A THEORY OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR

In many countries, especially poor countries, a heavy burden of taxes, fees, bureaucratic hassles, and bribes drives many producers into an informal sector. This paper shows that we can attribute the existence of a large informal sector to the fact that, because productive endowments contain important unobservable components, the state cannot adjust the amounts that it extracts from producers in the formal sector finely according to each producer's endowment. Given this fact, we find that if the endowment of well-endowed producers is sufficiently large relative to poorly endowed producers, or if their number is relatively large, or if the quality of public services is sufficiently low, then the state extracts a large enough amount from producers in the formal sector that poorly endowed producers choose to work in the informal sector. This result obtains both for a proprietary state, which maximizes its own net revenue, and for a hypothetical benevolent state, which would maximize total net output. But, we also find that there exist combinations of the distribution of endowments and the quality of public services such that the policies of a proprietary state, but not the policies of a hypothetical benevolent state, would cause poorly endowed producers to work in the informal sector.     

COMMENT MESURER LA CONTRIBUTION DU SECTEUR NON STRUCTURE A LA PRODUCTION NATIONALE DANS LES PAYS DU TIERS MONDE?*

This article discusses methods of integrating the “informal sector” in the national accounts of developing countries. This sector, defined generally as composed of producers who do not keep formal accounts, is difficult to capture by usual statistical collection techniques, and therefore is often neglected. The paper develops the requirements for a direct inquiry approach to obtaining data for this sector, emphasizing the need for national, exhaustive, and periodic coverage. It then proceees to propose methods of analysis for informal sector enterprises with and without fixed locations, tailored to the specific characteristics of each trade. The final section presents some results of application of the proposed methods in Tunisia and Niger.     

Sectoral Selection and Informality: a Nicaraguan Case Study

Using microdata from the 1998 and 1993 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey, this paper analyzes the relative size and attractiveness of formal and informal sector employment. Switching regression models of the formal/informal sector employment choice indicate that education across years and gender are the primary determinants of formal sector participation. Furthermore, the formal sector is characterized by positive selection. The results for the informal sector are less definitive, but are also suggestive of positive selection. These findings imply that the informal and formal sectors in Nicaragua contribute positively to the overall economy by attracting those individuals best suited for (in)formal sector employment.     

Economic reform,informal–formal sector linkages and intervention in the informal sector in developing countries: A paradox

Within a general equilibrium framework of a developing economy with a foreign owned factor of production, this paper questions whether the informal–formal sector relationship is pro-cyclical/complementary – expansion or contraction in one necessarily implies an expansion or contraction in the other – when the informal sector is subject to a technological shock. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which a positive shock to the informal sector results in an emphcontraction in both the size of the urban formal sector and the informal sector. Thus, although our result shows that the informal–formal sector relationship is pro-cyclical, it nevertheless calls into question the conventional wisdom on the benefits of intervention in the informal sector of developing economies, particularly where multinational corporations sub-contract certain labor-intensive stages of production to the informal sector.     

Education and earnings in urban West Africa

Using a series of comparable labor force surveys in urban West Africa, we estimate the private returns to education among representative samples of workers in seven economic capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou). The data allow us to provide a unique cross-country comparison using rigorously the same variables and methodology for each country. We tackle the issues of endogenous sector allocation (public, formal private and informal sectors) and endogeneity of the education variable in the earnings functions. We find that the returns to schooling are most often enhanced once an endogenous education variable is accounted for. This effect holds particularly true in the informal sector. In most West African cities of our sample, the public sector gives more value to education, followed by the formal private sector and then the informal sector. We also shed light on convex returns to education in all the cities and sectors, including in informal activity. More generally, a major contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of significant effects of education on individual earnings in the informal sectors of the West African cities, even at high levels of schooling.     

Labor Informality: Choice or Sign of Segmentation? A Quantile Regression Approach at the Regional Level for Colombia

The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous, with a small productive formal sector characterized by high wages and attractive employment conditions, and a large informal sector characterized by low productivity and volatile wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal sector at the regional level in Colombia. In general, our findings suggest that both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co‐exist by choice and as a consequence of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics across cities, particularly with respect to informal employment.     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

Quality dualism

We suggest a theory of quality dualism, defined in terms of the gap between the highest quality good produced in the informal sector and the lowest quality produced in the formal sector. We develop a model of vertically differentiated products, in which firms producing in the formal and informal sectors face different factor prices, and have a relative advantage in the manufacture of different qualities. We then use the model to examine the cyclical behavior of the respective sizes of the two sectors. Finally, we point out that factor price changes, which reduce or increase the size of the informal sector, may have the same or opposite effect on the degree of dualism in the economy.     

Job-search and foreign capital inflow — A three-sector general equilibrium analysis

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields' (1989) multi-sector job-search model in a three-sector general equilibrium framework by introducing international trade and capital as input. The three sectors are the rural sector, the urban informal sector and the urban formal sector. The rural sector and the urban informal sector use one type of mobile capital while the urban formal sector uses a sector-specific capital. We find that the effects of an inflow of foreign capital in the urban formal sector on unemployment and social welfare crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the rural sector and the urban informal sector. We show that there is a possibility of trade-off between the government's twin objectives of improvement in social welfare and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results are extremely crucial from the view point of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income developing economy.     

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

Earnings inequality and informal employment in Russia

In this paper, we explore the relationship between informality and earnings inequality using the data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) for 2000–2010. We determine that during the entire period, earnings inequality was substantially higher in the informal sector. Informality increases earnings polarization, widening both tails of the earnings distribution. Nonetheless, inequality has declined in both formal and informal sectors. In the formal sector, changes in the distribution of monthly earnings between 2000 and 2010 were primarily generated by changes in the distribution of hourly earnings. In the informal sector, reduction of variation in monthly earnings went through two channels: declining differences in hourly rates and considerable compositional shifts within the informal sector. The results point to the importance of distributional analysis of earnings gaps and explicit accounting for the sector choice.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

International Trade,Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal Sector

This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal sector, and then to urban formal sector. Positive employment effect of reformatory trade policy partly owes to the fact that the presence of informal sector directly reduces the cost of migration and, hence, further induces the process of outmigration from agricultural sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to include both informal intermediate and final good.     

Tanzanian formal sector workers' participation in informal production

A theoretical model is developed explaining formal sector workers participation in the informal sector. A reduced-form informal sector participation function is derived from a specific utility function, a specific informal sector production function, and a specific informal sector earnings function. The participation function can be estimated consistently, and provides a solution to the problem that informal sector ‘wages’ in developing countries are hard to observe. A sample of Tanzanian formal sector workers is used to estimate the participation function. A majority of Tanzanian formal sector workers participate in informal production. Participation in informal production is inversely related to household income, to living in Dar es Salaam, and to being a mother with small children. Participation is positively related to age, and multiple-job-holding seems to play a very different role in the transition from work to retirement in Tanzania compared to industrialized countries.     

Cross‐Subsidies,and the Elasticity of Informality to Social Expenditures: The Case of Mexico's Seguro Popular

How is the size of the informal sector affected when the distribution of social expenditures across formal and informal workers changes? How is it affected when the tax rate changes along with the generosity of these transfers? In our search model, taxes are levied on formal‐sector workers as a proportion of their wage. Transfers, in contrast, are lump‐sum and are received by both formal and informal workers. This implies that high‐wage formal workers subsidize low‐wage formal workers as well as informal workers. We calibrate the model to Mexico and perform counterfactuals. We find that the size of the informal sector is quite inelastic to changes in taxes and transfers. This is due to the presence of search frictions and to the cross‐subsidy in our model: for low‐wage formal jobs, a tax increase is roughly offset by an increase in benefits, leaving the unemployed approximately indifferent. Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the recent introduction of the “Seguro Popular” healthcare program.     

Microfinance and households access to credit: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire

Evidence on microfinance services these days ironically shows a great preference for savings products rather than credit products by households. For some authors, this phenomenon is explained by the fact that microfinance products, and especially loans, from formal microfinance institutions do not fit the households demand. This paper first presents evidence on the observed phenomenon in the Ivorian microfinance sector. Second, it analyses the Ivorian credit market so as to understand the determinants of the choice for credits from formal sources versus informal sources. The results reveal the size of the loan, agricultural purpose, the geographical area where households live and ethnicity as factors influencing the choice for formal sources.     

Informal Employment and the Role of Regional Governance

The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation to why the degree of informal employment may vary substantially between different regions within a country. In Brazil, 45% of workers in the urban labor force are employed informally. The degree of informal employment, however, varies substantially across regions, with some cities having 20% and others having 80% or more of their labor force in the informal sector. The hypothesis assessed here is that the quality of local governance—or government effectiveness—affects the decisions of workers and businesses as to whether to participate in the formal or the informal sector. The empirical analysis, based on data from 5500 Brazilian municipalities, shows that informal employment is lower in regions with better governance, higher average education, and with a relatively large manufacturing sector. Endogeneity concerns are addressed as part of a series of robustness checks of the results.