Market Share and Price Setting Behavior for Private Labels and National Brands

In this paper, we focus on the nature of demand and competitive response in the market for private label and national branded grocery products. Specifically,we employ less restrictive functional forms than usedin prior research. Specifically, we incorporateLA/AIDS demands and the corresponding price reactionequations to estimate consumer price sensitivities andsupply side price strategies for national brand andprivate label products. Oligopolistic priceinterdependence is explored further by specifyingbrand share, brand Herfindahl, and a measure of thestructure of the local retail markets in the supplyside relations to evaluate explicitly the impact ofmarket structure.In our empirical analysis, we estimate a system of market share and price equations simultaneously inorder to examine (i) the determinants of the demandresponse to pricing and promotion decisions and (ii)the determinants of private label and national brandpricing behavior. Using data for 143 food productcategories and 59 geographic markets, we develop amodel that captures the variation in privatelabel-national brand share and pricing acrosscategories and markets. Key findings include: (i)demand response to price and promotion is decidedlyasymmetric, (ii) price followship between privatelabels and national brands is positive, but notstrong, and (iii) markets characterized by highernational brand market share and higher supermarketconcentration tend to have higher prices forboth national brands and private labels.     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.     

A note on dominant firm market share and economic performance

The hypothesis of a positive concentration-profits relationship has been one of the most thoroughly tested in economics. Market share has been used in a number of these studies as a measure of horizontal dominance by a firm in an industry. Although these studies have shown empirically that a positive relationship exists between market share and rates of return, little theoretical evidence for this relationship exists. The price leadership model can be used to show that a continuous, direct relationship exists between market share and competitive injury. From a simulation exercise based upon the price leadership model, a positive association is demonstrated between increasing market share of the dominant firm (or collusive leading firms) and increasing competitive injury (as evidenced by a greater divergence between the competitive versus price leadership price-output decisions). This exercise establishes market share as a fundamental structrual variable in describing the short run competitiveness within the industry. The results of this model imply that intra-industry cross section studies, utilizing a carefully defined price leader(s) and price followers dictomy, should yield better statistical fits. At the present stage of empirical testing, however, only the roughest approximations using rather arbitrary definitions of the price leader-follower dichotomy have been made.     

Changes in REIT Liquidity 1990–1994: Evidence from Intra-day Transactions

This study uses data on intra-day transactions to analyze whether real estate investment (REIT) liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spread changed from 1990 to 1994, a period during which the industry's market capitalization increased from $8.7 billion to $45 billion. REIT percentage spreads (spread as percentage of share price) narrowed significantly, primarily attributable to higher share prices rather than narrower dollar-value spreads. An empirical model is used to analyze the determinants of percentage spreads. Return variance and share price, not market capitalization are found to be the primary determinants of percentage spreads in both periods. This suggests that the liquidity of REIT securities is similar to that of non-REIT securities with similar prices and return variance. In addition, percentage spreads are wider for REITs trading on the NASDAQ.     

考虑结构突变的大宗商品价格波动对中国经济的影响分析

本文从结构突变的视角，考察国际大宗商品价格波动对中国经济的影响规律。首先，运用内生多重结构突变的Bai-Perron检验，发现从1990～2015年的国际原油价格指数、工业投入品（包括金属和农产品）价格指数、中国工业增加值增长速度、消费物价指数等4个指标均存在结构突变现象。然后，利用退势处理方法去除这4个指标的结构突变影响，并运用结构向量自回归（SVAR）模型，建立了这4个指标之间的动态关系系统。脉冲响应分析表明，国际原油价格上升，短期内会减缓我国经济增长速度，但中期内反而会对经济有小幅刺激作用，同时会逐渐拉升我国物价水平；工业投入品价格上升也会减缓我国经济增长速度，但会先拉升后降低物价水平。本文通过考虑结构突变这一重要因素，能更精确地揭示国际大宗商品价格波动对中国经济的影响情况。     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

厂商市场份额的品牌经济模型及其现实解释

厂商的市场份额决定了其利润率,从而决定了厂商能否在残酷的竞争中生存、增长与发展。而在经济过剩的条件下,消费者的选择决定了厂商的市场份额,货币价格与品牌及品牌信用度决定的选择成本作为消费者选择和购买过程中的局限条件制约和影响着消费者的选择与购买。本文建立起引入品类需求强度系数、价格、选择成本的需求函数,并以此模型解释了厂商市场份额的决定是通过价格机制与品牌机制共同作用而实现的。在理论分析的基础上,对大量的现实进行了解释,在验证该模型的同时,对未来市场竞争及厂商市场份额做出了预测。同时,本文提出了提高厂商市场份额与定价权的＂品类需求强度—品牌信用度＂二维模型,并分别从开发具有较高品类需求强度的品类市场和提高品牌信用度的品牌建设方面给现实中的厂商提供了相应策略。     

Investment under Demand Uncertainty,Ex-Ante Pricing,and Oligopoly

This paper considers the capacity choice of duopolists who set price ex-ante under demand uncertainty with risk-neutrality. The duopolists compete for market shares on the basis of availability of supply, rather than by price competition. Collusive pricing coexists with Cournot–Nash capacity choice. A formal model is presented, where the market share of each firm may deviate from the certainty share due to rationing. With shares reflecting different costs, capacity utilisation for the lower cost firm is expected to be substantially lower. The implications for the price-cost margin and capacity formation are also explored.     

Modeling beef supply response and price volatility under CAP reforms: The case of Greece

This study examines the supply response of the Greek beef market and the possible effect of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the Greek beef sector during the period 1993–2005. A Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) process is used to estimate expected price, and price volatility, while several different symmetric, asymmetric and non-linear GARCH models are estimated. The empirical results show that price volatility and feed price are important risk factors in the supply response function, while the negative asymmetric price volatility that was detected implies that producers have a weak market position. Furthermore, the empirical findings confirm that the annual premium paid by the EU to beef producers had a positive impact on the production level and also, the change of the EU price support regime, after 2006, is having negative effects on beef production level in Greece.     

Quantifying price-driven wireless substitution in telephony

For the better part of a decade, a non-trivial and steadily increasing share of households in the United States has come to rely exclusively on wireless technology for their voice communications needs. Aggregate data show clearly (1) that the share of wireless-only households has risen steadily in recent years; while (2) the price of wireless service has fallen substantially relative to traditional landline service. The aggregate data are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that wireless/wireline cross-price elasticities are positive and economically significant. However, econometric corroboration of this conjecture has proven elusive in the existing empirical literature, which has relied on datasets compiled at the turn of the millennium, when wireless substitution was very limited. Partly in response to this dearth of econometric evidence, regulators and competition authorities in the US have generally been reluctant to conclude that wireless voice service represents a meaningful economic substitute for traditional wireline telephony. In the absence of reliable econometric estimates, even the sign of the relevant cross-price elasticities is an open question: The majority of US households maintain both a landline and at least one wireless connection, so it is unclear, ex ante, whether the two services are substitutes or complements. Thus, it is critical to identify consumer behavior at the margin. Using state-level panel data from a relatively recent time period (2001-2007), this study develops and estimates a demand system that permits evaluation of the own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities of demand for wireless and wireline telephony in the United States. A one percent decrease in the price of wireless service is estimated to decrease the demand for fixed-line service by approximately 1.2-1.3%, and the parameter estimates imply that the Slutsky symmetry holds for the demand system. These results substantially exceed prior econometric estimates from the existing empirical literature, and provide evidence that wireless voice service has evolved into a strong economic substitute for traditional landline service. The parameter estimates from the demand system suggest that roughly two thirds of observed landline attrition in the United States over the sample period is attributable to the observed decline in the relative price of wireless service.     

WIC Contract Spillover Effects

Under the U.S. Special Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, the three major infant formula manufacturers compete for WIC supply contracts, state by state. Policy makers have been puzzled by the question of why the contracted WIC price is substantially lower than the retail (non-WIC) price. Our explanation is that winning the WIC contract is extremely valuable to a manufacturer because of a spillover effect: The increased retail shelf-space that is dedicated to the WIC brand and the WIC logo increases non-WIC sales. We identify this effect by showing the variations in market shares of winning and losing firms that follow WIC contract changes. Immediately after the contract change, there is an immediate increase in the market share of the WIC contract winner and an equal drop in the loser’s share because of new WIC purchases. Then, over an extended period, the spillover effect increases the winner’s share and decreases the loser’s share as retailers shift shelf space from the loser to the winner.     

Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers, while manufacturers only learn it probabilistically. In contrast with the consolidated vertical contracting literature, we assume that manufacturers cannot use monetary incentives to align the retailers’ incentives to pass on their unverifiable distribution costs to consumers. Our objective is to study how, in this context, an information-sharing agreement according to which manufacturers share their demand information affects prices, profits and consumer surplus. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, regardless of whether manufacturers share information, partial delegation equilibria may exist with and without the exchange of information. These equilibria feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent retailers from passing on their distribution costs to consumers, and are more likely to occur when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they do not share this information. Manufacturers profit from exchanging demand information when products are sufficiently differentiated, and retailers’ distribution costs are high enough. Yet, expected prices are unambiguously lower when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they don’t, making the information exchange beneficial to consumers.     

Mobile-only consumers arise from heterogeneous valuation of fixed services

Mobile-only users are usually perceived as a consequence of fixed-mobile substitution. This study uses a unique dataset based on a survey in France, combined with interviewee's telecommunications billing data, to reveal heterogeneous consumer preferences for fixed services. With the same mixed logit model we estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for fixed communications services and fixed-mobile relationship. Results show a very large heterogeneity of WTP for fixed services among consumers. In addition, we show that fixed and mobile data are complement for all consumers. Mobile-only consumers have a much lower but non-zero WTP, and higher price sensitivity compared to fixed-mobile consumers. Consequently, an increase in the fixed offer price would reduce the demand for fixed service. Heterogeneous preferences for fixed services constitute an alternative explanation for the existence of mobile-only users, despite the complementary nature of fixed and mobile broadband. Counter-factual simulations show that the share of mobile-only could also be driven by the way to subsidize mobile handset. For instance, making the handset subsidy only available to fixed-mobile quadruple play subscribers could reduce the share of mobile-only by half.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

A Search Model Where Consumers Choose Quantity Based on Expected Price

I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not change if demand comes from a small share of perfectly informed consumers with zero search costs.     

The Impact of Accounting Earnings Disclosures on Stock Prices in Singapore

This paper reports the relationship between earnings and share prices. The results show that unexpected earnings changes are significantly associated with share price changes. However, the strength of the earnings effect is not as pronounced as those reported in the more analytically-intensive developed stock markets. The results are adjusted for risk differences by using a non-synchronous correction procedure to remove thin-trading bias.     

考虑价格因素的中国全要素生产率计算及其影响因素分析 ——基于Global Cost Malmquist和Tobit模型的实证研究

本文将价格因素引入模型中,基于Global Cost Malmquist指数模型估算全要素生产率,基于全要素生产率分解进一步分析我国的资源错配状况及其来源,并采用Tobit模型对全要素生产率尤其是价格效应的影响因素进行实证分析,研究结果表明:现阶段我国全要素生产率增长存在高估问题,技术进步对我国全要素生产率的正向促进作用日趋显著,由价格扭曲导致的资源错配是现阶段抑制我国全要素生产率进一步提高的主要因素,同时技术进步和价格扭曲加剧了地区全要素生产率差异;对外直接投资、出口贸易和金融发展提高了全要素生产率增长,改善了资源错配,而市场分割和工业占比则起到抑制作用;东部和西部地区的对外直接投资、中部地区的出口贸易以及西部地区的金融发展水平会显著改善地区价格扭曲程度。基于以上研究,提出加快资源配置市场化改革、培育开放的市场化动力、激发金融市场活力、优化产业结构等政策启示。     

The effect of coal combustion byproducts on price discrimination by upstream industries

Price discrimination is often difficult to disentangle from price dispersion due to a lack of transaction level data capable of tracking sales from individual companies to quantifiably heterogeneous groups of consumers. This paper uses mine-mouth prices and transportation prices paid by regulated coal-fired power plants in the U.S. coal market during the time period 2009–2010 to study how coal mines and transportation companies practice price discrimination against electricity plants. Power plants with heterogeneous demand for coal are perfectly identified based upon their ability to market flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) gypsum, which is a byproduct produced from scrubbing SO₂ emissions. Because sulfur is the raw material for FGD gypsum byproduct production, gypsum sellers are anticipated to have a more inelastic demand for high-sulfur coal. Results indicate that coal mines and transporters charge higher prices to gypsum sellers in comparison to non-sellers for transactions originating at the same mine during the same month of the same year. Coal-fired power plants capable of selling FGD gypsum byproducts are estimated to pay a 10.3–39.6 ¢/MMBtu price premium for coal. Coal mines and transportation companies each capture a relatively equal share of the associated rents.     

An Empirical Study of the Effect of Brand Proliferation on Private Label – National Brand Pricing Behavior

This paper investigates the competitive pricing interaction between national brand and private label food products, focusing on the effect of brand proliferation. IRI scanner data from 1991 and 1992 for 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets are used. Empirical findings are grouped into three categories: i) price, promotion and competitive effects, ii) brand proliferation and entry deterrence, and iii) local market effects. Results indicate that both private label and national brand reaction functions are positively sloped and asymmetric. Successful private label penetration, as measured by total private label share, lowers the average price of national brands. The paper's central finding is that the impact of brand proliferation on market pricing behavior is multi-dimensional. First, an increase in the number of brands increases the ability of national brand manufacturers to raise price. Second, the effectiveness of a brand proliferation strategy depends upon the distribution of market share. The more concentrated the brand structure, the lower the market price of national brands. Thus, the net effect of brand proliferation strategies is dependent upon not only the number of brands, but upon the actual distribution of brand shares. Finally, local market conditions play only a small role in the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands.