Intraday hedging with financial options: the case of electricity

As market intermediaries, electricity suppliers purchase electricity from the wholesale market or self-generate to deliver their customers. However, electricity suppliers are uncertain about how much electricity their residential customers will use at any hour of the day until they actually turn switches on. While demand uncertainty is a common feature of all commodity markets, suppliers generally rely on storage to manage it. Singularly, electricity suppliers are exposed to joint volumetric and price risk on an hourly basis given the physical attributes of electricity. In the literature on electricity markets, few articles compare the efficiency of forward contracts, options and physical assets (i.e. power plants) within intraday hourly hedging portfolios, whereas electricity markets are precisely hourly markets. We analyse portfolios made of forwards, options and/or power plants for specific hourly clusters (9 am, 12 pm, 18 pm, 9 pm) based on electricity market data from 2013 to 2015 from the integrated German–Austrian spot market. Through a VaR model, we prove that intraday hedging with forwards is structurally inefficient compared to financial options and physical assets, no matter the cluster hour. Moreover, our results demonstrate the contribution of ‘out of the money’ options for all hours within volatile spot markets.     

Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

One of the main elements of the recent reform of electricity trading in the United Kingdom is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyze this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), a positive impact on consumer surplus, and ambiguous implications for welfare and average prices.     

Is real-time pricing smart for consumers?

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We examine the effects of real-time pricing on welfare and consumer surplus in electricity markets. We model consumers on real-time pricing who purchase...     

Consumer surplus bias and the welfare effects of price discrimination

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This paper examines the incentives for efficient pricing mechanism in markets with non-convexities. The wholesale electricity market is a prominent example....     

Rethinking real-time electricity pricing

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. This paper evaluates the first program to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing (RTP). I find that enrolled households are statistically significantly price elastic and that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times. The program increased consumer surplus by $10 per household per year. While this is only one to two percent of electricity costs, it illustrates a potential additional benefit from investment in retail Smart Grid applications, including the advanced electricity meters required to observe a household’s hourly consumption.     

Reliability Management in Competitive Electricity Markets

This paper examines market design issues for reliability management in competitive power markets. The institutional structure is characterized by a power exchange that conducts electricity market trading, a system operator that operates the electric power system, and a property right system for transimission pricing. In a competitive market, priority insurance fosters market information for determining efficient system reliability levels and induces system operator to maintain system security efficiently. A six-node network example is examined to illustrate the basic insights.     

Options for Electricity Transmission Regulation in Australia

The pricing of access to electricity transmission networks in Australia is currently under review. Several options have been proposed including those based on nodal pricing and the assignment of transmission rights contracts. As most of the marginal costs of transmission are recovered through wholesale electricity prices we focus on the key issue of regulation and investment incentives. We find that current options are unlikely to be adequate in terms of encouraging socially optimal levels and timing of new transmission investment. As an alternative, we propose a regulatory scheme, based on a related idea by Sappington and Sibley that can overcome this problem. Our scheme can potentially generate first best results and is readily applicable given the current institutional structure of electricity markets in Australia.     

Response of industrial customers to hourly pricing in Ontario’s deregulated electricity market

This paper uses hourly data from Ontario (Canada) between 2005 and 2008 to estimate the effects of real time wholesale electricity prices on demand by industrial customers. Nonlinear SUR estimates from Generalized Leontief (GL) specifications reveal elasticities of substitution from 0.02 to 0.07, confirming that industrial customers (connected to the transmission grid) shift consumption across peak and off-peak periods in order to reap benefits of lower prices. Estimates from FGLS and IV models suggest that this reduction in demand by industrial customers results in lower wholesale prices, which benefits all consumers. The policy lesson is that market based schemes that encourage Real Time Pricing (RTP) pricing should result in positive spillovers to all consumers.     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.     

Household Electricity Demand, Revisited

Recent efforts to restructure electricity markets have renewed interest in assessing how consumers respond to price changes. This paper develops a model for evaluating the effects of alternative tariff designs on electricity use. The model concurrently addresses several interrelated difficulties posed by nonlinear pricing, heterogeneity in consumer price sensitivity, and consumption aggregation over appliances and time. We estimate the model using extensive data for a representative sample of 1300 California households. The results imply a strikingly skewed distribution of household electricity price elasticities in the population, with a small fraction of households accounting for most aggregate demand response. We then estimate the aggregate and distributional consequences of recent tariff structure changes in California, the consumption effects of which have been the subject of considerable debate.     

Price discrimination of digital content

This paper considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self-production is more efficient than that of a producer.     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences

A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We characterize optimal nonlinear pricing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers. Since consumers have a preference for commitment, the firm faces a trade-off between offering a small menu that makes the consumers’ self-control easier and offering a large menu that achieves better price discrimination. We show that the optimal menu resembles the one in the standard nonlinear pricing problem with a price ceiling, where the upper bound on prices is determined endogenously by a participation constraint. The ceiling motivates the firm to offer a relatively flat and compact price schedule, serving more consumers with low demand. The characterization also shows that the firm may earn less if consumers have temptation.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

Regulating prices for shifting between service providers

The price that a regulated access provider charges for shifting customers between service providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using US long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service providers can help to inform price regulation.     

OPTIONAL REAL-TIME PRICING OF ELECTRICITY FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS

Abstract. This paper proposes a pricing mechanism, optional real-time pricing (RTP), with day-ahead hourly prices, that exploits the potential offered by a competitive wholesale power market. When an electric utility offers the option to its industrial customers, the retail prices are based on an existing Hopkinson tariff and expectations as to the wholesale market's next-day hourly spot prices. The proposed RTP mechanism is Pareto-superior to the tariff in that it assures both the utility and the customer of profits that will be at least as great as under the tariff.