会计准则、资本市场监管规则与盈余管理之遏制:来自上市公司债务重组的经验证据

本文利用1999年、2001—2007年上市公司债务重组的数据来研究会计准则和资本市场监管规则在遏制公司盈余管理方面的作用。本文通过分析认为,为遏制上市公司的盈余管理,从上市公司盈余管理的动机端入手更为有效。就上市公司盈余管理主要为满足资本市场监管要求之动机而言,应该从资本市场监管规则的改进入手。而会计准则因其公共合约性质和不完备性,既没有责任也没有能力去遏制上市公司的盈余管理行为。1999年、2001—2007年间上市公司的债务重组行为支持本文的这一观点,来自上市公司债务重组的经验证据显示,是资本市场监管规则而非会计准则在影响和制约着上市公司是否利用债务重组来进行盈余管理。     

债务重组对上市公司盈余管理的影响——基于沪市A股上市公司的经验证据

我国财政部在1998年、2001年和2006年先后颁布和修订了债务重组准则,不同准则下债务重组损益的确认与计量有所不同。在这三个阶段,上市公司是否利用债务重组进行盈余管理．盈余管理程度和动机是否有所不同？针对这些问题,文章选取1999年、2006年和2007—2011年沪市A股的债务重组上市公司为样本,采用描述统计和多元回归方法研究不同债务重组准则下债务重组对盈余管理的影响。研究表明：将债务重组损益计入营业外收支的公司其盈余管理程度要高于将债务重组损益计入资本公积的公司;ST公司通过债务重组收益来粉饰报表达到扭亏为盈的目的。     

债务重组与上市公司盈余管理的实证研究

新会计准则允许债务人将产生的债务重组收益计入当期损益,这为绩差上市公司提供了盈余管理的可能,本文通过对上市公司年报的实证分析,证明了2007年发生债务重组收益的上市公司利用新债务重组准则进行了盈余管理,改善了会计业绩。并通过对其2008年度盈利状况的跟踪研究,发现取得债务重组收益的上市公司在后续会计期间其业绩并没有得到持续改善。     

盈余管理治理与债务重组新准则实施刍议

本文以我国2006年对2001年债务重组准则的变更作为研究的背景,以盈余管理的相关理论为基础,探讨盈余管理治理的基本思路,研究在盈余管理治理中进一步完善新债务重组准则实施效果的具体对策,从而评述2006年债务重组准则变更的合理性。     

浅析债务重组准则对上市公司盈余管理的影响

随着2006年新债务重组准则取代2001年的旧准则,债务重组已经成为影响上市公司盈余管理的重要因素。本文以比较2006年与2nm年的会计准则在债务重组方面的差异为起点,采用实证方法研究部分上市公司债务重组占利润之比的变化情况分析其对公司盈余管理的影响,并提出相关建议。     

关于债务重组与上市公司盈余管理的实证研究

<正>一、引言新会计准则与旧准则相比,在许多方面进行了重大修改,其中,债务重组准则的巨大变化是新会计准则一大显著特点。旧准则下,债务重组收益计入资本公积,阻止了上市公司利用债务重组进行盈余管理;而新准则下,债务重组以公允价值计量,并允许债务人将产生的债务重组收益计入当期损益,非货     

公司治理结构、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文在新《资产减值准则》的研究框架下,结合公司治理理论,对我国上市公司的公司治理特征、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回相互关系进行了实证分析。本文以2001年至2004年所有A股上市公司为样本,实证研究发现:(1)董事会和总经理两职合一、管理层薪酬外部竞争优势弱化、未设置独立审计委员会的公司越倾向于长期资产减值转回进行盈余管理;(2)具有扭亏动机、配股动机的公司越倾向进行长期资产减值转回,具有大清洗动机和利润平滑动机的公司越倾向长期资产减值不转回;(3)未来收益能力和经济环境不影响长期资产减值转回。文章还对政府经济管理部门、上市公司监管部门、上市公司利益相关者及上市公司管理层提出了建议。     

债务重组的文献综述

债务重组准则从1998年以来历经了三次修订,在不断完善的过程中也出现了不少问题,许多ST公司利用债务重组进行盈余管理.本文从债务重组的动机和目的进行文献回顾,进而引出债务重组与盈余管理的关东回顾,最后总结已有学者对债务重组问题的讨论及建议.     

债务重组收益都计入利润表吗?——基于西北轴承案例谈5号解释

中国作为新兴的资本市场,有着特殊的国情、法律制度和证券监管制度.我国的《企业会计准则——债务重组》经历了公布、修订和再修订过程.2006年的第二次修订又回归到1998年的原始规定,即将全部债务重组收益都计入当期损益.这进一步使中国会计准则与国际财务报告准则趋同.债务豁免作为债务重组中的一个重要方式,成为一些上市企业,尤其是业绩较差的企业的“救命稻草”.从2006年至今,一大部分ST公司靠债务豁免扮靓业绩.有些企业甚至用债务豁免来进行盈余管理,维持账面利润或获保持上市资格.     

企业实施债务重组会计准则的关键点和难点

1998年6月,财政部发布了《企业会计准则-债务重组》,并于1999年1月起实施。但在实务中,有些企业利用会计准则条款人为调节利润,操纵企业业绩,严重影响了投资者和债权人对企业经营业绩的公允判断。结合中国实际,财政部又于2001年1月1日发布了修订后的《企业会计准则-债务重组》。新准则针对如何确认债务重组损益、如何运用公允价值等方面做了较大调整,目的旨在简化债务重组业务的会计处理,遏制企业进行业绩操纵。下面从实务应用角度对修订后会计准则的关键点和难点进行简要分析。一、关键点1.正确确定一项债务重组业务应否按准则规定进行会计…     

我国债务重组准则的变革分析及实施效果评价——基于沪市ST公司2007年年报分析

2007年是我国财政部2006年颁布的新会计准则体系实施的第一年,其中债务重组准则的实施运用备受关注。本文在分析债务重组准则变革的基础上,以沪市96家ST公司①2007年年报资料为依据,重点对新债务重组准则的实施效果及其产生的影响进行了相关的探讨。     

Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management

We examine the impact of differential incentives arising from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management. We reason that firms with loans close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants have a stronger incentive to engage in earnings management than firms that are far from violating their debt covenants. We find results consistent with this expectation. Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants engage in higher levels of accounting earnings management, real earnings management, and total earnings management than far-from-violation firms. In additional analysis, we find that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid covenant violation switched from using more accounting earnings management before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total earnings management afterwards. We also document that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are observed primarily for firms with poor credit ratings and for firms that do not meet analyst forecasts.     

Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors

The ex ante optimal contract between investors and employees is derived endogenously and is interpreted in terms of debt, equity, and employees' compensation. Although public equity financing is feasible in this model through verified accounting income, debt is needed to force value-enhancing restructuring before the income realizes. The optimal debt level, however, is lower than that which maximizes the value of the firm when there is nonmonetary restructuring-related cost to employees. The paper explains how stock prices react to exchange offers, how earnings can be diluted by a decrease in leverage, and why employees' claims are generally senior to those of investors. New testable implications about leverage and compensation levels are derived.     

Earnings management and firm financial motives: A financial investigation of UK listed firms

This study focuses on the investigation of motives for and characteristics of UK firms that engage in earnings management activities. It concentrates particularly on the provision of voluntary accounting disclosures, the violation of debt covenants, management compensation, and on the equity and debt capital needs of firms and their relation with the use of earnings management. The study examines also the earnings management inclination of firms that seek to meet or exceed financial analysts' forecasts. The findings generally indicate that firms with low profitability and high leverage measures are likely to use earnings management. Also, firms that are in equity and debt capital need and are close to debt covenant violation also appear to be inclined to employ earnings management practices. Likewise, firms tend to use earnings management to improve their financial numbers and subsequently reinforce their compensation and meet and/or exceed financial analysts' earnings forecasts. In contrast, the study shows that firms that provide voluntary accounting disclosures appear to be less inclined to make use of earnings management.     

Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision-making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers' abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.     

The Impact of the Change to International Accounting Standards on Debt Covenants: A UK Perspective1

This paper examines the impact on covenants in the debt contracts of companies of the impending change to international accounting standards (IAS). The primary focus of the paper is the UK debt market, but comparisons are drawn with other EU countries that will also be affected by the adoption of IAS. Existing evidence of the nature of debt covenants and the impact of accounting regulation change on such covenants is briefly reviewed. It is argued that the adoption of IAS will have a significant impact both on reported earnings and on balance sheet values. Moreover, it is argued that the adoption of IAS will increase the volatility of earnings. It is further argued that, as a consequence of these effects, there will be a significant impact on debt covenants given the widespread use of rolling GAAP. A number of cases and hypothetical examples are provided to illustrate the impact of the adoption of IAS.     

What do we know about the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and debt covenants?

The paper examines the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and in particular focuses on the definition, measurement, and monitoring of accounting-based covenants used to manage agency relationships arising from borrowing by firms. The paper also reviews research in areas of financial reporting where the presence of accounting-based covenants provides incentives to managers, notably choice of accounting method, lobbying on standard setters' proposals, and accounting earnings management. Although US dominated and latterly increasingly focused on large datasets and quantitative and analytical methods, relevant research is available from a range of methodologies and countries and the paper reflects this variety and identifies both inter-jurisdictional differences and inter-temporal changes in debt contracting practices. Despite the extensive research which is reviewed important areas for new research remain.