Rational and intuitive decision-making in sourcing teams: Effects on decision outcomes

According to dual process theory, individual decision-making can be based on rational procedures and experience-based intuition, and the decision-making approach can influence decision outcomes. We investigate how the application of rational procedures and experience-based intuition affects the outcomes of supplier selection decisions taken by cross-functional sourcing teams. Specifically, we examine whether the selected supplier׳s cost and quality/delivery/innovativeness performance is higher when more team members use a highly rational and/or a highly experience-based decision-making approach. From data on 54 teams, we find that the use of rational procedures enhances cost performance. Conversely, when sourcing team members use their experience-based intuition, the decision is more likely to result in satisfactory supplier performance along all tested performance dimensions.     

An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes*

abstract We examine how cognitive style, as measured by the MBTI, affects strategic decision outcomes. Executives participated in a simulated strategic decision making environment that allowed controlled collection of decision outcomes, including manager decisiveness, decision quality, and perceived effectiveness. We found that iNtuiting/Thinking managers used their intuition to make cognitive leaps based on objective information to craft more decisions of higher quality than other managers. In contrast, Sensing/Feeling types used time to seek socially acceptable decisions, which led to the lowest number of decisions and the lowest perceived effectiveness of all. We found no effect on decisiveness or perceived effectiveness based on a manager's preference for Perceiving or Judging. However, we found that others perceived Extraverted managers as being more effective than Introverted managers when, in fact, the Extraverts were no more decisive than Introverts. Thus, cognitive style influences actual decision outcomes as well as how others perceive one's decision performance.     

Promise and peril in implementing pay‐for‐performance

Why would managers abandon pay‐for‐performance plans they initiated with great hopes? Why would employees celebrate this decision? This article explores why managers made their decisions in 12 of 13 pay‐for‐performance “experiments” at Hewlett‐Packard in the mid‐1990s. We find that managers thought the costs of these programs to be higher than the benefits. Alternative managerial practices such as effective leadership, clear objectives, coaching, or training were thought a better investment. Despite the undisputed instrumentality of pay‐for‐performance to motivate, little attention has been given to whether the benefits outweigh the costs or the “fit” of these programs with high‐commitment cultures like Hewlett‐Packard was at the time. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The mediating role of speed in the global sourcing decision process

The principal aim of this study is to provide theory and testing to elucidate the role of decision-maker's decision process and speed during the global sourcing decision-making process (GSDP). In order to achieve this goal, we examine the behavior of a sample of 202 decision-makers belonging to Italian SMEs in the manufacturing sector. Our main finding suggests that faster decisions during the GSDP process lead to superior financial and non-financial performance of the selected supplier. Moreover, we find support for dual processing theory wherein rationality and intuition of the GSDP are associated with increased supplier performance both directly and through their effects on decision speed. Results are discussed in terms of the GSDP, SME and strategic decision-making literatures and practical implications for managers in SMEs.     

Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model

Risk‐neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk‐neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal‐agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived.     

Temporary workers as real options

Firms experiencing or anticipating substantial workforce expansion face increasing pressure to accurately project the costs associated with human asset investments and potential future layoff requirements. With that in mind, the decision whether to take on temporary workers in lieu of hiring permanent employees is a decision that involves significant risk. Traditional valuation methods assume that investments are fully reversible and thus do not capture the idiosyncrasies of workforce management, in which investments are not fully reversible. However, real options theory offers managers the ability to consider irreversibility and to make workforce investment decisions under conditions of minimum uncertainty and maximum flexibility. We present real options theory as an especially useful means for managers to more accurately value human asset investment decisions, achieve expansion and defer commitment until future uncertainties can be at least partially resolved.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Joint decision of procurement lot-size,supplier selection,and carrier selection

The joint decision making of procurement lot-size, supplier selection, and carrier selection has potential to reduce buyer's purchasing expenditures. Furthermore, the total logistics cost can also come down through economies of scale in the purchasing and transportation costs, and reduction in supply chain disruptions such as rejections and late deliveries. We study a procurement setting in which a buyer needs to purchase a single product from a set of suppliers over finite discrete time periods to satisfy service level requirements. The suppliers offer all-unit quantity discounts, and transportation cost depends on carrier capacity as well as geographical location of suppliers. This paper proposes an integer linear programming model to simultaneously determine the timings of procurement, lot-sizes, suppliers and carriers to be chosen so as to incur the least total cost over the planning horizon. A numerical example is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model in establishing tradeoffs among purchasing cost, transaction cost, and inventory holding cost. Sensitivity analysis has been carried out to understand the effects of the model parameters on the purchasing decisions and total cost. Managerial insights of this study serve as a reference for decision makers to develop effective procurement strategies.     

Selecting the Good vs. Rejecting the Bad: Regulatory Focus Effects on Staffing Decision Making

Although staffing decisions are typically conceptualized as motivated by the desire to select the best employees, many managers and human resources practitioners may be more concerned with avoiding bad hires. Regulatory focus theory provides a rich and well‐developed framework for understanding how prevention and promotion orientations shape judgments and decisions. This work is the first to examine this theory's implications for understanding staffing, and it illustrates how these fundamental underlying motivations alter the salience of costs and benefits associated with staffing practices, as well as subjective judgments about individual applicants. Regulatory focus is a function of situational factors as well as individual differences, and predominant motivational orientations also vary with business cycles. This model therefore offers broad cross‐level explanatory power for understanding dynamic factors influencing staffing, as well as a novel perspective on ways to improve the quality of staffing decision making. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Delegation in Multi‐Establishment Firms: Evidence from I.T. Purchasing

Recent contributions to a growing theory literature have focused on the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination in determining delegation within firms. Empirical evidence, however, is limited. Using establishment‐level data on decision rights over information technology investments, I find that a high net value of adaptation is strongly associated with delegation, as are local information advantages and firm‐wide diversification; in contrast, a high net value of within‐firm coordination is correlated with centralization. Variation across establishments within firms is widespread: most firms are neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized. Delegation patterns are largely consistent with standard team‐theory predictions; however, certain findings, such as a negative correlation between delegation and firm size, call for a consideration of agency costs as well.     

Autonomy and teamwork in innovative projects

The use of teams that incorporate autonomy in their designs continues to be an important element of many organizations. However, prior research has emphasized projects with mostly routine tasks and has assumed that autonomy resides primarily with a team leader. We investigate how two aspects of team autonomy are related to teamwork quality, a multifaceted indicator of team collaboration (Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001). Specifically, we hypothesize that team‐external influence over operational project decisions is negatively related to teamwork quality, while team‐internal equality of influence over project decisions is positively related to teamwork quality. Testing our hypotheses on responses from 430 team members and team leaders pertaining to 145 software development teams, results support both predictions. Acknowledging the possible benefits of certain types of external influence (e.g., constructive feedback), the findings demonstrate that team‐external managers of innovative projects should generally refrain from interfering in team‐internal operational decisions. Likewise, the study shows that all team members should share decision authority, recognizing that their contributions to team discussion and decision making may well differ given differences in experience and expertise. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Transport tax reform, commuting, and endogenous values of time

We consider a model of urban transport with two trip purposes, commuting (assumed perfectly complementary to labour supply) and noncommuting, to analyse the effects of transport tax reform on the value of time and marginal external congestion costs. Higher commuting taxes plausibly reduce time values, but higher noncommuting transport prices will typically raise the value of time. The intuition for this latter finding is that the reduction in congestion that follows from the tax increase itself raises net wages per hour of work (inclusive of commuting time). Empirical illustrations with Belgian data show a potentially large effect of transport tax reform on time values. In quite a few of the tax reforms studied traffic levels are reduced, but the increase in time values implies that marginal external congestion costs actually increase.     

Application of fuzzy mathematical programming to imprecise project management decisions

In real-world project management (PM) decisions, the input data and environmental coefficients are generally imprecise/fuzzy because of incompleteness and unavailability of relevant information over the project planning horizon. This work aims to present a fuzzy mathematical programming approach to solve imprecise PM decision problems with fuzzy goal and fuzzy cost coefficients. The designed PM decision model attempts to minimize total project costs with reference to direct costs, indirect costs, contractual penalty costs, duration of activities and the constraint of available budget. The proposed approach achieves greater computational efficiency by employing the simplified triangular fuzzy number to represent imprecise goal and cost coefficients, and provides a systematic framework that facilitates the decision-making process, enabling a decision maker to interactively modify the imprecise data and related parameters until a satisfactory solution is obtained. An industrial case is implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of applying the proposed approach to practical PM problems. The computational methodology developed in this work can easily be extended to any other situations and can handle the realistic PM decisions in fuzzy environments.     

The Visible Hands of Hierarchy within the M‐Form: An Empirical Test of Corporate Parenting of Internal Product Exchanges*

ABSTRACT In this paper, we dismiss the traditional contingency argument that corporate staff should have minimal involvement with the decisions that its divisions make, because predictability, which underlies this contingency logic, is erroneous for most large corporations at this time. We offer an alternative theory of corporate involvement for the M‐form: under unpredictable environments greater interdependence of corporate staff with divisional operating decisions may be necessary to create value for the corporation. Since corporate staff cannot be involved in all divisional affairs, we empirically explore when corporate involvement is most likely. Building on transaction cost economics and the strategy literature, we reason that corporate staff may selectively involve itself in business level strategy and operating decisions when product characteristics signal threats to effective inter‐divisional coordination as well as opportunities for value creation. To explore this topic, we surveyed corporate managers of Fortune 500 companies. The results suggest some initial support for our theoretical argument: corporate staff is more likely to involve itself in business‐level decisions for uncertain products. We further find that when corporate staff is responsible for the capital investments used for the divisional venture, it is more likely to guide and influence product strategy decisions and inter‐divisional conflicts. We do not find, however, consistent evidence that specialized assets or brand‐name reputation trigger corporate involvement. Implications and limitations are further discussed.     

Developing Theories of Strategy Using Dominance Criteria

This article identifies key features of the strategy concept as a basis for reviewing existing theories of strategy. It also provides an agenda for future research. the article argues that there is a decision hierarchy in a firm, and defines strategy as the highest-level decision in the hierarchy. Consequently, strategy has to exhibit what may be called three features of dominance: vertical dominance, horizontal dominance, and dynamic dominance. A vertically dominant strategy is one that determines, directly or indirectly, other decisions of a firm. A horizontally dominant strategy seeks to optimize the value of the firm according to some criteria. Dynamic dominance implies that strategy should affect the subsequent decisions of a firm over a relevant period of time. With few exceptions, existing theories of strategy are issue-oriented and focus largely on horizontal dominance. More research should, therefore, be directed towards vertical and dynamic dominance criteria. If a comprehensive theory of strategy which satisfies the three dominance features cannot be developed, it is suggested that development should be directed towards integrating behavioural and economic approaches.     

The importance of client heterogeneity in predicting make-or-buy decisions

Scholars have begun to merge the transaction cost economics and capabilities perspectives to examine outsourcing decisions. Further integrating these perspectives with intermediation theory, we assert that a firm's decision to use an intermediary when entering a foreign market is largely a function of the intermediary's relative capabilities and relative transaction costs (i.e., relative advantage). We hypothesize that the intermediary's relative advantage is influenced by three significantly intertwined exchange conditions: client heterogeneity, intermediary risk, and firm learning. Using a sample of 929 new foreign market initiatives by a global consulting firm, our results support our theory.     

An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing

In this paper, we experimentally investigate a social learning model with endogenous timing. Specifically, we focus on a model, in which two subjects are supposed to make a binary decision. One alternative is a safe action with a fixed payoff, while the other alternative is a risky action. The subjects can make their decisions in three stages. The safe action is reversible, but the risky action is not. A subject who delays his decision can observe the decision of the other subject in the earlier stages, and as a result, acquire more information. We show that players do delay their decisions in order to obtain more information. Furthermore, they delay especially when their private information does not particularly support the risky action. We also find evidence which suggests that risk aversion plays an important role in timing decisions, often leading to ex post inefficient outcomes.     

An Empirical Exploration of Decision-making Under Agency Controls and Stewardship Structure

abstract Two theories have emerged in the managerial control literature as to the best way for organizations to ensure that managers are acting in the firm's best interest: agency theory, which stresses controlling decision‐makers through monitoring and incentives aligned with organizational goals, and stewardship theory, which stresses that decision‐makers will act in the organization's best interest even in the absence of controls. Much of the research investigating the utility of these two positions is based on archival data where actual decision‐making can only be inferred. In this study, we utilize a laboratory methodology in order to determine if decision‐makers actually make different decisions when under the types of control (or lack thereof) suggested in these two theories. The results of this study show that individuals under agency controls invest more in alternatives that maximize profits of an organization than individuals under stewardship controls.