On graduation from fiscal procyclicality

In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be a key determinant of a country’s ability to graduate. We show that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of fiscal procyclicality, there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.     

Cyclicality of fiscal policy and the shadow economy

A survey of recent literature on cyclical properties of fiscal policy reveals that fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries whereas it is countercyclical in developed ones. However, there is no consensus on what drives the difference in this specific cyclical property of fiscal policy. Using cross-section and panel data sets for 78 countries we document that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries with a larger size of the shadow economy. We also show that policies reducing the size of the shadow economy lead to a less (more) procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal response to shocks.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONS

Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes provide modest insurance against regional income shocks, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among provincial governments can easily overwhelm these stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget items among provincial governments in seven federations, showing that own-source taxes are generally highly procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are being devolved to subnational governments.     

The political economy of fiscal procyclicality

It is well-recognized that fiscal spending in developing countries tends to display significant procyclicality (increased spending during expansions and vice versa), in contravention of rational stabilization policy. Theoretical explanations have relied on either financial access or political-economic factors to justify this phenomenon. In this paper, we model the fiscal-output relationship as a dcc-garch process, and inquire whether debt or political economy constraints play a comparatively more important role in conditioning this correlation. Our evidence favors a positive effect from political economy, with weaker and more mixed results pertaining to financial access. Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that politics-induced procyclicality appears to be driven by advanced economies, and fiscal rules exacerbate procyclical tendencies.     

Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging markets

Emerging market economies typically exhibit a procyclical fiscal policy: public expenditures rise (fall) in economic expansions (recessions), whereas tax rates rise (fall) in bad (good) times. Additionally, the business cycle of these economies is characterized by countercyclical default risk. In this paper we develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic small open economy model with incomplete markets, endogenous fiscal policy and sovereign default where public expenditures and tax rates are optimally procyclical. The model also accounts for the dynamics of other key macroeconomic variables in emerging economies.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC FLOWS IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Empirically, net capital inflows are procyclical in developed countries and countercyclical in developing countries. Private inflows are procyclical and public inflows are countercyclical in both groups of countries. The dominance of private (public) inflows in developed (developing) countries drives the difference in net inflows. We rationalize these patterns using a two-sector model of a small open economy facing borrowing constraints. Private agents overborrow because of the pecuniary externality arising from these constraints. The government saves to reduce aggregate debt, making the economy resilient to adverse shocks. Differences in borrowing constraints and shock processes across countries explain the empirical patterns of capital inflows.     

Oil shocks and fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola: Assessing the role of asymmetries and institutions

The aim of this article is to examine procyclicality in Angola, assess whether it behaves asymmetrically over the oil cycle, and test the hypothesis that institutions and fiscal rules can moderate procyclicality. Received wisdom suggests that in resource‐rich economies, fiscal policy tends to be procyclical albeit improvements in the past decades due to institutional reforms. Similar evidence is available for oil‐rich economies; however, we know little about how procyclicality behaves over the oil cycle; that is, whether spending (and revenue) grows faster during oil‐market booms, than during downturns. Further, evidence on institutions and fiscal rules in oil‐exporting economies is still ambiguous. We bridge both gaps by examining fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola, one of the largest oil‐producers in Africa, and a country that has experienced an intense process of institutional reforms since 2002. Therefore, it is an ideal candidate for our study. We use data for the 2004–2014 period to estimate a threshold vector error correction model that extends vector autoregressive and vector correction methods used up to date. Our results indicate that revenue and spending are generally procyclical to oil shocks, that revenue is more procyclical during booms, and that institutional quality, net inflows, financial openness, and fiscal rules affect procyclicality.     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

Flexible fiscal rules and countercyclical fiscal policy

This paper assesses the impact of different types of flexible fiscal rules on the procyclicality of fiscal policy with propensity scores-matching techniques, thus mitigating traditional self-selection problems. It finds that not all fiscal rules have the same impact: the design matters. Specifically, investment-friendly rules reduce the procyclicality of both overall and investment spending. The effect appears stronger in bad times and when the rule is enacted at the national level. The introduction of escape clauses in fiscal rules does not seem to affect the cyclical stance of public spending. The inclusion of cyclical adjustment features in spending rules yields broadly similar results. The results are mixed for cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules: enacting the latter is associated with countercyclical movements in overall spending, but with procyclical changes in investment spending. Structural factors, such as past debt, the level of development, the volatility of terms of trade, natural resources endowment, government stability, and the legal enforcement and monitoring arrangements backing the rule also influence the link between fiscal rules and countercyclicality. The results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications.     

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.     

Asymmetric government expenditure: a comparison of advanced and developing countries

This paper studies the responsiveness of government expenditures to business cycles and introduces an index of asymmetric government expenditures using panel data for advanced and developing countries during the period 1981–2014. The empirical findings show that government expenditures tend to be procyclical in developing countries but acyclical in advanced economies. In addition, it is found that government expenditures respond in a countercyclical manner during bad times in advanced countries, but in a strongly procyclical manner during good times in developing countries. The index of asymmetric government expenditures for developing countries tends to be higher than that of the advanced countries.     

Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries

Based on a sample of 56 countries, we show that fiscal policy in the G7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical (i.e., fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times). To explain this puzzle, we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending. Given this distortion, a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base–as is the case for developing countries–will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

Fiscal Policy in Oil‐exporting Countries: The Roles of Oil Funds and Institutional Quality

Oil‐exporting countries face challenges in the conduct of fiscal policy owing to volatile oil revenues, especially in countries with weak institutions. Many oil exporters have established oil funds to delink government expenditure from oil revenues; however, their effectiveness remains unresolved. This paper examines the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in reducing fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in 42 oil‐exporting countries from 1960 to 2014 using panel vector autoregression techniques. The results show that oil funds are effective in reducing fiscal procyclicality in countries with high institutional quality. There is also a reduction in the procyclical bias in those with low institutional quality but the statistical evidence is weak. Nevertheless, oil funds are associated with reduced volatility of government consumption and the real exchange rate in countries with low institutional quality. These findings give credence to the macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds but also reinforce the importance of good institutions.     

On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe

Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.     

The Underlying Link between Fiscal Policy Patterns and International Reserves

This paper extends the model in Aizenman and Marion (2004 ) to study the underlying link and interaction between fiscal policy patterns and international reserves in developing countries. It shows that because of conditional access to international credit markets, the immediate impact of an adverse shock on an emerging economy is a lower level of international reserves and a procyclical fiscal policy. However, facing the uncertainty of future shocks, the authorities in this economy then have a strong incentive to hoard more precautionary reserves if possible. If the economy successfully accumulates more reserves, it can have a lower tax rate in the second period and its fiscal policy would be more countercyclical. The model's predictions are consistent with new empirical findings.     

Some Fiscal Implications of Monetary Policy

We study the implications of alternative monetary targeting procedures for real interest rates and economic activity. We find that countercyclical monetary policy rules lead to higher real interest rates, higher average tax rates, lower output but lower variability of tax rates and consumption relative to procyclical rules. For a country with a high level of public debt (e.g. Italy), the adoption of a countercyclical procedure such as interest rate pegging may conceivably raise public debt servicing costs by more than half a percentage point of GNP. Our analysis suggests that the current debate on the targeting procedures of the European Central Bank ought to be broadened to include a discussion of the fiscal implications of monetary policy.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

“When it rains,it pours”: Fiscal policy,credit constraints and business cycles in emerging and developed economies

Fiscal procyclicality, meaning co-movement between government expenditure and macroeconomic fundamentals, is an important feature of business cycle dynamics for emerging and poor economies. I estimate a panel SVAR to investigate the reasons for fiscal procyclicality. The analysis sheds light on the role of external financial constraints in shaping fiscal policy. My findings suggest that the response of emerging governments to output fluctuations is similar to that of developed governments. However, emerging governments curtail spending in response to increases in the sovereign borrowing rate, which forces their consumption expenditure to act more procyclically. Using counterfactual analysis, I show that the key forces behind fiscal procyclicality are the sensitivity of government spending to international borrowing costs and the procyclical nature of these costs for emerging economies.     

Macroeconomic stabilization in developing economies: Are optimal policies procyclical?

Many empirical studies provide evidence that macroeconomic policies as well as capital flows exhibit procyclical characteristics in developing economies. In particular Kaminsky et al. [2004. When it rains, it pours: Procyclical capital flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press] demonstrate that a large group of middle-income countries run contractionary policies and experience capital flight during times of recession. This paper investigates the role of international financial markets in explaining these macroeconomic policy and capital flow characteristics. An optimal fiscal and monetary policy problem is formulated and solved for a small-open economy that faces a country-specific interest rate spread in international financial markets. It is found that, in the presence of the country spread, optimal fiscal and monetary policies as well as capital flows are procyclical under a reasonable parametrization. Optimal policies and capital flows turn countercyclical in the absence of the country spread. This pattern is robust to a range of alternative model specifications.