Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution

We build a model of cross-border pollution between two large open economies, one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it, and derive their non-cooperative trade and environmental tax policies. We show among other things, that (1) in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries, the former country’s optimal policy is to lower its Nash emissions tax while the latter’s is to raise it, and (2) in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries, the former country’s optimal reaction is to raise its Nash import tariff, while the latter’s is to reduce its Nash export tax. That is, in the present context, freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies.     

Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

The authors examine a two–country general–equilibrium model of a two–country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates.     

What Drives Corporate Tax Rates Down? A Reassessment of Globalization,Tax Competition,and Dynamic Adjustment to Shocks*

We reassess the driving forces behind the recent decline of corporate tax rates in Europe. Using data for up to 32 countries from 1983 to 2006, we analyze the roles of economic and financial openness as well as tax competition, while allowing for dynamic adjustment to shocks and period‐specific and country‐specific effects. While there is no evidence that countries that have become more open have reduced their tax rates more, our findings suggest that countries strongly compete over statutory tax rates. A simulation of tax rates in a scenario with no cross‐sectional dependence in tax setting suggests that, in the absence of tax competition, the mean statutory tax rate of Western European countries in 2006 would have been about 12.5 percentage points above its actual level. We conclude that the recent downward trend in corporate taxes is mainly a result of tax competition.     

How elastic are national corporate income tax bases in OECD countries? The role of domestic and foreign tax rates

Abstract To what extent do reductions in corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile? These questions are explored using annual data from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005. Controlling for fixed country effects, year effects, and country time trends, and subjecting our results to an extensive robustness analysis, we find (i) a country’s aggregate reported corporate profits are negatively and significantly affected by CIT rate reductions in neighbouring countries; (ii) a unilateral reduction in the domestic CIT rate results in lower domestic CIT revenues.     

TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES*

We set up a simple two‐country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity decide in which location to produce and sell output. In this model, a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium is shown to exist, provided that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market size. Sorting of firms occurs in equilibrium, as the smaller country levies the lower tax rate and attracts the low‐cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets that raises the profitability of firms intensifies tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite higher corporate tax bases.     

Decentralization and international tax competition

This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition. In contrast to standard tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare.     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

International oligopoly,barriers to outsourcing and domestic employment

In this paper we analyze the impact of barriers to outsourcing on domestic employment in an oligopolistic context. We show that although an outsourcing tax makes domestic labour cheaper, its employment effect is ambiguous due to strategic considerations. Analyzing international policy interdependence, we also show that, although a unilateral tax (subsidy) by a country must raise its domestic employment, this may be counterproductive in a Nash policy equilibrium. Finally, both a credit crisis and increased product differentiation tend to worsen the employment effects of an outsourcing tax. Our central findings are robust to both Bertrand and Cournot modes of competition.     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

Efficient Migration and Income Tax Competition

This paper examines the consequence of the brain drain for the income tax systems of the source and destination countries for the migration, if the two countries' policies are set noncooperatively by self–interested voters. It is assumed that the brain drain does increase the value of world output: workers with the highest income–earning ability are assumed to be more productive in one country than in another. There are costs to migration of these high–ability workers, costs that are less than the gain in the value of their production. However, for lower–ability workers, the gains in production in moving from the low–productivity country to the high–productivity country are assumed to be less than the migration costs. Voters in the high–productivity country want to capture rents from migrants. These voters are aware of the influence their tax policy has on people's migration decisions. Voters in the low–productivity country also behave strategically. I solve for the Nash equilibrium income tax rates. Increased mobility of highly skilled workers cannot decrease, and may increase, progressivity in the income tax system of the destination country, if migration actually occurs. Finally, the effects of transfers between countries on their income tax systems are examined. Redistribution between countries tends to lead to less redistribution within countries. If transfers between countries are set by a vote of all residents of both countries, then the transfer chosen will be the one that leads to the least progressive tax possible being chosen in each country.     

The growth effects of tax rates in the OECD

This paper explores the merits of macro‐ and micro‐based tax rate measures within an open economy “fiscal policy and growth” model. Using annual data for 15 OECD countries we find statistically small, non‐robust long‐run growth effects of macro‐based average tax rates on capital income and consumption, but some evidence for average labour income tax effects. Changes in “micro” marginal income tax rates at both the personal and corporate levels yield statistically robust GDP responses of modest size. Both domestic and foreign corporate taxes appear relevant. In general, tax effects on GDP operate largely via factor productivity rather than factor accumulation.     

Corporate Tax Reductions,Cross‐Border Ownership and Welfare

In this paper, a three‐country model incorporating the cross‐border ownership of stock and international firm relocation is constructed. Using this model, the effects of a reduction in the corporate tax on welfare in all three countries is examined. The findings indicate that if the country undertaking the reduction is moderately rich, and one of the two remaining countries is rich while the other country is poor, the tax reduction not only brings about a positive effect on its own welfare, but also increases the welfare of the rich foreign country and lowers that of the poor foreign country.     

Why the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment with a Sales Factor*

Using a two‐country tax competition model with a multinational enterprise (MNE), this paper addresses the question of whether the European Union should replace separate accounting (SA) in corporate income taxation by formula apportionment (FA) and, if so, which apportionment factors should be used. Our main result is that FA with a sales factor may mitigate or even eliminate fiscal externalities caused by the countries' tax policy. Hence, our analysis provides a microfoundation for the sales apportionment factor. In an empirical calibration to the EU‐15 we show that the transition from SA to FA with a sales‐only formula raises average tax rates by 2% and average tax revenues by 1 billion euros or 0.1% of GDP. These effects result in an increase of welfare.     

In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment

The multinationalization of corporate investment in recent years has given rise to a number of international tax avoidance schemes that may be eroding tax revenues in industrialized countries, but which may also reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and so facilitate investment. Both the welfare effects of and the optimal response to international tax planning are therefore ambiguous. Evaluating these factors in a simple general equilibrium model, we find that citizens of high-tax countries benefit from (some) tax planning. Paradoxically, if tax rates are not too high, an increase in tax planning activity causes a rise in optimal corporate tax rates, and a decline in multinational investment. Thus fears of a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates may be misplaced.     

Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons

Abstract. Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.     

Which border taxes? Origin and destination regimes with fiscal competition in output and emission taxes

This paper posits a two-stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second-best emission and output taxes in a two-country world with an atmospheric externality. It shows that (i) either the destination–destination or the origin–origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game; (ii) either regime may Pareto-dominate the other; (iii) it is possible to have a prisoner's dilemma game where the origin–origin regime Pareto-dominates but the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for each country. Other results include (iv) under origin–origin regime: the output tax is used for fiscal competition; the emission tax is set at a rate equal to the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; and public goods are provided suboptimally. (v) Under destination–destination regime: the output tax is ineffective as an instrument for fiscal competition; the emission tax is used not only for combating pollution but also for tax competition; the tax is set at a rate below the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; emissions are pushed above their closed-economy level; the provision of public goods are optimal.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

Competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous

This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers. The small country attracts less firms than the large one but accommodates a share of the industry that exceeds its capital share—a reverse home market effect. This allows the small country to be more aggressive and to set a higher tax rate than the large one, thus implying that tax competition reduces international inequalities. However, the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country. Our model thus encapsulates both the “importance of being small” and the “importance of being large”. Last, tax harmonization benefits to the small country but is detrimental to the large one.     

The relationship between tax rates and tax revenues in eurozone member countries - exploring the Laffer curve

We estimate Laffer Curves for direct and indirect taxes for each Eurozone country, using panel data from 1995 to 2011, by means of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models. We choose the three taxes that contribute the most to the government tax revenue: the value added tax (VAT), the corporate income tax (CT), and the labour income tax (LT). From our estimated significant parameters, which have the expected signs according to the Laffer Curve theory, we obtained a maximum/optimal tax rate for VAT for Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia and for the majority of the Eurozone countries for direct taxes. We also take into consideration the business cycle. Many countries do not present differences in regime, and when they do, the optimal tax rate is higher during recessions. Finally, we compare the observed tax rates in 2012 to the estimated optimal tax rates, to assess if the 2012 policy was located at the prohibitive range of the Laffer Curve. Our results are important for the discussions about fiscal discipline and harmonization in the Eurozone, since they exhibit important disparities between countries and taxes. We can see that, especially for CT and LT, there is a strong divide between the values of the optimal maximum tax rates for Eastern European countries and Western European economies. Additionally, the economic and financial conditions of each country also influence the value for the tax rate.     

Commodity Tax Competition with Constrained Taxes

This paper examines a symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities, a positive rate and the zero rate. The main results characterize, under two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilibrium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one and the tax rate is too high. In contrast, under the destination principle, the optimal rule is implemented.