the coordinator must balance the potential gain against the cost of acquiring additional information. We find a satisficing solution to this problem which is computable and which terminates in a finite number of steps.We would like to thank Leo Hurwicz, Ken Matheny, Shailendra Mehta, Bill Novshek, Roy Radner, Stan Reiter, Vernon Smith, Mark Walker, and, especially, John Ledyard and Tom Marschak, for helpful comments and suggestions. We must, of course, however reluctantly, accept responsibility for any remaining defects.     

Some notes on trichotomous choice discrete valuation

For some respondents, the bid offered by the dichotomous choice format used in the discrete choice technique can in fact be the true optimum. In this case the correct answer is neither yes or no, but indifferent. We shall show results from a trichotomous choice format and analyse whether it produces welfare measures with narrower confidence intervals than the dichotomous technique. Another well known problem in contingent valuation (CV) studies is that the volume of the good to be purchased from hypothetical markets is not, in many cases, defined in precise terms. We show how the trichotomous choice technique can be used to test for possible vagueness in the volume of the project to be valued.     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

Combining Keynes and Schumpeter. Ingvar Svennilson’s contribution to the Swedish growth school and modern economics

In a study of European growth in the interwar period, the Swedish economist Ingvar Svennilson integrated a Keynesian theory of demand-led cumulative growth with a Schumpeterian analysis of transformation. Today, Svennilson is seen, together with the Schumpeterian economists Johan Åkerman and Erik Dahmén, as members of a unique Swedish growth school. A combination of Keynes and Schumpeter with Svennilson as a mediator has been facilitated by neo-Schumpeterian theories of demand-led innovations. But it has been obstructed by a hypothesis in the Schumpeterian tradition that productivity growth is stimulated by low aggregate demand and by Svennilsons strong commitment to Verdoorns Law which actually is Svennilsons Law. However, Svennilsons analyses of the importance of short-run imbalances for economic growth and the existence of imperfect capital markets discriminating progressive new firms have direct equivalences in modern macroeconomics. Svennilsons main contributions to economics of today are his syntheses between macroeconomic and structural analysis, short and long run theoretical perspectives and, more basically, between theoretical and empirical research.JEL Classification: B25, E32, L6, N14, O11, O14, O31, O4A Swedish version of the paper was presented at the 7th Nordic Conference on the History of Economic Thoughts in Molde (Norway), May 2-4, 2003 and at the Ratio institute (Stockholm), May 8, 2003. I thank participants, Rolf Henriksson and two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets

One of the most important and most contentious issues for regulation and competition raised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act is when to authorize the regional Bell companies to offer long-distance services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted a standard requiring that a Bells local market must first be irreversibly open to competition. This paper analyzes the competitive benefits and costs of authorizing Bell entry, explains the DOJs standard, and argues that the incentives created by this standard will help achieve the Acts competitive goals more efficiently and rapidly than other standards, ultimately reducing the need for intrusive regulation.     

Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51