Briefing Paper Import Penetration in the United Kingdom

There is widespread concern about the growth of imports in the United Kingdom. British industry is said to be ‘bleeding to death’ as a result of foreign competition and calls are heard for protective measures such as import controls to save the economy. There are three elements in the case for protection. The first is that trends in Britain's foreign trade in manufactured goods have been extremely adverse and that there are no good grounds for believing that they will change spontaneously. The second is that the growth of the economy is constrained by the balance of payments and that consequently a serious and growing depression will develop throughout the 1980s which could reach catastrophic proportions towards the end of the decade when North Sea oil production declines. The third is that import controls are an effective way of coping with the problem. It is recognised that the second two elements are controversial. As it happens we disagree with both of them. However, it is generally assumed that the first element - the view that increasing import penetration will destroy British industry - is common ground and that no-one disagrees with it. Our aim in this Briefing Paper is to challenge this view. There is no doubt that import penetration (which we measure as the share of imports in GDP) has growth rapidly, especially over the past two decades. In 1960 imports amounted to 25 per cent of GDP. By 1970 this proportion had risen to 28 per cent and in 1979 it had risen to 35 per cent. However, we shall argue that the economic processes that have been responsible for this development have on the whole been poorly understood. We reject the popular view that Britain is structurally unable to compete in world markets. Instead we propose an alternative interpretation of import penetration which explains UK trade performance in terms of the broader pattern of the world trade order. In the light of this theory we argue that import penetration in the UK is not an inexorable trend reflecting the relative weakness of the UK in international trade. On the contrary, UK import penetration has been adjusting to a new world trading environment and now that this process of adjustment is nearing completion the rate of increase of import penetration seems likely to abate. Moreover, the British people have benefited from this greater degree of free trade and any protective measures designed to inhibit the economic forces that we describe below would damage the economic welfare of the British public as a whole.     

American Commerce,American Empire: Late 19th-Century Merchant Organizations and Trade Policy

The American debate over free trade and protectionism has taken many forms, but it is particularly instructive when it occurs within a single sector of the economy, pitting allied economic interests against each other. That occurred in the shipping industry in the 19^th century when shippers and shipbuilders fought each other over trade-related questions: subsidies for shipbuilding and reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations. Shipbuilders wanted protection and subsidies; shippers wanted the freedom to make use of cheaper foreign vessels for trade and to develop trade agreements. We show how these opposing forces stymied each other and prevented the shipping industry from taking an active, unified role in national politics. These particular intra-industry debates reveal broader divisions within the business community over the relationship between business and government under modern commercial capitalism.     

Why we aren't predicting a global recession

• ? Fears that the global economy is heading into a recession are rising. But while we cannot ignore the risks that a recession could be brewing, our baseline assumption is still for a modest growth slowdown from here.
• ? The global economy is in a similar position to 2012 and 2015, as mounting uncertainties dampen growth. This time, trade tensions are a high‐profile culprit rather than the possible collapse of the eurozone or a China hard landing.
• ? In the previous two cases global growth fell to around 2.5% ‐ around the rates seen in Q2 this year ‐ only to then rebound. Our baseline forecasts assume a similar mini cycle, albeit with only a modest growth rebound.
• ? We also assume that further major adverse shocks won't materialise, and that insurance policy moves by central banks will stop a plunge in investment and households from panicking.
• ? Still, recession fears should be taken seriously ‐ slowdowns can become self‐perpetuating. Once annual GDP growth has fallen by over 1ppt from its peak, the eventual decline typically ends up being much larger ‐ of the seven growth slowdowns since the late 1970s where annual growth slowed by over 1ppt ‐ four resulted in either a global recession or only a narrow escape from one.
• ? With US‐China tensions unlikely to recede and factors like the US yield curve inversion adding to the air of gloom, the latest downturn could gain momentum.
• ? Although reduced macro volatility and anchored inflation have made it easier for policymakers to deliver soft landings, the effectiveness of monetary policy has waned. And with China no longer acting as spender of last resort, it's vital that governments in advanced economies stand ready to pick up the slack

     

The Role of Interregional Trade in Generating Change in the Regional Economies of Japan, 1980-1990

An earlier analysis (Hewings et al., 1998) revealed the 'hollowing-out' process, a decrease in the level of intraregional intermediation, in the Chicago economy during the period 1975-2011. The main force underlying this structural change has been the change in regional trade patterns in a way that interregional trades across economies has replaced the local purchases of intermediate inputs. The issue addressed in this paper focuses on the decomposition of structural change into changes in interregional trade and in technology, in order to investigate the nature of structural change over time and across sectors. The empirical realization is provided by reference to a series of regional input-output tables for a nine-region division of the Japanese economy (1980-1985-1990). The results revealed that interregional trade has played a key role in determining regional output level while technology itself had a tendency to decrease further.     

Trade Openness and Spatial Inequality in Emerging Countries

Abstract

Emerging world countries have experienced over the last two decades a significant change in their trade patterns. Bold trade reforms have been followed by rapid rises in international trade levels. However, despite these radical changes, we know remarkably little about how changes in trade patterns are affecting the evolution of regional inequality in the developing world. This paper addresses the link between trade openness and spatial inequality across 22 emerging countries over the period between 1990 and 2006. Our findings show that changes in international trade bring about a significant rise in within-country inequality across the developing world and that this impact is greatest in the poorest countries. This result is robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, and to changes in the specification of the sample and in the measure used to quantify the level of regional disparities. Consequently, the increase in trade exposure across the emerging world, while possibly benefiting the countries involved in the process in aggregate terms, is generating winning and losing regions.     

Product innovation for the people's car in an emerging economy

As product offerings of multinational enterprises (MNEs) continue to primarily serve the relatively well-to-do consumers in emerging economies, innovations to meet the unique affordability and acceptability criteria of masses at the base of the pyramid (BoP) continues to remain a daunting challenge. The academic literature is sparse on comprehensive in-depth studies about the intricate processes involved in shaping and managing technology development for the masses. Focusing on product innovation by Tata Motors of India with the Nano—the world's cheapest car, our case study aims to understand how the innovator's choices regarding the use of technology, product design and organizational practices for new product development enabled it to meet the challenge of innovation for India's masses. Drawing on Christensen's work on disruptive innovations, our analysis shows how frugal use of resources through a new combination of existing component technologies created a new modular product to achieve the unique price–performance requirements demanded by the BoP. Our findings show that collaboration with suppliers for component design and their early integration in the design phase substantially lowered costs and helped eliminate unnecessary frills whilst incorporating features valued by mass markets. Our study has important managerial implications for MNEs and provides critical insights into the processes for a new blueprint for an untapped market segment in the automobile industry.     

Public input competition and agglomeration

This paper analyzes the impact of public input competition in a New Economic Geography framework. It is shown that regional competition yields an overprovision of public inputs if trade costs are sizable while it leads to underprovision if regions are highly integrated. Moreover, public input competition assures a dispersion of industry as long as trade costs are high but induces agglomeration even for ex ante identical regions if trade costs have fallen below a certain value. Finally, a trade-off between regional convergence and efficiency arises since the efficient distribution of regional infrastructure requires full agglomeration for sufficiently low trade costs.     

The short and long-run impact of globalization if firms differ in factor input ratios

Empirical evidence has shown that exporters are more capital intensive than non-exporters. Based on this evidence, I construct a two-factor general equilibrium model with firm heterogeneity in factor intensities, monopolistic competition, scale economies and international trade. This setting can explain several empirical regularities on international trade, factor market competition, factor relocations and factor returns: (i) exporters are more capital intensive than non-exporters, regardless of a country's relative factor endowments; (ii) finite supply of capital limits a country's export activities; (iii) trade liberalization increases the relative return to capital; (iv) new profit opportunities in export markets change the distribution of firms towards the more capital intensive ones. Finally, I extend the setting to endogenous capital accumulation and show that trade liberalization induces economic growth and, in the long-run, benefits all factors in real terms.     

World trade recovering but still reasons for caution

• ? World trade has picked up in recent months, expanding at the fastest pace in six years in the first quarter, with the rise fairly evenly split between advanced and emerging markets. Stronger activity in China and a broader upturn in global investment have been key factors. But there are still reasons for caution. Although the ‘cyclical’ element in world trade is improving, the ‘trend’ element is not thanks to changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation.
• ? World trade growth looks set to reach about a 4% annual rate in Q1 2017, the fastest pace since 2011. Alternative freight‐based indicators confirm the upturn. This suggests some modest near‐term upside risk to our world growth forecasts.
• ? Recent growth has been evenly split between advanced countries and emerging markets (EM). In EM, the end of deep recessions in Russia and Brazil and an upturn in China have been key factors. China directly added 0.5 percentage points to annual world trade growth over recent months and firmer growth there has also pushed up commodity prices and the spending power and imports of commodity exporters.
• ? Another important positive factor is an improvement in investment, which is a trade‐intensive element of world GDP. Rising capital goods imports across a range of countries suggest the drag on world trade from weak investment is fading.
• ? The decline in the ratio of world trade growth to world GDP growth over recent years has both cyclical and structural elements. But while the cyclical component now seems to be improving, there is little evidence that the structural part – responsible for between a half and two‐thirds of the recent decline – is doing likewise.
• ? Key factors behind the structural decline in world trade growth are changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation/protectionism. Both are likely to remain a drag over the coming years. Meanwhile, a levelling‐off of growth in China and drop back in commodity prices could curb the recent cyclical uptick.

     

THE UK'S PERSISTENT TRADE DEFICIT

The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.     

造船企业供应链风险分析及其防范措施

随着国际贸易的迅速增长，水路运输的发展对船舶运输能力有了更高的要求，同时船运企业在相当长一段时间对船舶的需求也持续增长。而供应链的有效竞争能力关系到造船企业的生存。文章着重分析了造船企业供应链的特点及其常见风险，并从供应链管理的角度提出了风险应对策略。     

第三方食品冷链物流的发展（利润）空间研究

目前食品行业竞争剧烈,食品安全问题屡见不鲜,人们对食品质量和服务的要求越来越高,由此冷链食品出现并盛行,但冷链食品过程成本高,食品企业为降低流通成本寻找多元化的发展途径,第三方冷链物流应运而生。冷链物流是未来新兴的具有巨大前途的行业,国家政策上的支持及尚未满足的市场需求,使得我国第三方冷链物流面临前所未有的发展机遇,但同时也面临着不小的挑战。因此在分析冷链物流发展现状时,进一步探讨冷链物流的利润发展空间以及未来的发展机遇。     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Forecasts steady but near‐term signals mixed

• Our world growth forecasts are steady this month, at 2.3% for 2016 and 2.7% for 2017.
• One factor behind the more stable outlook is the rally in financial markets since mid‐February. This rally appears to have been the result of a number of factors including a more dovish Fed and an improvement in some near‐term economic indicators.
• The implied 12‐month ahead Fed funds rate dropped around 0.5% from its January peak to mid-February and remains around 0.35% lower now. So the Fed still apparently has the capacity to boost markets with changes in communication policy.
• The Citigroup economic surprise indicators have also improved over recent weeks, especially for emerging markets where the indicator is back in positive territory. The G10 index nevertheless remains clearly negative.
• Other economic signals are mixed. The latest reading of OE's world trade indicator (based on survey evidence for March) suggests a modest improvement, although again the indicator continues to signal weak world trade growth.
• Meanwhile, there have been some warnings of potentially softer labour market conditions. Though payrolls gains have remained solid, a weighted sum of the employment subindices of the US ISM surveys has dropped sharply over recent months. A similar index for the Eurozone is more positive, although it has also softened from its late‐2015 peaks.
• These mixed signals suggest limited likelihood of near‐term upgrades to the world growth outlook and overall we maintain our view from last month that risks look skewed to the downside – so that further monetary policy stimulus remains a possibility.
• This assessment appears to be shared, to some extent at least, by global bond markets. US 10‐year yields have dropped back to only 1.7% since mid‐March (only 0.1% above their February lows), with German yields at just 0.1% and Japanese yields at ‐ 0.1%. So the ‘great squeeze’ on G7 bond yields is still continuing.

     

Multinational Exposure and the Quality of New Chinese Exports

We exploit information on the geographic, product and trader characteristics of China's 1997–2009 exports to examine how the evolving city‐industry presence of multinational firms influenced the quality, frequency and survival of new export transactions by private Chinese firms. Our results show that own‐industry multinational firm contact was associated with more frequent, higher‐valued, and longer‐lasting new trade transactions. These effects appear to arise from beneficial multinational spillovers, rather than selection effects due to increased multinational competition, as increases in own‐industry or other multinational presence were also associated with an increase in the number of trade transactions introduced by private Chinese firms.     

股票流动性会影响公司商业信用融资吗？——基于A股上市公司的实证研究

商业信用作为企业短期外部融资的重要渠道,日渐成为学术界关注的重要话题。基于A股上市公司2007—2020年数据,实证检验股票流动性对上市公司商业信用融资的影响。研究发现：股票流动性与商业信用融资规模显著正相关,即流动性越好,商业信用融资规模越大。异质性分析结果表明：在融资约束大、行业竞争激烈以及地区市场化程度高的公司中作用更明显。机制分析结果表明,股票流动性通过降低第一类代理成本、提高信息透明度来增加商业信用融资。最后,采用工具变量法、地区固定效应以及替换关键变量等一系列稳健性检验后,结果依然存在且稳健。研究从市场微观结构角度,探索企业商业信用融资的影响因素,拓展了流动性治理相关研究,同时为缓解上市公司融资约束提供了新的经验证据。     

跨境电商监管的困境及求解——以区块链技术的应用为视角

新冠肺炎疫情全球肆虐一方面导致一般贸易遭受重创,但另一方面也使得跨境电商异军突起,逐步成为跨境贸易转型的新方向。对跨境电商进行监管面临偷逃漏税频发、检验检疫受阻、贸易数据失实、市场秩序遭受破坏等诸多新问题。作为解决信任成本的一项新兴技术,区块链技术与跨境电商监管需求具有较高契合度。本文通过分析当前区块链技术的政策条件、技术条件以及建链基础条件的可行性,继而提出构建以海关为核心的联盟链监管体系方案思路,以实现对跨境电商全流程监管,提高服务能力和监管水平,助力跨境电商行业发展。     

China‐commodity nexus at the heart of global upturn

• ? The China‐commodity nexus has been at the heart of the global upturn in trade and industry. It could directly and indirectly account for as much as 70% of the recovery since mid‐2016, based on our analysis. We think this nexus will continue to support world growth in the near term, but the global upturn is vulnerable to moderating Chinese growth and slippage in commodity prices.
• ? China has directly accounted for around a third of the upturn in world trade, similar to the contribution of G7 countries. But adding in indirect effects, China's influence is likely to have been much more significant. Stronger Chinese demand has contributed to an improvement in the trade performance of its Asian trading partners, commodity exporters and other advanced economies.
• ? Using a model simulation that introduces positive shocks to imports in “greater China” and to commodity prices (based on the scale we have seen since mid‐2016), our top‐end estimate for China's contribution to the upturn in world trade is around 70%.
• ? The simulation points to especially strong improvements in output and exports for economies such as South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and some commodity exporters. This broadly matches the pattern of performance seen over recent months, though commodity exporters' performance has been quite mixed.
• ? G7 investment growth is likely to have played only a modest role in the recent global upturn. But Japan is an exception, while upgrades to investment forecasts for South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have also been large.
• ? A 1% rise in commodity prices could raise commodity exporters' investment by 0.3–0.6%, based on our analysis. As a result, there could be additional improvement in commodity exporters' investment this year, supporting world growth. However, with our forecasts suggesting that commodity prices are set to slip further over the coming quarters, this boost could prove short‐lived.

     

中国汽车贸易问题的对策研究

随着中国进入WTO,汽车贸易的前景看好,但同时中国的汽车贸易也面临着前所未有的国际竞争,很多贸易问题也显露出来。文章针对贸易中产品质量,产业规模,售后服务等问题,提出加快企业改革,加强自主研发,借鉴别国经验等对策。     

金融业开放与中国制造业竞争力提升

研究目标：探究外资银行进入对制造业企业加成率变化的影响和作用机制。研究方法：基于异质性企业和新增长理论，将企业异质性和新熊彼特模型有机整合到统一框架中提出命题，根据中国工业企业和海关数据库，通过外资银行进入这一外生冲击对银行业开放后的制造业企业“加成率效应”进行实证研究。研究发现：总体上外资银行进入后，进入区域内企业平均加成率显著增加。行业层面异质性渠道检验表明，行业与技术前沿差距越小、行业外部融资依赖度越高、与银行业投入产出关联度越大，外资银行进入“加成率效应”越大。分所有制类型的结果显示，民营和外资企业的正向效应更为显著，且大型民营企业的正向效应值最大。分地区和要素密集度的结果显示，东部和劳动密集型企业的正向“加成率效应”较大。研究创新：首次从企业盈利水平视角出发探讨外资银行进入对下游制造业加成率的影响。研究价值：证实金融业开放有利于提升我国制造业企业市场势力。     

贸易开放是否影响了中国产业结构升级？

研究目标：探讨贸易开放是否影响了中国产业结构升级。研究方法：利用2003～2014年省际面板数据，采用中介效应检验方法。研究发现：贸易开放在加快产业结构整体优化的同时还有助于服务业与工业内部行业的变革。同时，贸易开放可以借助增加物质资本积累、刺激消费需求、提升技术进步、促进制度变革等方式间接加速产业结构整体升级和产业结构高级化发展。加工贸易对产业结构升级的促进力度小于非加工贸易，东部地区对产业结构升级的促进力度大于中西部地区，欧美发达国家对产业结构升级的促进力度大于东亚发达国家。研究创新：深入探讨了贸易开放影响产业结构升级的理论机制，并从产业间与产业内视角构建多维产业结构升级指数检验贸易开放对产业结构升级的影响。研究价值：有利于缩小贸易区域差异以及环境承载力差异对产业结构升级的影响，为实现产业转型升级提供科学决策依据。