What Explains the Bid‐Ask Spread Decline after Nasdaq Reforms?

This paper examines whether the decrease in bid‐ask spreads on Nasdaq after the 1997 reforms is due to a decrease in market‐making costs and/or an increase in market competition for order flows. Unlike previous studies, we jointly examine how competition and trading costs affect bid‐ask spreads. In addition, we separate the effects of informed trading and liquidity costs on bid‐ask spreads. Informed trading cost is directly estimated for each Nasdaq stock using a Bayesian theoretic model. Empirical results show that market‐making costs and competition significantly affect bid‐ask spreads. The post‐reform decrease in bid‐ask spreads is largely due to both an increase in competition and a decrease in informed trading and liquidity costs on Nasdaq.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact of Recent Market Reforms

This paper examines the effect of recent market reforms on the competitive structure of the Nasdaq. Our results show that changes in inventory and information costs cannot explain the post-reform decrease in bid-ask spreads. We interpret this as evidence that the reforms have reduced Nasdaq dealers' rents. Additionally, we find that the difference between NYSE and Nasdaq spreads have been greatly diminished with the new rules. Further, the reforms have resulted in an exit, ceteris paribus , from the industry for market making. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that the reforms have improved competition on the Nasdaq.     

Institutional Equity Trading Costs: NYSE Versus Nasdaq

We compare execution costs (market impact plus commission) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq for institutional investors. The differences in cost generally conform to each market's area of specialization. Controlling for firm size, trade size, and the money management firm's identity, costs are lower on Nasdaq for trades in comparatively smaller firms, while costs for trading the larger stocks are lower on NYSE. The cost differences estimated from a regression model are, however, sensitive to the choice of time period.     

Short selling and trading abuses on Nasdaq

We examine the potential for short-selling trading abuses unique to Nasdaq during a period when there was no up-tick rule and no effective prohibitions against “naked” short selling. We find that (a) short sellers earned significant abnormal returns on Nasdaq securities, but these were smaller than on NYSE/AMEX securities; (b) they did not destabilize markets by selling into falling markets and exacerbating price drops; and (c) Nasdaq short sellers may be more susceptible than NYSE/AMEX shorts to “short squeezes”. Our results cast doubt on the appropriateness of recent regulatory reforms established for Nasdaq and public concern over Nasdaq short-selling abuses.     

Execution Costs of Institutional Equity Orders

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than on either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G19, G20, G23.     

RECENT GROWTH IN NASDAQ TRADING VOLUME AND ITS RELATION TO MARKET VOLATILITY

We document a significant increase in Nasdaq trading volume relative to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading volumes. Although recent increases in the number of shares traded are reported in the financial press, we also find it present in the percentage of dollar values traded. We then examine correlations between trading volume and several measures of market volatility. Nasdaq volume appears to be more closely correlated with residual variance, while NYSE and AMEX volumes are more closely correlated with overall market variance. We conclude that the type and quantity of information driving trading are different on Nasdaq than on the two exchanges, and that the relative growth in Nasdaq volume cannot be attributed solely to differences in the methods of counting volume in the two market environments.     

Nasdaq ex‐day behavior: An out‐of‐sample test

We test various explanations of the ex‐dividend day price anomaly using Nasdaq‐listed firms. Similar to NYSE‐listed firms, on average the prices of Nasdaq‐listed firms drop by less than the dividend amount. However, the average Nasdaq price‐drop is substantially smaller than what existing theories would predict and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is double the maximum tax rate. We thus find little support for the tax hypothesis. We also find little support for the short‐term trading hypothesis and various other explanations. The significant disconnect we document between Nasdaq dividends and price changes seems to support the “free dividends fallacy.”     

Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

Market Response to Liquidity Improvements: Evidence from Exchange Listings

The study examines a sample of 895 stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the New York Stock Exchange or to the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1971 and 1994. We show how various measures of liquidity such as the bid‐ask spread, trading volume, and stock price precision improve in somewhat different ways upon transfer to NYSE (Amex). We also find that reductions in trading costs (percentage spread) and in pricing error volatility (Hasbrouck's σ₅) can explain most of stock market's positive response to exchange listing. Thus, liquidity has many facets and cannot be represented by the bid‐ask spread alone.     

Evidence and Implications of Increases in Trading Volume Around Exchange Listings

After controlling for market volume trends and differences in volume measurement between the Nasdaq and the exchanges, we find that mean trading volumes increase significantly for Nasdaq stocks that list on the Amex or the NYSE. Furthermore, stocks with low (high) pre‐listing volume tend to realize the largest volume increases (decreases) as well as the best (worst) post‐listing performance. Our results support the hypothesis that stocks with high past trading volumes tend to experience lower future returns, and shed new light on the nature and possible causes of poor post‐listing stock performance.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.     

Merger Announcements and Trading

We test whether an increase either in informed trades or in large liquidity trades leads to greater correlation of trading volume across markets. We confirm that both trading volume and positive returns of target companies are abnormally high before merger announcements. We find a statistically significant increase in the correlation between New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq/regional trading volume before merger announcements. Furthermore, after merger announcements, we find evidence of both large liquidity trading and a statistically significant increase in the correlation of trading volume across markets.     

The information content of stock split announcements: Do options matter?

We provide a new test of the informational efficiency of trading in stock options in the context of stock split announcements. These announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns. Our traditional event study results show abnormal returns that are significantly lower for optioned than non-optioned stocks, whether traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. After controlling for market returns, capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and trading volume, we find that the abnormal returns are significantly lower for NYSE/Amex optioned than non-optioned stocks. Although the results for Nasdaq stocks are not as clear, the overall effects tend to be lower after optioning. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the prices of optioned stocks embody more information, diminishing the impact of the stock split announcement. They provide new evidence of the beneficial effects of options on their underlying stocks.     

Presidential Address: Friction

The sources of trading friction are studied, and simple, robust empirical measures of friction are provided. Seven distinct measures of trading friction are computed from transactions data for 1,706 NYSE/AMSE stocks and 2,184 Nasdaq stocks. The measures provide insights into the magnitude of trading costs, the importance of informational versus real frictions, and the role of market structure. The degree to which the various measures are associated with each other and with trading characteristics of stocks is examined.     

Competition among Trading Venues: Information and Trading on Electronic Communications Networks

This paper explores the competition between two trading venues, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Nasdaq market makers. ECNs offer the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution, which attract informed traders. Thus, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock‐return volatility are high. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ECN trades than though market‐maker trades. However, ECN trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and offer them better executions.     

Is the Adverse Selection Component Really Higher on the NYSE/Amex than on the Nasdaq?

Affleck–Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is higher for NYSE and Amex stocks than for Nasdaq stocks. Using the model of Huang and Stoll (1997), we revisit their study and find the opposite to be true – the adverse selection component is actually higher for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE and Amex stocks. The economic magnitude of this additional adverse selection cost is very significant. Our results have important implications for the understanding of information production in dealer versus auction markets, and the costs of trading on such markets.     

Effects of Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of Nasdaq Stocks

The relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate. On January 20, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with Nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders. Additionally, superior quotes placed by Nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the Nasdaq market. We measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance, including trading costs and depths. Our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.