Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Does ownership concentration affect banks’ credit risk? Evidence from MENA emerging markets

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of ownership concentration on banks’ credit risk. The study employs a dynamic panel approach using data from 98 banks listed in the 10 Middle East and North African (MENA) emerging stock markets between 2003 and 2016. To better understand the nature of the relationship between ownership concentration and bank credit risk and how this relationship is shaped by the recent financial crisis, we conducted a pre- and postcrisis analysis. Our findings document a positive relationship between ownership concentration and nonperforming loans in the precrisis period, which surprisingly reverses during the postcrisis period. We argue that the reversal of this relationship is driven by changes in controlling shareholders’ risk aversion, behavior, and attitude prompted by the financial crisis. Given that central banks are entrusted with forestalling banks’ failure, incorporating ownership concentration, as a fundamental determinant of banks’ credit risk, is crucial to anticipate future financial calamities. Our findings highlight the gravity of agency problems in emerging MENA markets. Reinforcing firm-level as well as country-level governance mechanisms is crucial to restore a sound banking system, enhance markets’ integrity, and increase investors’ confidence.     

The sources of contagion risk in a banking sector with foreign ownership

Foreign-dominated banking sectors, such as those prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, are susceptible to two major sources of systemic risk: (i) linkages between local banks and (ii) linkages between a foreign parent bank and its local subsidiary. During and after the global financial crisis, the second source of risk has been stressed by local regulators. Using a nonparametric method based on extreme value theory, we analyze interdependencies in downward risk in the banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey during 1994–2013. We find that the risk of contagion from a foreign parent bank to its local subsidiary is substantially smaller than the risk between two local banks.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

Pre-recession efficiencies and input allocation decisions of agricultural and critically insolvent banks

The late 2000s’ economic recession is considered the longest economic downturn since the 1930s Great Depression. Declining real estate values ignited an increase in loan defaults and mortgage foreclosures that led to a surge of bank failures at a rate not experienced by the U.S. banking industry since the 1980s. A total of 509 bank failures were recorded by the FDIC from January 2007–December 2014, with nearly 60% of these failures occurring in 2009 and 2010. In contrast, there were only 24 bank failures in the U.S. during the 7-year period prior to 2007. This study analyzed certain components of operating decisions made by banks that either survived or became critically insolvent during the late 2000s financial crisis using an Input Distance Stochastic Frontier function to estimate the technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) between agricultural banks and non-agricultural banks. This efficiency analysis was applied to a 7-year pre-recession period and is designed to final out any early warning signals that decrease the efficiency level of banks. Results suggest that survival banks were more technically efficient than critically insolvent banks, and banks’ tendency to utilize cheaper inputs were more likely to stand the economic crisis.     

A test for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis

Motivated by the theoretical prediction of the opportunistic behaviour of large banks that face expected public intervention, we test a full and a partial form of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) hypothesis. The full form of the hypothesis implies the increase in the risk undertakings and profitability of banks that exceed a certain dimension; the partial form of the hypothesis implies only an augmented risk appetite of large banks compared to their smaller counterparts. The examined area is the European banking industry, whose behaviour is observed over the first wave of the present financial crisis (2007/09). The estimation of a quadratic fit that links change in a bank’s credit risk profile and profitability retention rates with a bank’s size suggests the existence of a partial form of the TBTF hypothesis. However, a more precise, local rolling windows estimation of the size sensitivities reveals that large banks – those whose liabilities exceed approximately 2% of the country of origin’s GDP (15% of our sample) – show an increase in credit risk profile and a superior capability of retaining higher ROA scores, vis-à-vis their smaller counterparts. With the caveats of our investigation, we interpret these results as evidence of a full form of the TBTF hypothesis.     

Firm credit risk in normal times and during the crisis: are banks less risky?

Bank solvency was a major issue during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, but bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads were almost always below nonbank CDS spreads. What is the reason for this gap? Are banks perceived to be less risky? This study empirically decomposes CDS premia for 45 major banks and 167 large industrial firms from Europe and the US. It turns out that expected losses are usually somewhat lower for banks than for nonbanks, but expected losses contribute relatively little to the observed CDS premia. CDS spreads for banks and nonbanks differ mainly because market participants require a lower compensation for bearing bank credit risk. The quite persistent difference in the credit risk premia for banks and nonbanks disappears only temporarily during the crisis.     

中国商业银行的操作风险控制

经济危机爆发后,美国多家银行倒闭,使得风险管理问题又一次成为人们关注焦点,我国银行大案、要案频繁发生,暴露出我国商业银行操作风险已经成为制约银行发展的软肋,如何控制操作风险?本文通过大量案例研究并结合实证调查,诊断我国商业银行操作风险控制中存在的问题,并提出解决对策。     

Social aspirations in European banks: peer-influenced risk behaviour

We test a sample of 3,586 banks from 33 European countries to determine whether performances above or below a social aspiration level (median performance of peer banks) influence banks’ aggregate risk levels. Our results are consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory in that we find that bank performance below a bank’s social aspiration level is followed by increased aggregate risk, i.e. risk-taking behaviour in the subsequent year. Although under-performing banks tend to be risk-takers, large banks and banks with high aggregate risk levels tend to limit the increase in their aggregate risk levels.     

Falling under the control of a different type of owner:risk-taking implications for banks

European banks have experienced significant changes in the type of entity that owns them (another bank, an individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a government, a foreign entity, a domestic entity…). In this paper, we look at the influence of ownership type changes on risk and profitability. Working with a panel of commercial banks from 17 European countries, we find that although banks that experience a change in ownership type do not exhibit lower or higher risk or profitability than other banks, their risk and profitability is significantly affected after the change takes place. The type of the acquirer plays a significant role in explaining the observed changes. When the acquirer is a non-financial company, the state or an institutional investor, the level of risk increases after the change while the level of profitability remains unchanged. Conversely, when the acquirer is a bank, we find that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases. Banks acquired by a different type of owner during the global financial crisis do not perform better or worse than they did before.     

Corporate governance and efficiency in banking: evidence from emerging economies

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the impact of corporate governance on bank efficiency across a sample of 139 commercial banks from 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the period 2005–2012. Data on governance characteristics are hand-collected from banks’ reports. The empirical findings indicate that implementing rigorous corporate governance structures is associated with higher costs for banks and a lower level of efficiency. However, during the crisis, a tight governance mechanism significantly increases banks’ cost and technical efficiencies. We also show that prudent risk management is associated with both higher cost and technical efficiency for more capitalized banks, while rigid supervisory boards are linked with greater technical efficiency for more capitalized banks.     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Modelling the causes and manifestation of bank stress: an example from the financial crisis

In this study, I model the predictors and manifestation of bank stress during the financial crisis using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause model. Unlike most early warning models that predict failure probabilities, this article describes a framework for predicting a broader notion of bank stress that need not rely on regulatory decisions. As such, this method can be easily applied to large institutions, and avoids the complications associated with modelling a regulatory decision such as failure or a CAMELS downgrade. Using bank reliance on Term Auction Facility funds and the out-of-sample incidence of failures and acquisitions, I demonstrate that the measure of bank stress generated here accords with other notions of bank-level distress. Finally, this method catalogues predictors of distress during the financial crisis. Thus, this article can help assess the validity of several recent regulatory proposals. I find that those banks entering the crisis with more Tier 1 capital, more liquid balance sheets, and relatively stable liabilities subsequently came under less stress. These findings support the Basel III recommended increases in banks’ capital adequacy, liquidity and stable funding.     

Foreign banks,financial crises and macroeconomic fluctuations

Understanding the implications of increased foreign bank presence is especially compelling in periods of financial crisis. In this paper, we explore this issue by examining the relationship between the involvement of foreign banks in the banking systems and the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in normal and crisis periods. Using a sample of 20 Emerging European countries from 1998 to 2013, we find that an increase in the assets of foreign banks in the banking system reduces output and consumption growth volatility in general but does not significantly affect the volatility of investments. However, these banks were found to play a significant role in increasing output, consumption and investment volatility in 2009. Our findings suggest that foreign banks’ harmful impact during the global crisis was only temporary and that they seem to help Emerging European countries stabilize macroeconomic volatility in normal times and after the global crisis.     

中国商业银行系统性风险溢价实证研究

全球金融危机的爆发使得系统性风险的溢出效应受到普遍关注,同时也暴露出主流的风险度量方法VAR存在重大缺陷。论文借鉴最新的CoVaR方法以及分位数回归技术,衡量了我国商业银行的系统性风险溢价,实证研究发现：第一,国有银行的系统性风险溢价大于股份制商业银行;第二,无条件风险价值VaR和条件风险价值之间没有必然关联,以VaR为核心指标的现行监管政策不能有效防范系统性风险溢价;第三,银行的值不仅受金融体系共同风险冲击的影响,还受银行自身特质的影响。     

由美国次贷危机引发的中国商业银行住房信贷风险研究

美国次贷危机所引发的国际金融危机愈演愈烈,加大了中国经济运行的不确定性。这进一步加大了中国商业银行住房信贷业务的风险。对此,中国商业银行应充分借鉴美国次贷危机的启示,加强中国商业银行个人信贷风险管理。     

Bank liquidity risk and monetary policy. Empirical evidence on the impact of Basel III liquidity standards

We extend the literature on the bank lending channel in two aspects. First, rather than following the literature by analyzing the impact of banks’ liquidity (measured via their asset portfolio) on monetary policy transmission, we study the role of banks’ actual liquidity risk, as measured by the Basel III liquidity regulations. Second, we investigate the effect of complying with the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy transmission. We use highly detailed bank-level data from Luxembourg for the period 2003q1--2010q4. Our findings are that monetary policy transmission works its way through small banks that also have a large maturity mismatch, as measured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In contrast, large banks with a small maturity mismatch increase their lending following a monetary policy shock, which confirms existing results that Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the European market. Based upon in-sample predictions and upon simulated data from an optimization model that takes the banks’ business models into account, we conclude that the bank lending channel will no longer be effective once banks adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulations.     

Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?

Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models.