Liquidity shocks and equilibrium liquidity premia

We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset returns when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. This result can help us understand why some securities have high liquidity premia, despite low turnover frequency.     

Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of Progressive Pension Arrangements*

This paper aims to quantify the welfare effects of progressive pension arrangements in Germany. Starting from a purely contribution‐related benefit system, we introduce basic allowances for contributions and a flat benefit fraction. Since our overlapping‐generations model takes into account variable labor supply, borrowing constraints as well as stochastic income risk, we can compare the labor supply, the liquidity and the insurance effects of the policy reform. Our simulations indicate that it would be optimal to introduce a flat benefit share of 50 percent and a basic allowance that amounts to 30 percent of average income. Such a reform would yield an aggregate efficiency gain of 3.3 percent of resources.     

The social cost of foreign exchange reserves

Abstract

There has been a very rapid rise since the early 1990s in foreign reserves held by developing countries. These reserves have climbed to almost 30% of developing countries' GDP and 8 months of imports. Assuming reasonable spreads between the yield on reserve assets and the cost of foreign borrowing, the income loss to these countries amounts to close to 1% of GDP. Conditional on existing levels of short-term foreign borrowing, this does not seem too steep a price as an insurance premium against financial crises. But why developing countries have not tried harder to reduce short-term foreign liabilities in order to achieve the same level of liquidity (thereby paying a smaller cost in terms of reserve accumulation) remains an important puzzle.     

Borrowing constraints and the trade balance–output comovement

The countercyclical trade balance ratio is among the key stylized facts about open economies. The magnitude of the correlation between the trade balance and output, however, differs from country to country. In particular, the trade balance ratio is more negatively correlated with output in emerging economies than in developed economies, suggesting that the trade balance is more sensitive to output changes in the former than in the latter. This paper explores whether this difference is caused by international borrowing constraints imposed on emerging economies.By modeling borrowing constraints as conditional on macroeconomic performance, this paper shows that when there is a positive shock takes place in an emerging economy, GDP increases and the borrowing constraint becomes less binding, resulting in a decreased incentive to accumulate foreign assets. When there is a negative shock, by contrast, GDP falls, and the representative household must increase the trade balance to avoid possible binding borrowing constraints.     

Ricardian equivalence and the public and private saving nexus in India

This study tests the Ricardian equivalence theorem (RET) and examines the responsiveness of private saving to public saving in India. Most estimators do not provide support for the empirical validity of RET and long-run cointegration between public and private saving. The increases in household saving (HHS) seem to have been engendered by the provision of saving incentives, institution of saving schemes, self-driven motivation to save, and the precautionary accumulations induced by uncovered uncertainties in incomes, rather than by Ricardian behaviour of households. The self-imposed aversion to debt and debt bequest, borrowing and liquidity constraints, and the intertemporal smoothing of consumption have been the added catalysts that contributed to the increases in HHS. The households with binding borrowing constraints, inadequate or no insurance and uncovered uncertainties in incomes seem to have been saving more to pay for higher inflation-tax. The fiscal consolidation and generation of public saving are essential to reduce the tax burden (both explicit through fiscal taxes and implicit through inflation-tax), minimize the likelihoods of economic and financial crises, and maintain the internal and external value of domestic currency.     

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOB LOCK: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX SUBSIDIES AND HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATIONS

This paper demonstrates that health insurance tax subsidies increase self‐employment, but that the effect differs substantially based on nongroup market regulations and health status. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I show that households that cannot purchase health insurance because of a preexisting condition do not respond to tax subsidies in states in which they would be denied insurance, but they respond strongly in states in which they face risk‐rated premiums. Households respond similarly to tax subsidies in states with nongroup market regulations similar to those established by the Affordable Care Act, regardless of preexisting conditions. (JEL H20, I13, J30)     

A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance

In an influential paper, Baily (1978) showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance (UI) in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters: risk aversion, the consumption-smoothing benefit of UI, and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit rate. This paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine the optimal level of social insurance. I show that a Baily-type expression, with an adjustment for precautionary saving motives, holds in a general class of dynamic models subject to weak regularity conditions. For example, the simple reduced-form formula derived here applies with arbitrary borrowing constraints, durable consumption goods, private insurance arrangements, and search and leisure benefits of unemployment.     

The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study

This paper investigates the crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk-sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment. Our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one-for-one and will reduce the total risk coverage. Furthermore, the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding-out effect, especially when there is an ex-ante income inequality. These predictions are mostly supported by the laboratory experiment, except that the crowding-out effect is not more than one-for-one, and hence the total risk coverage is not significantly reduced by formal insurance.     

Health insurance subsidies and the expansion of an implicit marriage penalty: a regional comparison of various means-tested programmes

Any subsidy provision for healthcare premiums, including those embedded in Affordable Care Act (ACA), has the potential to result in some couples facing an implicit penalty when married relative to unmarried. To illustrate such consequences of means-tested subsidies of health insurance premiums, we construct hypothetical households earning different levels of income who are eligible for current subsidies in the USA. and compare the estimated implicit marriage penalty faced by these households to the one faced by low-income households who are eligible for various means-tested programmes (e.g. TANF, WIC, SNAP) for each of the 48 contiguous states. We find that, like very low-income households, marriage can potentially penalize couples who receive health insurance premium subsidies by decreasing their overall disposable income by as much as 14%. We find that the ACA increases the number of households subject to marriage penalties embedded in means-tested programmes for low-income couples. This distortion will exist for any future health insurance premium subsidies that are means tested at the household income level.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents

A celebrated result in the theory of tournaments is that relative performance evaluation (tournaments) is a superior compensation method to absolute performance evaluation (piece rate contracts) when the agents are risk-averse, the principal is risk-neutral or less risk-averse than the agents and production is subject to common shocks that are large relative to the idiosyncratic shocks. This is because tournaments get closer to the first best by filtering common uncertainty. This paper shows that, surprisingly, tournaments are superior even when agents are liquidity constrained so that transfers to them cannot fall short of a predetermined level. The rationale is that, by providing insurance against common shocks through a tournament, payments to the agents in unfavorable states increase and payments in favorable states decrease which enables the principal to satisfy tight liquidity constraints for the agents without paying any ex ante rents to them, while simultaneously providing higher-power incentives than under piece rates. The policy implication of our analysis is that firms should adopt relative performance evaluation over absolute performance evaluation regardless of whether the agents are liquidity (wealth) constrained or not.     

Testing for liquidity constraints among households: An international analysis

A testable implication for optimizing households minimizing a dynamic loss function but encountering borrowing constraints is forwarded. It is argued that in an error correction model of consumers' expenditures, an asymmetric reaction by households to disequilibrium error reveals the presence of borrowing constraints in the market. A test of this implication for the 11 OECD countries shows that significant liquidity constraints are present for most countries. The proposed setup can be used to test the previously maintained assumption of symmetric reactions to disequilibrium errors in the ECM models.     

Manias,Panics and Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Investigation of the Post-2008 Crisis Period

ABSTRACT

Because of their economic importance, international bond markets are thought to be the likely location for the operation of financial market pressures on emerging market (EM) government policy. An important but unresolved debate that runs through the literature is the relative importance of domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows (pull factors), versus push factors exogenous to the receiving country, in driving portfolio flows to EMs. Through extensive interviews with financial market participants, and analysis of the financial press between January 2008 and 2013, this paper argues that not only were market participants fully aware of the importance of push factors over the cycle, but that their perceptions of the domestic fundamentals themselves were influenced by these push factors. The paper provides evidence on the micro-foundations of investment decision making that make investors susceptible to influence by the push factors, and adds to a growing body of evidence that financial market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market governments than previously assumed, because even when investors pay attention to domestic fundamentals, their assessments can be divorced from reality. This means that government efforts to attract foreign capital through implementing investors' preferred policies may be ultimately futile.     

History’s a curse: leapfrogging, growth breaks and growth reversals under international borrowing without commitment

A simple open-economy AK model with collateral constraints accounts for growth breaks and growth-reversal episodes, during which countries face abrupt changes in their growth rate that may lead to either growth miracles or growth disasters. Absent commitment to investment by the borrowing country, imperfect contract enforcement leads to an informational lag such that the debt contracted upon today depends upon the past stock of capital. The no-commitment delay originates a history effect by which the richer a country has been in the past, the more it can borrow today. For (arbitrarily) small delays, the history effect offsets the growth benefits from international borrowing and dampens growth, and it leads to both leapfrogging in long-run levels and growth breaks. When large enough, the history effect originates growth reversals and we connect the latter to leapfrogging. Finally, we argue that the model accords with the reported evidence on changes in the growth rate at break dates. We also provide examples showing that leapfrogging and growth reversals may coexist, so that currently poor but fast-growing countries experiencing sharp growth reversals may end up, in the long-run, significantly richer than currently rich but declining countries.     

When expectations become aspirations: reference-dependent preferences and liquidity constraints

A large body of literature suggests that consumers derive utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point. This paper shows that such reference dependence can affect savings in opposite directions depending on whether people face liquidity constraints. Existing models for wealth and intertemporal choice predict that reference dependence reduces savings, but these models abstract from liquidity constraints. Introducing a liquidity constraint, I find that reference dependence can increase optimal savings for people without access to credit. Ex post, after reference points have been formed, liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of an income loss in early periods, inducing those who are reference dependent to concentrate the full loss in early periods and save in order to eliminate future losses. Further, anticipating a liquidity constraint raises the expected level of future consumption and thus the expectations-based reference point for future periods, creating an ex-ante savings motive. These findings underscore that it is important to account for financial market imperfections when applying or testing reference-dependent models in low-income settings, and potentially explain heterogeneity in how much the poor save when facing binding liquidity constraints.     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Asset prices in a Huggett economy

This paper explores asset pricing in economies where there is no direct insurance against idiosyncratic risks but other assets can be used for self-insurance, subject to exogenously-imposed borrowing limits. We analyze an endowment economy, based on Huggett (1993) [11], both with and without aggregate risk. Our main innovation is that we obtain full analytical tractability by studying the case with “maximally tight” borrowing constraints. We illustrate by looking at riskless bonds, equity, and the term structure of interest rates, and we show that the model can reproduce many features of observed asset prices when idiosyncratic risks are quantitatively reasonable.     

The Emergence of Non-monetary Means of Payment in the Russian Economy

The widespread use of non-cash payments in Russia is the result of a complex bundle of factors: tax evasion, established networks of enterprises and policy-induced causes. By use of non-monetary payments, agents have relaxed their liquidity constraints, but they still lack the financial resources needed to undertake investment and restructuring. Banks' credit provision is based on criteria other than the profitability of the recipient of the funds. The interest rate, coupled with the restructuring of the banking sector, could operate as an effective lever that may lead to a more economically consistent management of liquidity and could also reduce capital flight.     

Optimal monetary policy: distribution efficiency versus production efficiency

This paper investigates the trade‐off between distribution effect and production effect of monetary policy when there exist unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In the absence of risk‐sharing arrangements such as a credit market, monetary policy serves to provide ex post insurance to smooth consumption. Specifically, issuing interest‐bearing bonds restores credit transactions on money through bond‐money exchanges. Such a policy has a positive distribution effect, but the resulting inflation hampers production efficiency. It is demonstrated that the trade‐off between distribution efficiency gain and production efficiency loss would result in net welfare enhancement if consumers are relative‐risk‐averse enough.