Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending

When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.     

School Finance Litigation, Tax and Expenditure Limitations, and Education Spending

Since the early 1970s, litigation in many U.S. states has led to education finance reform. Over the same period, many states have imposed new tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on local governments. The imposition of a TEL may alter how local and state education expenditures change subsequent to court-mandated decreases in spending inequality. Similarly, the effectiveness of TELs in limiting local education expenditures may be influenced by reform. To better evaluate the effects of reform and TELs on education spending, this article considers them jointly and finds that reform has a negative effect on local own-source education expenditures only in the presence of TELs. In the absence of court-ordered reform, TELs decrease own-source expenditure, but the effect is less pronounced than when TELs are present with reform. When both are present, state government spending on education is higher. Also TELs and court-ordered reform independently increase state government spending on education. (JEL H72 , I22 )     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget

Empirical research on the geographic distribution of U.S. federal spending shows that small states receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. This evidence, often regarded as the consequence of Senate malapportionment, in reality conflates the effects of state population size with that of state population growth. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978–2002, this study shows that properly controlling for population dynamics provides more reasonable estimates of small‐state advantage and solves a number of puzzling peculiarities of previous research. We also show that states with fast‐growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow‐growing ones independently of whether they are large or small. The two population effects vary substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy some advantage in defense spending, whereas fast‐growing ones are penalized in the allocation of federal grants, particularly those administered by formulas limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia, which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.     

Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from South Africa

South Africa has been going through a period of transition over the past three years as it changes its system of public finance from a structure suited to the old apartheid system to one consistent with the new South African Constitution. While the former system was highly centralized, the new constitution makes a clear commitment to municipal governments as important providers of government services, with greater tax and spending powers. Even as local autonomy has been substantially increased, there remains uncertainty as to the most appropriate design of a system of intergovernmental fiscal grants to metropolitan areas and townships.     

Aggregation bias in estimates of demand for local services: Empirical evidence

Studies of demand for local public services have long been of interest for the value they can have for state and local public finance policy. While both macro and micro studies of these demands are common, most of these evidences are derived from macro studies based on the median-voter model. Specification error arising from a median aggregation can be quite significant. This paper finds a substantial difference in the coefficients on property tax prices and education service resulting from aggregated data compared with those from their micro data. These findings are important for the allocation and design of local budgets and state programs for intergovernmental revenue sharing.     

Special interest groups and the allocation of public funds

I propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income. In this model, violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government. The predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry. Although windfalls are legally unrestricted, the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to $2.30 per capita upon receipt of funds. The marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0.20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income. States which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less. These results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature.     

State fiscal institutions and empty-nest migration: Are Tiebout voters hobbled?

Using the Health and Retirement Study and a national panel of local fiscal data, we test a lifecycle model of Tiebout sorting. On average, cross-state, empty-nest movers—presumed to be out of fiscal equilibrium—experience large fiscal gains in the form of reduced exposure to local school spending and property taxes, while local empty-nest movers experience no fiscal adjustment. We find evidence that within-state fiscal adjustment is constrained by state institutions that limit local discretion. Empty-nest households moving within states with school finance equalization do not engage in Tiebout-consistent fiscal adjustment, while those moving within states lacking school finance equalization adjust substantially.     

Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina

This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.     

Asymmetric information and agenda control: The bases of monopoly power in public spending

A pervasive empirical finding, widely known as the ‘flypaper effect’, is that lump-sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction. Moreover, such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process. We posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid. The empirical results are consistent with ‘flypaper’ and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants.     

Determinants of healthcare spending: a state level analysis

Within the high and rising level of healthcare spending for the US as a whole is substantial variation in spending across states. Yet relatively little attention has been given to the empirical analysis of interstate differences in aggregate healthcare expenditures, and therefore little empirical evidence exists at the state level to guide policymakers. Using data for all 50 states for the year 1998, we estimate an empirical model that includes structural and reduced-form healthcare spending equations and a health production function to assess the significance, size and relative importance of factors that prior research indicates, may play an important role in explaining interstate variation in medical care expenditures, and the main pathways through which they operate. Our results indicate higher levels of healthcare spending for state populations with higher income, less education, fewer uninsured residents, less healthy lifestyles, larger proportion of elderly residents, greater availability of medical care providers and less urbanization. Our findings suggest that the most effective cost containment measures may be those that increase education and promote healthy lifestyles. Not only do these actions lead to reductions in healthcare spending, they also improve the health status of the population, and may help to achieve other important social policy goals.     

Public finance,government spending and economic growth: the case of local governments in Brazil

The impact of local government spending on output growth is estimated using a panel of Brazilian municipalities during 1985–1994. Attention is focused on three expenditure categories, housing/urbanization, health/sanitation, and transport services, which are expected to be growth-enhancing, and their sources of finance (local taxes, intergovernmental transfers, and borrowing). The determinants of these spending categories are also examined. The size of the municipality, measured by the resident population, is shown to affect government spending nonlinearly. This is a contribution to the recent empirical literature on the linkages between decentralized government spending, public finances, and economic growth at the local, rather than national, level.     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON FRESHMAN FINANCIAL AID

When the economy slips into recession, more needy students enroll in college, increasing the need for financial aid while resources for aid become more scarce. We use “Freshman Survey” data from the Higher Education Research Institute to observe changes in financial aid composition from 1980 to 2000. We use state‐level tax revenues, unemployment rates, and personal income growth as macroeconomic indicators. During recessions, we find that the burden of financing a student's college education shifts from states and institutions to families and federal programs. We also show that these macroeconomic fluctuations are increasingly volatile for underrepresented minorities. (JEL I22, H52, E32)     

Are state–local government expenditures converging? New evidence based on sequential unit root tests

Large and persistent gaps in subnational public expenditure have important implications regarding growth, equity, and migration. In this context, we revisit the question of expenditure convergence across the American states to provide more nuanced evidence than found by a small number of previous studies. We employ a methodology due to Smeekes (Bootstrap sequential tests to determine the stationary units in a panel, 2011) that sequentially tests for unit roots in pairwise (real per capita) expenditure gaps based on user specified fractions. In a panel of 48 combined state–local government units (1957–2008), we found that expenditures on highways, sanitation, utility, and education were far more convergent than expenditures on health and hospitals, police and fire protection, and public welfare. There was little evidence of “club convergence” based on the proportion of intraregional convergent pairs. Several historically high-grant receiving states showed relatively strong evidence of convergence. Our results bode well for future output convergence and opportunities for Tiebout-type migration across jurisdictions. They also imply a diminished role for public infrastructure and education spending in business location choices over time and a mixed role for federal grants in inducing convergence.     

Inequity in American Schools: A New Perspective on the Distributional Effects of School Expenditures on Economic Well‐Being

This article explores how inequities in public K‐12 school spending impact the distribution of economic well‐being across American households with public school students in 1989 and 2000. Adapting concepts from the public finance literature, I explore the impact of school spending on the vertical and horizontal equity and its impact relative to other types of public spending on social programs and taxation. Conventionally, vertical equity refers to the size of the income gaps between households. Horizontal equity refers to the ranking of households along the income distribution with any change in ranks producing horizontal inequity. My main findings show that school spending, when converted into a component of income, served to reduce extended‐income inequality through improvements in vertical equity without the discriminatory implications of exacerbating horizontal inequity across households. Additionally, this impact was at least as large as that of spending on other social programs. This finding bolsters standard arguments for equity and progressivity of school finance across students.     

The spillover effects of state spending

This paper estimates the extent to which state spending is influenced by the spending of neighboring states, examining several different metrics of neighborliness in order to better identify the channels for interstate spillovers. It improves on previous studies by taking advantage of exogenous shocks to state medical spending to abstract from correlated local conditions and by allowing for spatial-autocorrelation. Focusing on mandated increases in medical spending, the analysis shows that each dollar of state spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by almost 90 cents. The most predictive measure of neighborliness is the degree of population mobility between states, suggesting that rational concerns about adverse migration may drive the interdependence of state spending policy.     

Government reactions to private substitutes for public goods: Remittances and the crowding-out of public finance

Migrant remittances have been praised as an important source of capital for development. However, one aspect that has been relatively neglected so far is: How do governments respond to the inflow of remittances? This research claims that remittances crowd out public finance, because governments enjoy higher approval rates in the presence of remittances without the need to buy electoral support and face lower pressure for increasing public spending when private substitutes exist. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis is provided from subnational public finances in Mexico, using exogenous variation in migrants’ exposure to U.S. labor market conditions as an instrument for remittances. The panel analysis of trends in municipal budgets reveals that state governments responded to the inflow of resources by allocating funds away from municipalities with a stronger presence of remittances. This is true for private remittances as well as for collective remittances, i.e. cases in which migrants and public actors jointly finance public spending via matching grant schemes. The effect is driven by poorer municipalities and is stronger in states governed by the traditional party PRI that has been associated with a long history of clientelistic rule.     

STATE DRUG CONTROL SPENDING AND ILLICIT DRUG PARTICIPATION

The purpose of this article is to estimate the effect of state criminal justice expenditures and state public health expenditures on deterring illicit drug use. The empirics are based on a demand-and-supply model of drug markets. The effect of a given expenditure on criminal justice or public health programs is dependent on the magnitude of the resulting shifts in the two functions and the demand price elasticity. A reduced form of the demand-and-supply model is also estimated. The data employed come from the 1990 and 1991 National Household Surveys on Drug Abuse (NHSDA). Data on state and local spending for drug-related criminal justice and drug-related public health programs were merged with the NHSDA. The main findings from the regression results are that drug control spending reduces drug use. However, the results suggest that for marijuana users, the marginal cost of drug control exceeds the social benefits of drug control. This may not be the case for users of other illicit drugs. Spending for drug enforcement by police and drug treatment is found most effective in deterring drug use. However, spending for correctional facilities is never significant, which suggests that a more efficient method of reducing drug use might be to reduce correctional facilities spending and increase spending on treatment.     

Tax efficiency in selected Indian states

This paper attempts to measure pure tax efficiency of fifteen major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) for the period 1980–81 to 1992–93 in a manner that allows this efficiency to vary both across time as well as across states. It is discovered that there is a moral hazard problem in the design of central grants in that higher grants by the central government to the state governments reduce efficiency of tax collection by these states. The less poor states are more efficient in tax collection. The rankings of states by tax efficiency for the various years do not converge. An index of aggregate tax efficiency is calculated and it appears that this index has been stagnating. It is argued that the weight placed on tax effort in the formula determining central grants to state governments should be increased to improve tax efficiency of state governments. First version received: November 1997/final version received: November 1998