The effects of analyst forecasts and earnings trends on perceptions of management forecast credibility

We examine whether analyst forecasts influence investors’ perceptions of the credibility of a good news management earnings forecast. We hypothesize that the effect of analyst forecasts will depend on whether the analyst forecast confirms management’s forecast and the extent to which management’s forecast is consistent with the prior earnings trend. Findings indicate that the positive effect of a confirming analyst forecast is greater when the management forecast is trend inconsistent than when it is trend consistent. The negative effect of a disconfirming analyst forecast does not differ based on management forecast trend consistency.     

The Credibility of Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses and Underpricing

This paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses and of the credibility of these forecasts, as perceived by investors at the time of the IPO. We measure forecast credibility ex ante with two approaches: (i) a vector of determinants of credibility that are observable by market participants at the time of the issue and (ii) the predicted value of the forecast error based on some of these determinants. Controlling for the firm's decision on whether or not to issue a forecast, we find that the issue of a forecast reduces underpricing. We find that the quality of the firm's governance and of the auditor and underwriter associated with the issue seems to act as a substitute to the disclosure of an earnings forecast in the prospectus, so that they significantly decrease the level of underpricing only for non‐forecasters. However, despite our various approaches to measure ex ante credibility, we find no association between the pricing of the issue and perceived forecast credibility at the time of the IPO.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Management forecast credibility and underreaction to news

In this paper, we first document evidence of underreaction to management forecast news. We then hypothesize that the credibility of the forecast influences the magnitude of this underreaction. Relying on evidence that more credible forecasts are associated with a larger reaction in the short window around the management forecasts and a smaller post-management forecast drift in returns, we show that the magnitude of the underreaction is smaller for firms that provide more credible forecasts. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing out-of-sample evidence of the drift in returns documented in the post-earnings-announcement drift literature, with the credibility of the news being one explanation for the phenomenon.     

How do the content,format, and tone of Twitter-based corporate disclosure vary depending on earnings performance?

Using 86,891 tweets, from the official corporate Twitter accounts of 715 unique firms, this study examines whether and how managers strategically attract and distract investors’ attention from corporate news through Twitter. We find that firms with good earnings news use Twitter to post more earnings-related information directly, whereas firms with bad earnings news post more non-earnings-related information on Twitter. We further find that depending on earnings performance firms strategically choose the format of tweets (qualitative or quantitative) and the tone of earnings tweets (positive or negative) to attract investors’ attention to good news or distract investors’ attention from bad news. Our results are robust to difference-in-differences (DID), alternative sample periods, and different variable specifications. Our findings provide empirical evidence for investors and regulators regarding current practices in corporate information on Twitter.     

An Empirical Analysis of Qualitative Management Earnings Forecasts

Despite efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encourage corporate disclosure of quantitative management earnings projections, only a small fraction of firms voluntarily do so. Instead of quantitative estimates, a large number of firms choose to disclose qualitative (verbal) assessments of their earnings prospects. This paper is a study of the information characteristics and the usefulness of this alternative form of forecast disclosure to investors. The study examines a sample of qualitative forecast statements from the 1979–1985 period and finds associations between these forecasts and percentage changes in realized earnings per share, the direction of financial analysts' forecast revisions following the disclosure of these forecasts, and abnormal stock returns on the date of their disclosure. These associations are, however, shown to be more significant for negative (bad news) than for positive (good news) forecasts.     

Macro information environment change and the quality of management earnings forecasts

The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’ tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.

Underreaction to Industry‐Wide Earnings and the Post‐Forecast Revision Drift

We test whether the post‐forecast revision drift is mainly attributable to investors’ underreaction to industry‐wide earnings news conveyed by analysts’ forecast revisions. We find a large drift associated with industry‐wide earnings news but no drift associated with firm‐specific earnings news. Consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, we provide evidence that the post‐forecast revision drift is driven by investors’ underreaction to the higher persistence of industry‐wide earnings. Although prior research has focused on differential persistence of earnings components stemming from managerial reporting discretion, we provide evidence suggesting that investors do not fully understand the differential earnings persistence attributable to industry fundamentals.     

Range has it: decoding the information content of forecast ranges

Range forecasts have emerged as the predominant form of management forecasts, but prior research has overlooked the information conveyed by forecast ranges. This study fills this void by examining the information content of the extent to which managers’ forecast ranges overlap with the range of individual analysts’ pre-existing estimates (i.e., overlap). We expect managers to signal their superior private information by issuing low-overlap forecasts. We predict and find that, compared with high-overlap forecasts, low-overlap forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions and higher accuracy of management forecasts relative to analyst estimates. Moreover, when responding to low-overlap management forecasts, analysts with prior estimates out of management forecast ranges are more likely to revise into the management forecast range, less likely to revise toward the consensus, and more likely to improve in revised forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that investors and analysts view low-overlap management forecasts as signals of superior private information.     

The best of all possible worlds: unraveling target price optimism using analysts’ scenario-based valuations

We document that the relative placement of analysts’ target price within their subjective distribution of scenario-based valuations for the covered firm (i.e., tilt) is informative to investors. When analysts forecast price appreciation, tilt incrementally predicts ex post valuation errors and realized returns; the predictive value of tilt disappears when analysts forecast price declines. In additional analyses, we find that tilt appears to reflect an optimistic bias in target price forecasts as opposed to information about asymmetric state-contingent risk payoffs. Finally, we document that investors can use estimates of implied tilt based on observable firm characteristics to distinguish between investments with equally optimistic target price forecasts, yet lacking scenario-based information.     

Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.     

Investor and Analyst Reactions to Earnings Announcements of Related Firms: An Empirical Analysis

In this article I examine the response of investors and analysts of nonannouncing firms to the earnings report of the first announcers in the industry. The error in the earnings forecast of the first announcer is found to be informative about the errors in the contemporaneous earnings forecasts of subsequent announcers in the industry. However, investors and analysts do not appear to fully incorporate the information from the first announcers' news in their revised earnings expectations for subsequent announcers. This apparent underreaction to the first announcers' news leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the days following the first announcement. Results of this study can be seen as further evidence of investor and analyst underreaction to publicly available information.     

How Disaggregation Enhances the Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts

An important problem facing managers is how to enhance the credibility, or believability, of their earnings forecasts. In this paper, we experimentally test whether a characteristic of a management earnings forecast—namely, whether it is disaggregated—can affect its credibility. We also test whether disaggregation moderates the relation between managerial incentives and forecast credibility. Disaggregated forecasts include an earnings forecast as well as forecasts of other key line items comprising that earnings forecast. Our results indicate that disaggregated forecasts are judged to be more credible than aggregated ones and that disaggregation works to counteract the effect of high incentives. We also develop and test an original model that explains how disaggregation positively impacts three factors that, in turn, influence forecast credibility: perceived precision of management's beliefs, perceived clarity of the forecast, and perceived financial reporting quality. We show that forecast disaggregation works to remedy incentive problems only via its effect on perceived financial reporting quality. Overall, our study adds to our understanding of how managers can credibly communicate their expectations about the future to market participants.     

Capital market consequences of managers' voluntary disclosure styles

This paper studies the capital market consequences of managers establishing an individual forecasting style. Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset, I examine whether and when manager-specific credibility matters. If managers' forecasting styles affect their perceived credibility, then the stock price reaction to forecast news should increase with managers' prior forecasting accuracy. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the stock price reaction to management forecast news is stronger when information uncertainty is high and when the manager has a history of issuing more accurate forecasts, indicating that individual managers benefit from establishing a personal disclosure reputation.     

Voluntary Causal Disclosures: Tendencies and Capital Market Reaction

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on whether voluntarily disclosed causal attributions made in management earnings forecasts are credible by investigating the conditions under which such attributions are made and the extent to which security price responses are associated with attribution existence. We find that causal attributions are more likely to be made when forecast news is bad (relative to good), and that the type of attribution made is more likely to be external (internal) for bad (good) forecast news. Incorporating the existence and type of attribution into models that explain announcement period three-day cumulative abnormal returns yields significant effects for attribution incidence and type after controlling for unexpected earnings and forecast type (e.g., point, range, etc.). Consistent with the idea that attributions enhance the credibility or precision of management forecasts, attribution disclosure enhances price reactions per dollar of unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast.     

Determinants of analysts’ revenue forecast accuracy

This study investigates financial analysts’ revenue forecasts and identifies determinants of the forecasts’ accuracy. We find that revenue forecast accuracy is determined by forecast and analyst characteristics similar to those of earnings forecast accuracy—namely, forecast horizon, days elapsed since the last forecast, analysts’ forecasting experience, forecast frequency, forecast portfolio, reputation, earnings forecast issuance, forecast boldness, and analysts’ prior performance in forecasting revenues and earnings. We develop a model that predicts the usefulness of revenue forecasts. Thereby, our study helps to ex ante identify more accurate revenue forecasts. Furthermore, we find that analysts concern themselves with their revenue forecasting performance. Analysts with poor revenue forecasting performance are more likely to stop forecasting revenues than analysts with better performance. Their decision is reasonable because revenue forecast accuracy affects analysts’ career prospects in terms of being promoted or terminated. Our study helps investors and academic researchers to understand determinants of revenue forecasts. This understanding is also beneficial for evaluating earnings forecasts because revenue forecasts reveal whether changes in earnings forecasts are due to anticipated changes in revenues or expenses.     

The debt market relevance of management earnings forecasts: evidence from before and during the credit crisis

We investigate the credit market’s response via changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads to management earnings forecasts and evaluate the importance of these forecasts relative to earnings news during the periods before and during the recent credit crisis. We document that credit markets react significantly to management forecast news and that the reactions to forecast news are stronger than to actual earnings news. Consistent with the asymmetric payoffs to debt holders, the forecast news is mainly relevant for firms with poor credit rating or announcing bad news. We also show that the relevance of management forecasts to credit markets is particularly strong during periods of high uncertainty, as experienced during the recent credit crisis.     

基于佣金收入动机的机构投资者盈利预测偏离与股票交易量研究

本文基于信息反应模型研究了机构投资者盈利预测偏离与普通投资者交易需求之间的激励关系,并选取2006至2010年的相关盈利预测和股票交易数据进行实证分析。结果表明,机构投资者的盈利预测存在显著偏离前期市场平均预测值的倾向,而且这种偏离倾向会进一步诱发股票交易增量,从而增加机构投资者的佣金收入。这意味着普通投资者在参考机构投资者的盈利预测报告时,需要考虑其基于刺激交易量的自利因素。     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: international evidence

We examine international differences in the effect of management forecasts (which we use to proxy for voluntary disclosure) on the cost of equity capital (COC) across 31 countries. We find that the issuance of management forecasts is associated with a lower COC worldwide but that the effect of management forecasts on the COC depends on country-level institutional factors. Specifically, management forecasts have a stronger effect on the COC in countries with stronger investor protection and better information dissemination and a weaker effect in countries with higher mandatory disclosure requirements. Further analyses reveal that these relations are more pronounced when management forecasts are more frequent, more precise, and more disaggregated. Overall, our findings suggest that the ability of management forecasts to reduce firms’ COC derives not only from country-level factors that enhance the credibility of their forecasts but also from factors that reflect the quality of the information environment in terms of the distribution of news and the availability and quality of alternative information. Thus, investor protection, media penetration, and mandatory disclosure requirements have an important effect on the ability of management forecasts to lower the COC.