Optimal tax policy and foreign direct investment under ambiguity

We analyze the optimal timing of an irreversible foreign direct investment by a foreign firm and the optimal tax policy by a host country under ambiguity. We derive the optimal GDP level at which the foreign firm switches from exporting to a foreign direct investment. Furthermore, we derive the optimal tax policy by the host country, and analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal tax policy. We show that the host country should reduce the optimal corporate tax rate from the host government’s perspective in response to an increase in ambiguity. Our result is different from the one obtained by Pennings (2005) that shows that an increase in risk induces an increase in the optimal corporate tax rate.     

Tariff Policy and the Foreign Entry Decision in the Presence of a Cost-Based Informational Asymmetry

The paper demonstrates that the standard prediction on the relation between tariff rates and the mode of foreign entry—exports or direct investment—may not hold in the presence of incomplete information. A foreign firm lacks full information on the cost structure of an informed incumbent firm located in the domestic (potential) host country. Within a two‐period model, the local incumbent may behave in a manner which keeps the potential foreign entrant uninformed of its cost structure. In such a pooling equilibrium, the uninformed foreign firm either refrains from entering altogether or serves the host country via exports at tariff rates which would, otherwise under complete information, induce entry via direct investment. When entry mode is altered, other standard full‐information effects of trade policy may also no longer hold.     

Attracting Fdi in a Politically Risky World*

Conventional wisdom holds that lack of government commitment deters foreign investment in developing countries. Yet this explanation is not convincing because some econometric studies have found little support for the role of political risk and host governments can offer upfront subsidies that compensate foreign investors for their sunk cost. This paper shows that a second commitment problem upsets the argument. A multinational firm cannot credibly commit to invest in only one country. Since countries differ in production costs and government credibility, this article explains the pattern of investment in a politically risky world.     

FDI Policy,Greenfield Investment and Cross‐border Mergers

This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross‐border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross‐border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade‐off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

MULTINATIONALS,TAX HOLIDAYS,AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER*

Host country governments often grant investment incentives to foreign firms located in their territories. We show that such preferential treatment of foreign firms can induce transfer of foreign technology, facilitate entry by the local firm, and improve host country welfare. However, this pro‐competitive outcome results when preferential treatment is granted for a limited time. Permanent tax concessions yield the opposite effect.     

THE ALLOCATION OF OECD DIRECT INVESTMENT BETWEEN CEECS: A DISCRETE CHOICE APPROACH

The choice of the location of foreign direct investment is a complex phenomenon, depending not only on host‐country characteristics, but also on host‐industry and specific source‐firm characteristics. To capture these different influences for foreign investment location decisions into 13 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) over a twelve‐year period, this paper uses a Generalized Nested Logit (GNL) model with firm, industry, and country data. The novel empirical results show that the responsiveness of firms’ decisions regarding where to locate capital in CEECs to country‐level variables differs both across sectors and across firms of different sizes and profitability.     

Information-eliciting compensation schemes

This paper examines the implications of the ‘residence’ approach to taxing foreign source income such as employed by the United States. It is argued that, because the repatriation of earnings to the home country investor and not the earnings themselves are typically the source of tax liability, the foreign source income tax should affect foreign investment differently depending on the required transfers of funds within the firm.One implication of viewing the tax in this way is that in order to maximize after-tax profits, a firm should finance its foreign investment out of foreign earnings to the greatest extent possible. That is, a firm's required foreign return jumps at the point at which desired foreign investment just exhausts foreign earnings. This allows us to draw a distinction between ‘mature’ foreign operations, which are at any point in time financed at the margin by investing earnings (and perhaps also pay dividends to their parent firm in the home country), and ‘immature’ foreign affiliates, which rely on funding from their parents (and should not be paying dividends). It is noted that survey evidence on multinational firm behavior is consistent with this distinction. Direct investment data indicate that mature foreign operations probably account for nearly 90 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment.The discussion then turns to investment incentives. It is shown that the home country's rate of tax on foreign source income and the presence or absence of a foreign tax credit should be irrelevant to a mature foreign operations's investment and dividend decisions. This conclusion, which conflicts sharply with the conventional wisdom, follows because the home country tax acts as an unavoidable cost. New firms' investment decisions are, on the other hand, influenced by home country taxes.     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Host country's strategic policies and multinational firm's choice of entry mode

This paper examines the effects of contract enforceability and market structure on a firm's choice between licensing and foreign direct investment. Clearly, the firm's choice impacts upon social welfare in the host country. Therefore, the government of the host country is likely to set contract enforceability for inducing the multinational firm (MNF) to choose a desirable mode of entry. The paper takes into account two different cases. In the first case, the host country does not have an incumbent that can compete with the MNF, and in the second case, it has one incumbent that can compete. The paper shows that the government's choice of contract enforceability is crucially dependent upon the domestic market structure and the domestic capacity to absorb the advanced technology of the MNF.     

WHO GAINS FROM WHOM? SPILLOVERS,COMPETITION AND TECHNOLOGY SOURCING IN THE FOREIGN‐OWNED SECTOR OF UK MANUFACTURING

There is a growing literature explaining foreign direct investment flows in terms of ‘technology sourcing’, whereby multinational firms invest in certain locations not to exploit their firm‐specific assets in the host environment, but to access technology that is generated by host country firms. However, it is far from clear whether the literature has found significant evidence of such activity beyond a few isolated examples. This paper extends this work by allowing for the possibility of multinational enterprises (MNEs) sourcing technology not only from host country firms but also from each other within a host economy. The paper demonstrates that MNEs in the UK do indeed appropriate spillovers both from indigenous firms and from other foreign investors, but that there are also significant competition effects that act to reduce productivity in certain industries. The paper also explores which countries' affiliates gain most from technology sourcing in the UK, and which generate the greatest spillovers within the foreign‐owned sector.     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

东道国ESP系统与东道国外商直接投资特征研究--以中国为例

国际直接投资地域结构的时空差异性对忽视东道国因素的传统国际投资理论提出了挑战。文章研究了东道国因素对国际生产资本地域运动的影响，提出了国际直接投资是东道国因素与投资主体三优势综合作用的结果，东道国环境、体制、政策系统的状态特征决定了东道国外资特征等观点，并实证研究了中国改革开放进程与外商对华投资规模和结构的内在互动性。     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

Economic freedom and bilateral direct investment

Economic freedom (freedom from the intervention of government) is essential for doing business, so economic freedom of both the home country and the host country are important for bilateral foreign direct investment. However, though some literature has investigated the role of host country's economic freedom in bilateral direct investment, no literature has studied the role of home country's economic freedom. This paper has studied this issue in a gravity model with a sample of 155 countries. This paper has also employed some effective estimation techniques of gravity model to incorporate the zero observations and adopted quantile regression method. The findings indicate that economic freedom of both the home country and the host country are positively correlated with bilateral direct investment, and the economic freedom of home country has even stronger explanatory power for foreign direct investment. Hence, promoting the economic freedom may encourage more outward foreign direct investment than inward direct investment.     

INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

Welfare effects of competition for FDI between technologically asymmetric countries with varying trade costs

Given the traditional argument that host countries' excessive competition for FDI (foreign direct investment) deteriorates the host countries' welfare, this paper examines the impact of policy competition for FDI on social welfare considering varying trade costs. Based on a model where two technologically asymmetric countries compete for FDI, we determine an equilibrium where a multinational firm relocates to a less efficient country. Moreover, we demonstrate that the policy competition for FDI between less integrated economies might improve social welfare when the multinational firm relocates to a country with a lower technology and a less competitive market. Nonetheless, we show that the traditional argument can be true when the policy competition for FDI between highly integrated economies deteriorates host countries' welfare, as supported by the empirical evidences of moderated competition for FDI within EU member countries.     

Competition for natural resources and the hold‐up problem

We study the role of competition for the hold‐up problem in foreign direct investment in resource‐based industries. The host country government is not only unable to commit not to expropriate investment ex post but also unable to commit to the provision of local resources. In the case of competition for local resources, this dual commitment problem triggers higher investment levels and increases host country revenues, but hurts profits of international investors.     

FDI and pollution havens: Evidence from the Norwegian manufacturing sector

This is an empirical study of the firm and country determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and how it is affected by the stringency of environmental regulations in host countries. We employ disaggregated data on sales by Norwegian multinationals' affiliates from 1999 to 2005 that allow such affiliates to be categorized as either efficiency-seeking (vertical) or market-seeking (horizontal) FDI. While the environmental stringency of a host country and its enforcement are found to have no effect on the average investment, we find a significant negative effect on multinationals with vertical motives. Compared to those located in lenient countries, the efficiency-seeking affiliates in more environmentally regulated countries receive less investment from their parent companies in terms of (i) equity capital, (ii) capital stock, and (iii) assets. We further find that the total exports from affiliates to parent companies in Norway decrease with the level of enforced environmental stringency in the host countries.