Comparing the top and the bottom income earners: Distribution of income and taxes in the United States

Tax reform is again at the center stage as Congress grapples with ideas to reduce the US budget deficit and the country readies itself for another election year. Given this unusually charged tax reform season, populist and party rhetoric appears to the general population to have largely replaced reasoned debate as politicians, economists and pundits “cherry pick” facts to justify their claims. Our contribution to the current debate on tax equity is that this is one of the very few studies that jointly consider the impact of payroll and income taxes. Most tax equity studies focus only on the federal income tax and as such issue misleading implications. It is important to jointly consider payroll and income taxes because (a) for taxpayers in lower income ranges, the payroll tax burden outweighs the income tax burden, while (b) for higher income taxpayers income from wages above $106,800 ($110,000 in 2012) are payroll-tax free, and (c) other sources of income, namely dividends and capital gains, are not subject to payroll taxes at all. Thus, we provide a more comprehensive picture of the overall progressivity (or lack thereof) exhibited by the current tax laws. In addition, we also consider how some often-raised tax proposals would prospectively affect income inequality and tax progressivity.     

Progressive taxes and firm births

Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the “flat tax” model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. We explore the implications of changes in these parameters for entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births. The Swiss fiscal system offers sufficient intra-national variation in tax codes to allow us to estimate such effects with considerable precision. We find that high average taxes and complicated tax codes depress firm birth rates, while tax progressivity per se promotes firm births. The latter result supports the existence of an insurance effect from progressive corporate income taxes for risk-averse entrepreneurs. However, implied elasticities with respect to the level and complexity of corporate taxes are an order of magnitude larger than elasticities with respect to the progressivity of tax schedules.     

我国利息税税负累进程度分析——以北京地区为例

税负累进程度是指税收负担随收入数额的增加而提高的程度,它是衡量税收公平的指标.对我国现行利息税税负累进性的分析表明,当前5%的税率下,利息税的税负累进性微弱,20%的税率更能增强利息税的税负累进性.要强化利息税的公平功能,可能的政策途径有:提高利息税税率;设定起征点,采用累进税率;并入个人所得税实行合并征收;加强对利息税收入的二次分配.     

Reduced Tax Progressivity in Norway in the Nineties: The Effect from Tax Changes

The inequality in pre-tax income increased in Norway in the 1990s, while the concentration of taxes remained largely unaltered. This means that tax progressivity has decreased in the period, as measured by summary indices of tax progressivity. In this paper I analyze individual income data to ascertain whether tax changes in the period can explain the observed decrease in tax progressivity. As marginal tax rates at high income levels have been substantially reduced in the period, for instance through the tax reform of 1992, it is expected that tax changes may have influenced the degree of inequality in pre-tax incomes. This behavioral effect is examined by deriving estimates of the elasticity of gross income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, obtained from various panel data regressions. The tax changes may also have shifted the distributional burden of taxes for unaltered level of pre-tax income inequality. In order to identify this (direct) effect of tax-law alterations, the same fixed distribution of pre-tax income is exposed to various tax-laws in the period.     

Effects of Progressive Taxes under Decentralized Bargaining and Heterogeneous Labor

We consider changes in income tax progressivity in an economy where workers' productivities differ and workers and firms bargain individually over wages. With given employment a pure increase in tax progressivity reduces wages by reducing workers' relative bargaining power. When average taxes also increase, after-tax wages are unambiguously reduced, while the effects on gross wages and firm profitability are ambiguous. We next endogenize employment and firm entry under a uniform worker productivity distribution and the government's only policy instrument is a linear income tax. While a first-best solution then is ruled out, a second-best solution can be implemented using a family of linear tax functions, where a more progressive tax implies a higher tax revenue to the government. We show that the government can increase its tax revenue, and reduce after-tax income differences, without any additional disturbance to allocation.     

After the death of inflation: will fiscal drag survive?

Declining inflation rates might have negative consequences for tax revenues. Phenomena such as the inflationary bracket creep in a progressive income tax system do not work any longer. With this background, the paper analyses the extent of fiscal drag for OECD countries since 1965. Some consideration of the role of money illusion and indexation in this context lays the theoretical base. A framework is presented that allows for the classification of fiscal structures with regard to the type of fiscal drag. The subsequent econometric panel analysis is performed for total and disaggregated government revenues. The results back theoretical considerations of inflation's impact on different kinds of taxes, which tends to be positive for individual income taxes and social security contributions and is negative for corporate income taxation. The paper concludes that both declining inflation and changing tax structures limit the potential for future fiscal drag.     

The Stability of Tax Elasticities over the Business Cycle in European Countries

We estimate short‐ and long‐run tax elasticities that capture the relationship between changes in national income and tax revenue. We show that the short‐run tax elasticity changes according to the business cycle. We estimate a two‐state Markov‐switching regression on a novel data set of tax policy reforms in 15 European countries from 1980 to 2013, showing that the elasticities during booms and recessions are statistically (and often economically) different. The elasticities of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions tend to be larger during recessions. Estimates of long‐run elasticities are in line with existing literature.     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

Earnings,institutional investors,tax avoidance,and firm value: Evidence from Taiwan

This study examines the valuation of earnings from China and Taiwan by foreign and domestic institutional investors across a sample of Taiwanese electronics firms. We further compare the valuation of firm earnings reported in tax havens and non-tax havens, and whether these firms have changed tax avoidance activities since 2004 when the Taiwanese government enacted stricter auditing of transfer pricing regulation.Our findings show that both operating income from the home country and investment income are positively associated with firm value. Operating income from China, however, is not significantly related to firm value when institutional ownership of the firm exceeds fifty percent. This result indicates that operating income is valued differently, depending on the location from which the income was generated. Non-operating income enhances firm value regardless of the revenue source. We also report that foreign institutional investors favor operating income from domestic and investment sources over earnings generated from non-domestic sources and other non-operating income. Furthermore, our results suggest that firms rearrange reported profits from subsidiaries located in tax havens to affiliates in other countries following the transfer pricing audit guide Taiwan implemented in 2004. Results also indicate firms may have been shifting profits to other low-tax-rate countries, or to countries which do not require firms to pay taxes, even if they are not doing business in that country.     

基于一体化的视角看欧盟税收体系的结构问题与改革取向

欧盟的一体化进程在向各国提出新的税收课题的同时,也使得各国原有的税收问题进一步凸显.在税收结构中,劳动税有一个高税收楔子,对消费税的依赖度很高,而公司所得税和不动产税在总税收中却占一个很小的份额.这种税收结构带来了较低的劳动积极性、较大的税收非中性、较弱的税收再分配能力等问题,并有悖于市场统一化和货币单一化的新形势.这一切决定了欧盟税收体系的改革取向.     

Personal taxation of capital income and the financial leverage of firms

Tax competition for capital has led to a trend where many countries levy lower taxes on interest income, often introducing differential taxation between interest and business income. This study analyzes the effect on firm debt usage. We exploit Germany’s 2009 tax reform, which introduced a final withholding tax on interest income with a flat rate 18 percentage points below the unchanged tax rate on income from unincorporated businesses, as a quasi-experiment. The results, based on firm-level panel data, indicate that firms increase their leverage when the tax rate on interest income decreases, albeit to a small degree.     

Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking

Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk‐taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm's upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss‐offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government.     

Do government preferences matter for tax competition?

This paper explores how government preferences affect capital tax decisions of a country. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and income equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990–2012, is that an increase in government preferences for pursuing economic development relative to income equality makes countries’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Unlike the existing studies, our result contributes to the tax competition literature by highlighting the importance of government preferences in determining the extent of tax competition among countries and so offering a novel explanation for the widely observed heterogeneous tax policies across countries.     

How well-targeted are payroll tax cuts as a response to COVID-19? evidence from China

Numerous countries cut payroll taxes in response to COVID-19, including China, which reduced employer contributions by up to 21 percentage points. We use administrative data on more than 800,000 Chinese firms to evaluate payroll tax cuts as a business relief measure. We estimate that the tax cuts cover 31.5% of the decline in business cash flow, but labor informality causes 53% of registered firms-24% of aggregate economic activity-to receive no benefits at all. We quantify the targeting of the policy in terms of how much benefits flow to small firms less able to access external finance and to sectors worse hit by COVID-19. We find that (1) small firms and vulnerable industries are comparatively more labor intensive, which leads to desirable targeting; (2) labor informality worsens, but does not eliminate, targeting by firm size; and (3) labor informality is uncorrelated with the COVID-19 shock, and therefore does not affect targeting by sector.

     

税制结构演变的国际经验与中国展望

税制结构的演变受到经济因素、政府政策目标、国家和社会关系的影响和约束,具有普遍的规律性。考察世界各国税制结构的演变历程可以发现,发达国家税制结构和税种结构均比较稳定,直接税占比高但税种分散,货物与劳务税仍为最大的单一税种;发展中国家税制结构相对稳定但税种结构呈趋势性变化,个人所得税和企业所得税均稳中有升。个人所得税和社会保障缴款是国家间税制结构差异的主要来源,企业所得税负担的国际竞争面临深刻变化。当前我国已基本形成了双主体税制结构,直接税收入中所得类税收、企业主体税收占比较高。鉴于此,我国应在强化均贫富、促消费的目标下,提高个人所得税比重、完善财产税制度、加强自然人税源管理;在新经济增长模式下,对增值税进行适应性调整和税负优化。     

Political costs and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from sin firms

The products and services of firms operating in sin industries (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and firearms) run contrary to social norms and can produce significant negative externalities for society. As such, we expect that sin firms are at greater risk of incurring political costs in the form of additional regulation, higher excise taxes, or capital market intervention if they come under scrutiny for their income tax avoidance practices. Because of the nature of their products, regulators and policymakers are likely to face less pushback on new regulations or taxes on these firms. Sin firms start with a lower ability to influence the political process than firms in non-sin industries. Consequently, we hypothesize and find that sin firms exhibit less tax avoidance than non-sin firms, particularly through uncertain and more risky tax avoidance strategies. The negative relationship between the status of sin firms and tax avoidance is less pronounced in firms that accumulate political capital via intensive lobbying activities. Exploiting changes in partisan control of the Congress and White House, difference-in-differences tests show that firearm firms engage in less (more) tax avoidance when the Democrats (Republican) control both the Congress and White House. Overall, we conclude that political costs play an important role in corporate tax avoidance decisions.     

How do labor adjustment costs affect corporate tax planning? Evidence from labor skills

Labor adjustment costs (LACs) are a broad concept and involve costs incurred to search, hire, train, retain, and fire employees. Using the level of labor skills as a proxy for LACs, I find that higher LACs are associated with greater tax savings. The effect is stronger for firms facing more intense competition, and firms in states that strengthen labor protection, but weaker for firms in states that restrain labor mobility. High-LAC firms avoid taxes in order to generate precautionary cash. Collectively, the evidence indicates a significant influence of frictions in labor markets (i.e., LACs) on corporate tax planning behavior.     

TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND CORPORATE INCENTIVES TO HEDGE

If a company faces some form of tax progressivity—that is, its marginal tax rate increases over the firm's expected range of reported taxable income—corporate hedging can reduce the firm's expected tax liability by reducing the volatility of pre-tax income. In a study described in this article, the authors used simulation methods to investigate the extent to which tax progressivity arises from various provisions of the tax code, such as the AMT and tax carryforwards and carrybacks. Based on their analysis of over 80,000 COMPUSTAT firm-year observations, the authors find that, in about 50% of the cases, corporations face effective tax functions that exhibit progressivity. The other 50% of cases are about evenly divided between firms that are tax neutral and those facing tax schedules that are "regressive" (again, over the relevant range of expected reported income).
For those companies facing progressive tax functions, the authors estimate that the projected average tax savings from a 5% reduction in the volatility of taxable income is about 5.4% of the expected tax liabilities. However, the distribution of expected reductions is highly skewed, in extreme cases exceeding 40% of the total tax liability. Most of these extreme cases are small to medium-sized companies, since such firms are much more likely to meet the two conditions for achieving large tax benefits: (1) expected pretax income that is close to zero; and (2) sufficiently volatile income that the firm (in the absence of hedging) expects to report losses in some years. In sum, small to medium-sized companies experience the greatest tax benefits from hedging.     

On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.