Accounting measures of unfunded pension liabilities and the expected present value of future pension cash flows

The associations between three alternative measures of the unfunded pension obligation discussed in the accounting literature and a measure that reflects the present value of expected cash flows (economic liability) are examined in this study using simulated data. The sensitivity of the correlations to funding methods, growth rates of the plan population, interest rates, plan initiation dates, and extent of sweetening are also studied. It is shown that all the accounting measures of the pension obligation are highly correlated with the total economic liability when funding is excluded, but the correlations decrease significantly when the net (unfunded) liability is examined. Furthermore, it is shown analytically that one cannot predict ex ante which measure of the unfunded liability will be most highly correlated with the economic liability. The implication for accounting standard-setting bodies is that both the pension plan assets and pension obligations should be disclosed to facilitate users in making predictions about changes in the economic liability. A recent official pronouncement, SFAS 87, provides for such disclosure in most circumstances.     

Pension Funding,Share Prices,and National Savings

This paper examines empirically the effect of unfunded pension obligations on corporate share prices and discusses the implications of these estimates for national saving, the decline of the stock market in recent years, and the rationality of corporate financial behavior. The analysis uses the information on inflation-adjusted income and assets which large firms were required to provide for 1976 and subsequent years. The evidence for a sample of nearly 200 manufacturing firms is consistent with the conclusion that share prices fully reflect the value of unfunded pension obligations. Since the conventional accounting measure of the unfunded pension liability has a number of problems (which we examine in the paper), it would be more accurate to say that the data are consistent with the conclusion that shareholders accept the conventional measure as the best available information and reduce share prices by a corresponding amount. The most important implication of the share price response is that the existence of unfunded private pension liabilities does not necessarily entail a reduction in total private saving. Because the pension liability reduces the equity value of the firm, shareholders are given notice of its existence and an incentive to save more themselves. For this reason, unfunded private pensions differ fundamentally from the unfunded Social Security pension and the other unfunded federal government civilian and military pensions.     

THE EFFECT OF SFAS 87 ON CORPORATE FUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Statement of Financia1 Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) modifies the method of accounting for pensions by requiring companies sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to (1) recognize a balance sheet liability for unfunded pension benefits and (2) disclose their obligation for pension benefits based on expected future compensation levels (the projected benefit obligation). These requirements may affect users' perceptions of a company's financial position, especially if these plans are underfunded. This research examines whether the requirements of SFAS 87 result in increased funding of corporate pension plans to counteract possible adverse perceptions of users about these plans. The results indicate that early adopters (companies adopting SFAS 87 in 1985 and 1986) increased the funding of their defined benefit pension plans in response to SFAS 87 ; however, later adopters did not do so. These findings provide evidence that companies may alter economic policies when faced with significant changes in financial disclosure requirements. Further analysis suggests that the effect of SFAS 87 on the pension expense recognized by the sample companies provided impetus for early adoption of this pronouncement.     

Pension ratios as “correlates” of municipal pension underfunding

Unlike the corporate sector, detailed estimates of unfunded pension liabilities for most local governments are not available. Thus, prior research on the association between unfunded pension liabilities and municipal creditor decisions (Copeland and Ingram 1983; Marks and Raman 1985) has implicitly assumed that certain pension ratios are good surrogates for municipal pension underfunding. In this paper, we rely on a theoretical model by Ehrenberg (1980) to test empirically the appropriateness of pension ratios as “correlates” of municipal pension underfunding. These ratios were found to be correlated with pension underfunding, although they accounted for only about 30 percent of the variance in the underfunding variable.     

Elections,political competition and bank failure

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.     

Government pension policy and the cost of labor and capital

This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pension plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with underfunded plans.     

Accounting of the German Statutory Pension Scheme: Balance Sheet,Cross‐Sectional Internal Rate of Return and Implicit Tax Rate

We present a framework for accounting of the German statutory pension scheme and calculate a balance sheet for the period 2005–14. Estimating a funding ratio of about 90 per cent, we present some policy recommendations in order to restore balancing of assets and liabilities. Extending and applying the methodology proposed by Settergren and Mikula (2005), we additionally estimate the aggregate cross‐sectional internal rate of return of the German pension scheme over this period. We are able to show that these internal rates of return are mainly financed by increasing contributions and by increasing unfunded liabilities. Additionally, our analysis reveals that from an expenditure perspective, the major part of the internal rate of return results from changing longevity rather than other changes. We also estimate the implicit tax rates from a cross‐sectional perspective and find that they can mainly be interpreted as an ‘implicit wealth tax’ on pension wealth. Finally, we analyse the impact of demographic change on the balance sheet employing a population projection. While the pure demographic effect leads to a decreasing funding ratio during population ageing, the automatic balancing mechanisms of the German pension scheme lead to a significant overfunding in the long run from the accounting perspective adopted in the Swedish pension system.     

Politics, Insurance Regulation, and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

ABSTRACT: Insurance regulators operate in an environment in which resources are scarce and issues are most often complex and not salient to affected persons. Consequently, regulatory agencies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), need to use resources efficiently by making issues salient and not complex if regulatory goals are to be attained. To further its goal of full funding of defined benefit pension plans, the PBGC annually published a list of the Top Fifty Companies With the Largest Underfunded Pension Liability (LIST). This article investigates the issue of the economic effects of pension plan disclosure by measuring the share price response of the companies included on the LIST; then policy implications are drawn. The event study findings show that, on average, publication of the LIST did not have a negative effect on firm value. However, cross-sectional analysis provides some support for the contention that publication of the LIST had an economic cost on LISTed firms. The authors' results show that the value of large firms on the PBGC's list is less negatively affected at arrival (ARRIVAL) than smaller LISTed firms. Conversely, when firms leave the list (DEPARTURE), the value of large growth-oriented firms is more negatively affected than the value of other firms that reduce their unfunded pension liability. From a policy perspective, as hypothesized by Meier (1991), the PBGC used its scarce resources effectively by publishing the LIST. The issue of unfunded pension liability became less complex and more salient to interested parties. Consequently, consumer groups and political elites provided their support to further the regulatory agency's stated goal, which was the full funding of defined benefit pension plans. Furthermore, increased awareness of the underfunding problem contributed to the passage of the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

How Do Firms Respond to Political Uncertainty? Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections

We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within-firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8-K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term-limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.     

Florida's Pension Election: From DB to DC and Back

During the year 2002, the State of Florida's 600,000 public employees were given the choice of converting their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan into an individual‐account defined contribution (DC) plan with full control over asset allocation and investment decisions. To mitigate some of the risk and uncertainty in the decision, the State granted each employee electing the DC plan an additional option to switch back (i.e., change their mind once) at any point prior to retirement. This option has been labeled the 2nd election by the State and the cost of reentry is fixed at the accumulated benefit obligation of their pension entitlement, which is the present value of the life annuity. Our article presents some original analytic insights relating to the optimal time and financial value of this unique 2nd election. Although our model is deterministic in nature, we believe that it provides a number of intuitive insights that are quite robust. Our results can be contrasted with Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) . We estimate that the increase in retirement wealth that arises from having the 2nd election is equivalent to at most 30 percent in future value, and only when utilized optimally. Furthermore, for most State employees above the age of 45, the 2nd election has little economic value because the DB plan dominates the DC plan from day one. Of course, it remains to be seen what percent of Florida's 600,000 employees will elect to behave rationally with their newfound pension autonomy.     

Smoothing Mechanisms in Defined Benefit Pension Accounting Standards: A Simulation Study*

The accounting for defined benefit (DB) pension plans is complex and varies significantly across jurisdictions despite recent international convergence efforts. Pension costs are significant, and many worry that unfavorable accounting treatment could lead companies to terminate DB plans, a result that would have important social implications. A key difference in accounting standards relates to whether and how the effects of fluctuations in market and demographic variables on reported pension cost are “smoothed". Critics argue that smoothing mechanisms lead to incomprehensible accounting information and induce managers to make dysfunctional decisions. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these mechanisms may vary. We use simulated data to test the volatility, representational faithfulness, and predictive ability of pension accounting numbers under Canadian, British, and international standards (IFRS). We find that smoothed pension expense is less volatile, more predictive of future expense, and more closely associated with contemporaneous funding than is “unsmoothed” pension expense. The corridor method and market‐related value approaches allowed under Canadian GAAP have virtually no smoothing effect incremental to the amortization of actuarial gains and losses. The pension accrual or deferred asset is highly correlated with the pension plan deficit/surplus. Our findings complement existing, primarily archival, pension accounting research and could provide guidance to standard‐setters.     

Determinants of Actuarial Valuation Method Changes for Pension Funding and Reporting: Evidence from the UK

This study examines various factors that potentially explain cross‐sectional variations in UK corporate managerial discretion to switch towards a market‐based actuarial pension valuation method for pension funding and reporting purposes. Evidence is based on accounting, actuarial and share market data for an industry‐matched pair sample of 90 UK firms. Consistent with our hypotheses we find that companies have a greater propensity to switch actuarial methods if they use lower discount rates, lower flow funding ratios and sponsor larger pension plans in the pre‐switch valuation year. These findings are consistent with the traditional perspective, which implies that UK corporate switching decisions are explained by characteristics of their defined benefit pension funds. The results run contrary to the findings of earlier US based studies that find that such choices can be explained from an alternative corporate financial perspective.     

Modelling the pension system

This paper argues that pensions modelling should be a parsimonious process using different methodologies for different purposes. A range of methodologies exists and is being extensively used in different countries and quarters. Very simple aggregate accounting models can yield robust results as for the sustainability of pension systems, an issue that worries most analysts and governments. While more sophisticated formally derived models have the advantage of yielding results that take into account general equilibrium effects, ad hoc models have the advantage of being better able to cope with the fine structure of pensions programmes and formulae. Focusing on the Spanish pension system to illustrate the output of an ad hoc model, several applications are briefly presented: sustainability indicators up to the horizon 2050, effects of increased migratory flows and an evaluation of recent pension reform legislation. Some attention is paid to the fact that societal issues and behaviours are intertwined with pensions in a way difficult to be captured by standard modelling methodologies.     

The quality and conservatism of the accounting earnings of local governments

Our aim is to provide insight into the usefulness of accounting earnings for measuring the economic performance of local governments across Australia. Specifically, we explore whether (i) accrual accounting provides useful information, and (ii) earnings of local governments are conservative. We find that accrual accounting by local governments provides useful information as measured by the ability to predict one-year-ahead operating cash-flows. We find no conservatism in the financial reports of the average local government. This, we posit, is due to a lower level of demand for high-quality accrual-based financial reports from these entities. Consistent with this argument, both the quality of accruals and the degree of conservatism increase for local governments for which we predict a demand for higher-quality financial reporting.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Accounting as discursive construction: The relationship between statement of financial accounting standards no. 106 and the dismantling of retiree health benefits

This study explores reductions in benefits that occurred coincident with the passage of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 106 requiring companies to accrue a liability for unfunded retiree health benefits. Congressional hearings and the business press reveal two competing discursive constructions of the retiree health benefits crisis. The first portrayed them as moral obligations that firms were attempting to avoid, the second as unexpected liabilities threatening corporations. Drawing on the work of Skocpol (1992), Weber (1949, 1978) and Burawoy (1983, 1985), we argue that characterizing these benefits primarily as accounting liabilities reinforced the second construction, facilitating corporate efforts to roll back retiree health coverage.     

Do Outside Directors with Government Experience Create Value?

We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer operating performance and more negative merger announcement returns, although their mergers are less likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. These adverse valuation effects are largely alleviated when firms have large government sales, when they operate in regulated industries, or when government directors are politically connected. Using close gubernatorial election outcomes as a natural experiment and an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity bias do not change the results.     

Signs of dependence and heavy tails in non-life insurance data

In this paper, we study data from the yearly reports the four major Swedish non-life insurers have sent to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). We aim at finding marginal distributions of, and dependence between, losses on the five largest lines of business (LoBs) in order to create models for solvency capital requirement (SCR) calculation. We try to use data in an optimal way by sensibly defining an accounting year loss in terms of actuarial liability predictions and by pooling observations from several companies when possible to decrease the uncertainty about the underlying distributions and their parameters. We find that dependence between LoBs is weaker in our data than what is assumed in the Solvency II standard formula. We also find dependence between companies that may affect financial stability and must be taken into account when estimating loss distribution parameters. Moreover, we discuss under what circumstances an insurer is better (or worse) off using an internal model for SCR calculation, instead of the standard formula.