Keynes against Kalecki on economic method

In the past twenty years, there has been considerable debate on the “coherence” of post Keynesian economics, in view of post Keynesian economists’ ambitions to develop a paradigmatic alternative to neoclassical economics. Given the growing importance of methodological aspects in this discussion, this article addresses the differences of approach to economic theory between the fathers of the two most important strands in post Keynesian economics. We thus focus on Keynes’s criticism of Kalecki’s theory of the business cycle and the tensions between Keynes’s logical approach and Kaleki’s formal modeling. We show that in criticizing Kalecki’s theory, Keynes made use of the same methodological criticism (based on detecting logical fallacies in reasoning) he had employed to attack both the classical theory and contemporary “pseudo-mathematical” models. After illustrating these fundamental differences between Keynes and Kalecki about the proper way of doing economics, we draw some conclusions on the possible future evolution of post Keynesian economics.     

Solving the U.S. Trade Deficit and Competitiveness Problem

We compare the analytical approach of John R. Common and Ronald H. Coase to institutional analysis and social provisioning. In particular, we examine their similarities in (i) the definition and role of institutions in the economy, (ii) the allocative (social provisioning) role of institutions in the economy, and (iii) the inescapable and unchanging role of institutions in shaping the social provisioning process. We contend that Commons and Coase had more in common than did Coase and many of his followers in the “new institutional economics.” In particular, the two had strong similarities in both (a) their insights into the nature of institutions in the legal-economic nexus that is the foundation of the economy and (b) their methods for conducting economics research. Because this role of institutional evolution is, as Warren Samuels noted, an inescapable and unchanging part of an economy’s social provisioning process, it will remain an integral part of any such work in the future, regardless of the “school of analysis” or methodological approach.     

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

Economists in the neoclassical tradition do their best to avoid using the word “need.” Social economists have traditionally been more open to discussions of need. Philosophic discussions of need are also scarce but nevertheless helpful. This essay will argue that need is “a word we cannot do without” in economics, and not only in social economics. Need is objective, satiable, and absolute, by contrast with want or preference as it is defined in neoclassical economics. With this clarification, 1) it is reasonable that public policy should consider need as well as want and aim to satisfy some needs, and 2) for some purposes, such as the economics of health care, conventional demand cannot be understood without the concept of need. Thus, even the narrower purposes of neoclassical economics cannot be achieved without clarifying and using the concept of need, in addition to the more usual motivational assumptions of neoclassical economics.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Comment on “What is Heterodox Economics? Conversations with Historians of Economic Thought”

The Comment on Wrenn’s article “What is Heterodox Economics?” suggests that the inability of heterodox economists to define their field arises from an as yet unrecognized and different metaphysical foundation than that of orthodox economics.     

Post-Keynesian Theory: An Overview

Kregel provides the reader with an understanding of the evolution and current position of post-Keynesian economics. As in the past, its practitioners seek to explain the level of output and employment and its growth and distribution, recognizing “that money enters into the economic scheme in an essential and peculiar manner.”     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

To value or not to value? That is not the question

Should we reject money when we value nature? Like most environmentalists, ecological economists are increasingly divided on this question. Synthesizing political ecology with ecological economics, we argue that this way of framing the question is limited. We propose a reformulation of the question into “when and how to value with money?” and “under what conditions?” We recommend four criteria for a sound choice: environmental improvement; distributive justice and equality; maintenance of plural value-articulating institutions; and, confronting commodification under neo-liberalism. We call for due attention to the socio-political context within which a valuation is placed and the political goals it serves. The relevance of this framework is demonstrated by applying it to three practical cases: pollution damages, water pricing and payments for ecosystem services.     

“Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting*

The article questions the methodology of “economics and psychology” in its focus on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject hyperbolic discounting as well. Furthermore, a decision‐making procedure based on similarity relations better explains the observations and is more intuitive. The article concludes that combining “economics and psychology” requires opening the black box of decision makers instead of modifying functional forms.     

Complexity Economics as Heterodoxy: Theory and Policy

Complexity economics has quickly become a powerful research program for real-world economics in recent years. This article provides an overview of complexity economics, and argues that it is incompatible with the “equilibrium” and “optimality” conceptions of the mainstream and its “market economy.” Instead, it develops older heterodox — including evolutionary-institutional — issues like self-organization, emergence, path?dependence, idiosyncrasies, lock-ins, or skewed power distributions. Also, the space for emergent institutions through the “intentionality” of agents, including their improving collective performance, reducing complexity, and others, is investigated. This article considers complex adaptive systems through “games on networks” in an “evolution-of-cooperation” perspective. Moreover, a surge in policy implications of economic complexity has emerged, even if still rather general. With some more specific implications derived, the article again reveals the close similarities with long-standing heterodoxies: namely, pragmatist policy conceptions in this respect.     

经济发展、结构变化与“货币消失”——兼对“中国之谜”的再解释

2 0世纪 90年代中后期以来 ,中国的“超额”货币供给与宏观经济运行表现出了新的特点。本文试图利用发展经济学方法 ,从“货币消失”问题入手 ,对这一时期经济增长、货币供给与通货膨胀之间的关系进行解释。我们发现 ,中国经济的两部门特点导致了阻碍经济发展的“结构约束”与“需求约束”。而“中国之谜”出现的新特点 ,很大程度上正是经济运行内在机制的变化在货币方面的反映。     

The economics of education and policy: Ideas for a principles course

There are many aspects of the “economics of education” that would make excellent examples for introductory economics students. The author presents two topics that are central to the economics of education and to human capital theory: the economic benefit (or “returns”) to schooling and educational attainment as an investment. There are two key concepts the author hopes students get from this discussion. The first is that there are both private and social benefits of schooling whence we derive the rationale for government intervention. The second is that educational attainment is an investment decision with both costs and benefits, and some risk.     

Information Theory and Attitude Formation in Economic Education

Hodgin presents an econometric model in which attitudes toward economics are modified by performance in the course (as grades accumulate) and in which performance is modified by changes in attitude. The “results” support the economics of information rationale that informational messages about performance in economics affect attitude.”     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

A Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Role of Gender in Persistence in the Economics Major

So much has been done in terms of measuring the impact of economics courses on student knowledge and understanding of facts, concepts and principles, and so little research has dealt with the possible effects on student political attitudes, that this study by Scott and Rothman should be of great interest to economics instructors. The authors address themselves to George Stigler's assertion that “the education of an economist makes the person who receives it more conservative.” They report on the use of their own “Social Opinion Questionnaire” and how it was employed to investigate “the different effects, if any, introductory economics and introductory psychology have on opinions related to economic issues.”     

Distributional preference in Japan

Using experiments developed by Engelmann and Strobel ( 2004 ), this study investigates distributional preference in Japan. We find that just over half the people in the study have a maximin preference, approximately 7 to 19% have an efficiency preference, approximately 8% have a self‐interest preference, and approximately 18% chose the allocation that would reduce the payoff to the rich and the poor, given that her/his payoff would remain constant. The last preference could be interpreted as what is referred to as “malice”, “deep envy” or a “feeling of vulnerability” in behavioural economics and cross‐cultural psychology.     

Reputation and imperfect information

A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a “small” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the “reputation effect” that one intuitively expects.     

A New Look at the High School Economics Texts

Townshend-Zellner shows that, as a group, high school economics texts have improved substantially during the last decade. “It is now possible,” he asserts, “to recommend to high schools a significant number of texts … which substantially meet the minimum criteria set by the canons of our professional discipline.” There are still problems, however, in that “… the quality of the acceptable texts now runs strongly ahead of the typical teacher's preparation in economics.”     

Sickonomics: Diagnoses and Remedies

In their recent analysis of the alleged decay in modern economics, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find its source and origin in the “marginal revolution” of the 1870s. They argue that this development led to “methodological individualism” and the detachment of economics from society and history. I contest their account of the marginal revolution and of the role of Alfred Marshall among others. They also fail to provide an adequate definition of methodological individualism. I suggest that neoclassical economics adopted a denuded concept of the social rather than removing these factors entirely. No such removal is possible in principle. It is also mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the science of prices and the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to capture the true nature of markets. I consider some sketch an alternative explanation of the sickness of modern economics, which focuses on institutional developments since World War II.