金融生态环境、债务治理效应与现金持有价值

文章将现金持有价值作为衡量企业资本配置效率的指标,系统考察了银行信用和商业信用两种债务融资的治理效应。实证检验发现,银行信用比例与现金持有价值呈负相关关系,在短期银行信用比例较高的企业中这一负相关关系尤为明显,特别对处于金融生态环境较差地区的企业,银行信用不仅不具有债务治理效应,反而会阻碍资本的有效配置。较之银行信用,商业信用并没有显示出显著更优的资金效率治理功能,并且其治理效应不受金融生态环境地区差异的影响。     

On the use of semimartingales and stochastic integrals to model continuous trading

The continuous-time contingent claim valuation model is generalized to stopping times (random trading dates), giving substance to the question of what it means to have unlimited opportunities to trade while trading intercessions may occur only finitely, albeit arbitrarily, often. Robustness and stability of the contingent claim valuation formula are demonstrated, validating the use of continuous-time models for approximating discrete-time trading environments. The no-arbitrage value of a redundant contingent claim is shown to be a stochastic integral obtained as the limit of bounded arbitrage opportunities. As a corollary, we find that the hypothesis needed to value an American call option is significantly stronger than that sufficient to value a European call option.     

Use Tables for Imported Goods and Valuation Matrices for Trade Margins— an Integrated Approach for the Compilation of the Belgian 1995 Input–Output Tables

This paper describes the compilation of the use table for imported goods and the valuation matrix of trade margins for Belgium in 1995. It introduces the methodological novelty of integrating the compilation of both tables and systematically exploiting the fact that large import and export flows do not generate trade margins. This is notably the case for direct imports for intermediate consumption or investment by non-traders, and direct exports by producers. For identifying these trade flows, extensive use was made of intrastat and extrastat data. The results are compared with those of a proportional distribution of imports and trade margins. Many statistical offices resort to the latter approach because of a lack of survey data on the destination of trade margins and imports. We demonstrate that the integrated approach can improve the quality of both the import matrix and the valuation matrix for trade margins, while using only existing data sources.     

The end of the Ghent system as trade union recruitment machinery?

During the past 15 years, membership rates in many unions have been declining in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Reasons for this decline may be similar to what has happened in other countries—occupational change and neoliberal ideology and policies—but in the three Ghent countries, changes in the unemployment insurance system may also have affected trade union membership losses. The major part of the decline has taken place in a period of low unemployment, which may have reduced the employee incentive to take unemployment insurance, but will increasing unemployment rates mean more trade union members? At least for the LO‐ and SAK‐affiliated trade unions, it seems that trade union independent unemployment funds may be alternatives for workers who take unemployment insurance.     

Supply surprise is a ‘nice’ reprise

• ? This year advanced economies have enjoyed a rare positive supply surprise: output is higher than expected and inflation is lower. The initial China‐related boost not only proved to be a great antidote to secularly weak global demand, but it has also engendered unexpected global momentum and a benign inflation response. As a result, 2016–17 resembles a mini‐reprise of the “nice” 1990s, a non‐inflationary, consistently expansionary decade.
• ? The global momentum has been propelled by a strong international trade multiplier. This has contributed to strength in several advanced economies, particularly the Eurozone. We expect global growth in 2018 to be bolstered by US fiscal stimulus as the impulse from China fades.
• ? It will remain “nice” in 2018, albeit in the context of weak secular trend growth. We expect the benign output‐inflation trade‐off to continue. Several of the factors that are underpinning low inflation and unemployment as well as weak wage growth are likely to be present for some time.

     

Not all trade wars are created equal

• ? When interpreting estimates of the economic impact of trade wars, the devil is in the detail. Our review of more than 30 institutions' trade war projections finds huge variation – much of which can be explained by differences in assumptions rather than differences in models' structures or specifications. Relative to estimates based on extreme financial or tariff assumptions, our main trade war scenario results are moderate and comparable with the IMF's latest analysis.
• ? In our baseline forecast, trade policy measures have a relatively limited overall impact on global growth. This is in line with recent experience: to date, direct effects from higher trade costs have been small, and policy action has acted to offset adverse impacts on confidence. But the risk of further escalation in US‐China trade tensions remains, even following the (fragile) Trump‐Xi truce agreed at the recent G20 summit.
• ? Our review finds that estimates of the impact of such an escalation range from negligible impacts to a deterioration in some countries’ economic conditions approaching that seen during the global financial crisis. Results in Oxford Economics’ “rising protectionism” scenario – from our latest Global Scenarios Service – are moderate in comparison.
• ? We also find that all estimates showing substantial economic effects from a trade war in our sample are predicated on extreme asset price or tariff moves. In some cases, tariffs are assumed to rise more than at the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s.
• ? Such differences in assumptions can largely account for the divergence in trade war impact estimates. This is illustrated in our very low probability “full‐blown global trade war” scenario – incorporating severe tariff and financial assumptions more in line with institutions like the Bank of England – which generates a deterioration in economic conditions that broadly matches extreme estimates in our sample.

     

World trade forecasts upgraded,but headwinds from Asia

• ? Most leading indicators of world trade point to growth remaining robust in the next few months, but there are some headwinds, especially from Asia. Overall, we expect trade growth to decelerate this year, yet the outlook has improved since August. We see world trade rising by 6.1% in 2017 and by 4.8% this year, up from our previous forecasts of 5.7% and 3.8%, respectively .
• ? The latest trade volume data for the major economies support our forecasts, as does our survey‐based export indicator, which leads trade by around three months. This indicator and the main measure of global freight volumes are consistent with world trade continuing to grow by around 6% y/y in the near term.
• ? World trade growth is likely to be supported by emerging markets (EMs), which made a large contribution to the trade recovery last year. Another factor that may be supportive – especially for EMs – is the slippage in the US dollar last year, as there is some evidence of a negative correlation between dollar strength and world trade.
• ? The recovery of demand in the Eurozone and expected fiscal stimulus in the US add to the positive constellation of factors supporting world trade growth. Business sentiment indicators remain positive and imply upside risks to our forecasts. Yet it is not obvious that they have a strong leading relationship with trade – and the statistical relationship has become weaker since 2007–2009. This reinforces our view that there has been a structural change in the relationship between world trade and world GDP.
• ? The main near‐term downside risks to world trade come from Asia. Freight indicators for Shanghai and Hong Kong have slowed markedly, as have semiconductor billings. Although Chinese activity indicators have also moderated, China's trade volume growth remains surprisingly strong.

     

On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999     

Optimal design of trade institutions

We model an economy with social institutions that facilitate trade and induce three types of costs: establishment costs, access costs, and use costs. Use costs are specific transaction costs related to the use of these trade institutions. We assume that a trade institution is economically completely determined by the costs it imposes and by the effects on the trades it facilitates. We extend the Pareto efficiency concept to include various modes of organization of social institutions: the costs and benefits of these organizations are expressed in the trades they facilitate.Within this setting we discuss a valuation equilibrium concept, in which all agents use a common conjectural price system that assigns to every trade institution the price vector that would prevail under it. This feature of the equilibrium is important in securing the second welfare theorem, and is new to the analysis of economies with costly trade. Since the use costs can be nonlinear, there are non-convexities that prevent the second welfare theorem from obtaining in a finite economy, but we show it for large economies.Received: 3 April 2002, Accepted: 30 April 2003, JEL Classification: D59, D70, H49Robert P. Gilles: donewhile visiting the Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B46-390, is gratefully acknowledged.Dimitrios Diamantaras: Part of this research wasSupport from Temple University via a Fuller research fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.The authors would like to thank Suzanne Scotchmer, Andreu Mas-Colell, Marcus Berliant, Shlomo Weber, Hans Haller, Dhanajay Gokhale, Julian Manning, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and discussions of previous drafts of this paper. A previous version of this paper was circulated as Equilibria of economies with costly trade.     

Trade Unions in a Free Society

What is the function of trade unions in a free society? G.R.Steele, of Lancaster University, analyses the paradox that trade unions, which are only possible in a free society, are ultimately in conflict with it.     

European industry: the emerging market competitiveness challenge

As the global economy has become increasingly open to 'free' trade, European industry ‐ and, indeed, industry across the developed world ‐ has found itself faced with growing competition from low cost, emerging market countries. How is it facing up to this stiff challenge? Newspaper headlines may suggest that effort has been focused on raising trade barriers to keep competition at bay. However, such actions are a thin veneer over the very real, structural changes that are rapidly taking place. This article, by Grant Colquhoun, examines the changing structure of the EU15's trading patterns and the differential impact across manufacturing sectors. It then analyses the steps industry is taking to cope with the competitiveness challenge. As well as attempting to squeeze costs, it is clear that industry in Europe is restructuring in order to focus on higher value added activities, where it typically has a competitive advantage over emerging markets.     

Democracy and trade: an empirical study

The theoretical discussion on globalization has suggested that there are linkages between democracy and trade, although the direction of influence is less certain. Formal empirical studies remain scarce, and have often focused on the question of whether democratic regimes influence trade policy, as opposed to the actual relationship between democracy and trade. This paper seeks to answer the question, “Do democracies trade more?” by applying the gravity equation to a large dataset of bilateral trade data for the period 1948–1999, while taking into account the role of democracy. It finds that democracy is positively related to trade flows, but only after controlling for trade pair heterogeneity. In addition, it makes the case for studies of this nature to draw a distinction between trade flows in the pre- and post-1990s period of rapid democratization as well as between developed and developing countries.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again

• ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
• ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
• ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
• ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
• ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.

     

Two-sided unobservable investment,bargaining, and efficiency

Asymmetric information can lead to inefficient outcomes in many bargaining contexts. It is sometimes natural to think of asymmetric information as emerging from imperfect observation of previously taken actions (e.g., obtaining compliments or substitutes for the item being bargained over). How do such strategic investment choices prior to bargaining interact with the strategic problem of bargaining under private information? We focus on bilateral bargaining when players can make unobserved investments in the value of the item prior to their interaction. With two-sided hidden investment, strategic uncertainty induces a post-investment problem analogous to that in Myerson and Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 29(2):265–281, 1983), and inefficiencies might be expected to arise. But, there are strong incentives to avoid investment levels that do not lead to trade and this must be anticipated by the other trader. This effect is shown to drive a form of unraveling; as a result in every equilibrium to the larger game the good ends up in the hands of the agent with the higher valuation.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth resilient to trade slowdown

• ? It seems increasingly clear that the manufacturing‐ and trade‐driven soft patch in late‐2018 is extending into this year. But we still think that global recession risks remain low and see no reason to make any notable shifts to our outlook for the global economy this year. We continue to forecast that GDP growth will slow from 3.0% in 2018 to 2.7% this year, with a similar outcome seen in 2020.
• ? Various indicators show that trade volumes slowed sharply at end‐2018 and survey indicators for January suggest that the situation has not improved since then (see Chart). The main reason for this weakness has been China, where imports ended the year on a very weak note and we expect a further slowdown in Q1.
• ? We have lowered our forecast of Chinese imports in 2019 by around 1.5pp in response. However, we expect a bounce back in Q2 and beyond; reflecting this, Chinese import growth over the year as whole is still expected to be notably stronger than in the 2015/16 soft patch. In a similar vein, while global trade growth is expected to slow sharply from 4.6% to 3.3% this year (down from 3.6% last month), it should still be stronger than in 2012–16, providing a solid backdrop for exporters.
• ? Meanwhile, financial markets have rebounded sharply from the December sell‐off due to renewed optimism regarding US and China trade talks and a more dovish Fed. We now expect the Fed to leave rates on hold until at least Q3 and hike rates only once this year. This, along with lower government bond yields and weaker inflation, is also likely to reduce the need for monetary tightening elsewhere, particularly in emerging markets (EMs), helping to support global growth later in the year.
• ? Overall, we still see global GDP growth softening in H1, but with a modest rebound in H2 as Chinese growth stabilises and EMs and European growth regain momentum. Sharper slowdowns in China and global trade and financial‐market weakness remain key concerns for the 2020 outlook. But the risk of inflation‐induced policy tightening is still low and the odds of a renewed flare‐up in trade tensions have ebbed lately.

     

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

THE UK'S PERSISTENT TRADE DEFICIT

The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

Trade Liberalization and Industrial Restructuring: The Role of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions

This paper analyzes industry adjustments to trade liberalization. It introduces cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as an alternative mode of industrial restructuring to firms' exit. In a two-country Cournot model, we examine the responses of domestic and foreign firms endowed with different technologies for different stages of trade openness. It is found that the less efficient firm loses market shares in its home market at the beginning of trade liberalization. Only for a more advanced level of liberalization, does it take advantage of a larger access to foreign demand. Trade liberalization may therefore harm its profits too strongly, forcing it to leave the market. However, although its incentives decrease with trade liberalization, the high-technology firm may be willing to take it over for low organizational and technological costs of firms' integration. In addition, it may buy it out even if the less efficient firm manages to stay. Then, trade liberalization affects M&A incentives depending on the technological gap. For low and high (medium) gap, there is an inverted U- (W-) shaped relation between trade costs and incentives to merge. Moreover, although technology transfer is assumed to be complete, M&A may lead to a reduction in consumers' welfare. Firms may capture some pro-competitive gains from economic openness. Lastly, an empirical analysis based on a data set of OECD members' multinationals gives some support to these theoretical predictions.     

World trade recovering but still reasons for caution

• ? World trade has picked up in recent months, expanding at the fastest pace in six years in the first quarter, with the rise fairly evenly split between advanced and emerging markets. Stronger activity in China and a broader upturn in global investment have been key factors. But there are still reasons for caution. Although the ‘cyclical’ element in world trade is improving, the ‘trend’ element is not thanks to changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation.
• ? World trade growth looks set to reach about a 4% annual rate in Q1 2017, the fastest pace since 2011. Alternative freight‐based indicators confirm the upturn. This suggests some modest near‐term upside risk to our world growth forecasts.
• ? Recent growth has been evenly split between advanced countries and emerging markets (EM). In EM, the end of deep recessions in Russia and Brazil and an upturn in China have been key factors. China directly added 0.5 percentage points to annual world trade growth over recent months and firmer growth there has also pushed up commodity prices and the spending power and imports of commodity exporters.
• ? Another important positive factor is an improvement in investment, which is a trade‐intensive element of world GDP. Rising capital goods imports across a range of countries suggest the drag on world trade from weak investment is fading.
• ? The decline in the ratio of world trade growth to world GDP growth over recent years has both cyclical and structural elements. But while the cyclical component now seems to be improving, there is little evidence that the structural part – responsible for between a half and two‐thirds of the recent decline – is doing likewise.
• ? Key factors behind the structural decline in world trade growth are changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation/protectionism. Both are likely to remain a drag over the coming years. Meanwhile, a levelling‐off of growth in China and drop back in commodity prices could curb the recent cyclical uptick.