市场规模、利润侵蚀和争取多产品跨国企业的政策竞争

本文考虑两个国家(或者地区)的政府为争取一家外国跨国企业直接投资(FDI)而进行的政策竞争。两国拥有不同的市场规模,跨国公司生产两种水平差别化产品。文章证明:均衡时跨国企业的FDI选择取决于市场规模效应(marketsize effect)、两种产品间的利润侵蚀效应(cannibalization effect)和两国FDI补贴政策的共同作用。在此基础上,本文进一步得到了政府间FDI竞争的福利含义。特别地,本文还证明了:两国福利可能因参与FDI竞争而获得帕累托严格改进,或者发生帕累托严格损失。     

模糊需求环境下企业合并的效果分析

通过构建一个模糊需求环境下的寡头垄断模型,具体分析存在政策性补贴、外国进口关税时本国受补贴企业、不受补贴企业和外国企业之间的合并选择行为.我们发现,当政策性补贴较高时,合并会发生在本国企业之间;当关税较高、政策性补贴较低时或者关税非常低、政策性补贴较高时,合并均会发生在本国企业与国外企业之间;本国不受补贴企业和外国企业之间不会产生合并.需求模糊函数中斜率的不确定性不影响对企业对合并的选择,但对企业的产量及利润大小具有负作用.     

模糊需求环境下企业合并的效果分析

通过构建一个模糊需求环境下的寡头垄断模型，具体分析存在政策性补贴、外国进口关税时本国受补贴企业、不受补贴企业和外国企业之间的合并选择行为。我们发现，当政策性补贴较高时，合并会发生在本国企业之间；当关税较高、政策性补贴较低时或者关税非常低、政策性补贴较高时，合并均会发生在本国企业与国外企业之间；本国不受补贴企业和外国企业之间不会产生合并。需求模糊函数中斜率的不确定性不影响对企业对合并的选择，但对企业的产量及利润大小具有负作用。     

扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据

文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。     

我国出口补贴转变为技改补贴的有效性分析

文章探讨了本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业技改投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业技改投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业技改投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一政策可接替在未来实施中具有不确定性的出口补贴政策。     

战略性贸易政策在出口管理中的运用

一、战略性贸易政策在出口管理实践中的运用 战略性贸易政策指一国能在实际或潜在的国际市场上影响企业战略决策结果的贸易政策,它的基本主张是在具有规模经济或垄断性的行业,当本国企业与国外厂商竞争时,政府应采取关税或补贴等措施,使垄断利润从外国垄断厂商转移到本国厂商,从而使本国企业获得"垄断租".     

跨国多期技术授权方式选择及社会福利分析--基于空间数量歧视竞争的框架

跨国技术授权作为企业获得竞争优势的重要途径已经受到理论界的关注。与以往的内部技术授权研究不同,文章构建了一个外国拥有技术的企业与东道国企业的空间数量歧视竞争模型,考察多期技术授权存在技术泄露、关税内生及空间竞争对外国拥有技术的企业的最优授权策略选择以及东道国社会福利的影响。研究表明：(1)外国拥有技术的企业偏好双重收费方式,且固定收费方式优于特许权收费方式;(2)双重收费方式不能同时实现拥有技术的企业和社会福利的最优,但可以实现社会福利的次优;(3)外国企业应该通过双重收费方式或固定收费方式进行技术授权,而东道国政府不应一味地提高关税水平,适当地降低进口关税有利于跨国技术授权的实现。文章的结论对于发展中国家的技术引进以及技术出口政策的制定具有一定的现实意义。     

出口补贴的经济效应研究

在当今世界各国的贸易政策中，相对来说，捉进出口的政策要比限制进口政策处于更加重要的地位。发达国家十分重视通过各种出口政策来刺激出口的扩大，而广大发展中国家也高度重视出口政策的运用，以扩大出口，增加外汇收入，从而促进本国工业和经济的发展。而作为促进出D的补贴政策无论是在发达国家还是在发展中国家的出口政策中都占有了重要地位，本文就对出口补贴的经济效应作一个初步的分析。出口补贴又称出口津贴，是一国政府为了降低出口商品的价格，加强其在国外市场上的竞争能力，在出口某种商品时给予出口厂商的现金补贴或财政上的…     

不完全竞争、非对称信息下的最优进口贸易政策和产业政策

本文讨论了不完全竞争和非对称信息情况下 ,如何运用进口贸易政策和产业政策增进本国福利的问题。本文发现 ,(1 )在Cournot同质产品竞争的情况下 ,制定可以诱使本国企业显示真实成本的政策规则可以实现与完全信息情况相同的配置结果 ;并且 ,本国企业的生产成本越低 ,政策规则规定的最优关税越低 ;在某些成本结构下 ,甚至应该执行零关税政策。 (2 )在圆形城市空间竞争 (SpatialCompetitioninCircularCity)的情况下 ,生产补贴和关税的作用完全等价 ;不存在可以实现事后效率的政策规则 ,并且 ,约束最优结果不是一个PBE均衡结果 ,本国政府的最优政策是制定等于单位运输成本的关税。上述结论蕴含 ,最优政策干预以及它能否消除非对称信息可能带来的效率损失依赖于竞争类型 ,而不依赖于信息结构 ,因此 ,它不会发生扭曲     

论产业政策与竞争政策的战略搭配 ——以日本为例

产业政策与竞争政策是一国的两大基本经济政策。两大政策虽目标一致,都为推动本国经济发展,但其实施的方式和侧重点并不相同,因此两者有时会发生冲突和矛盾。各国都非常重视协调产业政策和竞争政策,重视两者的战略搭配,以充分发挥其作用。日本的产业政策和竞争政策颇具特色,受到广泛关注,而日本产业政策与竞争政策的发展和完善实际就是两者此消彼长的过程。本文拟从日本产业政策与竞争政策的动态消长变化入手,探析产业政策和竞争政策的战略定位和搭配,以期对中国在制定相关的经济政策时有所启示。     

Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs

Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports.     

TARIFFS AND IMPORTS MISINVOICING UNDER OLIGOPOLY

Mismatch of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial misinvoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). In this paper, we focus on import underinvoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of underinvoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.     

Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership

Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI.     

Multinational Firms and Strategic FDI Subsidies

A simple three‐stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly, consisting of domestic and foreign multinational firms, is exploited to examine strategic FDI subsidies. While in the first stage the governments decide the optimal FDI subsidies, the firms endogenously choose their FDI levels (or subsidiary plant sizes) in the second stage and their output–export levels in the third stage. Thus, this paper finds that while the outflow and inflow FDI subsidies have different effects on firms’ FDI choices, the FDI subsidies are used as tools for the implementation of strategic policies and that the optimal FDI subsidies vary, depending on whether the governments assess labor employment.     

Location choice under trade and environmental policies

In this paper, we use a game theoretic model to analyze the trade-off between the attractiveness of FDI and the environmental damage caused by production under asymmetric information. In the first stage, the domestic developing country reveals the level of import tariff and pollution tax under information uncertainty about the environmental damage that the foreign firm can cause. The foreign firm from a developed country decides where to locate afterwards with complete information about its own damage. Results show that the developing country can be better off encouraging FDI if and only if the marginal damage of pollution is sufficiently low. The optimal level of pollution taxes attracting FDI is higher than the marginal damage of pollution. However, the optimal pollution tax without FDI can be lower than the marginal damage of pollution with sufficiently high demand in the developing country.     

The Effects of Tariffs and Export Subsidies on Entry Barriers and Investment

This paper explains the effects of unilateral tariffs and export subsidies on entry decisions in an imperfectly competitive industry, and suggests that carefully targeted trade policies play a strategic role in shifting the industry structure and the terms of subsequent competition. The model provides a new justification for tariffs which is different from the traditional infant industry argument; the tariff affects foreign firms' reactions as well as those of the domestic firms. [410]     

Optimum tariffs and patent length in a model of North–South technology transfer

We study a developing country's choice of optimum tariffs and patent length in a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer. A Northern firm chooses whether to export or produce a new good in a Southern country. In the absence of patent protection, a high tariff is required to induce FDI. This reduces Southern welfare when the good is imported. The Southern government can combine a positive patent length with tariffs to reduce this loss and induce FDI. Thus Southern countries may have an incentive to protect patents, although never to the same extent as Northern countries.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies*

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman–Helpman politically‐determined export policy is identical to the rent‐shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically‐determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.     

ALTERNATIVE OPTIMAL TRADE POLICIES IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN INPUT MONOPOLY

Abstract.  This paper develops a generalized three-country model with downstream and upstream industries to analyze optimal import and export trade policies in the presence of monopoly distortion in a foreign intermediate input market. It shows that the import tariff and export tax are linearly dependent. Thus, the optimal choice of the tariff gives rise to the same results as the optimal choice of the export tax, which implies that the domestic government, to avoid tariff retaliation, can use export tax as a substitute for the import tariff.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.