大银行中小企业贷款外包研究

大银行中小企业信贷业务需要效率、成本及对风险的控制,贷款外包或许是一个解决之道.作为一种新的商业模式,中小企业贷款外包可以帮助大银行专注于中小企业信贷的核心业务、降低贷款成本、提高贷款的规模效益和信贷效率、优化信贷流程和分散大银行中小企业信贷的风险,从而使大银行对中小企业的融资保持商业可持续性.中小企业贷款外包为大银行带来好处的同时,也会给大银行带来外包风险,认识并有效控制这些风险是做好贷款外包的关键.目前.已有一些金融服务外包商在中小企业信贷业务链的某些环节上与银行合作,共同促进我国中小企业信贷业务的创新.     

建设企业信用体系，解决中小企业贷款融资难问题

中小企业融资主要来自于商业银行贷款，但目前商业银行贷款难以满足中小企业对融资的需求．存在着严重的融资缺口。造成银行对中小企业放款存在融资不足的主要原因是中小企业自身信用不足．而融资信息不对称是贷款融资难的直接原因。     

庐江县农行：一场银企交心会

“请问中小企业融资业务有那些？” “中小企业融资业务有流动资金贷款、小企业简式快速贷款、固定资产贷款、签发银行承兑汇票、银行承兑汇票贴现、中小企业外汇信贷业务等。”[第一段]     

关系型银行贷款理论对中小企业融资的启示

文章从中小企业在中国经济的重要性及其本身的融资困难入手,引出关系型贷款的含义、特征及优势,发现关系型贷款对银行和中小企业均有益处,因此关系型贷款是缓解中国中小企业融资困难的新思路。     

关于建立我国中小企业贷款融资支持体系的构想

对中小企业进行贷款融资支持问题，理论界和实业界巳做过多方面的研究和探讨。本课题从深入分析我国商业性金融和政策性金融制约中小企业贷款融资的因素入手，在考察其他国家和地区金融支持中小企业发展的基础上，提出了建立我国中小企业贷款融资支持体系的构想。这一体系具体由商业性金融贷款融资体系和政策性金融贷款融资体系两部分构成。其中，应以商业性金融包括国有商业银行、股份制商业银行、区域性中小金融机构等为主体，政策性金融包括政策性银行、信用担保机构、中小企业发展基金等为补充，尽而形成全方位、多角度的中小企业贷款融资支持体系。     

关系型银行贷款理论对中小企业融资的启示

文章从中小企业在中国经济的重要性及其本身的融资困难入手,引出关系型贷款的含义、特征及优势,发现关系型贷款对银行和中小企业均有益处,因此关系型贷款是缓解中国中小企业融资困难的新思路。     

问策银行中小企业贷款业务

解决中小企业融资问题是我国经济发展达到一定阶段后的迫切需求,而发展中小企业贷款业务也是银行实现业务转型,优化资产规模的必然选择.但是在中国当前的整体环境下,中小企业贷款还面临着许多现实问题,若没有针对性的解决之道,必然会影响银行,特别是其基层机构从事中小企业贷款的积极性,从而影响国民经济的可持续健康发展.     

选择权贷款应对中小企业融资难——基于企业的收益成本分析

中小企业融资难已经成为学术界和实业界的普遍共识,银行融资的选择性和资本市场融资的局限性导致中小企业难以合理的成本融资用于发展。选择权贷款是将银行贷款与资本市场融资相结合的新型金融产品,能够克服商业银行贷款短视性和收益局限性,提高中小企业融资能力。本文总结选择权贷款的特性,并对中小企业从选择权贷款中获得的收益和成本进行详细分析,还提出了中小企业在使用选择权贷款中还需要考虑的其他因素。     

银行中小企业贷款的效益与风险分析

中小企业贷款具有“信息不对称”和“小、急、频”等特点，这增大了商业银行的审查监督成本，降低了银行在中小企业贷款方面的积极性。对此，已有文献提出组建民营银行专门为中小企业服务、国有银行民营化、设立银行中小企业贷款最低比例限制等解决方案。本文认为，讨论中小企业银行融资难问题的解决，首先要解决银行发放中小企业贷款的风险与收益是否能够平衡的问题。为此，本文对目前我国中小企业银行融资的风险与收益的结构进行了剖析，研究了中小企业贷款利率水平与成本及风险调整后收益的关系，提出了中小企业贷款成本及风险调整后收益不低于其他优质贷款的建议利率水平。     

关系型贷款与中小企业融资

本文认为中小企业融资难的根本原因在于其信息的不可得性和不可控性。文章简要介绍了国外银行开发的多种形式的贷款技术,着重分析了“关系型贷款”(相对于其他形式贷款而言)能更好服务于中小企业融资的原因。最后,文章指出了“关系型贷款”在实际运用过程中存在的问题,并就“关系型贷款”在我国中小企业融资中的推行提出了相关政策建议。     

The governance,risk-taking,and performance of Islamic banks

We examine whether the difference in governance structures influences the risk taking and performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. Using a sample of 52 Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 countries for the period from 2005 to 2013, we conclude that the governance structure in Islamic banks plays a crucial role in risk taking as well as financial performance that is distinct from conventional banks. Particularly, we show that the governance structure in Islamic banks allows them to take higher risks and achieve better performance because of product complexities and transaction mechanisms. However, Islamic banks maintain a higher capitalization compared to conventional banks. These results support the research on Islamic investment and risk taking. Our results add a new dimension to the governance research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for policy makers and regulators in the financial services sector.     

FinTech,BigTech, and the Future of Banks

Banks are unique financial institutions in that they combine the production of liquid claims—that is, demand deposits—with loans. Though banks can replicate most of what FinTech firms can do, FinTech firms benefit from an uneven playing field in that they are less regulated than banks. The uneven playing field enables nonbank FinTech firms to challenge banks in specific product areas where success is not tied to what makes banks unique—namely, their deposit‐gathering abilities and the potential for synergies with borrowers provided by deposits. And although banks’ responses to FinTech have also been hampered by their legacy IT systems and by internal frictions inherent in large diversified firms, FinTech's narrow product offerings and lack of established “franchises” appear to put clear limits on Fintech's ability to displace banks. Unlike Fintech, however, BigTech firms have some advantages that banks will find it harder to replicate, and so they present a much stronger challenge to established banks in two main areas: consumer finance and loans to small firms. And FinTech as well as BigTech are contributing to a trend in which banks are losing a comparative advantage that has derived from having more immediate access to information about parties seeking credit. The extent to which banks succeed in warding off such threats will depend on (1) their ability to make effective—and possibly even better—use of the same information technology now being used by its new competitors, and (2) their success in realizing economies of scale and scope that their nonbank competitors will find hard to match.     

Debt,Taxes, and Banks

Understanding the impact on banks’ capital structures of tax biases toward debt finance is critical to assessing policy responses to socially excessive bank leverage—but there is no empirical evidence of its extent. Guided by some simple theory, this paper explores this impact for a large panel of banks in 82 countries. On average, the tax sensitivity of banks’ leverage proves significant and about as large as for nonfinancial firms. Somewhat counterintuitively, but as the theory suggests, taxation has little impact on the use of hybrids. Banks holding smaller equity buffers and larger banks are noticeably less sensitive to tax.     

Subordinated Debt,Market Discipline,and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value‐destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

Derivatives usage,securitization, and the crash sensitivity of bank stocks

We show that the information on derivatives usage and securitization activities of U.S. banks as disclosed in their pre-crisis 10-K filings explains extreme equity returns of banks during the financial crisis. Stocks of banks that had previously disclosed a more extensive use of financial derivatives and loan securitization were more likely to experience extreme losses. Our findings are consistent with investors viewing banks that used derivatives for non-hedging purposes as highly vulnerable to the crisis. Moreover, banks which had significant securitization activities and were thus potentially exposed to under-capitalized risks from conduits possess a higher vulnerability of their equity to market downturns.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Subordinated debt,market discipline,and banks' risk taking

The present paper demonstrates the ambiguous impact of subordinated debt on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that in comparison with full deposit insurance, subordinated debt reduces risk only if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk. If, however, banks are not able to commit, subordinated debt leads to an increase in risk. This is because due to limited liability banks always have an incentive to increase their risk after the interest rate is contracted in order to reduce the expected costs of debt. Rational debt holders anticipate this behavior and accordingly require a higher risk premium ex ante. The higher interest rates in turn further aggravate the excessive risk-taking incentives of banks.