利益相关者公司治理模式探讨

鉴于现行的"股东至上"的公司治理模式引发对企业目标的争议,"利益相关者"的公司治理模式逐渐引起人们的关注。首先简单介绍了"利益相关者"的公司治理模式的主要理论依据,然后概述"利益相关者"公司治理模式的特点,最后提出"利益相关者"公司治理模式的发展对策。     

利益相关者公司治理研究综述

随着传统的"股东至上"的公司治理模式的缺陷日益突出,"利益相关者"公司治理的模式受到越多越多的青睐,国内外相关的研究成果丰硕。为此,总结了利益相关者公司治理的理论基础,并总结了利益相关者的界定和分类方法,对目前利益相关者公司治理模式进行分析,为国内外研究的进一步开展提供借鉴。     

利益相关者治理的理论背景与最新研究进展

利益相关者治理模式是对传统股东至上治理模式的一次管理革命,利益相关者理论的发展经历了三个阶段,当前进入了实证分析与可操作层面的研究阶段.     

公司治理中利益相关者治理问题研究

文章基于利益相关者的公司治理理论,公司治理模式从单边治理走向多边利益主体共同治理的趋势已经不可逆转,试图研究在考虑公司发展阶段和公司发展外部环境基础上的"股东至上"主义和"利益相关者至上"主义有效结合的公司治理模式,发现不同公司治理模式之间并非相互对立,进而提出完善我国公司治理理论需要结合我国实际并借鉴不同模式的优点。     

利益相关者与公司治理

企业是一系列不完全契约的集合体,企业不仅是股东的企业,也应成为全体利益相关者的企业。利益相关者理论在逐渐完善的过程中,对传统股东至上的治理模式提出了挑战和质疑,并相应地提出了利益相关者治理模式。但利益相关者治理模式也并非完美的治理模式,依然存在着一些不足和改进的必要。     

利益相关者治理的理论背景与最新研究进展

利益相关者治理模式是对传统股东至上治理模式的一次管理革命,利益相关者理论的发展经历了三个阶段,当前进入了实证分析与可操作层面的研究阶段。     

委托人模式与受托人模式公司治理结构比较分析

股东至上理论与委托人模式公司治理的治理主体是股东,而利益相关者理论与受托人模式公司治理的治理主体则多元化:包括公司股东、管理层、员工、债权人、供应商及当地社区等。本文从利益相关者理论的基本原理出发,通过对股份公司控制权争夺机制的初步分析,推定受托人模式公司治理结构的合理性。     

利益相关者理论下公司治理主体的确定

利益相关者理论主张寻求一种利益的均衡,要求公司的治理主体扩大到包括股东在内的各利益相关者,这与传统的“股东至上”理论产生了冲突。利益相关者理论强调利益均衡有可能会导致效率的损失,其还面临着实际运作中的各种问题。作为公司治理主体必须具备相应的动机和能力,本文认为利益相关者理论下治理主体应包括以股东为主的各核心利益相关者。     

现代公司财务治理分析——基于利益相关者合作视角的探究

现代公司是多边契约关系的集合体。公司的各相关主体有着不同的利益诉求。原有的以"股东至上"的单边治理模式已不适应新环境的需求,因此,现代公司需建立一个由各利益相关者合作的共同治理机制,谋求实现公司价值最大化的财务治理目标。     

商业银行引入公司治理模式的战略意义

公司治理结构的本质是一个关于企业所有权的契约,治理起因于产权的分离,治理的功能是权、责、利的分配,治理模式有效率的前提是剩余索取权与控制权的均衡分布。“股东至上主义”逻辑和利益相关者理论作为公司治理的思想源流,导致了两种迥异的治理模式:股东单边治理模式和利益相关者共同治理模式。本文通过对这两种模式的对比分析,认为我国商业银行公司治理应当采取利益相关者共同治理模式。     

中国保险公司治理研究:基于知识和创新的视角

中国保险公司治理的基本特征是"股东单边治理",本文基于知识和创新的视角指出,股东单边治理的根本缺陷在于无法对经理层进行有效的内部制衡和市场制衡,上述缺陷导致中国保险公司内部治理结构失衡.不同国家采用不同方式对股东单边治理缺陷进行弥补.通过理论推导和国外实践,本文指出中国保险公司治理发展只能走利益相关者内部治理主导模式.     

The Governance of Corporate Sustainability: Empirical Insights into the Development,Leadership and Implementation of Responsible Business Strategy

This article explores how corporate governance processes and structures are being used in large Australian companies to develop, lead and implement corporate responsibility strategies. It presents an empirical analysis of the governance of sustainability in fifty large listed companies based on each company’s disclosures in annual and sustainability reports. We find that significant progress is being made by large listed Australian companies towards integrating sustainability into core business operations. There is evidence of leadership structures being put in place to ensure that board and senior management are involved in sustainability strategy development and are then incentivised to monitor and ensure implementation of that strategy through financial rewards. There is evidence of a willingness to engage and communicate clearly the results of these strategies to interested stakeholders. Overall, there appears to be a developing acceptance amongst large corporations that efforts towards improved corporate sustainability are not only expected but are of value to the business. We suggest that this is evidence of a managerial shift away from an orthodox shareholder primacy understanding of the corporation towards a more enlightened shareholder value approach, often encompassing a stakeholder-orientated view of business strategy. However, strong underlying tensions remain due to the insistent market emphasis on shareholder value.     

大股东侵占、公司声誉与公司绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

外部大股东一方面具有减少管理者机会主义行为的积极效果,另一方面又会利用控制权侵占小股东和其他利益相关者的利益影响公司绩效;约束大股东行为、保护中小投资者利益成为公司治理的核心问题。在诸多约束大股东侵占的机制中,公司声誉机制被认为是约束大股东利益侵占的有效机制。本文采用2004年1261家上市公司为研究对象,对大股东侵占度和公司声誉制约机制对上市公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析,结果表明,大股东侵占度对公司绩效的影响不显著,公司声誉对公司绩效产生了显著的正面效应。此外,我们还发现法律环境对公司绩效产生积极影响。     

The Politics of Shareholder Activism in Nigeria

Shareholder activism has become a force for good in the extant corporate governance literature. In this article, we present a case study of Nigeria to show how shareholder activism, as a corporate governance mechanism, can constitute a space for unhealthy politics and turbulent politicking, which is a reflection of the country’s brand of politics. As a result, we point out some translational challenges, and suggest more caution, in the diffusion of corporate governance practices across different institutional environments. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance in Africa, whilst creating an understanding of the political embeddedness of shareholder activism in different institutional contexts—i.e. a step closer to a political theorising of shareholder activism.     

大股东所有权、控制权与公司治理绩效的灰色关联分析——基于三一重工的案例研究

以中国"股权分置改革第一股"——三一重工为研究对象,采用案例研究的方法,对三一重工的公司治理绩效和控制性大股东的所有权、控制权以及两权分离度进行灰色关联度分析。实证研究结果表明:三一重工的最终控制大股东所持有的的所有权(现金流量权)在一定程度上抑制了其进行"隧道挖掘"的行为,起到了利益汇聚的激励效应,并且随着其所有权比例的上升,公司治理绩效随之提高。同时,三一重工的最终控制大股东虽然通过采用金字塔控股结构分离所有权与控制权,用较少的所有权掌握大部分的控制权,但是两权分离并没有降低上市公司的治理绩效,即两权分离并未产生隧道挖掘的防御效应。但是激励效应和防御效应均不显著。     

Monitoring Costs,Managerial Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Modeling Approach

This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders’ choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types, monitoring efficiency, and effectiveness of ethics education. We conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value. When managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms, ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation.     

数字金融的公司治理效应--基于非家族股东治理视角

非家族股东治理能够有效助力家族企业实现可持续发展与现代化转型的目标,因而提升非家族股东治理水平具有重要意义。数字金融作为传统金融发展模式的重要创新,能够实现“金融服务实体经济”的目标,促使非家族股东积极参与家族企业治理。基于此,本文以代理理论与社会情感财富理论为基础,探讨了数字金融对非家族股东治理的影响。实证检验发现,随着数字金融的发展,非家族股东治理水平不断提升。其作用机制在于,数字金融能够通过缓解代理冲突、弱化家族控制与强化传承意愿,提升非家族股东治理水平。拓展性分析发现,对于非创业型、融资约束较强、位于金融监管程度较强地区的家族企业来说,数字金融对非家族股东治理的积极效应更显著;数字金融对异质性非家族股东制衡度存在差异化影响,即相较于外资股东与机构股东制衡度,数字金融能够强化国有股东与民营股东对家族股东的制衡;数字金融能够通过提升非家族股东治理水平促进家族企业可持续发展。本文从数字金融视角探究非家族股东治理的动机,丰富了数字金融与非家族股东治理的相关研究。     

Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility in Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Systems Approach

Current research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) illustrates the growing sense of discord surrounding the ‘business of doing good’ (Dobers and Springett, Corp Soc Responsib Environ Manage 17(2):63–69, 2010). Central to these concerns is that CSR risks becoming an over-simplified and peripheral part of corporate strategy. Rather than transforming the dominant corporate discourse, it is argued that CSR and related concepts are limited to “emancipatory rhetoric…defined by narrow business interests and serve to curtail interests of external stakeholders.” (Banerjee, Crit Sociol 34(1):52, 2008). The paper addresses gaps in the literature and challenges current thinking on corporate governance and CSR by offering a new conceptual framework that responds to the concerns of researchers and practitioners. The limited focus of existing analyses is extended by a holistic approach to corporate governance and social responsibility that integrates company, shareholder and wider stakeholder concerns. A defensive stance is avoided by delineating key stages of the governance process and aligning profit centred and social responsibility concerns to produce a business-based rationale for minimising risk and mainstreaming CSR.     

Rules of the game: whose value is served when the board fires the owners?

How does a board of directors decide what is right? The contest over this question is frequently framed as a debate between shareholder value and stakeholder rights, between a utilitarian view of the ethics of corporate governance and a deontological one. This paper uses a case study with special circumstances that allows us to examine in an unusually clear way the conflict between shareholder value and other bases on which a board can act. In the autumn of 2010, the board of Liverpool Football Club sold the company to another investing group against the explicit wishes of the owners. The peculiar circumstances of this case provide insight into the conflict between ethical approaches to board decisions, allowing us to see certain issues more clearly than we can in listed corporations with many shareholders. What the analysis suggests is that the board saw more than one type of utility on which to base its ethical decision, and that one version resonated with perceived duties to stakeholders. This alignment of outcomes of strategic value with duties contrasted with the utility of shareholder value. While there are reasons to be cautious in generalizing, the case further suggests reasons why boards may reject shareholder value, in opposition to mainstream notions of corporate governance, without rejecting utility as a base of their decisions. Further, the partial alignment of duty and utility facilitates a pragmatic decision rather than one based on a priori claims.     

Corporate Responses to Shareholder Activists: Considering the Dialogue Alternative

This empirical study examines corporate responses to activist shareholder groups filing social-policy shareholder resolutions. Using resource dependency theory as our conceptual framing, we identify some of the drivers of corporate responses to shareholder activists. This study departs from previous studies by including a fourth possible corporate response, engaging in dialogue. Dialogue, an alternative to shareholder resolutions filed by activists, is a process in which corporations and activist shareholder groups mutually agree to engage in ongoing negotiations to deal with social issues. Based on a unique dataset of resolutions filed by member organizations of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility from 2002 to 2005 and the outcomes of these resolutions, our analysis finds that corporate managers are more likely to engage in dialogue with shareholder activists when the firm is larger, is more responsive to stakeholders, the CEO is the board chair, and the firm has a relatively lower percentage of institutional investors.