Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects for Real Estate Investment Trusts

Previous research on real estate investment trusts (REITs) assumes that their dividend policies are determined solely by tax regulations. We observe, however, that REITs often pay out more dividends than are required by tax rules. This paper examines the dividend policies of REITs by drawing inferences from agency-cost theory and tests for the determinants of REIT dividend payout ratios. The study also considers whether the stock market responds differently to the dividend announcement effects of equity and mortgage REITs based on asymmetric information. Our results support agency-cost explanations for dividend policy and suggest a differential announcement effect.     

Dividend Pricing Models and REITs

Dividend pricing/present value models relate current stock prices to expectations of future dividends. In this study we apply the West and Campbell–Shiller tests of the dividend pricing relation to an index of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs provide a unique test of these models since, during our study period, REITs were mandated to pay out at least 95% of taxable income as dividends. While our results complement previous research which finds that the dividend pricing model cannot be rejected if share repurchase is included as part of dividends, our data contain a much less significant amount of share repurchase, so that our approach to the issue of the viability of dividend pricing models offers an alternative insight. Our research suggests that, for our REIT population, dividend pricing models cannot be rejected.     

Elective Stock Dividends and REITs: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

In response to the recent financial crisis, the U.S. Government introduced new rules which allow Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to issue elective stock dividends (ESDs), i.e., noncash dividends, to satisfy their distribution requirements. The purported goal of these rules was to provide temporary relief to REITs facing cash flow problems. We investigate how the introduction of these rules affects dividend policy of REITs. Surprisingly, we document that only 17 REITs chose to issue elective stock dividends. We examine the characteristics of these REITs and find that their cash flows are similar to REITs that do not select these dividends. This suggests that cash flow problems are unlikely to be the primary determinant of the ESD issuance decision. Instead, our findings indicate the decision to pay ESDs is related to the level of loans that are close to maturity, REIT size, growth prospects and poor performance during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that the same factors determine the ratio, amount and frequency of stock dividends issued by these REITs. We also examine the response of shareholders to ESDs announcements and find positive abnormal returns surrounding these dividend announcements.     

The Impact of Dividend Reinvestment Plans on Firm Payout Choices—Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study investigates whether firm dividend payout choices are influenced by the presence of a Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP). Given that DRIPs help retain capital, we show that dividend‐paying firms with a DRIP will tend to pay a high dividend and maintain a stable payout policy. Using a multinomial logistic model, we show that in comparison to REITs without DRIPs, REITs with DRIPs have a higher payout ratio and are less likely to: (1) pay regular dividends with extra dividends and share repurchases, (2) distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, yet omit regular dividends and (3) omit all payouts. In addition, we find that REITs with a capital‐retaining DRIP invest more aggressively and such increased investment activities are undertaken without raising the reliance on external financing.     

An Examination of REIT Dividend Payout Policy

This paper proposes a new methodology for decomposing real estate investment trust (REIT) dividends into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. By examining the tax characteristics of dividends, I am able to accurately measure the discretionary component of a REIT's dividend. This methodology provides new insights into our understanding of REIT dividend payout policy. Unlike previous studies that find limited explanations for discretionary dividend payouts, I find a systematic explanation. Discretionary dividends tend to be large on average making up between 18% and 35% of a REIT's total dividend and display considerable variation through time and across firms. The main determinant of these discretionary dividends appears to be dividend smoothing. There is an inverse relationship between discretionary and nondiscretionary dividends. Even if a REIT has excess cash flow it could distribute in discretionary dividends, it will tend not to do so if it has a high dividend payout due to its nondiscretionary dividends. In this sense, REITs appear to use discretionary dividends to smooth their payout ratios.     

Dividend Policy and Cash-Flow Uncertainty

We explore the role of expected cash-flow volatility as a determinant of dividend policy both theoretically and empirically. Our simple one-period model demonstrates that, given the existence of a stock-price penalty associated with dividend cuts, managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when future cash flows are less certain. The empirical results use a sample of REITs from 1985 to 1992 and confirm that payout ratios are lower for firms with higher expected cash-flow volatility as measured by leverage, size and property-level diversification. These results are consistent with information-based explanations of dividend policy but not with agency-cost theories.     

REIT Dividend Determinants: Excess Dividends and Capital Markets

The determinants of excess dividend payments above mandatory requirements in real estate investment trusts (REITs) are evaluated. Payment of excess dividends is related to factors associated with reduced agency costs, strong operating performance, the implementation of a stock repurchase plan and an ability to access short-term bank debt. Recognizing that access to external capital is essential for long-term growth, REITs manage dividend policy to allow for capital acquisition in the form of both equity and debt. The acquisition and use of short-term bank debt provides REIT management flexibility in determining dividend policy.     

The Ex–Dividend Pricing of REITs

Past studies have shown that ex–dividend stock prices are not fully reflective of dividend payments. A tax–induced clientele effect and micromarket limitations in stock pricing have been used to explain this pricing anomaly. This study focuses on the ex–dividend behavior of real estate investment trusts (REITs). Due to a low correlation between dividend size and dividend yield, REITs permit a cleaner examination of a tax–induced clientele effect. The results indicate that tick constraints in pricing ex–dividend stocks create the appearance of a tax–induced clientele effect in REITs when none should exist.     

Takeover Risk and Dividend Strategy: A Study of UK Firms

We investigate the relationship between a company’s dividend strategy and its risk of takeover. Our results from a large panel of UK quoted companies suggest that higher dividend payments are associated with a significantly lower conditional probability (hazard) of takeover. Moreover, firms which wish to avoid takeover would be better to distribute the marginal £1 of earnings in dividends rather than investing it in the company. We consider two explanations for these findings. We suggest that the presence of an active market for corporate control could encourage firms to raise dividends to maintain shareholder loyalty.     

Financial Flexibility and Investment: Evidence from REIT At‐the‐Market (ATM) Equity Offerings

This article examines changes in real estate investment around the establishment of at‐the‐market (ATM) equity programs by equity REITs. We document a significant increase in the rate of investment following an ATM program announcement and its subsequent use. However, we find that ATM access has a differential impact on the investment activity of REITs facing more significant financial constraints. We also provide further evidence that REITs with ATM programs generate positive long‐run returns in excess of that of similarly timed SEOs.     

Do newly public acquirers benefit or suffer from their pre‐IPO affiliations with underwriters and VCs?

We examine whether pre‐IPO affiliations affect post‐IPO corporate events, namely acquisitions. On the one hand, newly public acquirers may benefit from their pre‐IPO affiliations through residual signaling value or/and resource‐related benefits. On the other hand, newly public acquirers may suffer from those affiliations when conflicts of interests arise during the post‐IPO period. Equity underwriters may have incentive to promote non–value‐creating acquisitions (Type II error), and venture capitalists (VCs) may have incentive to forgo strategically important acquisitions (Type I error). Drawing on a sample of 4,029 acquisitions made by 717 newly public firms, we find that on average the announcement of an acquisition by a newly public acquirer elicits a positive response from investors. The market views more favorably the acquisitions announced by newly public acquirers associated with prestigious equity underwriters, but this reaction becomes negative when the lead underwriter is retained as the acquisition advisor. The market reacts more favorably to acquisitions announced by VC‐backed newly public acquirers, but only when those VCs are committed to a longer lockup period. The effects of pre‐IPO affiliations on expected returns are stronger for newly public acquirers with a high intangible resource base and persist throughout the three‐year post‐IPO period (across each subsequent acquisition announcement). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

REIT Stock Price Volatility and the Effects of Leverage

This article sheds light on several puzzling empirical observations. We examine the volatility implications of equity Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) stock returns over the sample period from January 1985 through October 2012. We find a negative “leverage effect” in the pre‐ and post‐Greenspan era, but not during the Greenspan era (circa 1994–2006). We argue that the positive elasticity of variance with respect to the value of equity during the Greenspan era can be explained by a decline in the spread between the yield on commercial mortgages and 10‐year Treasuries, which triggered a wealth transfer from REIT equity holders to REIT debt holders. We also argue that the declining commercial‐mortgage‐10‐year‐Treasury yield spread during the Greenspan era allowed REITs to take on far more risk than most people realized. We then document that average REIT stock return volatility increased significantly in the 2007–2010 period in the midst of a historic decline in REIT stock prices. The results have significant implications for the good deal of interest and debate in the media over the status of REITs and whether equity REITs have become excessively risky relative to the returns they generate.     

REIT and Commercial Real Estate Returns: A Postmortem of the Financial Crisis

In the years surrounding the financial crisis, the share prices of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were much more volatile than the underlying commercial real estate prices. To better understand this phenomenon we examine the cross‐sectional dispersion of REIT returns during this time period with a particular focus on the influence of their capital structures. By looking at both the debt ratio and the maturity structure of the debt, we separate the pure leverage effect from the effect of financial distress. Consistent with leverage and financial distress costs amplifying the price decline, we find that the share prices of REITs with higher debt‐to‐asset ratios and shorter maturity debt fell more during the 2007 to early‐2009 crisis period. Although REIT prices rebounded with the bounce back in commercial real estate prices, financial distress costs had a permanent effect on REIT values. In particular, we find that REITs with more debt due during the crisis period tended to sell more property and issue more equity in 2009, when prices were depressed.     

股权分置改革后上市公司股利政策研究

2006年我国股权分置改革基本完成，这种制度变革是否对上市公司2006年的股利政策产生了影响。通过对2006年上市公司股利政策进行统计分析，结果显示2006年上市公司的股利政策具有股利分配形式以现金股利为主、整体分红水平提高不多、异常派现行为减少等特征。在对这些特征进行分析的基础上，提出了应加强现金流量管理和大力发展机构投资者。     

基于企业生命周期理论的现金股利分配实证研究

本文在回顾西方股利政策理论的基础上,基于生命周期理论对股利政策的影响因素进行实证分析。我们以留存收益资产比作为企业生命周期的代理变量,选取沪市528家A股上市公司作为样本,采用2000—2008年间的数据,运用Logit模型、Tobit模型分别考察留存收益资产比和一些控制变量对上市公司是否支付现金股利、股利支付率的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司是否支付现金股利呈现生命周期特征,而现金股利支付率则不具有生命周期特征;在选取的控制变量中,增长率变量与股利发放显著负相关,从增长率这一角度看,暗合生命周期特征,资产收益率和公司规模变量与股利发放显著正相关。根据研究结论,本文建议证监会分行业制定公司的现金股利分配政策。     

Evidence of imputation clienteles in the Australian equity market

This paper investigates the development of shareholder clienteles in response to the introduction of the Dividend Imputation (Integrated Tax System) into the Australian capital market. It is found that companies paying franked dividends have significantly increased dividend payments relative to companies paying little or no imputation tax credit. It is also shown that the use of dividend reinvestment plans has increased significantly post-imputation. This is interpreted as support for the existence of shareholder clienteles related to companies' imputation policies.The author is Lecturer in the Department of Commerce, the University of Queensland. This paper has benefited from financial assistance provided by the Department of Commerce at the University of Queensland. Comments made by Jamal Munshi and participants at the Third International Conference on Asian-Pacific Financial Markets are gratefully acknowledged.     

They Would If They Could: Assessing the Bindingness of the Property Holding Constraints for REITs

This study examines the bindingness of the property holding constraints which Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) face on their portfolios (the dealer rule), and illustrates how these constraints hinder REITs from exploiting opportunities to time the property market. I first simulate a set of filter‐based market timing strategies, which outperform a buy‐and‐hold strategy out of sample, and show that imposing a four‐year (or even the newer two‐year) holding constraint significantly reduces the excess returns the strategies generate. I then analyze actual holding periods of properties in REIT portfolios and find that there seems to exist a large degree of demand for short property holding periods and that the trades generated by the filter strategy generally resemble actual REIT trading activity, validating the relevance of the simulation results. A direct test for the constraint reveals that REITs' propensity to hold a property beyond the minimum period increases, the higher the profit from the transaction, consistent with the asymmetric nature in which the rule is enforced. By contrast, this effect is insignificant for Umbrella‐Partnership REITs (UPREITs), which are not as affected by the constraint. I further show that UPREITs overall achieve significantly better ex‐post market timing performance than non‐UPREITs. I thus find that overall REITs are limited by the dealer rule.     

REIT Auditor Fees and Financial Market Transparency

This article examines the relationship between overinvestment in audit services, abnormal nonaudit fees paid to the auditor and market-based measures of firm transparency. Because real estate investment trusts (REITs) must distribute 90% of their earnings as dividends, many are repeat participants in the seasoned equity market. Thus, REITs have unusually strong incentives to strive for security market transparency. We find that the capital markets reward REITs that overinvest in audit services with better liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads. However, firms with abnormally high nonaudit expenditures appear to be penalized with wider spreads, consistent with the notion that such fees may compromise auditor independence.     

Can Bank Lines of Credit Protect REITs against a Credit Crisis?

In a tight credit market, the primary concern of most real estate investment trusts (REITs) is the ability to access capital and maintain adequate liquidity. Bank lines of credit or loan commitments, which are legally binding contracts arranged to provide debt at the call of the borrowers under prespecified terms, have been theorized to provide insurance protection against a credit crisis. This article examines whether bank lines of credit can indeed provide some insurance for REITs and allow them to access credit during bad times. Covering three credit crunch events, both the origination and utilization patterns of commitment loans by 275 REITs publicly traded between 1992 and 2007 are analyzed. We find that bank lines of credit insulated REITs from credit rationing at both the broad market level as well as at the firm level. However, the insurance value is qualified in the case of smaller and risky firms which may not get to extend their credit limit or draw down on their existing credit lines in a credit crisis.     

关于股票分割原因的研究综述

上市公司在派发股利时,既可以派发现金股利,也可以派发股票股利,也有的公司进行股票分割。随着我国证券市场的不断发展和完善,上市公司为了各种不同的目的而运用股票分割日益增多。上市公司为什么要进行股票分割呢?本文的目的是对上市公司股票分割原因作一述评,了解这些内容对上市公司股利分配政策的研究是有利的。