基于大股东掏空下的经理人薪酬激励机制研究

大股东的存在加强了对经理人的监督,但存在大股东掏空时经理人会与大股东谈判以降低其业绩标准,从而削弱经理人的薪酬激励监督。文章将大股东掏空与经理人薪酬激励纳入同一分析框架,探讨两者的相互作用。研究发现,大股东掏空降低了经理人的业绩薪酬激励强度,并且实际控制人性质也影响这种激励强度。文章的研究为更全面地了解大股东的作用和两类代理成本的相互影响提供了参考。     

Reducing agency conflicts through bank dividend payout decisions: the role of opacity and ownership structure

We empirically examine whether banks’ dividend decisions are influenced by their degree of opacity and ownership structure. We find that banks with concentrated ownership structure pay lower dividends when they have high degrees of opacity, in line with the hypothesis that majority shareholders pay lower dividends to extract higher levels of private benefits. We do not observe such expropriation behaviour from managers in widely held banks. Further analysis shows that higher levels of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain opportunistic behaviour of majority shareholders. Our findings have critical policy implications for the Basel 3 implementation of restrictions on dividend payouts.     

Does bank shareholding impact corporate innovation? Evidence from China

Corporate innovation is an engine of economic development, while bank shareholding is the phenomenon of having a bank as a shareholder. Their relationship, however, has been underexamined. We provide the first study on the direct impact of bank shareholding on corporate innovation. Using patents granted to Chinese firms from 1999 to 2013, our findings suggest that bank shareholding significantly contributes to corporate innovation. Additional analysis suggests that easing financial constraints can facilitate the positive impacts of bank shareholding on corporate innovation. We also find that bank shareholding works better when firms have effective external monitoring and when they are nonstate-owned firms with nonstate-owned banks as shareholders. We contribute to the literature by showing that (1) despite the restrictions some countries impose on bank shareholding, allowing it could be a good economic policy for promoting corporate innovation, and (2) successful corporate innovation requires proper monitoring and incentives.     

Earnings distribution,corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non‐manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970–1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de‐linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates.     

山西票号与现代商业银行的治理机制比较研究

从产权制度、激励约束机制、组织架构三个方面对山西票号与现代商业银行的企业治理机制进行了比较,认为山西票号尊重股东、管理者、员工利益,以人为本,注重构建激励约束体系,强调总号对分号的控制力及各机构间的紧密联系和信息共享,对现代商业银行有一定借鉴意义。     

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

利益驱逐：制衡抑或共谋？——我国上市银行股权特征与经营绩效的关系研究

基于股权特征的视角,以2000-2011年中国13家上市银行的经验数据为样本,对大股东间利益驱逐的行为抉择与银行绩效的关系作了实证分析。研究表明：股权集中度对银行绩效具有显著的负作用;并且,随着股权集中度增大,对银行绩效的削弱能力就越强。股权制衡度与银行绩效间呈显著倒U型关系,即其他大股东对第一大股东的利益驱逐不仅具有制衡作用,而且存在＂利益共谋＂的可能性。因此,应规范大股东资本市场运作行为,提高银行信息披露的透明度,健全中小投资者＂参政＂网络渠道。     

国有参股股东能够促进企业创新吗

在中国鼓励发展非公有资本控股的混合所有制企业背景下，以2008-2017年民营上市公司为样本，手工搜集前十大股东性质和持股比例数据，研究国有参股股东对企业创新的影响。实证发现，国有参股股东能够促进民营企业创新，并且国有参股股东与民企高管政治关联对企业创新的影响具有一定的替代效应。机制检验证实，缓解企业融资约束、提升企业创新意愿是两条主要的渠道机制。研究结果表明，民资、国资混合参股的股权结构能够取长补短、相互促进、共同发展，有助于澄清“国进民退”的争议，对进一步深化混合所有制改革具有重要政策意义。     

Pyramidal group structure and bank risk in Thailand

This paper investigates how banks and finance companies operate in business groups. Using uniquely detailed ownership data from Thailand, we find that the controlling shareholders extensively use pyramids to control banks and finance companies and assign different lending strategies across pyramidal tiers. Lower-tier banks tend to extend loans more aggressively and perform more poorly, while upper tier banks carry out more profitable investments. After the crisis hit, upper-tier banks survived and almost all lower-tier banks went bankrupt. Our results suggest that the multilayer organizational structure of bank ownership can affect a bank’s lending behavior and its resistance to economic shocks.     

Political influence,central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis

This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.     

股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效--来自山东、河南两省的调查证据

银行体系的重要地位和银行危机的频繁发生显示了加强银行公司治理的重要性 ,在我国银行体制改革的背景下 ,研究商业银行公司治理问题具有重要的现实意义。本文利用山东、河南两省 2 8家城市银行的调查样本对我国地方商业银行的股权结构、治理机制及其效果进行了实证分析。结果发现 ,虽然我国地方性银行国有和集中的股权结构特征明显 ,但大股东的国有性质并没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,同时集中型股权结构对银行绩效有明显的积极影响。银行高管人员薪酬有较明显的负激励效果。此外我们还发现 ,外部董事比例和银行规模基本没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,而且山东、河南两省城市银行在公司治理方面也不存在省际间的显著差异。     

European banks’ executive remuneration under the new European Union regulation

We review how the new European regulation of bank executive compensation could affect the future of banking in Europe. Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the relation between bank executive remuneration and the financial crisis, authorities have intensively regulated the compensation of bank managers to eliminate risk-taking incentives in the financial industry. However, the new regulation could have unintended consequences of creating an adverse selection problem at European banks, reducing the number of best-performing managers available for European banks, and motivating an excessive increase in fixed remuneration over total remuneration, altering the way incentive systems work.     

基于债权治理视角的利益侵占约束博弈分析

运用代理成本理论和契约理论,阐述了控股股东与银行债权人之间利益博弈的机理。针对我国转轨经济时期特殊的经济和社会背景———独特的股权结构、过度的政府干预、较低的社会信任程度等,构建了控股股东与银行债权人之间的利益博弈模型,证明了均衡状态的存在,并通过进一步分析各参数变量的政策含义,搭建了控股股东与银行债权人之间利益博弈的理论分析框架,为研究我国上市公司的银行债权治理提供了新的分析思路。     

Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms

This paper seeks to relate the increases in executive compensation observed in China to improvement of the legal environment. We build a simple model and demonstrate that improvement in legal investor protection reduces the manager's private benefits of control; in order to make the managerial incentives compatible, some of the forgone private benefits have to be compensated in the form of increased executive pay. Using a large dataset on Chinese listed corporations, we find strong evidence that improvement of the legal environment is significantly associated with both the rise in executive compensation and the reduction in agency costs, which is consistent with our model predictions.     

企业特征、高管薪酬结构与企业绩效

利用2005—2010年我国沪深两市A股非金融保险行业1654家上市公司的高管年度薪酬数据,结合企业特征,对不同类型企业的高管薪酬结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,细化锦标赛理论和行为理论在不同类型企业中可能形成的差异化实施效应。结果显示:我国不同类型的企业都比较适宜采用锦标赛理论制定高管薪酬激励政策,竞争性的高管薪酬结构对于提升企业绩效具有正面作用,均等化高管薪酬结构不利于企业的价值创造;相对于民营企业、小规模企业、低成长企业而言,我国国有企业、大规模企业、高成长企业更宜采用锦标赛理论设计企业高管薪酬结构。因此我国不宜对非金融保险行业国有企业的高管薪酬进行过度均等化的管制,否则会负面影响企业绩效提升和企业价值创造。     

How does organizational structure affect executive compensation?

Does the rise of the CFO as the second-ranked executive increase the status of the CEO? We find that, as a CFO becomes #2, a CEO receives higher pay in relative terms compared with other top executives. This result corresponds to the literature on span-of-control of executives in top management team.     

The changing role of dividends: a firm-level study from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century

Abstract .  We investigate the changes in dividend policy for one of North America's oldest banks (and Canada's first bank), Bank of Montreal, over time by considering the relationships between dividends, prices and earnings for this prominent firm. In the early part of the sample we find that annual dividend and earnings changes are highly variable, with dividend changes following changes in earnings and a larger portion of investors' returns coming from dividends. Since World War II dividend policy has been characterized by more stable and gradual increases in dividends, with more of investors' returns coming from capital gains. Overall, our results suggest that investors' perception of dividends has changed over time, allowing management to pay smaller dividends and reinvest funds in the firm.     

Taxation and the stock market valuation of capital gains and dividends: Theory and emphirical results

Dividends seem to be more heavily taxed than capital gains. Why then do corporations pay dividends rather than repurchasing shares or retaining earnings? Either corporations are not acting in the interests of shareholders, or else shareholders desire dividends sufficiently for nontax reasons to offset the tax effect.In this paper, we measure the relative valuation of dividends and capital gains in the stock market, using a variant of the capital asset pricing model. We find that dividends are not valued differently systematically from capital gains. This finding is consistent with share price maximization by firms but inconsistent with the fact that most shareholderspay a heavier tax on dividends.We also show that the relative value of dividends provides an indirect measure of a marginal Tobin's q. The measured value of dividends relative to capital gains tends to be higher during prosperous periods, as is consistent with this interpretation. We hope that this time series on a marginal Tobin's q will prove to be useful in forecasting the rate of investment.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

公司治理视角的中国上市公司盈余管理研究

盈余管理是一个令全球投资者和政府关注,但一直未能得到有效解决的问题。使用修正的Jones模型对1999—2010年中国上市公司的盈余管理进行估计,可以看出中国上市公司存在较为严重的盈余管理,盈余水平与总资产之比的平均值为7．6％左右。对公司治理变量与盈余管理之间关系作进一步的实证研究发现,第一大股东持股比例对盈余管理存在显著的正向影响,第二到第十大股东持股比例和高管持股比例对盈余管理的影响显著为负;民营控股企业进行盈余管理的倾向高于国有控股企业。这些结果意味着,中国需进一步完善上市公司治理机制,降低盈余管理的幅度。