英国电信产业的放松管制和对主导运营商BT的再管制

自 1 980年起 ,英国电信产业先后实施了邮政、电信分离 ,建立独立的管制机构 ,对开放市场准入和私有化以后仍然居于主导地位的运营商———英国电信公司 (BT)实施包括价格上限管制在内的一系列管制 ,促进了英国电信产业向竞争性结构的转化。目前 ,我国电信产业同样面临着放松管制以及放松管制以后如何重组和再管制主导运营商的棘手难题。本文拟对英国电信产业 2 0余年的改革经验进行比较系统的回顾和评析 ,以期对我国电信产业的下一步改革有所启示。     

Should telecoms liberalisation stop at call termination?

In recent years concerns about the degree of competition in the provision of telecommunications call termination services have emerged. While the general consensus is that call origination is becoming more and more competitive, regulatory attention to call termination has widened in scope beyond the incumbent public telephone operators, leading to direct regulation of mobile termination charges in some countries and a debate on whether regulation should also be extended to “non-dominant” networks. This paper assesses whether these concerns are justified, extending the analysis to review the economic literature on reciprocal setting of termination charges between network operators. We conclude that while ex ante regulation of call termination simplifies the work of regulators it does not appear justifiable in all circumstances.     

UK strategy - the momentum of change

In July 1980, the UK government set into motion a programme of reform for telecommunications. The British Telecommunications Act 1981 maintains British Telecom's exclusive privilege but provides for market entry in network transmission, services and attachments. The process continues with a new Telecommunications Bill, currently being considered by Parliament, which will make shares available to the public and allow for the creation of a new Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). Jonathan Solomon considers the impact of the new legislation on the UK telecommunications environment.     

Consumer behavior towards on-net/off-net price differentiation

This paper explores how consumers react towards price differentiation between on-net and off-net calls in mobile telecommunications - a pricing policy that is common in many mobile telecommunications markets. Based on a survey of 1044 students it is demonstrated that some consumers may suffer from a "price differentiation bias", i.e., a fair number of consumers may overestimate the savings that result from reduced on-net and/or off-net charges, as they do not appear to weigh the prices with the probabilities of placing off-net and on-net calls. This may help to explain why it have been the smaller operators in various countries who have introduced on-net/off-net price differentiation. The paper also discusses the implications that such a consumer bias may have for market competition.     

Inconvenience cost of mobile communication failure: The case of South Korea

Mobile communication failure can occur when mobile traffic exceeds the manageable level. This depends on frequency bandwidth. Mobile communication failure causes inconveniences in a user's daily life that lead to social and economic damage. To address this issue, mobile telecommunications companies deploy additional bandwidths and develop new technologies, but these are costly strategies. This study applies a spike model based on a contingent valuation method (CVM) to measure the inconvenience cost resulting from mobile communication failure. The mean monthly willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid communication failure per user is estimated to be KRW 898.14 (USD 0.80) over a period of five years in our study. The inconvenience cost borne by the population is estimated to be KRW 2.97 trillion (USD 2.61 billion). Users experiencing greater frequency of communication failure are found to be willing to pay more to avoid the inconvenience. When excluding respondents citing zero-WTP, the mean WTP per user was calculated to be KRW 3426.41 (USD 3.01). Data traffic usage and frequency at which communication failure is experienced are variables that exhibit statistically significant effects on WTP to avoid mobile communication failure. Overall, estimation results show that a price discrimination based on data traffic usage or quality can be considered by mobile telecommunications companies and regulators to address the issue of data traffic inducing mobile communication failure.     

Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets

This paper demonstrates how revealed- and stated-preference analyses can be used for modeling network effects in the field of mobile telecommunications. The aim of this study was to verify if network effects may still play a role in the Polish mobile telecommunications market, measure their strength, identify their sources and variability across consumers by accounting for consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity, evaluate their monetary value to consumers, and finally, to verify if the marginal utility associated with network effects is constant. The analysis of consumers' revealed choices (currently used mobile telephone operator) allowed the identification of major differences between customer bases of incumbent and new entrant operators, and insight into the business strategies adopted in the presence of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates. The second part of the study—the analysis of the consumers' stated choices (made in carefully prepared and designed hypothetical choice situations, known as the choice experiments) made it possible to directly model consumers' utility functions and, in this way, investigate the nature of network effects in mobile telecommunications markets. From the results, the presence of strong network effects, which are related to the ratio of consumers' social network group using the same operator, and to the magnitude of on-net price discounts, is confirmed. These network effects can be disaggregated to pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects. Through the utilization of the random parameters multinomial logit model, consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity can be accounted for, which proved a scientifically revealing and potentially policy-relevant approach. The results might be of a particular interest to other researchers aiming at modeling consumers' preferences as well as to mobile telephone operators and regulatory authorities—it is shown that capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited by non-price factors, which affect subscriber's choices, especially in the presence of asymmetric mobile termination rates.     

Evaluating the efficiency change and productivity progress of the top global telecom operators since OTT's prevalence

The telecommunications industry has undergone significant evolvement from fixed to mobile substitution (FMS) to fixed mobile convergence (FMC) and now to over-the-top (OTT) services due to the huge rise in data usage. This paper explores efficiency variation during the period 2012–2017 for the top 41 global telecom operators in Forbes Global, 2000. Based on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) meta-frontier approach to reflect differences in production functions, the empirical results herein show that the number of operators achieving technical efficiency with respect to the meta-frontier fell from 13 firms in 2012 to 10 firms in 2013 to 8 firms in 2014 to 8 firms in 2015 and then to 7 firms in 2016, but then rose to 11 firms in 2017, displaying the impact from rise in OTT. For the mobile-only group, the average technical efficiency with respect to the meta-frontier is 0.841, which is superior to the fixed-mobile group's 0.774 and the fixed-only group's 0.714, and the group difference is significant among the three facilities-based groups. The meta-frontier estimation suggests that the fixed-mobile group has the highest meta-technology ratio (MTR) of 0.901 versus the mobile-only group's 0.886 and fixed-only group's 0.718. The empirical results offer policy implications for regulators to encourage telecom operators to have fixed-mobile operations. We further suggest that telecom operators cooperate with OTT service providers and invest in them in order to take advantage of people's more personalized digital life.     

Technological and geographic heterogeneity in broadband markets: The challenge for regulation

When the telecommunications industry was liberalised in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s, it inherited a legacy of monopoly providers whose footprint was national or multi-regional in its character. The regulatory framework, particularly that adopted in EU member states, reflected this pattern of relatively homogeneous deployment achieved, in part, by decades of cross-subsidised pricing and universal service goals. Perhaps because of this legacy, telecommunications regulators have often adopted the presumption that relevant markets are national in character, unless proven otherwise Although geographically-variegated regulatory remedies have been permitted (even in the face of allegedly national relevant markets) and adopted in many member states, many regulators have never done so, and overly cautious thresholds for permitting geographically based forbearance suggest a continued bias towards presuming national markets and remedies. We find that this presumption of uniformity and the tendency to aggregate geographic markets together is not supported by first principles of antitrust analysis, although there may have been strong practical reasons to apply this presumption in the past circumstances of the telecommunications and broadband industries.On the ground, however, there has arguably never been as much heterogeneity across geographies and across technological solutions that provide effective ultra-fast broadband speeds. Both technological (i.e., product market) and geographic heterogeneity are likely to increase with the advent of mobile 5G networks. With their deployment, a cautious regulatory stance towards geographic variation and a cautious regulatory stance towards inter-technology or inter-modal competition may result in regulation that could exceed what is required to ensure effective competition and could instead distort the incentives to enter of facilities-based actors. This may also result in higher-cost and inefficient investment. A more geographically varied and technologically agnostic regulatory framework may satisfy the principle of proportionate and focused regulation—with the possibility that the locus of regulation shifts from the access network to bottleneck facilities such as fibre, ducts and poles.This discussion is especially germane when one considers the highly speculative nature of forecasts and projections about future demand, and the competing claims of proponents of 5G and fibre. While there is some scepticism about the performance of mobile networks, we note that pure mobile and fixed 5G services may have synergies in deployment, and that the idea of competing with residential broadband services is a core strategy of very influential large-scale industry actors. In terms of a future research agenda, regulatory decisions could benefit from much more research into the relationship between domestic and global bandwidth constraints and their influence on development of software and application, as well as much more quantitative research by academics on the drivers of bandwidth demand. The risks associated with promoting investment that results in large-scale wasted resources should also be central to the regulatory agenda.     

Churn analysis for an Iranian mobile operator

To survive in the challenging environment of a global market, organizations must recognize and analyze customer attitudes. To be competitive, organizations must recognize and forecast customer preferences and behaviors to maximize customer retention before their rivals do so. This research identifies factors that affect customer churn, the single most valuable of an organization's assets. One year's data from call log files relating to 3150 customers were selected randomly from an Iranian mobile operator call-center database. Binomial Logistic Regression was the method of analysis used in this research. The results of this research indicate that a customer's dissatisfaction, their amount of service usage and certain demographic characteristics have the most influence on their decision to remain or churn. The results also imply that customer status (active or inactive status) mediates the relationship between churn and the cause of churn. The Iranian government's current plan to privatize the telecommunications industry without deregulation leads to a non-square competition environment. Deregulation in favor of delegating more authorities of customer care is necessary in order to develop a square private competition environment in the Iranian mobile telecommunications industry.     

Interconnection regulation in India: Lessons for developing countries

Interconnection is not only a major competition issue per se, it is also a critical element of the basic telecommunications agreement of the WTO. An important issue in interconnection regulation is interconnection charging especially in the context of a dominant incumbent. Most regulators in developing countries face challenges in setting interconnection prices in the absence of market information on the incumbent's or entrant's costs, competition or demand and models suited for developing countries that also adhere to the WTO guidelines. There are few papers that illustrate the challenges faced by regulators in such a context. This paper attempts to bridge the gap by highlighting the nature of interaction between the regulator, incumbent, judiciary and the political environment, the role of formal models in setting interconnection charges and the implications of rapid technological changes in a developing country context through a case study of India.The case study highlights the point that besides independence, it is important to vest enforcement powers in the regulatory agency for it to be credible. Incorporating the WTO interconnection guidelines within a developing country context has implications for network growth and poses challenges to the regulatory processes.Although Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) started with a distortionary, inefficiently priced network providing low coverage and quality, it has meandered its way to a more reasonable network access pricing regime. The decreasing cost of technology and increasing incomes in India and political interventions in regulation have put pressure on TRAI to provide lower interconnection charges and faster telecom growth. Thus, it is pragmatic for regulators to start with a “quick and dirty” estimate, provided that they can signal the downward trend in interconnection pricing, rather than wait for the “correct” estimates.Adoption of future looking strategies (interconnection exchanges), use of a variety of formal models, and strengthening of regulatory capacity are all necessary steps in fostering a competitive environment. Interconnection regimes set up early in the reform process require a review. For successful competition, effective dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions are also important.     

Cost orientation and xDSL services: Retail-minus vs. LRAIC

Forward-looking long run average incremental cost (LRAIC) bottom-up models have now established themselves as a popular methodology to guide European telecommunications regulators’ setting of interconnection charges between the incumbent and other operators. The purpose of this article is to discuss the adequacy of using bottom-up LRAIC models or retail-minus to calculate bitstream access charges—the charges typically applicable to wholesale xDSL services. In particular, the author is interested in the cost drivers of such services, how different they are from circuit-switched voice services, and ultimately whether retail-minus should be preferred over LRAIC models when setting these bitstream charges.     

TP case study: fixed–mobile interconnection in India

The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) attempted, in late 1999, to introduce the calling party pays (CPP) regime for mobile cellular services, with a corresponding revenue-sharing arrangement between fixed and mobile operators. According to the revenue-sharing proposal, mobile operators in India were to be compensated for carrying traffic to and from the fixed networks. Under their original license conditions, fixed operators (usually one of the two state-owned incumbents) were not paying mobile operators for terminating calls on their networks. However, mobile operators had to compensate the state-owned incumbent for terminating traffic. This unfavourable environment for mobile operators has meant that mobile services have not been able to reach their full potential in India. There was great disappointment within the mobile industry when the TRAI's CPP order was overturned by the Supreme Court of India in early 2000, due to lack of jurisdiction. Since then, the enabling legislation has been amended. It is hoped that the new provisions of the TRAI Act will empower the regulator to establish a level playing field for mobile network operators. It is only through the creation of a suitable framework for interconnection that the TRAI will be able to ensure the success of telecommunications reform in India.     

MODELLING REGULATORY DISTORTIONS WITH REAL OPTIONS

The introduction of uncertainty can make a significant difference in the valuation of a project. This manifests itself, inter alia, in the regulatory constraints that can affect the valuations of the firm's investment which, in turn has an adverse impact on consumers' welfare. In particular, the inability to exercise any or all of the delay, abandon, start/stop, and time-to-build options has an economic and social cost. With this view in mind, we specify and estimate a model where regulatory constraints impact on the firm's cash flow and on investment valuation with real options methods.

This paper uses real options analysis to address issues of regulation that have not been previously quantified. We show that regulatory constraints on cash flow have an impact on investment valuations in the telecommunications industry. Specifically, a model is developed to estimate the cost of regulation for broadband services. We show that the cash flow constraints and the inability to delay and abandon has a significant cost. Because some costs are not recognized in a static view of the world, this failure to recognize the operation and implications of non-flexibility by regulators (which can be modeled by real options methods) will lead to a reduction in company valuations which in turn will lead to a reduction in economics welfare.     

电信重组引发五大悬念

重组的具体过程依然会显得漫长而艰辛,并充满各种不确定性和悬念。在经过了几年的猜谜游戏之后,中国电信行业第三次重组方案终于尘埃落定。5月24日14:00,工业和信息化部、国家发改委以及财政部联合发布中国电信业重组公告:基于电信行业现状,为实现改革目标,鼓励中国电信收购中国联通CDMA网(包括资产和用户),中国联通与中     

Monopoly power and the problem of CLEC access charges

The analysis in this paper considers the problem of excessive originating and terminating access charges imposed by some competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in the United States. The problem arises because the current institutional structure provides an incentive for CLECs to charge for access service in excess of what a competitive market would indicate. An examination of the data shows that the problem of excessive access charges imposed by CLECs is very real. An analysis of terminating access charges for September 2000 reveals that average terminating access charges billed to three interexchange carriers (IXCs) are excessive, exceeding average price cap regulated incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) access charges by 370–470 percent. Some solutions to the problem are offered including a first-best solution whereby the calling party would be required to pay for originating access service and have the receiving party pay for terminating access service. A second-best solution would be to limit CLEC's access charges to an IXC to be less than or equal to the access charges of the ILEC with which it directly competes for customers.     

Global political economy of technology standardization: A case of the Korean mobile telecommunications market

This paper examines empirical cases of standardization in the Korean mobile market as vehicles for approaching the broader political and institutional context of standardization in telecommunications. A consideration of Korean standardization in the mobile telecommunications market is particularly interesting because it reveals how the state's political interests influence standards decisions, which are primarily driven by market and technological changes in telecommunications. Judged from the social construction of technology perspective which sheds light not only on technology itself but also on political, social and economic interests that surround transformations in technology, this paper highlights power relations among the major actors that have made technology standards decisions in Korea regarding second (2G) and third-generation (3G) mobile telephony. The paper also attempts to show how the Korean government has dealt with the diverse interests of various market actors while pursuing its own policy agenda.     

Impacts of mobile Internet use intensity on the demand for SMS and voice services of mobile network operators: An empirical multi-method study of German mobile Internet customers

Scholarly and business publications alike convey the message that past and future strong growth in mobile Internet (MI) access and service demand has solely positive commercial implications for mobile network operators (MNOs). This position neglects the possibility that increasing MI use intensity may lead to demand decreases for the highly profitable short messaging service (SMS) and mobile voice telephony. The extant literature provides few insights on relations between MI use intensity, on the one hand, and SMS as well as mobile voice call use intensities, on the other hand. This study developed hypotheses concerning the presence or absence of impacts of MI use intensity and circumstances of MI use (e.g., device type, tariff scheme) on the demand for SMS and mobile voice telephony at the individual customer level. The hypotheses were tested by analyzing actual use behaviors of 304 MI adopters in Germany, for whom objective use intensity data were extracted from the billing system of an MNO. These non-reactive measures were combined with responses collected from the adopters through a telephone survey. Multivariate regression results suggest that though MI use intensity significantly negatively affected both number of SMS sent and received, these effects were so small that their practical relevance is highly doubtful. Further, customers who used MI more intensively did not generate lower volumes of outgoing or incoming mobile voice connection minutes. Conclusions are drawn for MNO, telecommunications sector regulators and scholarly researchers seeking to explain the acceptance of mobile communications services.     

Telecommunications companies: One meeting with any competitor is enough to violate the EU's competition laws and result in fines

This commentary's purpose is to review how Telfort, T-Mobile, Vodafone, and others discovered that one “meeting” of any type with any telecommunications competitor could result in fines up to 10 percent of total “turnover” under EU competition law Regulation no. 1/2003, Article 23(2)(a), and to provide planning tips on how to eliminate the potential for those adverse consequences. While competition laws do not apply solely to the telecommunications industry, they do seem to affect it disproportionately. Telecommunications companies have global reach, and some of the most stringent competition law exists in Europe. Thus, all should review the most recent telecommunications ruling from the European Court of Justice, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van der Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit C-8/08 (2009). ¹ The ruling deals with whether the one meeting was “concerted activity” in violation of Article 81(1) EC.     

On access pricing in telecoms: theory and European practice

This paper discusses European legislation concerning interconnection between telecommunications operators. An important and distinct element of regulatory policy in the European Union is that operators with significant market power are required to provide cost-based interconnection whereas other operators are not required to provide such cost-based interconnection. It analyzes the consequences of different interconnection charges for competition and investments. Using recent insights from the theoretical literature on competition in telecommunications, it finds that the socially optimal regulatory policy concerning interconnection has the same characteristics as that adopted in the European Union.